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       Abstract  
 
While relevant literature considers experiencing a conflict or episodes of political violence a 
unitary event, and focuses on the effects of the exposure to the violence itself, I disaggregate 
political violence (focusing on military operations and wars) while highlighting its’ aftermath 
(as opposed to its’ type, duration etc.). I distinguish between different outcomes of political 
violence (victory, defeat, stalemate and a negotiated agreement and between successful and 
unsuccessful military operations) as perceived by individuals (consistent with the way they 
are framed by the media) and assess their effect on national and social identities.  
The theoretical arguments are mainly based on Social Identity theory and the concepts 
of “Cutting Off Reflected Failure” & “Basking In Reflected Glory”, employed by individuals 
when confronted with a threatened social identity. The role of humiliation and pride, in-group 
gilt and in-group glorification and group performance as a possible covariate are also 
discussed in this regard. When exploring the effect of discrepant outcomes of political 
violence on social and national identities, I focus on two key identity-components: National 
Identification (operationalized as national pride) and social identification (operationalized as 
inter-group cohesion and social trust between various social groups). A macro-level analysis 
of findings originating in two web-based experiments is complemented by a comprehensive 
micro-level analysis of the Israeli society, based on a unique set of data drawn from a decade 
of social surveys (2003-2015). 
The potential implications of the research extend beyond the Israeli case and include 
the longevity of nation state in the face of persistent political violence, susceptibility to 
mobilization by political entrepreneurs leading to fragment voting patterns and social 
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Every human being has an assortment of diverse identities, and it greatly 
matters which one is triggered by social situations which hold up different 
kinds of mirrors. The same is true for nations.  
    --- Cass Sunstein 
 
 
1.1  Background and Motivation 
 
Few concepts are as integral to social assumptions, beliefs and claims of belonging as 
the concept of identity, whilst simultaneously escaping consensus regarding its 
definition. From personal to group to collective identities, they all reflect the complex 
nature of human societies. 
While identity is set to provide a sense of unity and recognition, the feelings of 
attachment and belonging, and the processes of values’ formation relay on a certain 
type of identification. As such, identities create boundaries and borders: they define 
the in-group alongside the out-group, the friend and the foe. Multiple layers of 
identifications overlap, interact, contrast, separate and exclude.  
Identities have also proved to be effective instruments for the politicization of social 
life and are used to mobilize and generate legitimacy for social and political action. 
Since  an identity was posited to be a central component of discerning ones’ place in 
the world (Erik H. Erikson, 1994) it is not surprising to find identities at the heart of 
many global conflicts occurring in the 21st centaury (Huntington, 1996). As such, 
identity-oriented research is not only proper from a broad theoretical point of view but 
is also relevant in studying contemporary issues (such as conflict and anti-immigration 
attitudes). 
For supporters of Rational Choice Theory1, identity oriented research may be 
able to reasonably explain events and social dynamics that cannot be explained by a 
                                                 
1 Rational choice theory assumes that humans base their decisions on rational calculations, act with 
rationality when choosing, and aim to increase either pleasure or profit (2011). It stipulates that given 
the available choices, individuals will always make prudent and logical decisions as the latter provide 
them with the greatest benefit or satisfaction. According to Rational Choice Theory, all complex social 
phenomena are driven by individual human actions and thus necessitate an analysis of the rational 
decisions made by relevant individuals. 
                                       8 
purely rational pursuit of interests. Yet, research concerned with identities is 
appropriate in a much broader spectrum. Prime examples are the research of emotions, 
attitudes and social class identity2 , research within the discursive construction of 
community identity and the psychological sense of community3 (Azzopardi, 2011; 
Colombo & Senatore, 2005) and research concerning imagined communities 4 
(Anderson, 1991, 2006; Phillips, 2002). 
One of the most outstanding aspects of conflict is that it is practically intrinsic 
to the lives and dynamics of groups; Conflict is present in interpersonal relations (e.g., 
Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Rice, 2013), in intragroup and intergroup relations (e.g., 
Gotsis & Kortezi, 2015) and in strategic decision-making (e.g., Hurt & Abebe, 2015). 
Alongside a vast scholarship concerned with conflicts’ economic effects (such as on 
production, labor and capital; Blattman & Miguel, 2010; O’Neill, McLarnon, Hoffart, 
Woodley, & Allen, 2015), which are relatively easy to measure, a growing empirical 
literature focuses on the effects of violent conflicts on individuals and groups 
(societies, nations). While macro-level, cross-sectional studies of violent conflicts 
have dominated modern research on conflict and have included important inter-
country comparisons, with natural implications for national and international policies 
aimed at mediating, resolving or preventing conflicts (Justino, 2007;4) 5 , relevant 
micro-level analyses of conflicts were less common until about a decade ago6. Recent 
                                                 
2 According to Kemper, in the past, cognition perspective dominated the social sciences and emotions 
were relegated to the fringes of scientific work (Kemper, 1990, page 3). Yet, emotions have reemerged 
as a legitimate and interesting topic of inquiry for sociologist since 1975 and are widely discussed ever 
since. For a review of the themes and variations in the sociology of emotions and the development of 
emotions-based research, see Kemper, 1990. 
3 Whereas a functionalist perspective largely dominated conceptualization and research of community 
identity and psychological sense of community, a discursive approach introduced new ways to 
conceptualize research questions, new methodological approached to inquiry and new ways of 
understanding the aims of phycology itself (Antaki, Billig, Edwards, & Potter, 2003; Colombo & 
Senatore, 2005; Hosking & Morley, 2004). 
4  While the concept of “imagined communities” is largely discussed in relation to diversity, 
immigration, national identity and the construction of a European community (see for example 
(Fligstein, Polyakova, & Sandholtz, 2012; Graves-Brown, Jones, & Gamble, 2013; Wright, 2011) it is 
also relevant when researching language acquisition (Duff, 2013; Ushioda, 2011), cultural identity and 
diaspora (Alonso & Oiarzabal, 2010; S. Hall, 2014), social media (Acquisti & Gross, 2006; Gruzd, 
Wellman, & Takhteyev, 2011) etc. 
5 Justino (2007, 2009) surveys relevant macro-level literature alongside a few national level analyses. 
6 In her 2007 paper cited above, Justino further notes in this regard: Micro-level analyses of conflict are 
uncommon in spite of the fact that, at a fundamental level, violent forms of conflict originate from 
individual behavior and their interactions with their immediate surroundings, their social groups and 
institutional norms. However, existing literature on violent conflict, as well as existing programs of 
conflict resolution, prevention and mediation, are typically driven by regional, national and 
international perspectives. These make inadequate concession to the role of individual and group 
interactions leading to or resulting from violent conflicts, and their links with social norms that 
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efforts to empirically document the effects of violent conflicts, which are difficult to 
measure and often occur in countries that have weak infrastructure and sparse pre-
conflict statistics have found more lasting impacts on human, rather than on physical 
capital (Buvinic, Gupta, Casabonne, & Verwimp, 2013).  
Whereas a conflict may be perceived as an engine of technological, economic 
and social progress (Morris, 2014; Nef, 1950; Soloviev, 1915), the human costs of war 
are undeniable. In the short-term, indirect victims of armed conflicts might suffer 
greatly or even lose their lives as a result of the loss of access to basic health care, 
adequate food and shelter, clean water, etc. 7 . Further short-term ramifications of 
violent conflicts include an increase in neonatal and infant mortality (Ali, Blacker, & 
Jones, 2003) and a surge (up to 20%) in acts of suicide8. In the long run, armed 
conflicts may have a destructive impact on the national economy and infrastructure, on 
social cohesion, and on individuals’ psychological health and well-being (Ghobarah, 
Huth, & Russett, 2003; Li & Wen, 2005; Santhirasekaram & Amirthalingam, 2010). 
Children are especially susceptible to the aftermaths of such violence, which can affect 
their health, growth9 and schooling- an effect that may even result in lower lifetime 
earnings 10 . Notwithstanding the significant increase in gender-based violence 
following major wars (Bastick, Grimm, & Kunz, 2007), a more recant scholarship 
suggests a far wider set of post-conflict11 gender oriented, social issues; Death and 
destruction alter the structure and dynamics of households, their demographic profiles 
and challenge traditional gender roles. Whereas wars’ mortality burden is 
disproportionately borne by males, women and children constitute the majority of 
                                                                                                                                             
encourage some groups to be violent, while discouraging others from engaging in violent acts (Justino, 
2007:4). 
7 Spiegel & Salama (2000) found that in Kosovo, men were 8.9 times more likely than women to die 
from war-related trauma. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, surveys suggest that millions may have 
died as a result of the recent civil war, primarily due to hunger and disease (Coghlan et al., 2006). For a 
discussion of suicide trends during and after the Northern Ireland conflict see Tomlinson, 2012 (cf. 
Plümper & Neumayer, (2010). 
8 Comparing pre-war to post-war periods in Serbia and Montenegro (Selakovic-Bursic, Haramic, & 
Leenaars, 2006), as well as in Croatia (Bosnar et al., 2005). 
9 According to Guerrero-Serdan (2009), children living in high-conflict areas during the 2003 Iraq war 
were found to be 0.8 cm shorter than those living in low-conflict areas.  
10 Bundervoet, Verwimp, and Akresh (Bundervoet, Verwimp, & Akresh, 2009, p. 558) estimated that 
the impact of child stunting from the Burundi conflict could translate into as much as a 20.5% reduction 
in adult wages. In terms of schooling, Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (2004) estimated that German and 
Austrian children lost approximately 0.2 years of schooling, on average, during the Second World War. 
This loss of schooling translates into a long-term loss of earnings of 2–3%, which, even in the 1980s, 
may have amounted to 0.8% of the GDP (Buvinic, Gupta, Casabonne, & Verwimp, 2013, p. 23). 
11 “Post conflict” also refers to periods of low intensity violence between intervals of high intensity 
violence in the course of an on-going protracted conflict. 
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refugees (Buvinic et al., 2013). Conflicts often create households headed by widows 
who can be especially vulnerable to intergenerational poverty (Brück & Schindler, 
2009; Schindler, 2010). Households adapt to the aftermath of violent conflict with 
changes in marriage and fertility (Jayaraman, Gebreselassie, & Chandrasekhar, 
2009)12 , migration (Calderón, Gáfaro, & Ibáñez, 2011), investments in children’s 
wellbeing and education, and the distribution of labor between the genders (Buvinic et 
al., 2013). The latter may also hinder or negatively affect the prospect of national-level 
post-conflict peace-building (Global Burden of Armed Violence report, 2008 Chapter 
2) and as such, increase the propensity of recurrent violence, contributing to the 
creation of conflict cycles. Interestingly, and alongside the aforementioned negative 
results of various forms of political violence13, experiencing such violence may give 
rise to positively valued processes, both socially and nationally. An increased sense of 
shared faith and increased national identification may mobilize individuals to support 
the war effort and may enhance social cohesion and camaraderie among fellow 
citizens (e.g., De Dreu & Van de Vliert, 1997; O’Neill et al., 2015; Posthuma, Ayub, 
& Jehn, 2014; Turner, 2014).  
This dissertation will focus on two aspects of our complex and multilayered 
identities: national identification, which relates to the attachment or bond between the 
individual and his/her country, and social trust, which relates to the relationship 
between different individuals or fractions of a given society. Before turning to the 
discussion of the contribute scope of the current research, I will first introduce those 
core identity aspects.  
 
 
1.1.1.  National Identification  
 
Group Identification is regarded as an important phenomenon by social scientists, 
especially when national identification is concerned. The importance of national 
identification was previously researched in the context of nation-building processes 
                                                 
12 Van de Walle (2011) presented evidence of long-term negative ramifications of conflicts for children, 
particularly girls (in terms of nutritional status) in Mali, even when a widow remarried. 
13  “Political violence” is a broad term used to describe violence perpetrated by individuals or 
governments in order to achieve political goals (Mars, 1975). Whereas the term encompasses many 
different forms of violence such as terrorism, genocide, revolutions, torture, rebellion and rioting, in this 
dissertation I will focus on two common types of political violence, namely wars and military 
operations.  
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(e.g. Bendix, 1980) and addressed recently in light of the European refugee crisis, 
Brexit, and the resurgence of right-wing political parties across the globe (Bekhuis, 
Lubbers, & Verkuyten, 2013; Gusterson, 2017; Kaufmann, 2016; Osborne, Milojev, & 
Sibley, 2017).  
A core debate, which permeates the study of nations and nationalism pertains 
to the definitions of the underlying terms. The latter, so it seems, depend on the 
disciplinary outlook. Anthropologically, Anderson defined the nation as an imagined 
political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign14 while 
Handler defined nationalism as an ideology about individuated being. It is an ideology 
concerned with boundedness, continuity, and homogeneity encompassing diversity. It 
is an ideology in which social reality, conceived in terms of nationhood, is endowed 
with the reality of natural things (Handler, 1988, p.6). While Renan, an important 
French theorist and author of the essay “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” sees the nation as 
a soul, a spiritual principle15, Hroch, a prominent Czech political theorist defined the 
nation as a large social group integrated not by one but by a combination of several 
kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, 
geographical, historical), and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness16. 
Embracing a historical perspective, Breuilly defines the term “nationalism” in 
reference to political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such 
                                                 
14 It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion 
… The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them encompassing perhaps a billion 
living human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations … It is imagined 
as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were 
destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. Coming to maturity at a 
stage of human history when even the most devout adherents of any universal religion were inescapably 
confronted with the living pluralism of such religions, and the allomorphism between each faith's 
ontological claims and territorial stretch, nations dream of being free, and, if under God, directly so. 
The gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state … Finally, it is imagined as a community, 
because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is 
always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it 
possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to 
die for such limited imaginings (Anderson, 2006, p. 7). 
15 … Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute this soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the 
past, one in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is 
present- day consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one 
has received in an undivided form (Renan, 1996; Zuelow, 1999). 
16 … many of these ties could be mutually substitutable - some playing a particularly important role in 
one nation-building process, and no more than a subsidiary part in others. But among them, three stand 
out as irreplaceable: (1) a 'memory' of some common past, treated as a 'destiny' of the group - or at 
least of its core constituents; (2) a density of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of 
social communication within the group than beyond it; (3) a conception of the equality of all members 
of the group organized as a civil society (Zuelow, 1999). 
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actions with nationalist arguments17. According to Breuilly, of all modern political 
ideologies, nationalism appears to be the most through and through historical. … in 
principle one could identify a nation non-historically (genetic make-up, language, 
fundamental moment) but that identity is soon embedded within the unique history 
which produces that phenotype, language group, or revolutionary act (2013, p. 1).  
It was the political significance of nationalism, demonstrated in both the onset 
and the offset of the First World War that first attracted the attentions of historians to 
nationalism18. Challenges confronted by nation states in central Europe, both winners 
and losers, further generated increasingly extreme nationalist claims (Breuilly, 2013, 
p. 3). In light of the interesting historical relationship between violent conflicts and 
nationalism, and the significant political reunification thereof, I would argue that an 
analysis of the nexus between national identification and violent conflict is proper. 
Where histories of ideas make a few detailed connections to the role 
nationalism plays in political movements, organizations and nation states and in 
providing people with a sense of identity (see Breuilly’s analysis of Kedourie’s work 
(1962) in Breuilly, 2000), the research of nationalism, according to Breuilly, 
necessitates breaking the conflation of national and nationalism. Since much of this 
work uses ahistorical concepts (such as “identity”) and a contemporary perspective, 
Breuilly points to the centrality of other disciplines (sociology and political science). It 
is for that reason and in light of the author’s academic background that this 
dissertation offers a cross disciplinary analysis based on key concepts and theories 
from various social sciences. 
It is long been known that in-group formation arises from processes of social 
categorization and the need for cooperative interdependence within groups19. At the 
                                                 
17 Breuilly further defined the political ideology of nationalism as one which claims that there exists a 
unique nation, that this nation has a special value and therefore right to existence and recognition, and 
that to secure this right the nation must possess autonomy, often understood as sovereign nation states.  
18 According to Breuilly: the war aims of the states involved were formulated in nationalist or anti-
nationalist terms. The Habsburg fear of Slav nationalism accounts for its dramatic response to the 
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914, triggering the sequence of events that 
rapidly transformed a local conflict into general war. The post-war settlement that emerged from the 
Versailles Treaty included the establishment of new ‘nation states’ in central Europe, justified by US 
President Woodrow Wilson’s doctrine of national self-determination. The publicity given to this 
doctrine raised nationalist expectations across the world, also stimulated by the near-simultaneous 
declarations by Vladimir Ilich Lenin and the Bolsheviks in favor of national liberation. Disappointment 
with the (inevitably) partial and biased implementation of the principle of national self-determination 
served to intensity such nationalism (2013, p. 3).  
19 See Sumner’s structural functional theory of the origins of groups in the context of conflict over 
scarce natural resources (Sumner, 1906). 
                                       13 
individual level, identification with in-groups is motivated by the need to belong and 
to participate in bounded cooperative social units. Once the self is attached to a 
distinctive in-group, additional motives to achieve positive valuation, maintain secure 
inclusion and protect in-group boundaries are engaged (Brewer, 2001). One of the 
most comprehensive theories of group relations is Social Identity Theory (Emler & 
Hopkins, 1990; Tajfel, 1959, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). This theory builds 
on several basic assumptions; Individuals strive to achieve positive self-esteem, an 
important part of an individual’s sense of self is derived from membership in social 
groups, and that values connotations associated with groups are the result of social 
comparisons between one’s in-group and a relevant out-group.  
National identification was found to be essential in sustaining both the 
individual as well as the nation, and enables the two to survive and remain productive 
in the face of difficulties (Garrison, Wakefield, Xu, & Kim, 2010). According to 
Social Identity Theory, one’s self-esteem is derived from, and is dependent on their 
social group in constant comparison to other groups. As such, group performance in a 
violent conflict (victory or defeat in a war, for example), may mitigate the effect of 
political violence  and national identification. An analysis of the way individual 
perceptions concerning the outcome of political violence are formed, and by 
distinguishing between different such outcomes, would contribute to our 
understanding of the effect political violence has on national identification. 
Furthermore, useful insights acquired in the course of the research could contribute to 
tailoring specific conflict prevention and post-conflict policies in light of past 
violence’ offset and the effect thereof. 
Drawing on the aforementioned, I hypothesize that diverse outcomes of 
political violence will have distinct effects on Israeli national identification; I suggest 
that whereas Israelis are expected to “Bask in Reflected Glory” (BIRG) following a 
positively valued outcome of Israeli warfare (in order to raise their own self-esteem), a 
negatively valued outcome would likely to lead them to “Cut Off Reflected Failure” 
(CORF), so as to counter a potential decrease in self-esteem. Put in other words, 
Israelis are likely to identify more with their state following a successful military 
operation, and less following an unsuccessful military operation. However, not all 
Israelis are expected to follow this general hypothesis. Past research has found 
asymmetric attitudes of ethnic minorities and majorities towards their country, 
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especially when ethnic violence is concerned. Israel is a unique case in this regard. As 
a Jewish state and “the national home of the Jewish people”, Arab Israelis do not only 
constitute an ethnic minority but are effectively excluded from the Israeli society 
insofar that it is constructed around a Zionist and Jewish ethe. Consequently, I 
hypothesize that Arab-Israelis may not perceive the states’ victory as their own, and 
thus will not demonstrate BIRGing tendencies. Hence, an increase in national 
identification among Arab Israelis following a successful conclusion of Israeli warfare 
is not expected. Lastly, based on the “Embedded Identity” scholarship and since 
Jewish Israelis constitute an ethnic majority in a Jewish nation-state, Israeli warfare 
(regardless of its outcome) is not expected to significantly affect national identification 
among Jewish Israelis. Theses hypothesis are discussed in chapter six. 
  
 
1.1.2  Social Trust 
 
The increased heterogeneity of modern societies has led to the growing awareness of 
the importance of social trust, the confidence people have that strangers will not take 
advantage of them (Bjørnskov, 2006; Uslaner, 2002) or the belief that at worst, others 
will not knowingly or willingly do [them] harm20. According to Fukuyama, social trust 
is the foundation of social capital which underpins economic growth and democratic 
stability (1995) 21. Whereas nationalists may argue that only identification with the 
nation, best based upon ethnic homogeneity- guarantees stability, multiculturalists 
would make the opposite argument and posit that in times of increasing mobility and 
multiethnic societies, identification must be otherwise organized in order to ensure 
stability. 
Does exposure to political violence unifies communities or lead to a 
breakdown of social trust between them? This is one of the central questions 
researched in this dissertation, in the Israeli context. A secondary question in this 
regard is whether social trust and a sense of community are based on national 
tendencies. Whereas it is widely agreed upon that exposure to political violence has 
substantial effect on individual and group’s identities, particularly within multi-ethnic 
                                                 
20 And at best they will act in his interests (Van Deth, Montero, & Westholm, 2007, p. 38). 
21 See Putnam (2007, p. 159) regarding the nexus between social trust and a sense of shared identity. 
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societies, the extent to which such violence builds or erodes social trust is disputed. 
Traditional approaches from the sociological and psychological literature (cf. Coser, 
1956; Sherif, 1966) posit that external conflict has a galvanizing effect and should 
increase cohesion. Yet, integrated threat theories and further scholarship have pointed 
to violence’s effect in decreasing community cohesion and increasing community 
fractionalization (Kalyvas, 2006), particularly in relation to immigrant communities 
(Stephan & Stephan, 2000), and decreased trust towards those associated with the 
threat (Riek, Mania & Gaertner, 2006). 
Consequently, I hypothesize that the framing of the way political violence was 
concluded as either successful or unsuccessful, can trigger a range of contradictory 
effects vis à vis social trust and community cohesion in Israel. In a model presented in 
chapter seven, I view the breakdown of social trust as part of the dynamic by which 
perception of threat can be increased and thus lead to political exclusionism. I theorize 
that the framing of the outcome of Israeli warfare along with group-affiliation will 
trigger feelings of pride or humiliation that may, in turn, impact group member’s  
perception of threat and trust in members of various out-groups. While framing an 
outcome of political violence as successful may lead to greater collective pride, an 
unsuccessful outcome may lead to a sense of collective humiliation. Pride is often seen 
as a unifying force for group members (Halperin, 2015, pp. 145–146) and may 
contribute to increased in-group self-esteem and trust between groups (Čehajić et al., 
2011). Yet, glorification-based pride may lead to decreased social cohesion (Halperin, 
2015) and induce group-based guilt. Such guilt has the potential to erode inter-group 
cohesion (Schori-Eyal et al., 2015). Collective humiliation can trigger shame and 
aggressive action and even result in withdrawal and inertia (Halperin, 2015). Whilst 
feelings of humiliation may be expected to create greater social cohesion between the 
wider in-group and the out-group, both dynamics could lead to inter-group 
fragmentation, as groups seek to blame or distance themselves from those that they 
perceive to be sympathetic to the source of humiliation (Johns, Schmader, & Lickel, 
2005; Lindner, 2000; Schmader & Lickel, 2006). In the case of Israel, one might 
expect the breakdown of social trust towards those perceived as sympathetic to the 
Palestinian cause, such as Arab Israelis, the political left or even Ashkenazi Jews in 
large.  
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1.1.3  Focusing on Israel 
 
With its communities of multiple origins, Israel is a multi-ethnic, deeply divided 
society that splits along social, intra-cultural, inter-cultural, inter-religious, intra-
religious and political lines. Israel is also engaged in a constant discussion which 
concerns its basic  character and the ramifications thereof.  
Notwithstanding differences between social subgroups in contemporary Israel, 
a majority of both Jewish and Arab Israelis proclaim their pride in being Israeli and 
have done so in the last decade despite experiencing frequent political violence 
committed as part of the protracted Israeli Palestinian conflict. Given that Israeli Arabs 
are an ethnic minority who does not share the Zionist ethos (which is shared by most 
Jewish Israelis22), who suffer from ongoing discrimination (even in the eyes of a 
majority of the Jewish public (Hermann, Heller, Cohen, Bublil, & Omar, 2016) and 
who is in between a rock and a hard place in light of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict- this is a very interesting data, which illustrates the complex nature of group 
identification. The complexity is increased when fluctuations in national identification 
are analyzed in conjunction with successful and unsuccessful termination of Israeli 
military operations.  
Furthermore, in the Israeli context, research often focuses on attitudes of 
political exclusionism towards the largest out-group, namely the Palestinians or the 
Israeli-Arab community. Less attention, however, has been directed at the effect of 
political violence on inter-group cohesion and trust between the various sub-groups 
within the Israeli society (new immigrants vs. natives, Ashkenazi Jews vs. Sephardic 
Jews 23 , rich vs. poor, religious vs. secular). This issue will be comprehensively 
explored against the backdrop of a historical analysis of the development of Zionism 
in Europe, the realization of its ultimate goal- the establishment of a national home for 
diasporic Jews and the way a unidimensional Israeli identity was institutionally and 
socially shaped in Israel’s early years. 
                                                 
22 This statement refers more to the first five decades since the establishment of the state of Israel. A 
discussion of Zionism as a uniting power in Israel’s first years and the way intellectual and social trends 
resulted in a reconstruction of contemporary Israeli identity would be presented in chapter four. 
23 “Ashkenazi Jews” refers to members of the Jewish faith who originated in Europe and their decedents 
(“Ashkenaz” is a term found in the Jewish literature in reference to Germany). “Sephardic Jews” refers 
to members of the Jewish faith originating in the Arab-Muslim world (“Sepharad” is Hebrew for Spain). 
“Sephardic Jews” can be further divided into ”Sephardim”- Jews who originated in Spain and Portugal 
and “Mizrahim” who originated in North Africa and the Middle East (Mizrah is Hebrew for “East”). 
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1.2  Prologue 
 
This dissertation project started in the fall of 2014, under the umbrella of the Graduate 
School of Decision Sciences in the University of Konstanz. Originally planned as an 
accumulative PhD based on a quantitative analysis, the project’s initial goal was to 
provide a general theory of the way discrepant outcomes of political violence affect 
the propensity of repeated violence. Following a semester-long research fellowship at 
the Kilian-Köhler-Centrum für Sozial und Kulturwissenschaftliche Psychologie und 
Historische Anthropologie in Ruhr Universität Bochum, I chose to pursue a more 
identity-based approach and focus on the effects of political violence on individual 
identities. Israel was then chosen as a test case.  
It was only in late 2017, when I joined the Graduate School Global and Area 
Studies in Leipzig University that I finally felt at home, both professionally and 
personally. Reflecting on how to proceed while attending to what the project has 
morphed into, rather than its initial conception, necessitated a further shift in focus 
alongside a formation adjustment. Following Professor Middell’s kind guidance and 
helpful insights, it was decided to focus on Israel and the Israeli society against its 
unique social, political and historical backdrop, rather than as a test case used to 
establish a general theory. Consequently, an additional study based on a historical 
discourse analysis was added to complement an extensive quantitative analysis. The 
former and the latter were harmonized in a monograph dedicated to the study of the 
socio-national effects of discrepant outcomes of military operations on the Israeli 
society. Here, I would like to acknowledge the significant effect the aforementioned 
institutional and disciplinal shifts have had on the evolution of this dissertation. 
Observant readers would undoubtedly be able to notice various disciplinary footprints 
throughout this thesis. My conceptual trail between different institutions and schools 
of thoughts reflects the way various disciplines conceptualize vague terms such as 
“identity”, and the difficulty of bridging the distinctive disciplinary understandings.  
My decision to focus on a quantitative analysis is based on scientific motives 
and data availability, but also constituted an honest attempt to distant myself24, an 
Israeli, from the research in order not to compromise either its reliability or validity.  
                                                 
24 Bearing in mind questions of positionality and whether a hermetic distinction between researcher and 
researched is even possible (cf. Gray, 2013; Merriam et al., 2001). 
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 As a final preliminary remark, I find it important to commiserate the inevitable 




1.3  Contribution Scope 
 
The context of a real-life violent conflict between groups has interesting 
characteristics that permit a close examination of some of the central assumptions in 
social identity theory. While identity salience changes over time and in terms of wider 
social perceptions 25 , violent conflicts, in particular, transforms and rigidifies that 
legacy. According to Kaldor, if one is threatened with death because of a particular 
identity, that identity becomes salient (2013). A possible hypothesis is thus that when 
individuals are confronted with an identity threat (for example, when war erupts 
between their home country and an adversary), an increase in social and national 
identities’ saliency will be demonstrated. Whereas an identity threat was found to 
generally increase identity salience, its effect on distinct ethnic groups in the Israeli 
context is unclear. This question is particularly interesting when Israel is concerned (a 
nation state in which  over 20% of the citizens belong to an ethnic minority that does 
not share the underlying cohesive narrative of the state, but still calls it “home” and is 
equally threatened when the country experiences high intensity political violence.   
Whereas relevant literature considers political violence a unitary experience 
(and focuses on the effects of exposure to the violence itself), or distinguishes between 
different forms of political violence according to objective measures (type, duration, 
number of casualties, etc.) it consistently overlooks the effects of the way such 
violence was concluded from subjective points of view. According to the 
aforementioned Social Identity Theory, a prime motive for individuals to seek and 
proclaim their identification with a specific group is in order to enhance their own self-
esteem (both in their own eyes and in the eyes of others)26. As such, it is to be 
                                                 
25 The raw materials from which identity is produced may be inherited from the past but they are also 
worked on, creatively or positively, reluctantly or bitterly, in the present (Gilroy, 1997, p. 305). 
26 Tajfel and Turner (1979) argued that three mental processes are involved in evaluating whether others 
are part of the “in-group” or the “out-group”: categorization, social identification (adoption of the 
group’s identity that conforms to the norms of the group) and social comparison (with other groups). 
According to Social Identity Theory, If our self-esteem is to be maintained our group needs to compare 
favorably with other groups (McLeod, 2008). 
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expected that victories and defeats will have distinct effects vis á vis group 
identification. Consequently, by consistently neglecting any analysis derived from the 
perceived outcomes of political violence, the extensive literature examining war-torn 
and post-conflict societies is missing a vital piece of the puzzle.  
In this dissertation, I explore the effect of two common forms of political 
violence (military operations and wars) on social and national identities, while 
highlighting their aftermath of the former. First, I analysis whether the underlying 
theoretic assumption concerning the distinct effects of discrepant outcomes of 
political violence on social and national identification finds statistical support 
(chapter four). Once affirmed, I turn to the examination of the effect of military 
victories and defeats (aka successful and unsuccessful conclusions) of Israeli military 
operations on two highly interesting and important identity components: national 
identification (operationalized as national pride) and social trust and cohesion 
(operationalized as the overall level of trust between members of the Israeli society 
alongside perceived tensions between specific social group27). Multidimensional in 
nature, the study of the effects of conflicts also necessitates a multilevel analysis 
(concerning individuals, social groups and the general society). As such, it related to 
both individual as well as social identities ,across ethnic and other sub-groups 
comprising the Israeli society.  
Equally important is the multi-layered nature of individual identities. 
Consequently, and based on relevant literature, political violence is likely to have 
distinctive effects on social and national identification among members of minority 
and majority groups. By grouping Israelis along various lines (place of birth, ancestry, 
ethnic, religious and social status), the research further addresses the intricate 
complexity inherent to individual and group identities.      
 
Does exposure to violent conflicts unify communities or lead to a breakdown of social 
trust? Is there greater erosion of trust between specific communities following specific 
outcomes of political violence? How resilient is national identification in the face of 
chronic political violence? Do distinct outcomes of such violence affect national 
                                                 
27 The analysis includes social rifts that are both directly and indirectly related to the Israeli Palestinian 
conflict. 
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identification differently? Does group performance (success vs. failure) or 
membership in an ethnic group (minority vs. minority) mitigate the effect?  
Against the framework of Social Identity Theory, this doctoral dissertation 
contributes to the academic literature28 by empirically analyzing the way political 
violence effects Israeli social and national identification, while focusing on the 
perceived aftermath of such violence. I develop and test an argument according to 
which, the way such aftermath is framed (victory vs. defeat/successful vs. 
unsuccessful) is an important piece of the puzzle and essential in understanding how 
political violence influences the special relationship Israelis have with one another, 
and with their nation state. The analysis utilizes the concepts of “Cutting Off Reflected 
Failure” & “Basking in Reflected Glory” with regard to Israeli national identity and 
discusses the role of humiliation, pride, in-group gilt and in-group glorification in 
increasing or decreasing social trust. 
Whereas the current work is not aimed at forming and testing a general theory 
explaining fluctuations in national and social identification in the context of violent 
conflicts, evidence from the Israel may contribute to the discussion of the stability and 
durability of nation states against the backdrop of protracted political violence. 
Similarly, the research concerning shifts in social trust within the Israeli society, a 
diverse society trapped in a protracted conflict, may contribute to our understanding of 
the factors that affect consolidation or breakdown of trust in similar settings. 
Moreover, increased social susceptibility originating in social rifts and social 
discontent may be exploited by political entrepreneurs and contribute to further social 
breakdown. The latter may also translate into fragmented voting patterns and hinder 
the prospect for peace. 
 
1.4  Overview of Aims and Chapters 
 
The dissertation is comprised of eights chapters. The first two chapters, encompassing 
the theoretical framework and methodology, will set the stage for the research 
                                                 
28 No empirical work examining the effects of group performance has thus far been framed within social 
identity theory and applied to a protracted conflict such as the Israeli Palestinian conflict. 
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conducted at the heart of this study (chapters four to seven). The final chapter will 
conclude while discussing the limitations to the study and ideas for future research. 
Chapter two constitutes the theoretical framework which underlies the main 
argument and deriving hypotheses explored throughout the dissertation. This chapter 
consists of three parts: Part I explores the historical evolution of the study of conflicts 
as part of the social and political sciences and in light of global geopolitical 
developments. Contemporary research trends and challenges are also discussed. Part II 
is dedicated to national identification. Here, I review the processes of identity 
formation while focusing on ethnic identification. A discussion of global and political 
spaces of identity precedes a discussion of the main manifestations of national 
attachment: patriotism and nationalism. Social identity theory will then complement 
the discussion by providing us with two strategies employed by individuals in order to 
cope with a threatened social identity (“Basking in Reflected Glory” and “Cutting Off 
Reflected Failure”). Exceptional cases such as self-embedded social identity and social 
identity among ethnic minorities (‘The Minority Hypothesis’) will complete this 
discussion. Building on Social Identity Theory, Part III is dedicated to the examination 
of the concepts of social trust and social cohesiveness, two of the most interesting and 
important indicators of the strength and qualities of communities and societies. After 
unrevealing the riddle of social trust and exploring possible threats to social cohesion, 
the concepts of pride, humiliation and victimhood will be explained in this regard.  
Chapter three encompasses a discussion of the methodology employed in the 
empirical chapters of this dissertation, used in order to test the hypotheses proposed in 
the theoretical chapter. This will be done in two levels of analysis: macro-level (by 
conducting two web-based experiments) and micro-level (by focusing on the state of 
Israel and Israeli society). This chapter is concerned, inter alia, with topics related to 
the research designed and facilitates both levels of analysis. Further discussion of how 
different framing29 of political violence’s aftermath affects individuals’ perception will 
be conducted from a Political-Psychology perspective. 
Chapter four is titled “The Ending Matters” and is set to establish the 
underlying hypothesis of this dissertation, namely, that different outcomes of political 
violence resonate with the people who experience it in distinctive ways. This macro-
                                                 
29 In the field of communication, ‘framing’ refers to the way media coverage shapes mass opinion by 
focusing attention on certain events or ways to represent them and then placing them within a field of 
meaning (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Davie, 2011; Druckman, 2001b). 
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level analysis of variations in the salience of social and national identifications 
(operationalized as levels of national pride, the sense of belonging, the sense of 
community and social trust), generated by different war outcomes (victory, defeat, 
stalemate and a negotiated peace-agreement), utilizes data from two original web 
experiments. As the results obtained in the macro-analysis support the underlying 
argument of the dissertation, the next three chapters explore the distinctive effects of 
discrepant outcomes of warfare in the context of the state of Israel and Israeli society. 
Whereas chapter five constitutes a qualitative analysis of the historical and social 
processes that reconstructed the Israeli identity in the last seven decades, chapters six 
and seven address the intricate relations between political violence offset and socio-
national identification across various ethnic and social groups in the Israeli society. 
Chapter five analyzes the development of Jewish nationalism and Zionism 
before the establishment of the state of Israel and the construction of an institutionally 
indoctrinated, unidimensional Israeli identity in Israel’s first years. An extensive 
analysis of the components of Israeli national identity will be complemented by a 
discussion of Hebrew culture in present-day Israel alongside challenges to 
contemporary Israeliness. I then turn to the discussion of Israeli national pride in order 
to set the stage for its examination in the following empirical chapter. 
Chapter six is titled “Together We Stand?” and examines the relationship 
between Israelis and their nation-state following different outcomes of political 
violence. Specifically, this chapter studies variations in national pride among Israelis 
across a tempestuous ten-year period (2003-2013), following successful and 
unsuccessful military operations (as perceived by Israelis). The research is based on 
social surveys conducted on the individual level, which is then aggregated to the group 
level (Jewish Israelis, Arab Israelis and Immigrants). The overall Israeli society is also 
considered.  
Chapter seven is titled “Conflicted Israeliness” and focuses on the relationship 
between perceived outcomes of Israeli warfare on social tensions within the various 
communities of Israeli. By utilizing a unique set of data, drawn from over a decade of 
social surveys (2003-2015), existing social rifts in the Israeli society, both related and 
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unrelated to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict30 are researched in light of the framing of 
the war Israeli warfare was concluded.  
Finally, Chapter eight will summarize the theoretical and empirical findings 
against the backdrop of the underlying argument of the dissertation and predictions 
derived from Social Identity Theory. This chapter further includes a discussion of the 
study’s shortcomings that may restrict its conclusions. Lastly, ideas for future conflict 
and identity-based research projects will be set forth.  
  
                                                 
30 For example, Israeli Arabs vs. Israeli Jews and rich vs. poor. 
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2 Theoretical Framework: Conflict Research, National 
Identification and Social Trust 
 
 




2.1  Conflict Research 
 
Early developments of conflict analysis and management were prompted by the 
industrial revolution of the 19th century, producing extensive demographic 
dislocations, extreme poverty and a wide gap between workers and owners. What 
followed were class conflicts and, in turn, Marx’s social conflict theory31 as an attempt 
to manage social conflicts by restructuring economic and social relations in society 
(Parkin, 1981; Williams, 1977). Towards the end of the 19th century, ethnicity joined 
class as a focus of conflict scholarship. According to Wehr (1998), Powerful ethno-
nationalism served various national policies as European governments were 
increasingly using ethnic identity and myths of racial superiority to carve out colonial 
empires in other continents32. As diverse ethnic groups within Europe, artificially 
bound into nation states were getting restless, theorists such as Simmel (1908, 1955) 
and Carver (1908), and later on Lewin (1948) Sherif (1966), Tajfel and Turner (1979) 
and others have started analyzing intergroup conflict as an objective process. Conflict 
theory, thus emerged within the social sciences. 
 The field of “Conflict Research”, also known as “Peace and Conflict Studies”, 
“Dispute Resolution” or “Conflict management”, had initially focused on Conflict 
Resolution (CR), namely, ways of settling conflicts through negotiation and 
                                                 
31 In the words of Karl Marks and Friedrich Engels (originally published in The Communist Manifesto 
in 1848): The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, 
patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and 
oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now 
open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or 
in the common ruin of the contending classes (Marx & Engels, 1998, p. 2). 
32 By 1900, huge areas of the world were controlled by the colonial powers of Europe. One of the most 
widely applied theoretical and practical challenges to colonialism was Gandhi's Satyagraha approach, a 
technique of non-violent political movement, meant to resist the British domination but also to eliminate 
violent caste and communal structures within India (Rai, 2000; Wehr, 1998).  
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compromising. CR refers to all stages33 and domains34 of conflicts and encompasses 
several major realms: conflict applications, academic theorizing and researching 
(Kriesberg, 2008).  
In order to provide a general background before turning to the discussion of the 
main concepts used in the upcoming empirical chapters, I will briefly survey several 
important topics pertaining to the field of conflict research 35  (theory formation, 
contemporary trends and challenges, and the future of the field). 
  
 
2.1.1  General Theory and Practices 
Whereas several CR theories refer to specific conflict arenas (for example, the Middle 
East) or to particular conflict stages (early/late), others purport to provide a general 
understanding of a wide range of conflicts in their entire course (Kriesberg, 2008, p. 
15). Traditional CR methods primarily include the use of military force to wage and 
settle conflicts when one party violently and coercively imposes its will upon the other 
party. With time, other ways of settling disputes (negotiation, mediation, adjudication) 
have been developed and practiced 36 . Contemporary CR approaches combine 
academic research with traditional and innovative practices. Whereas CR encourages 
generating solutions that yield mutual gains, contemporary CR tends to emphasize the 
role of external intermediaries in ending conflicts.  
Although modern CR seem to focus on terminating conflict related violence, it 
also addresses peace-building and post-violence reconciliation (e.g., in establishing 
conflict management systems) (Kriesberg, 2008). No consensus exists regarding any 
comprehensive theory of social conflicts and their resolution. Yet, Considerable 
agreement exists about particular conflict processes and empirical generalizations 
(Kriesberg, 2008, p. 15). These empirical generalizations, together with knowledge of 
relevant conflict processes, prove valuable when studying conflicts’ effect on 
individuals, societies and nations, and when considering suitable strategies to decrease 
their destructiveness. The CR field is in continuing evolution37. It is becoming more 
                                                 
33 From finding constructive ways to conduct a conflict to maintain its aftermaths. 
34 E.g., whether within or between individuals, groups/communities and nations. 
35 A more comprehensive analysis of the development of CR is found in appendix A. 
36 According to Chatfield & Ilukhina (1994), calls for finding an alternative to war were expressed as 
early as in ancient Grecian times. 
37 In 2016, Kriesberg (2016, p. 115) argued that research assessing the consequences of various CR 
methods is now underway and increasing.  
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differentiated, with workers in the field attending to a single domain or a wide range of 
arenas, specialize in particular kinds and stages of conflicts or in specific aspects and 
methods of conflict resolution (Kriesberg, 2008).  
 
 
2.1.2  Contemporary Trends and Challenges  
The CR field is characterized by areas of broad consensus alongside piercing internal 
disagreements. Where scholars agree that different strategies should be tailored to 
different types and stages of conflicts and that the influence of the adversarial parties 
on conflict escalation and de-escalation should be emphasized38 (Conflict Research 
Consortium Staff), several fundamental disagreements persist. Such major issues 
concern the extent to which CR is, and should be a focused discipline or a broad 
general approach39, the degree to which the field is an area of academic study or a 
profession, and the nature of the integration of theory, practice and research within 
CR. Further disputed issues include the universality of CR theory and practices, the 
relative emphasis on core topics in training/education, resorting to violence in waging 
conflicts40, certification and codes of conduct in various domains of practice, and the 
role of the mediator (Abu-Nimer, 2003; Avruch, 1998; Cohen, 1997; Faure, 2005). 
Another set of issues pertains primarily to external relations and the difficulty to 
achieve a long-term funding for large-scale CR research41. Underlying differences 
between CR analysts and practitioners exists as well42. 
Coordination of applied work between various governmental and non-
governmental organizations poses other issues. The engagement of such organizations 
in large-scale conflicts produces problems of competition, redundancy and confusion. 
To increase the possible benefits and minimize difficulties, diverse measures may be 
taken, ranging from informal ad-hoc exchanges of information, regular get-togethers 
                                                 
38 Additionally, increasing recognition that social conflicts involve many parties and issues which are 
often interlocked prevails within the field (Conflict Research Consortium Staff).  
39 While some CR workers support the perception of CR as an interdisciplinary field with a shared 
research-grounded theory, others prefer to focus on specific matters for investigation and practice. 
40 Most CR analysts and practitioners would agree that violence is morally and practically wrong when 
used in an extremely broad and imprecise manner, and when divorced from other means to achieve 
constructive goals. However, whereas some CR workers oppose any use of violence in conflicts, others 
believe that various kinds of violence are occasionally necessary in particular circumstances. 
41 Tuition charges as well as foundations and governments support CR education and research.  
42 For example, concerning the importance of the process used in settling conflicts vs. the goals sought 
or concerning time perspectives (long-term changes and strategies and transformation vs. short-term 
policies of conflict management). 
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of organizations in the field or having one organization leading a specific project. A 
final issue to be addressed is the professional independence of CR analysis, 
practitioners and NGOs which is occasionally challenged, especially as they become 
more and more financially dependent on funding by national governments and 
international organizations43 (Fischer, 2006). 
 
 
2.1.3  Looking Forward 
Unlike ever-narrowing specialization that has occurred in some academic fields in 
recent decades, CR has greatly expanded. Whereas half a century ago, CR and the 
pursuit of peace were widely viewed as the province of international diplomacy and 
the understanding of war was often presumed to be inseparable from military history, 
nowadays, CR incorporates various approaches and practices and encompasses the 
promotion of human rights, justice, individual rights and well-being with its original 
international focus on understanding and preventing war and the spread of nuclear 
weapons44. The CR field is likely to further increase in size and magnitude in the 
future, especially in regions where it is needed the most (the Middle East, parts of Asia 
and in Western and Central Africa) and in light of the increasing costs of failing to 
prevent and stop destructive conflicts.  
Regarding the internal rifts within the field of CR, Kriesberg (1997) argues that 
many disagreements stem from value differences. People priorities different values 
over others (freedom, economic well-being, justice, fairness) and what they value most 
shape their preferred CR approach. Whereas CR is unable to bridge such gaps, it offers 
a wide variety of perspectives and methods from which to choose (Conflict Research 
Consortium Staff).  
                                                 
43 Especially when the funding institution is autocratic or a highly ideological entity (Kriesberg, 2008).  
44 This expansion is also evident by the growing importance of NGOs and the very concept of civil 
society (History of Peace Studies — Peace, Conflict, and Social Justice). 
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Part II: Belonging, Identity and the Nation 
 
 
2.2  Identity Formation 
 
Though a prevalent concept in many subfields of political science the complicated and 
unclear nature of “identity” did not go unnoticed (see for example, Fearon 1999). 
Whereas the concept is mainly derived from the work of Psychologist Erikson in the 
1950’s (1956; 1968), Fearon, as Gleason (1983) before him, have pointed to the fact 
that dictionary definitions of the concept have not caught up with its modern, everyday 
uses in the social sciences. In a piece dedicated to a language analysis of the term, 
Fearon concludes that “identity” refer to (a) either a social category, defined by 
membership rules and (alleged) characteristic attributes or expected behaviors, or (b) 
socially distinguishing features that a person takes a special pride in or views as 
unchangeable but socially consequential (or (a) and (b) at once)(1999, p. 1).  
Issues of self and identity occur at multiple levels of analysis: individual within 
a social context, groups within a specific society and nations in the world (Jussim, 
Ashmore, & Wilder, 2001). Concerning the former, ethnic identity was linked to both 
in-group bonds and hostility towards other groups (Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003). 
Pertaining to groups within a given society, Social Identity Theory and Self-
Categorization Theory emphasize the potential for group-based identities to foster 
intergroup competition and movement for political change among the lower power and 
status groups (Licata, Klein, Saade, Azzi, & Branscombe, 2012; Smith & Mackie, 
2006; Tajfel, 1981a). Among several contemporary nations, identity is implicated in a 
variety of conflicts when the state represses internal minorities (Anderson, 2013; 
Gibler, Hutchison, & Miller, 2012), in an armed uprisings by ethnic groups against 
central governments (Etheredge, 2013; Gelvin, 2015) or within the context of 
international conflicts (Fisher, 2012; Kalmoe, 2015). Research on identity formation 
has emphasized the ways in which people construct and negotiate a sense of “who we 
are” and “what we do” (Baysu & Phalet, 2017; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2016, 
2009) alongside discriminatory social action (Smith & Postmes, 2009, 2011).  
Over the last several decades, social and behavioral scientists have increasingly 
emphasized the role of identities in the discussion of the causes and consequences of 
                                       29 
both intragroup and intergroup hostility. For example, it was argued that polarization, 
the process whereby a group is divided into opposing sub-groups or by which public-
opinion divides in the extremes, holds the key to our understanding of social tension 
and conflict (Esteban & Ray, 1994).  
 
 
2.3  Social Belonging and Group Identification  
 
The social world is experienced by humans as a web of social relationships, systems, 
signs and institutionalized forms of social organization (Schutz, 1964). According to 
Schutz, any member born or reared within the group accepts the ready-made 
standardized scheme of the cultural pattern handed down to him by ancestors, 
teachers and authorities as an unquestioned and unquestionable guide in all situations 
which normally occur within the social world (Schutz, 1964, p. 49). 
Calhoun distinguishes between three main forms of social belonging: 
communities, which are relatively small groups that are not primarily constituted 
through formal political-legal institutions but through informal, directly interpersonal 
relationships, categories, which are based on the putative cultural similarity of 
persons, and are comprised of large numbers of people with a low density of directly 
interpersonal ties and publics45, quasi-groups constituted by mutual engagement in 
discourse aimed at determining the nature of social institutions including states (1999, 
p. 220 as cited in Frosh & Wolfsfeld, 2007).  
One of the ways humans approach the world is through typifications- 
fundamentally intersubjective means of perceiving and structuring the world 
(Sociology Index). Typification is depicted as an essential and intrinsic aspect of the 
basic orientation of actors to their situations and is a necessary feature in the 
development of social structure (McKinney, 1969). Being a member of a community 
is tantamount to being supplied with guaranteed criteria of relevance and knowledge. 
This cultural pattern provides a sense of security and assurance to those belonging to 
the social group (Väyrynen, 1997). Accordingly, societies and social groups need 
dominating ideologies or myths to justify and establish foundations for self-
interpretation (and to distinguish themselves from other social groups). As a scheme of 
self-interpretation, the central myth belongs to the relative natural conception of the 
                                                 
45 Based on Habermas’s work concerning the public’s sphere (e.g., Habermas, 1996).  
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world which the in-group takes for granted (Schutz, 1964; Vaitkus, 1991, p. 82). The 
knowledge of typifications and of their appropriate use is an inseparable element of 
the socio-cultural heritage handed down from person to person and is stored in our 
'stock of knowledge’ (Schutz, 1964; Schütz & Luckmann, 1974). 
 Yuval-Davis (2006) differentiates between diverse kinds and degrees of 
attachments people experience and express at different times and places. Some forms 
of belonging, she notes, are grounded in people’s everyday lives and have thus became 
key psycho-social resources. While belonging is presumed to be critical to people’s 
emotional balance and well-being (Yuval-Davis, 2011, p. 200), ‘politics of belonging’ 
are the ways different criteria for belonging (such as ethnicity and shared values) are 
used by dominant groups to support or legitimize a specific group while excluding 
others (Skey, 2013).  
 
 
2.4  The Sense of Belonging, Nationhood and Statehood 
 
The sense of belonging has been studied since the 1950s’. Though different 
definitions46 of ‘belonging’ exist, they all point to a need to connect with other people. 
Self-Determination Theory points to relatedness as a basic human need (Deci & Ryan, 
2001). A general sense of belonging fulfills an innate psychological drive to belong to 
groups and to partake in meaningful social interactions. Such sense of belonging is so 
fundamental that it can be as compelling as the need for food (Baumeister & Leary, 
1995, p. 498). Considerable scholarship indicates that having a general sense of 
belonging is vital to individual’s psychological and physical health, positively affects 
social relations and is related to higher levels of well-being and life satisfaction (Allen 
& Kern, 2017; Hale, Hannum, & Espelage, 2005; Hall, 2014; Nadler, 2012; Yuval-
Davis, 2006). Important to note is that a sense of belonging is independent of 
participation with, or proximity to others and relies on perceptions about the quality of 
social interactions (Allen & Kern, 2017). 
 
 
2.4.1  What is a Nation? 
                                                 
46 For example, Rogers (1951) described belonging as a need to be regarded in a positive way by others, 
Vallerand (1997) discussed an intrinsic desire to relate with others and Friedman (2007) described a 
sense of belonging as the development of the self and identity building. 
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A Nation is a problematic category, as various answers to the question “what 
constitutes a nation?”- exist. 
Whereas Renan saw the nation as a soul, a spiritual principle47, Hroch defined 
the nation as a large social group integrated not by one but by a combination of 
several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, 
religious, geographical, historical), and their subjective reflection in collective 
consciousness48.  According to Guibernau (1996, p. 47), a nation is a human group 
conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly 
demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future and 
claiming the right to rule itself. This definition presupposes statehood, namely, the 
existence of nation state. In contrast, Moore’s definition does not contain a political 
component and is subjective in nature. According to Moore, a nation is a group of 
people who identify themselves as belonging to a particular nation group, who are 
usually ensconced on a particular historical territory, and who have a sense of affinity 
to people sharing that territory (1997, p. 906). Similarly, Norman’s answer to the 
question at hand is also subjective: Ultimately, communities are nations when a 
significant percentage of their members think they are nations (1999, p. 53). The latter 
correspond to Anderson’s idea that a nation is an imagined political community- and 
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign49 (1983, p. 5–6). According to 
Anderson, a modern nation is primarily an imagined community whose members, 
                                                 
47 … Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute this soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the 
past, one in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is 
present- day consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one 
has received in an undivided form (Miroslav, 1996, p. 79). 
48 … many of these ties could be mutually substitutable - some playing a particularly important role in 
one nation-building process, and no more than a subsidiary part in others. But among them, three stand 
out as irreplaceable: (1) a 'memory' of some common past, treated as a 'destiny' of the group - or at 
least of its core constituents; (2) a density of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of 
social communication within the group than beyond it; (3) a conception of the equality of all members 
of the group organized as a civil society (Miroslav, 1996, p.79). 
49  … The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them encompassing perhaps a 
billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations … It is 
imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution 
were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm … it is imagined as 
a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the 
nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes 
it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly 
to die for such limited imaginings (Anderson, 1983). 
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despite not knowing the majority of their fellow citizens, achieve a common sense of 
identity through the image50 of community.  
Regardless of whether “nation” is objectively or subjectively defined and 
whether self-governance or territorial integrity are necessary components, a “nation” 
seems to be a system for classifying people. Similarly to class and race, though often 
considered “natural”, such classifications are constructed. As a construct, “nation” 
should not be conceived as a fixed term but as a dynamic concept (Verdery, 1996). 
 
 
2.4.2  National Identification 
National identity is defined as a subjective or internalized sense of belonging to the 
nation (Huddy & Khatib, 2007, p. 65). Early research on national attachment has 
acknowledged three main forms of such relationship: Symbolic/affective involvement, 
characterized by a sentimental attachment to the nation and its values & symbols, 
Functional/goal involvement, characterized by a belief in a citizenship role defined in 
terms of institutional responsibilities, and normative/ego involvement, characterized 
by a perceived link between the achievements of the nation and the self (Davis, 1999). 
Whereas group Identification is regarded as an important phenomenon by social 
scientists, national identification is one of its most significant manifestations. National 
identity was said to be the cohesive force that holds nation states together (Smith & 
Jarkko, 1998, p. 1). A sense of national identity can be instilled through the creation 
and dissemination of national culture, especially through mass media (Ashuri, 2005). 
The importance of the sense of national identification was previously 
researched in the context of nation-building processes (e.g. Bendix, 1980) and 
addressed recently in light of the European refugee crisis, Brexit and the resurgence of 
right-wing political parties across the globe (Bekhuis et al., 2013; Gusterson, 2017; 
Kaufmann, 2016; Osborne et al., 2017). It relates to feelings of patriotism and 
nationalism, was linked to resilience following trauma (Han, Berry, & Zheng, 2016) 
and has been shown to predict government effectiveness (Ahlerup & Hansson, 2011), 
tax compliance (Konrad & Qari, 2012), pro-trade preferences (Mayda & Rodrik, 
2005), support for a united European community (Risse, 2015), and individual-level 
                                                 
50 Following the same path, Schudson suggested that: All societies are fictive. Personal identification 
with any grouping of people beyond those one encounters face to face in daily life … depends on an 
imaginative leap (1994, p. 24). 
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life satisfaction and well-being (Morrison, Tay, & Diener, 2011; Reeskens & Wright, 
2011; Zdrenka, Yogeeswaran, Stronge, & Sibley, 2015). However, research has also 
shown that national attachment is associated with nationalistic attitudes (Wagner, 
Becker, Christ, Pettigrew, & Schmidt, 2010) such as increased support of restrictive 
immigration policies (e.g., closing national borders) (Gordon, 2016) and general 
hostility towards foreigners (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2008, 2010).  
 
 
2.4.3  Hierarchies of National Belonging  
Whereas nationalism has been often examined as a political ideology or as a mean of 
articulating and securing political and social rights (Calhoun, 2002, 2007, 2008), it is 
also a cultural construct of collective belonging, realized and legitimated through 
institutional and discursive practices (Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008, p. 536). As such, 
nationalism helps locate an experience of belonging in a world of global flows and 
fears (Calhoun, 2007, pp. 1–2).  
Kinnvall stressed the importance of establishing national formations in order to 
provide order from the chaos and uncertainty in the world … answers to questions 
concerning … the external world and human life ... the ‘other’ and what self-identity 
really is (2004, p. 759). Psychological benefits of collectivities that are viewed as 
coherent (Skey, 2013) include collective self-esteem (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), 
reduction of uncertainty (Mullin & Hogg, 1999), and confidence in the future (Sacchi, 
Castano, & Brauer, 2009). Moreover, groups containing high identifiers (Demoulin et 
al., 2009) and groups perceived to be relatively unified are better able to endure 
potential challenges (Skey, 2013).  
Although a vast literature supports the notion that the nation constitutes a 
source of comfort and security, it is important to note that this is not true for all 
individuals. Claims of indigenousness (Kaufmann, 2004a) are typically used to 
distinguish between those who belong to the nation and are thus more entitled than 
those who are not. Similarly, Hage’s definition of nationality (1998, p. 53) is based on 
the concept of “National Cultural Capital”51. Hage suggests that people who possess 
specific characteristics or contingencies are conceptually situated within the nation. As 
such, they are treated as  more national than others (1998, p. 52). Intra-group power 
                                                 
51 Drawing on Bourdieu’s notion of cultural capital. 
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relations are also important in this respect52 (Kaufmann, 2004b). Consequently, only 
people with more national cultural capital are “privileged” enough to experience the 
aforementioned psychological benefits. In this regard, Skey (2013) added that whereas 
a sense of belonging provides individuals with a sense of security and comfort, those 
who are positioned low in the hierarchy of belonging may be perceived as “outsiders” 
by the dominant group and thus may experience insecurity and hostility.   
 
 
2.4.4  The Nation State  
The modern state53 is both territorial and internally sovereign. Namely, it is externally 
demarcated from others … makes no claim to rule outside of its borders and 
recognizes no authority above it within them (Spruyt, 1996, p. 34). 
 The sovereign state (Bauman, 1992; Linklater, 1990; Walker, 1993) and its 
assumed coexistence with the nation is of a vital importance in understanding 
ethnicity. It is within the space of the sovereign state that ethnic identification, and 
especially violent identification, often actualizes (Väyrynen, 1997). By providing a 
shared domain of meaning for individuals and groups located within its autonomous 
control/territory, the sovereign state, a system of inclusion and exclusion par 
excellence, has traditionally tried to solve the problems set forth by various forms of 
identity politics (e.g. class, gender and ethnic claims) by producing precise distinctions 
between citizens and aliens, by domesticating particular identities and by creating a 
coherent national identity. A state flag, for example, is a sign which stems from the 
sovereign state as a social practice, establishing differences between citizens and 
aliens. The experience of the sign reinforces the illusory experience of national unity 
on the national level, and of an imagined community of citizens on the social level 
(Väyrynen, 1997). 
According to Bauman, National states promote 'nativism' and construe its 
subjects as 'natives.' They laud and enforce the ethnic, religious, linguistic, 
                                                 
52 For example, upper and middle class men were those who defined the ideal national type in the west. 
53 In Europe, several countries have transferred certain sovereign rights to the European Union as part of 
a “New Legal Order” as declared by its Court of Justice, in order to be included in the union, thereby 
subordinating their own domestic legal system to Community law (MacCormick, 1996, p. 553). It was 
argued that the very legitimacy of the project of a European Union requires the constructions of a new 
European identity or the actualization of a European Demos. Such identity/demos was supposed to play 
a similar role to the one national identity plays in the legitimation of state institutions (MacCormick, 
1996; Weiler, 1996). 
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cultural homogeneity. They are engaged in incessant propaganda of shared attitudes. 
They construct joint historical memories and do their best to discredit or suppress 
such stubborn memories that cannot be squeezed into a shared tradition--now 
redefined in the state-appropriate quasi-legal terms, as 'our common heritage.' They 
preach the sense of common mission, common fate, common destiny. They breed, or 
at least legitimize and give tacit support to, animosity towards everyone standing 
outside the holy union (1991, p. 64) [emphasis by Bauman]. 
 
 
2.4.5 Nationhood and Statehood 
Smith (1986), distinguishes between a “Western” model of nationhood, according to 
which a nation is a territorial community of citizens bound by laws, and an “East 
European” model, according to which statehood is based on “ethnie”. Ignatieff (1993) 
similarly differentiates between “civic” and “ethnic” nationalism. Central to the 
reproduction of nationhood in established countries is a recurrent reminder of 
nationhood, a concept Billig named “Banal Nationalism” (1995, p. 8). Unlike 
patriotism and nationalism, in ordinary times (not in times of crisis), Banal 
Nationalism depends less on conscious mobilization. However, when national crisis is 
the norm, such as in the case of Israel, Frosh and Wolfsfeld (2007) suggests that the 
conspicuous display of seemingly autonomous, grassroots social affinities, 
independent of state initiative and control, is of paramount importance and stress the 
media’s role in what they referred to as “Mediated Civil Nationhood”.  
An important part of the construction of nationhood is making the people 
national. As such, making the state (a political unit) congruent with the nation (a 
cultural unit) is vital. Accordingly, social relations and organizations are continuously 
defined in national terms (Skey, 2013). The government, educational establishments, 
the media 54  and civil society actors continuously address national audiences by 
referencing national symbols (Billig, 1995; Edensor, 2002; Palmer, 1998). Further 
means of promoting a nation-state congruence include promoting language, national 
(and nationalist) educational curricula and at times- military conscription, forced 
assimilation and expulsion (Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008). Likewise, Individuals 
                                                 
54 While nationhood is represented, constructed and maintained through various institutions, Frosh & 
Wolfsfeld (2007) emphasized the central role of mess media in doing so.  
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routinely demonstrate that they belong to a nation through everyday conversations 
(Condor, 2006) and interactions (Edensor, 2006; Palmer, 1998). 
According to van der Stoel (2001), the first High Commissioner on National 
Minorities as part of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE): The relationship between nationhood and statehood is a dilemma that 
plagued the twentieth century and it is an issue that we continue to grapple with today. 
Not all existing nations have states. Whereas the term “Nationhood” emphasizes 
consciousness of unity, which may be subjective, “Statehood” emphasizes political 
unity and is objective. In this regard Zimmern noted that: nationality is psychological, 
statehood is political; nationality is a condition of mind, statehood is a condition of 
law … (1918, p. 51). According to Gottlieb (1994), statehood has become the ultimate 
prize of nationalists; their banner is self-determination and their demands are 
territorial. A lack of statehood makes people particularly vulnerable and the quest for 
self-determination is often violent. Consequently, van der Stoel (2001) posits that the 
problem of accommodating nationhood within statehood is the root of many 
contemporary conflicts55. While both citizenship and national identity may involve 
Social-psychological, political and cultural realms, unlike national identity, citizenship 
is always legally determined (Gottlieb, 1994). 
 
 
2.5  Conflicts and Group Identification  
 
Identity is one of several fundamental human needs and thus underlies numerous 
intractable conflicts. Conflicts over needs are fundamentally different from conflicts 
over interests; whereas interests are negotiable, needs are not (Conflict Research 
Consortium, 1998). Identity-based conflicts occur when a person or a group feels that 
their sense of self is threatened, denied legitimacy or respect. One's sense of self is so 
fundamental, not only to one's self-esteem but also to how one interprets the rest of the 
world, that any identity threat is likely to produce a strong response. Typically, this 
response is both aggressive and defensive, and can quickly escalate into a conflict that 
                                                 
55 Van der Stoel considers multinational states as a potential solution to this problem and sets that 
national self-government does not necessarily require independence, or in other words self-
determination does not mean secession. The goal is to satisfy the need for self-government within the 
bounds of the state (2001).  
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is especially difficult to resolve. The opponent is often viewed as evil, or even non-
human, and their views unworthy of attention (Conflict Research Consortium, 1998). 
The Interpersonal influence of violent conflicts is a topic extensively 
researched in several disciplines. Relevant research in the fields of Political Science 
and Socio-psychology includes an analysis of the effects of political violence on 
identity salience 56  (Stewart, 2016), in-group biases (Bauer, Cassar, Chytilová, & 
Henrich, 2014), local cooperation and civic engagement (Bauer et al., 2016a), 
collective action (Bellows & Miguel, 2009), parochial altruism (Choi & Bowles, 
2007), competitiveness (Cecchi, Leuveld, & Voors, 2016) and on further social and 
political behaviors (Bauer et al., 2016b; Witte & Davis, 2013). Due to the fluid nature 
of individual identities, new identity aspects can be acquired as time and context 
change. Globalized modern societies provide more sources, situations and multiplicity 
of life styles, thus producing more complex, yet flexible identities (Hill, Abercrombie, 
& Turner, 2006, p. 190). This complex nature of individual identities is often captured 
by the term “Hyphenated identities”57.  
Identity-based conflict does not stop the process of identification. Ethnic 
narratives in conflict situations enclose alternative ways to typify the world (Cobb, 
1994) and alternative interpretations which can destabilize dominant interpretations 
(such as alternative self-definitions of the group) and thus exclude alternative 
identifications, roles and modes of action58 (Väyrynen, 1997). While identity salience 
changes over time and in terms of wider societal perceptions59, violent conflicts pose a 
threat to national identification and as such, profoundly affect it. It is thus not 
surprising that an identity threat was found to increase identity salience.  
In light of the complex and multi-layered nature of individual identities, the 
current study will address two distinct identity aspects in the upcoming analysis: the 
social aspect, discussing social trust and social cohesion, and the national aspect, 
discussing the sense of affinity with the state and national pride. 
                                                 
56 Mostly ethnic (Fearon & Laitin, 2000) than national (Pherali & Garratt, 2014). 
57 Hyphenated identity references the multiple socially bound features that individuals use to think 
about themselves (Cheng, 2004, p. 216) based on their belonging to more than one group. 
58 Ethnicity narratives (e.g. ethnic origin, group memberships) tend to become fixed during an active 
conflict, often wrongly seen to imply fixed identities. However, as Cobb notes narrative closure is 
never complete and contestation is inevitable (1994, p. 56). Consequently, conflict resolution can create 
new identification and political sphere only if it is based on the creation of 'alternative' social practices 
with a new political subject (Väyrynen, 1997). 
59 The raw materials from which identity is produced may be inherited from the past but they are also 
worked on, creatively or positively, reluctantly or bitterly, in the present (Gilroy, 1997, p. 305). 
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2.6  Patriotic   Affinity:  Conceptual Outlines 
  
 There are only two forces in the world, the sword and the spirit. In the 
long run the sword will always be conquered by the spirit. 
                                --Napoleon 
 
Etymologically, “Patriotism” is derived from Greek and Latin. The meaning of the 
word revolves around “father” and “fatherland 60 ” (or “motherland” in European 
languages). While Niccolo Machiavelli famously said that a man has no greater 
obligation than the one he has to his country, John Stuart Mill described patriotism as 
the feeling of common interest among those who live under the same government, and 
are contained within the same natural or historical boundaries, as sympathy, not of 
hostility; of union (Dēmētriou & Loizides, 2013, p. 242). In the early nineteen’s 
century, Alexis de Tocqueville allied patriotism with public spirit defining it as  an 
attachment to the land …the affections of man with his birthplace ... a taste for ancient 
customs and a reverence for traditions of the past (Berman, 2000, p. 122). Cicero 
emphasized the nexus between family and patriotism in his famous saying: Patria est 
communis omnium parens (our country is the common parent of all).  
The nucleus of patriotism is a family-tribal feeling and a sense of commonality 
among members of a specific group of humans, generally based upon ethnicity (shared 
language, culture, history and kinship). Patriotism is a manifestation of national 
pride61, defined by Smith & Kim as the positive affect that the public feels towards 
their country, resulting from their national identity (2006, p. 127). It is both the sense 
of esteem that a person has for one’s nation and the self-esteem that a person derives 
from one’s national identity 62 . Whereas sacrifice 63  is an extreme expression of 
                                                 
60  In Hebrew, patriotism evokes a sense of heritage and connection to the past captured by the 
expression “Land of Our Fathers”.  
61 “Pride” is defined by Webster dictionary as Delight or elation arising from some act, possession, or 
relationship (Merriam-Webster, 2018a) 
62 An interesting anecdote in this regard was the victory of the National Football League’s (NFL) New 
England Patriots in Super Bowl XXXVI (February 3, 2002) which signified, according to popular belief 
in the US, the unification of the nation, coping with the tragic events of September 11, 2001 (Martin & 
Breitenfeld, 2008). This Patriots triumph in one of the most popular sporting events in the world was 
said to evoked “Unbridled Patriotism” (Shapiro, 2002) and sense of national identity and pride among 
people in the US (Weems & Singer, 2015).  
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patriotism (such as when one is called to serve during times of hardship and turmoil), 
more common manifestations are a feeling of pride in belonging to, and the 
accomplishments of the nation. Patriotism stems from a feeling of loyalty and 
commitment to one’s country that unites citizens into a national entity and 
encompasses empathy, solidarity and attachment to ones’ compatriots as well as a 
willingness to act for the good of the community, even at the cost of personal interest 
(Arad & Gal, 2006). 
Patriotic affinity and the channels to which it is directed were continuously re-
examined during the past century. Whilst critics of classical patriotism argue that 
cherishing the state more than the individuals is irrational and selfish, supporters of 
patriotism maintained that such an affinity is an undeniable and inherent. Various 
forms of patriotism include “Republican Patriotism” (embedded in the fatherland, as 
discussed by Maurizio Viroli in his book “For Love of Country”), “Covenanted 
Patriotism” (described by American President Lincoln as an affinity which isn’t based 
on land but rather on political contract and the formative values that unify the nation’s 
people64), and “Constitutional/Cosmopolitan Patriotism65” (developed by Habermas, a 
philosopher who endorsed commitment to a democratic regime and humanistic 
values). Be the bond that underlies patriotic sentiments as it may, its inherent national 
advantages and centrality in building national reliance are uncontested.  
Comprehensive academic study of the issue in recent decades attributed a 
broader meaning to both the affinity individuals feel toward their spheres of 
attachment and to the various channels to which this affinity is directed. Exploring 
                                                                                                                                             
63 George Washington argued that patriotic sentiment is not utterly altruistic: whoever builds upon 
[patriotism] as a sufficient basis for conducting a long and bloody war, will find themselves deceived in 
the end... a great and lasting war can never be supported on this principle alone. It must be aided by a 
prospect of interest or some reward [for those who fight] (quoted in Grodzins 1956, p. 3). 
64 Americans, a motley gathering of various races and cultures, were bonded together not by blood or 
religion, not by tradition or territory, not by the calls and traditions of a city, but by a political idea” 
(Schaar, 1981, p. 291). Stewart suggested that a similar bond forged the Athenian patriotic emotion, as 
"the Athenian loved Athens, less because it had been the home of his fathers than because it was the 
home of his own ideals... If he had persuaded himself … that some other state was better, his loyalty 
was open to change (Stewart, 1917, p. 621). 
65  Constitutional/cosmopolitan patriotism essentially replaced the bond between a nation and its 
homeland, and between members of a nation and their formative values with a commitment to a liberal 
democratic regime and humanistic values. Habermas’ approach turns patriotism into a cosmo-political 
phenomenon, which is not necessarily grounded in time or place. By strengthening universal values and 
making them the unifying force, that binds different groups and nations, advocates of cosmopolitan 
patriotism regard it as the way to establish a sharp distinction between the patriotism and the 
nationalism (Canovan 2000, Markell 2000).  
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patriotism in the United States, Schats & Stauc (1997) and Parker (2003, pp. 14–15), 
identified and defined three types of such affinity: “Symbolic Patriotism” (which is 
based on an emotional bond to American symbols and to America itself),  
“Constructive Patriotism” (representing the rational dimension of the phenomenon 
channeled via constructive criticism of the government and its conduct) and “Blind 
Patriotism” that embodies irrational and unquestioned extreme loyalty. Examining the 
effect of patriotism on the presidential elections in the United Stated in 1988, Sullivan 
and colleagues (1992), identified five different types of patriots: “Iconoclastic 
Patriots” evolved from the potentially dangerous “Symbolic Patriotism” (which is 
robust and absolute) turned safe as it is channeled into critical engagement in civic 
society. “Environmental Patriots” which sanctified the environment and land more 
than the flag and anthem and condemns pollution as a result of a pursuit of profit. 
“Capitalistic Patriots”, and which endorsed economic growth as the ultimate 
realization of the American patriotic vision. Lastly, “Nationalistic Symbolic 
Patriotism” mirrored extreme forms of American superiority66.  
In the past, most countries were national states, encompassing members of the 
same ethnic group (Smith & Jarkko, 1998). However, minorities seeking self-
determination, immigration and modern politics made it possible for diverse 
individuals to inhabit nation states, thus created multi-ethnic, heterogenic states (such 
as Canada) (Gurr, 2000). While it can be argued that this phenomenon has somewhat 
undermined the sense of patriotism, the Unites States is a good example for the 
manifestation of symbolic patriotism which isn’t rooted in the legacy of ethnic 
kindship but in commitment to a political-constitutional order and a certain way of 
life. 
 
The expression “hossen leumi”, the Hebrew equivalence of “National Strength” or 
resilience, has become a widely used currency in Israeli public discourse (Arad & Gal, 
2006). The expression extends its realm beyond the traditional understanding of 
“National Security” to include other dimensions of strength, which are relevant to the 
existence of the state (economic, political, international, social, and governmental 
elements). National morale, a sense of national purpose, stamina and cohesion are 
among these dimensions (Arad & Gal, 2006). It is the link between material and 
                                                 
66 Placing the United States at the top of God’s current order (Sullivan, Fried, & Dietz, 1992, p. 209). 
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spiritual strength, as reflected by Napoleon’s abovementioned quote, which constitutes 
the term “Hossen Leumi”. The term “Patriotism” is directed at expressing the same 
sentiment- the bond between citizens and their country and the former’s commitment 
to the nation. National strength is thus entwined with an emotional connection to ones’ 
country.  
 
2.6.1  Between Patriotism and Nationalism 
The difference between patriotism and nationalism is that the patriot is 
proud of his country for what it does, and the nationalist is proud of his 
country no matter what it does.  
         -- Sydney J. Harris 
Handler defined nationalism as an ideology about individuated being. It is an ideology 
concerned with boundedness, continuity, and homogeneity encompassing diversity. It 
is an ideology in which social reality, conceived in terms of nationhood, is endowed 
with the reality of natural things (Zuelow, 1999). Embracing a historical perspective, 
Breuilly defines the term in reference to political movements seeking or exercising 
state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments. According to 
Breuilly, of all modern political ideologies, nationalism appears to be the most 
through and through historical. … in principle one could identify a nation non-
historically (genetic make-up, language, fundamental moment) but that identity is soon 
embedded within the unique history which produces that phenotype, language group, 
or revolutionary act (2013, p. 1).  
Despite clear dissimilarities, in common language, and on occasion even in 
scholarly literature, “Patriotism” and “Nationalism” are used interchangeably67. At 
times they are distinguished from each other by agent or degree, not by meaning68. In 
his 1945 book “Notes on Nationalism”, George Orwell clearly illustrated the 
difference between the two terms:  
                                                 
67According to Dietz The blurring of patriotism into nationalism, or even the acknowledgement of 
nationalism as a “species” of patriotism reveals that we have literally lost touch … with a very real 
past in which real patriots held to a particular set of political principles and their associated practices- 
to a conception of citizenship that bears scant resemblance to modern nationalism (1989, p. 191). 
68 Hobsbawm (1990), for example, uses the term “National Patriotism” as distinguished from “State 
Patriotism” or talked of nationalism as a political force. Viroli (1995) describes patriotism as love of 
country and nationalism as loyalty to the nation. 
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… By ‘nationalism’ I mean … habit of identifying oneself with a single 
nation or other unit, placing it beyond good and evil and recognizing no 
other duty than that of advancing its interests. Nationalism is not to be 
confused with patriotism … one must draw a distinction between them, 
since two different and even opposing ideas are involved. By ‘patriotism’ 
I mean devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which 
one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other 
people. Patriotism is of its nature defensive, both militarily and culturally. 
Nationalism, on the other hand, is inseparable from the desire for power. 
The abiding purpose of every nationalist is to secure more power and 
more prestige, not for himself but for the nation or other unit in which he 
has chosen to sink his own individuality. 
 
Whereas patriotism is a reflexive and positive sentiment of commitment, directed 
towards ones’ compatriots, nationalism is perceived to be negative as it can be 
potentially offensive if directed against “the other”, and may result in xenophobia. 
However, nationalism can also be exhibited in non-offensive terms, such as in the case 
of non-violent self-determination. 
From President Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address to President Kennedy’s 
inauguration speech, political leadership appealed to constructive patriotic emotions in 
order to invoke the love of the political institutions and the way of life that sustain the 
common liberty of a people (Viroli, 1995). At different points in history, such as in the 
late 18th century Europe, patriotism was manipulatively exploited and turned to 
aggressive nationalism in order to reinforce the cultural, linguistic and ethnic 
homogeneity of a people who were prejudicial to the good of their own nations.  
 
 
2.7  Coping with a Threatened Social Identity 
 
2.7.1  Social Identity Theory 
In a formal theoretical statement by Tajfel and Turner (1979, p. 40), self-esteem was 
explicitly referred to as a motivation behind intergroup behaviour. This statement rests 
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on a further assumption (grounded in Social Comparison theory) that individuals 
strive to maintain and/or enhance their self-esteem and achieve a positive self-concept. 
According to Social Comparison Theory (Festinger, 1954; Suls & Wills, 1991; Suls & 
Wheeler, 2013), individuals possess an innate drive to evaluate themselves in 
comparison to others. Consistent with Festinger (1954), social comparisons are used as 
a way to establish a “benchmark” according to which individuals can make accurate 
evaluations of themselves. The social comparison process involves self-evaluation of 
own attitudes, abilities and beliefs in comparison with others. Two kinds of Social 
comparison is usually regarded in the literature: “Upwards social comparison”, in 
which we compare ourselves with those who we believe are better than us, and 
“Downward social comparison”, when we compare ourselves to other who we 
perceive as worse than us. As comparisons are often aimed at sustaining a positive 
self-concept, upwards social comparison is usually done in order to improve 
individual’s current level of ability or status69, whereas downward social comparison 
is meant to reassure ourselves in our abilities or achievements70 (Cherry, 2018). As 
such, social comparison plays a central role in self-judgement and behavior 
modification71.  
 
According to Social Identity Theory, an important part of an individual’s sense of self 
comes from membership in social groups (i.e. social identity). It is, thus, of no surprise 
that individual’s self-esteem was found to be associated with the status of his/her 
group (Tajfel, 1981b). Accordingly, groups compete not just for material resources or 
gains, but for anything which can enhance their self-esteem or self-definition: i.e., 
positive social identity (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Oakes & Turner, 1980; Turner, 1982). 
Yet, self-esteem is a relative state rather than an absolute one and is affected by 
interactions with other individuals/groups and by changes in the status of ones’/other 
groups.  
Values connotations associated with groups are the result of social 
comparisons between one’s in-group and a relevant out-group. Consequently, a 
positive social identity is only achieved if one’s group is seen as being different from a 
                                                 
69 For example, by comparing ourselves to someone who we consider to be better off (fitter, richer, 
more educated etc.) and look for ways to achieve similar successes/results.  
70 Mostly, by reminding ourselves that there are those who are worst off. 
71 As a consequence of social comparison, one may be motivated to try harder and achieve a goal or be 
discouraged and pursue other interest.  
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relevant out-group in a favourable way72. In other words, the process of between-
group differentiation is tied to measures that reflect success of failure (i.e., winning or 
losing a war). Ergo, individuals are motivated to proclaim their associations with 
others who are successful, and dissociate themselves from others who fail (Hirt et al., 
1992). It was found that high and equal power group members reported that they felt 
more comfortable, satisfied and happy than lower and no power group members about 
their group membership (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985, p. 430), whereas low status 
groups experiences lowered self-esteem (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987).  
What are individuals to do in order to avoid decreased social status, and 
consequently, decreased self-esteem when confronted with a superior group? 
Consistent with Social Identity Theory, so as to cope with a threatened social identity, 
individuals may employ the following social change strategies (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979); Individual mobility, involves an attempt to dissociate oneself from the in-group 
and possibly move to another (often higher) status group. Individual mobility is 
predicated on the belief that social mobility is possible and that group boundaries are 
permeable 73 . Two other strategies, social creativity and social competition are 
predicated on the belief that group boundaries are rigid and fixed. Social competition 
involves engaging in conflict with the advantages out-group in order to reverse the 
positions of in-group and out-group. Lastly, Social creativity involves cognitive 
behaviours such as comparing the in-group with the out-group on a new dimension of 
social comparison (Lalonde, Moghaddam, & Taylor, 1987; Lemaine, 1974), changing 
the values assigned to traditional dimensions of social comparison or changing the out-
group of social comparison. 
Among the aforementioned strategies, individual mobility and social 
competition are largely non-viable options in the context of individual identification 
with countries and nations. Individual mobility would require members of the group to 
                                                 
72 This tendency of a perceiver to accentuate differences between motivations from different categories 
is generalized from the perceptual to the social domain and referred to as between group differentiations 
(Tajfel, 1978). In social identity theory, this process is used to explain the clear distinctions that are 
often made between in-groups and out-groups (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). 
73 While there are agents who are willing to endure the utmost sacrifices to stay true to their identity, 
evidence exists that in some cases individuals are able and willing to shed their identity to respond to 
external circumstances, particularly due to discrimination: In post-reform Europe, entire populations 
switched back and forth between Catholicism and Protestantism, as the political alliances of their 
princes switched back and forth between the Pope, the Emperor and other potentates. In Fascist Italy, 
many Jews converted to Catholicism to escape discrimination. In modern day India, some lower-caste 
Hindus convert to the Muslim or Catholic faiths that suffer relatively less from discrimination (Caselli 
& Coleman, 2013).  
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quite it74. Seeking social competition by engaging in conflict with another nation may 
only be possible for heads of states. Identity threats discussed in this research not only 
presuppose the existence of a conflict but are also associated with the way it was 
terminated (favorable/unfavorable to the group). Accordingly, social creativity is 
likely to be the most attractive course of action. 
In the sport realm, it was repeatedly demonstrated that wins or losses by teams 
are related to fans’ self-perception (Bizman & Yinon, 2002; Cialdini et al., 1976; 
Sloan, 1979; Snyder, Lassegard, & Ford, 1986). Adjustments in fans’ associations 
with their teams were found to serve as a tactic applied by fans in order to maintain 
their psychological health (Wann, Melnick, Russell, & Pease, 2001). Consequently, 
the psychological distance between the fans and their favorite clubs was either 
decreased or increased, in conjunction with the success of their favorite club. 
Notwithstanding controversies in early literature (Bradley, 1978; Miller, 1978; Miller 
& Ross, 1975; Weary, 1979), this phenomena is viewed as the outcome of two 
impression management tactics: “Basking in Reflected Glory” (BIRGing), and 
“Cutting Off Reflected Failure” (CORFing)75.  
 
 
2.7.2  Basking In Reflected Glory 
Basking in Reflected Glory (BIRG; Cialdini et al., 1976) is a strategic impression 
enhancement technique/tactic76. BIRGing enables individuals to raise their esteem in 
the eyes of others by publicizing their connection with a successful other77 (Hirt et al., 
1992a). Although it is understandable that people might wish to share in another's 
success when they have been instrumental to that success, the one who basks in the 
                                                 
74 The psychological costs of giving up one’s identity may vary with the nature of that identity: in some 
cases, passing from one group to the other may require religious conversion. Abandoning one’s 
religious identity may be more psychologically costly than abandoning other traits of one’s cultural 
identity (Caselli & Coleman, 2013). Moreover, some religions create physical markers, such as 
circumcision, that further increase the cost of passing.  
75 BIRGing and CORFing are cconsistent with Social Identity Theory, which sets that individuals are 
motivated to proclaim their associations with others who are successful (BIRG), and dissociate 
themselves from others who fail (CORFing), and denying responsibility for such failure.  
76 A goal-directed process in which people attempt to influence the perceptions of others regarding a 
person, object or event, by controlling information in social interaction (Piwinger & Ebert, 2001). 
77 Essentially, by taking undue credit for success. 
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glory of another has done nothing tangible78 to bring about the group's success (i.e., 
football fans of a wining club). BIRGing involves a process of unit formation between 
the individual and the successful group. In an attempt to increase their own self-esteem 
or ego, the psychological distance between the individual and the successful group is 
decreased (Cialdini & De Nicholas, 1989; Cialdini & Richardson, 1980). According to 
Tesser's self-evaluation maintenance model (1986, 1988), the reflection process of 
BIRGing is an important means by which individuals maintain a positive self-concept. 
An example of a BIRGing behaviour was described by Cialdini et al. (1976) 
who found that university students were more likely to wear school-identifying 
apparel on the Monday after a winning performance by their school's football team 
than after a losing performance. Students were also found to use the pronoun “we” 
more frequently when describing the outcome of a game in which their school's team 
had been victorious than when their school's team had lost.  
The tendency to BIRG has been found to be at its strongest when one's public 
image is threatened (Schlenker, 1980), for example, in the context of a violent conflict. 
The preceding analysis explains the “Fair Weather” Fan-ship observed when sport 
teams are successful (e.g., Becker & Suls, 1983; Cratty, 1983; Hirt et al., 1992) and 
lend support to the potential general increase in group members’ identification with 
the group following positively valuated group performance (e.g. victory79).  
 
 
2.7.3 Cutting off Reflected Failure 
While identifying with a group may affirm the individual’s sense of self-worth (for 
example, by BIRGing in group’ success), several theorists stressed the existence of 
unavoidable consequences or costs that the individual bares in case of group’s debacle 
(e.g., Edwards, 1973; Roberts, 1976). In order to avoid declining self-esteem and 
decreased status suffered by group members (following decreased group status), an 
                                                 
78 This technique is consistent with the finding that a sense of belonging to a group reflects one’s 
perception of his or her involvement in a social system or environment (Hagerty, Lynch-Sauer, Patusky, 
Bouwsema, & Collier, 1992). 
79 In the context of political violence such as wars and military operations, a “successful” outcome may 
not be limited to victories and an “unsuccessful” outcome may not be limited to defeats. The latter may 
include other unfavorable outcomes, not only in the conventional sense (e.g., military rout, a forced 
withdrawal of troops or an abject surrender) but also in a subjective sense (such as in the case of a 
perceived failure to meet declared objectives).  
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important corollary to the BIRGing phenomenon is Cutting Off Reflected Failure 
(CORFing: Snyder, Higgins, & Stucky, 1983).  
CORFing is a self-image protection tactic and a distancing mechanism, which 
enables individuals to actively distance themselves from a lower status other80. By 
increasing the psychological distance between the individual and the unsuccessful 
group, the former is able to prevent harm to his/her self-esteem or public image 
(Snyder et al., 1986)81.  
A classic example of the tendency to CORF is the “killing/shooting the 
messenger” metaphor82, commonly used to describe the act of blaming the bearer of 
bad news. This metaphor is a subdivision of argumentum ad hominem logical fallacy, 
whereby an argument is rebutted by attacking the character, motive, or other attributes 
of the person making the argument, or persons associated with the argument, rather 
than attacking the substance of the argument itself83 (Labossiere, 2013). Early literary 
citing of "shooting the messenger" are found in Plutarch's “life of Lucullus”: The first 
messenger that gave notice of Lucullus' coming was so far from pleasing Tigranes 
that, he had his head cut off for his pains; and no man dared to bring further 
information. Without any intelligence at all, Tigranes sat while war was already 
blazing around him, giving ear only to those who flattered him 84  as well as in 
Sophocles’ Antigone: no one loves the messenger who brings bad news or no man 
delights in the bearer of bad news (Jebb, 1891 Line 277). Manis, Cornell, & Moore 
(1974) examined the popular metaphor and ascertained that their subjects were 
reluctant to deliver bad news to others since they wanted to avoid association with the 
bad message and the negative evaluations that follows. In contrast, subjects were ready 
                                                 
80  Snyder, Lassegard, & Ford, (1986) showed that Subjects involved in a successful group effort 
manifested more association with their group relative to a no-feedback control group, whereas subjects 
involved in a failed group effort showed less association with their group (relative to controls). 
81  Banyard and Shevlin (2001) noted that English Premier League (football) club fans reported 
psychological distress comparable to traumatic distress caused by physical threats or natural disasters 
when their club was relegated to a lower division. 
82 Until the advent of modern telecommunication, messages were usually delivered by human envoys. 
During the early Warring States period of China, the concept of chivalry and virtue prevented the 
executions of messengers sent by opposing sides. The same principle was demonstrated further in the 
prohibition to hard a town crier, an officer of the court who made public pronouncements (which often 
included bad news) in the name of the ruling monarch (BBC, 2010). 
83 This fallacy was expressed, for example, in Antony and Cleopatra, a tragedy by Shakspear which was 
performed in 1607 and printed in 1623 in Mr. William Shakespeare's Comedies, Histories, & Tragedies. 
When Cleopatra threatens to treat the messenger's eyes as balls when told Antony has married another, 
the response is Gracious madam, I that do bring the news made not the match. 
84 Paragraphe 25.  
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and willing to transmit good news to others in order to embrace the positive 
association with the positive message. 
 
BIRGing and CORFing tendencies were used to explain fans’ support of sport teams 
on and offline 85  and were even detected among children playing videogames 
(Slymond, 2013). In the context of the research at hand concerning the effect of 
discrepant outcomes of political violence on individual’s identification with their 
nation state, this scholarship suggests that individuals would likely identify more with 
their nation following positively perceived outcomes (such as victory) whereas 
negatively perceived outcomes would result in a decrease in national identification. 
Chapter six will empirically address the intrinsic relationship between discrepant 
conclusions of Israeli warfare and Israelis’ national identification. 
 
 
2.7.4 Self-Embedded Social Identity 
Further scholarship addressing the way an association with a group affects the 
individual suggests a more complex state of affairs, as not all individuals employ the 
aforementioned BIRGing/CORFing tactics equally; high identifiers may be more 
likely to maintain their association with an unsuccessful group than those low 
identifiers. When self-categorization as a group member is salient, a person is 
influenced by group norms, behaves in line with those norms and share the concerns 
and interests of the group (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). This view is based on qualitative 
studies examining fan behavior, stemming from an interpretivistic research 
paradigm86. The latter challenge the traditional perspective of BIRGing and CORFing 
following failures or successes. 
According to Wann, Hamlet, Wilson, & Hodges (1995), individuals who chose 
to maintain their association with a losing group were higher in identification than 
those not displaying their membership. Similar findings prevail in sport management 
research, according to which fans’ loyalty to their club, even if unsuccessful, is 
explained in terms of their social motives (Dimmock & Gucciardi, 2008). Alternative 
                                                 
85 E.g., fluctuating attendances in football games depending on the team’s success (Baade & Tiehen, 
1990; Whitney, 1988) and frequency of visits to teams’ internet sites (Boen, Vanbeselaere, & Feys, 
2002). 
86  This stream of research (cf. Black, 2006; Harris, 1981) enables the examination of subjective, 
symbolic, and socially embedded meanings and self-expressions in individuals that are not easily 
quantified and measured objectively. 
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explanation is based on fans’ feelings of belonging to a community and the 
opportunity it offers them to make and maintain social contacts (Woratschek, Horbel, 
Popp, & Roth, 2007). Sloan (1979), stated that some fans always admitted their 
association with the team, even in a loss, suggesting a stronger bond to the team than 
mere momentary BIRGing (p. 254-255). This finding was further reaffirmed by Wann 
& Branscombe (1990). 
Indeed, Social identity (ethnic or religious belonging, group membership or 
even Fanship in the sport realm87) may constitute an affiliation with a group from 
which a substantial emotional significance and value are derived (cf. Abrams & Hogg, 
1990). For some individuals (such as the majority group in a nation state), group 
identity (commitment to their identity as members of a particular group) constitutes an 
integral part of their self-identity (McCall & Simmons, 1966; Nuttbrock & Freudiger, 
1991). Individuals who have formed a strong bond with a specific group may even 
perceive it as an extension of their personal sense of self. Taylor, Doria, & Tyler, 
(1983) suggested that when group’s identity is integral to the individual sense of self, 
group members are not likely to detach themselves from their group (to CORF). That 
was found to be true even following poor group performance and even when the cost 
of such poor performance is a potential decrease in their own self-esteem88 (Lalonde, 
1992; Lalonde, Moghaddam, & Taylor, 1987). 
While Social Identity Theory assumes that members of a disadvantaged group in a 
social hierarchy cannot ignore their situation when they engage in social 
comparisons89 , such group members would still try to maintain positive in-group 
distinctiveness in order to sustain positive social-identity, vital for maintaining their 
own self-esteem. This could be achieved by sustaining superiority on an attribute that 
is unrelated to group performance (using social creativity) and by consciously 
                                                 
87 Hirt et al. (1992) view fanship as representative of any of a number of important social identities to 
which individuals might ally themselves. It was suggested there that similar effects might be observed 
when positive and negative outcomes are experienced by any important social group or affiliation (e.g., 
a nation, political party, or ethnic group) with which the person has strong allegiance. 
88  The psychological costs of giving up one’s identity may vary with the nature of that identity. 
Abandoning one’s religious identity may be more psychologically costly than abandoning other traits of 
one’s cultural identity (Caselli & Coleman, 2013). Moreover, some religions create physical markers 
(e.g., circumcision) that further increase the costs of passing.  
89  Members of a losing group could not ignore performance indicators, and positive in-group 
distinctiveness could not be achieved on dimensions of social comparison that related to the 
unsuccessful performance (denial). 
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ignoring certain information regarding the performance 90 . When self-identity and 
group-identity are embedded in each other, certain broader socio-psychological factors 
may effectively “fix” the level of social-identification at the interpersonal place (Hogg 
& Abrams, 1988). Consequently, poor group performance will not result in lower 
social identification levels among individuals whose own self-identity is highly linked 
to their group identity.  
Chapter six will examine this special case of self-embedded identity by 




2.7.5 National Identity of Ethnic Minorities  
Past research has found asymmetric attitudes of ethnic minorities and majorities 
towards their country. According to Staerklé, Sidanius, Green, & Molina (2010), 
ethnic, linguistic, and religious majorities identify more with the nation and more 
strongly endorse nationalist ideology than minorities. Staerklé et al also found that the 
largest difference between minorities and majorities exist in ethnically diverse 
countries and in egalitarian, low inequality contexts (2010, p. 491). Dowley & Silver 
(2000) discovered a similar finding and attributed it to a cohort effect (see also, Smith 
& Jarkko, 1998). Consequently, it can be speculated that when members of an ethnic 
minority group do not perceive the states’ victory as “their own”, an increase in 
national-identification following such a favourable outcome of political violence will 
not be registered. The described findings may persist the more segregated or 
discriminated against the minority group might consider itself to be.  
 Numerous variables interact with one’s social identity; Fleming and Petty 
(2000) have demonstrated that the strength of ones’ identification with the group is an 
                                                 
90 A familiar example is Tajfel’s experiment concerning a hut building competition in a summer camp 
for boys. Contestants were divided into groups. One group, which was deliberately allocated an inferior 
set of building materials compared with other groups responded by creating a garden around their 
inferior hut and by insisting that the garden be taken into account in the comparison (Tajfel, 1982). A 
more recent example is found pertaining to the British song in the 2018 Eurovision song contest. 
Whereas the song achieved the second lowest score in the competition, the British press chose to 
concentrate on praising the singers’ “courageous” behavior as she continued her performance after a 
stage invader interrupted her, completely ignoring the low rank of the song (Waddell & Bayliss, 2018).  
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important determinant in the process of shaping his/her own opinions91 (see also, 
Anastasio, Rose, & Chapman, 2005). As minority-status makes one’s group identity 
more salient, members of minority groups may be more influenced by their social 
identity than members of the majority group. Accordingly, it was founds that members 
of the minority group will go to greater lengths in order to favor an in- group member 
than will members of the majority group (Brewer, Manzi, & Shaw, 1993).  
In the case of Israel, Arab Israelis not only constitute an ethnic minority but are 
also caught between a rock and a hard place when national identity is concerned. On 
the one hand, they are native Israelis, hold an Israeli ID and are well off in comparison 
to Palestinians elsewhere. On the other hand, they are often considered “second class 
citizens” by members of the majority group (Jewish Israelis) and do not share the 
Jewish-Zionist Israeli common denominator. For Arab Israelis who identify as 
Palestinians, the situation is even more complex as frequent political violence takes 
place against the backdrop of the protracted Israeli Palestinian conflict. As such, an 
Israeli victory may even result in a decreased national identification among Arab 
Israelis who identify as Palestinians92. Accordingly, not only that the overall level of 
national attachment among Arab Israelis is expected to be lower in comparison with 
Jewish Israelis, Arab Israelis who do not consider Israel as “their country” (and/or 
identify as Palestinians), may not exhibit increased national identification which is 
expected in light of Social Identity Theory. The effect of successful termination of 
Israeli warfare on Arab Israeli will be empirically tested in chapter six. 
How would individuals react if confronted with a situation of increasing/diminishing 
group-status in the context of a real time violent conflict? Do individuals react 
differently to discrepant conclusions of political violence? Does group performance 
mitigate this effect? How would such an effect be demonstrated vis á vis national 
identification? Building on social identity theory, the current work aims at answering 
those questions by studying variations in identity’s saliency among Israelis, generated 
by different outcomes of political violence and their effect on national identification. 
                                                 
91 Other relevant criteria, such as the perceived expertise of the communicators, may be stronger than 
divisive coverage (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986); should opinions vary in terms of perceived expertise, the 
divisive coverage effect might be mitigated or rendered moot (Anastasio, Rose, & Chapman, 2005). 
92 Rather than an increased identification (according to Social Identity Theory’s BIRGing strategy) 
expected among the general population, or a null effect expected among members of minority groups 
that do not perceive Israel’s success as “their own”.     
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Part III: Social Capital, Trust and Cohesion 
 
 
Trust... is never to be taken for granted.... In our relation to the 
world, trust is always in conflict with mistrust. ...Yet if we are dominated 
by mistrust we cannot attend or interpret adequately, 
we cannot act accountably, and we will rupture, not strengthen, 
the solidarity of the community or communities we live. 
 




2.8  Social Capital and Cohesion 
 
According to Putnam (1995, p. 664), social capital is the social networks, norms and 
trust that enable people to act together effectively in the pursuit of shared objectives. It 
is the confidence people have that strangers will not take advantage of them 
(Bjørnskov, 2008, p. 271) or the belief that at worst others will not knowingly or 
willingly do harm and at best they will act in his interests (Newton, 2001, p. 202). This 
belief is based on shared identity, a sense of belonging to a common group or an 
imagined community. John Stuart Mill referred to this element as “sympathy” and 
argues that it is associated with the stability of the community, the sense of fellow 
feeling …   that one part of the community shall not consider themselves as foreigners 
with regard to another part (Dēmētriou & Loizides, 2013, p. 242). 
The eminent 14th century historian Ibn Khaldun maintained that the theory of 
“Asabiyyah” or tribal solidarity 93  is the social paste that binds people together. 
Asabiyyah enables members of a community or a nation to sustain themselves and to 
confront their opponents (Halim, Nor, Ibrahim, & Hamid, 2012). Ibn Khaldum 
                                                 
93 According to the Arab-English Lexicon, the term Asabiyyah emerged from the word “ta’asub” which 
literally means ...bounding the turban round (his own) head”. Asabiyyah is explained as the “...the 
action of ones in helping his people or his group against any aggressive action, the quality of a person 
who is angry for the sake of his group and protecting them, the action of ones who invites others to help 
his group … the action of an individual who associate with others or of him who protects others or 
partisanship and a strong association with holds numbers of person closely bound based on the same 
interest and opinion... (Lane, 1984). 
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contended that this tribal partisanship has influenced the rise and fall of certain 
dynasties or states94. Indeed, for democratic governance to be effective, citizens must 
have a basic trust in their government and should care, even slightly, about what 
happens to their fellow citizens and to the society at large (Cohen, 2008).  
Social capital 95  underpins both economic growth and democratic stability 
(Fukuyama, 1995). High level of social trust promote an open society, boost economic 
development and political stability, foster social happiness and increase the likelihood 
of investment in the future (Delhey, Newton, & Welzel, 2011; Inglehart, 1999; 
Putnam, 2001; Uslaner, 2002). Shared values and understandings within a given 
society not only facilitate co-operation, but also produce trust96. Social capital is the 
linchpin of every social group (Keeley, 2007 Chapter 6) and constitutes the foundation 
of civic participation in social and political activities97. A cohesive group  (c.f Forsyth, 
2010) is one in which the members are attracted to the group and to its task 
(Kozlowski & Bell, 2003). Members of strongly cohesive groups are more inclined to 
stay in the group and to engage in active participation (Dyaram & Kamalanabhan, 
2005).  
Traditionally, group cohesiveness has been inferred from the number and 
strength of mutual positive attitudes among members of a given group (Friedkin, 
2004; Lott & Lott, 1965). Turner (1981; 1982) describes this traditional view as the 
social cohesion model and notes that its central prediction is one which links group 
cohesiveness to success and failure. While this hypothesis was supported by extensive 
literature (Gnanakumar, 2015; Mooij, Smeets, & De Wit, 2011; Villagomez, Wyne, & 
Hsueh, 2010), a growing number of studies indicate that the relationship between 
group performance and intragroup cohesiveness may not be so straightforward (e.g., 
“Groupthink”, Janis, 1971). 
The profound benefits of unity, a feeling of togetherness or oneness98, are 
reflected in numerous historical literature and cultural references; The motto Unus pro 
omnibus, omnes pro uno (All for one and one for all) was used throughout history in 
                                                 
94 Ibn Khaldun argued that dynasties and cultures have a built-in lifespan, because the same solidarity 
that enables growth also contains the seeds of its eventual disintegration (Itzchakov, 2018). 
95 Defined by the OECD as networks together with shared norms, values and understanding that 
facilitate co-operation within or among groups (Keeley, 2007, p. 102). 
96 Trust would be directly and thoroughly addressed in the next subsection. 
97 As well as processes crucial for the functioning of effective democracy (Stolle & Hooghe, 2004). 
98 Also a totality of related parts or a condition of harmony as defined by Merrian-Webster dictionary, 
retrieved January 17, 2018 from: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unity).  
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order to evoke a sense of solidarity, duty and national unity. The slogan was originally 
used by Protestants in 1618 against the backdrop of the Defenestration of Prague 
(Helfferich, 2009, p. 16). In 1868, it was the center of an official campaign launched 
by Switzerland following widespread floods in the Swiss Alps earlier that year 
(Pfister, 2005), and has been considered the national Swiss motto since 1902 (Maurer, 
2013). A slightly modified version of the slogan has been popularized by its 
association with Dumas’ novel “The Three Musketeers”. Published in 1844, the 
historical adventure was the first in a trilogy to have risen to fame, having been 
adapted to stage, cinema and television in the 20th and 21st centuries99.   
The motto L'union fait la force (unity means strength) is based on the Bellum 
lugurthinum of the Roman republic (concordia res parvae crescent in Latin) and can 
be found on various nations’ coat of arms (such as Netherlands, Belgium, Bulgaria and 
Haiti). A similar message appears in Aesopic’s fable “The Old Man And His Sons” 
which dates back to the 2nd century BC100 and have resurfaced in modern times. A 
more recent version of the slogan, translated to “Hand by hand, stand firm together” 




2.9  Unraveling the Riddle of Social Trust 
 
Social trust is the expectation that others will contribute to the well-being of a person 
or a group, or at least refrain from harmful actions (Offe, 1999) and is one of the key 
resources for the development of societies (Traunmüller, Born, & Freitag, 2015) and 
democracies (Jamal & Nooruddin, 2010). Trust depends on dense social networks in 
civil society (Paxton, 2007; Putnam, 2001; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1994) and on 
effective and just political institutions (Freitag & Bühlmann, 2009; Rothstein & Stolle, 
2008). These structural bases of trust may be altered in ways that both hinder or foster 
trust relations within a population affected by political violence. The more a 
                                                 
99 For a very recent translation of the novel see Dumas, 2018. 
100 On his death bad, Skilurus, king of Scythia, father of 80 sons, gave a bundle of darts to each of them 
and asked each son to break them. When all refused, drawing out one by one, he easily broke them; thus 
teaching them that by sticking together they would be strong, but if divided- they would become weak 
(Plutarch, 1878). 
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community shares a common set of moral values, the greater likelihood that there 
should be a high level of collective trust (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 153). 
Trust research utilizes a multidimensional conception of social trust and 
distinguishes particularized from generalized trust (Freitag & Traunmüller, 2009; 
Uslaner, 2002). Particularized trust is trust at close social range and is exhibited 
toward people known from everyday interactions (e.g., family members, friends, 
neighbours). In contrast, generalized trust is an abstract attitude toward people in 
general, encompassing people beyond one’s immediate familiarity including fellow 
citizens, people of different background or complete strangers. The different forms of 
trust are occasionally assumed to be inversely related to each other (Fukuyama, 1995). 
Two main perspectives concerning the foundations of trust dominate the literature: 
whereas there are those who argue that trust is a general psychological propensity or a 
personal predisposition (Uslaner, 2002; Yamagishi, 2001), others stress that a person’s 
trust is a rational evaluation of the trustworthiness or dependability of others 
embedded in shared social structures (Coleman & Coleman, 1994; Cook, Hardin, & 
Levi, 2005; Hardin, 2002). These coincide with psychological and social structural 
aspects discussed in the effects of war101.  
Social trust tends to be higher when based on a sense of shared identity. Yet, 
identities are subject to repeated cycles of construction and reconstruction (Putnam, 
2007, p. 159). Similarly, theories of social trust hold that trust is the product of 
experience that is revised in relation to experience and circumstances (Brehm & Rahn, 
1997, p. 1009; Delhey & Newton, 2003, p. 97).  
The foundations and workings of social trust within the framework of politics, society 
and civic organizations is still not fully understood (Newton, 2001, p. 204). There is 
some consensus that social trust forms the basis of social capital as the driver for 
participation in the set of informal networks that govern daily life and creates 
connections between people (Delhey & Newton, 2003, pp. 110–111). Hearn (1997, p. 
97) goes as far as to suggest that social capital can only take root where trust prevails. 
Often defined as the mutually shared expectation, often expressed as confidence, that 
people will manifest sensible and when needed reciprocally beneficial behavior in 
their interactions with others (Welch et al., 2005, p. 475), the source of its 
development and its inherent endogeneity can be challenging to unravel. In spite of 
                                                 
101 See Kage, 2003 for a review of relevant literature in this regard. 
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Allport’s Contact Hypothesis (1954) by which contact should reduce social distance 
between in-group and out-groups and increase social trust, Putnam found that greater 
ethnic heterogeneity leads to lower levels of social trust (2007, p. 142). Similarly, 
Hooghe (2000) claimed that contact through organizations can lead to automatic 
increase in trust. However, as Delhey & Newton (2003) highlight, Putnam’s theories 
are more dependent on non-psychological experiential variables. The social-
psychological perspective or personality theory of trust point to trust being strongly 
associated with measures of personal optimism and a sense of control over one’s own 
life (Delhey & Newton, 2003, p. 96).  
There is a wide consensus in the literature that societies characterized by high 
levels of social trust demonstrate higher levels of political tolerance (Putnam, 2001, p. 
289) and greater resilience and ability to manage social problems (Fukuyama, 1995; 
Putnam, 2000; Welch et al., 2005, p. 467). Studies concerning the role of social capital 
as the foundation of stable democracy and economic efficiency have emphasized the 
critical function of trust as the main component of social capital (Coleman, 1990; 
Fukuyama, 1995; Newton, 2001, p. 202 citing Arrow, 1972; Ostrom, 2000; Putnam, 
1995, 2000). Whilst it is difficult to unravel the impact of social trust, Brehm and 
Rahn (1997) found a strong relationship between social trust and civic participation, 
and Misztal (2001) argueed that it is the crucial basis for social order as it provides the 
boundaries by which human interaction is limited. Overall, there seems to be little 
dispute in the literature that trust is the basis of peaceful, social relations and that it is 
critical to the development of strong economies and democracies. 
Studies of social trust in highly divided societies have emphasized that individual’s 
“trust radius” may only extend to a quarter of the population in the society (Fukuyama, 
1995). Bjørnskov (2008, p. 273) argued that such reduced radius of trust is likely to 
lead to reduced levels of both tolerance and economic well-being.  
 
 
2.9.1  Threats to Social Trust and Social Cohesion  
 
 
You may be deceived if you trust too much, but you will live in torment if 
you don’t trust enough  
   -- Frank Crane 
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Social trust is dependent upon dense social networks in civil society (Brehm & Rahn, 
1997, p. 1017) which will inevitably be altered in some measure due to the 
psychological consequences of violence. Consequently, exposure to violence is widely 
agreed to have significant effect on both individual and group identities, particularly 
within multi-ethnic societies. Nonetheless, the extent to which it builds or erodes 
social trust is disputed.  
It is generally posited that unifying effects emerge as a reaction to external 
threat, as an enhanced desire for internal conformity, and that cohesion can serve as a 
coping mechanism for dealing with the stress of threat. Such tension was found to 
have a galvanizing effect even within highly fractionalized societies. As Sumner 
(1906) emphasized, the exigencies of war outside is what makes peace inside. 
Traditional approaches from the sociological (Coser, 1956) and psychological (Sherif, 
1966) literature expanded upon Sumner’s thesis. High intensity violence was found to 
constitute a positive transformative force and lead to greater social trust (Traunmüller 
et al., 2015). Increased danger and perception of threat leaves no place for opposing 
views (Bar-Tal & Antebi quoted in Vollhardt, 2015), leading to greater cohesion and 
unity between communities. Identification Theory explains how individual action and 
change can trickle up to result in mass level mobilization, in that: 
 
If a mass of people exist whose individual constituents share the same 
national identification, then it can, with a clear methodological base, be 
stated that this mass may act as one unit in situations which affect the 
shared identity.  They may act together to make new identifications or act 
together to enhance and protect identifications already made (Bloom, 
1993, p. 53). 
 
 
Similarly, Nelson underlined that positive consequences of threat can reduce 
prejudices between those usually cast in the out-groups leading all members of the 
superordinate group to unite in the face of common threat (2009, citing Donvidio et. 
al, 2004). This supports the general understanding that external conflict increases 
internal cohesion and solidarity within groups leading to a “rally around the flag” 
effect. These findings support a growing literature on post-traumatic growth theory 
(PTG) that relates traumatic experiences to positive changes in personal outlooks and 
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social relations (Calhoun & Tedeschi, 2014; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). PTG effects 
include an improved self-concept, strengthened social relationships and changes in 
general views toward others. PTG has been documented in studies of youth exposed to 
conflict in Kashmir (Bhat & Rangaiah, 2015), displaced persons in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Petrov & Klariĉ, 2013), former refugees and displaced people in 
Sarajevo (Powell, Rosner, Butollo, Tedeschi, & Calhoun, 2003), American combat 
veterans (Elder & Clipp, 1989; Tedeschi & McNally, 2011) and youth exposed to 
terror incidents in Israel (Laufer & Solomon, 2006). This scholarships suggests that 
violence may have a ‘sobering’ effect on individuals (Ward, O’Loughlin, Bakke, & 
Cao, 2007, p. 32).   
 While political violence may result in positive social effects (demonstrated by 
the PTG literature), increased perception of threat and vulnerability caused by 
exposure to political violence can create psychological stress, giving rise to 
traumatizing experiences. The latter may provide people with clear evidence of the 
untrustworthiness, uncooperativeness and hostility of others (Kunovich & Hodson, 
1999; Rohner, Thoenig, & Zilibotti, 2013). Exclusionist attitudes were found to be 
associated with “perceived threats”, an observed long-term effect of exposure to 
terrorism (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2008, 2009; Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006). 
Psychological stress induced by exposure to terrorism, for example, was found to be 
associated with increased perception of threat that triggers “threat buffers” such as 
political exclusionism102 (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009, p. 364). Violent episodes can thus 
undermine trust and norms of cooperation and lead to increased political intolerance 
towards out-groups. Kalyvas’ (2006) model of selective violence focuses on the 
multiple layers of identities in each individual that can lead to increased 
fractionalization within communities when faced with violent events. Weidmann & 
Zurcher’s (2013) study of communities in Afghanistan similarly found that social trust 
in the face of external violence was not as resilient as expected. 
Social-psychological explanations for increased political exclusionism as a 
result of exposure to violence have focused on the impact of the perception of threat 
on social identity and consequently on group identity. Threat perception has been 
                                                 
102 Much of this scholarship focuses on the relationship between the views of the Jewish communities 
towards the Palestinian communities of Israel, although similar studies (cf. Coenders, 2001; Halperin, 
Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004) have also examined different 
types of exclusionism relating to other ethnic out-group members, immigrants and political refugees. 
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considered by many as the single best predictor of hostile intergroup attitudes 
(Canetti-Nisim, Ariely, & Halperin, 2008, p. 90 citing Sullivan, 1981; Quillian, 1995; 
Stephan & Stephan, 2000). This has been examined in depth in relation to exposure to 
political extremism and its relationship on political exclusionism (Canetti, Strenger, 
Lavi, & Bar-Tal, 2017; Canetti-Nisim et al., 2008; Canetti-Nisim, Halperin, Sharvit, & 
Hobfoll, 2009; Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006). More recently, the focus has shifted to 
a closer examination of the discrete emotions that are triggered as a result of exposure 
to violence including the effect of fear, hatred and anger (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009; 
Halperin, 2011, 2015). This scholarship helped explain some of the micro-processes 
that underpin the relationship between theories of realistic and symbolic threats 
(Stephan & Stephan, 2000, 2009) and the derogation of out-groups (as explained by 
social identity theory, Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
 
Social trust is constantly being re-evaluated in relation to the accumulation and 
updating of experiences (Hardin, 2002; Newton, 2001). Whilst social trust might 
increase between communities during times of perceived high-levels of threat, it can 
also have negative social effects due to increased threat perception. As the relevant 
literature fails to distinguish between discrepant conclusions of political violence, the 
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3  Methodology 
   
Research presented in this dissertation was carried out in two levels of analysis. First, 
a macro-level analysis, aimed at empirically testing the underlying hypothesis 
according to which discrepant outcomes of political violence have distinct effects on 
social and national identities. This was done by two web-based experiments. Second, a 
micro-level analysis explored the effect of successful and unsuccessful conclusions 
(perceived by Israelis) of Israeli military operation on Israelis’ national identification, 
social trust and social rifts. The methodology employed in both levels of analysis, the 




3.1           Macro-level Analysis 
  
 
3.1.1 Appropriateness  
Web experiments 103  offer a number of advantages 104  compared to traditional 
laboratory experiments. While online data collection efforts are undertaken in many 
areas of research (American Psychological Society, 2018), the web experimental 
method was found to be particularly suitable for cognitively oriented areas of research, 
both theoretically (Reips, 1997) and practically (Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000). 
High speed with which web experimenting is possible, its low costs and the chance to 
reach participants from diverse background and locations stood in the base of my 
decision to use internet-based research in order to test the nexus between discrepant 
outcomes of political violence and identity saliency on the macro-level105.  
 Another consideration related to positionality. As mentioned in the 
introduction, quantitative analysis in general and web-experiments in particular 
enabled me to both distance myself from the subject matter (which I felt necessary as 
                                                 
103 Also referred to as internet/internet-based/online experiments. Here the term “Web Experiments” is 
used for two main reasons: it was the original term and it is also the most accurate one, as most online 
experiments are put on and delivered via the web, rather than via emails, social networks etc. 
104 Reips (2002b) noted 18 advantages and seven disadvantages of implementing web experiments. 
105 The full analysis appears in chapter six. 
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an Israeli researching Israeli identities), and contributed to the validity of the results 
(e.g., replicability). Moreover, while a large number of participants is vital when 
conducting experimental research due to higher statistical power associated with a 
larger sample size, as I was unable to offer any monetary reward to my participants106, 
internet-based experimentation constituted an appropriate choice. Naturally, I used the 
Web to promote both experiments. Lastly, since the experiments were set to base a 
more general relationship between war outcomes and individual identities, online 
experiments allowed me to easily and quickly access a wide range of people (of 
different origins, ages, educational background etc.).   
What follows is a short history of web experiments and a discussion of their 
advantages and disadvantages in conducting quality academic research. I then turn to 
reviewing measures taken in order to address potential issues when designing the two 
web-based experiments conducted as part the macro-level analysis (see chapter five).  
 
 
3.1.2 A Short History of Web Experiments 
Whereas local computer networks allowed researchers to extend computerized 
experimenting beyond a single Personal Computer (PC) in the 1990s 107 , the 
development of the Internet and its exponential growth has undoubtedly revolutionized 
the field of experimental research. For the past two decades, distinct advantages of the 
World Wide Web (WWW) over traditional laboratory research practices108 made it a 
popular medium for conducting human experimental research 109 . Adaptivity, 
interactivity, and ease of data storage and analysis constitute the main advantages110 of 
the new technology (Musch & Reips, 2000). Early computerized experimental 
research dates back to the 1970s’ and include Connes (1972) and Hoggatt (1977). 
Back in the 1960s’, the initial purpose of the Internet was to connect the “Advanced 
Research Projects Agency Network” (ARPAnet), a US Defense Department network, 
                                                 
106 Higher number of participants was found to be associated with a financial incentive offered to 
subjects (Musch & Reips, 2000).  
107 E.g., in order to collect data (Hoffman & MacDonald, 1993). 
108  For a comparison between traditional pen and paper laboratory research and computerized 
experimental research see Hewson, Laurent, & Vogel, 1996. 
109 Unlike an online (or offline) questionnaire, experiments include a manipulation of some variables. 
110  Further advantages are standardized and controlled presentation of stimuli, item-branching 
capabilities, immediacy of data entry and accurate measurements of response times on the one hand, 
together with reduced transcription costs, errors, experimenter biases (Hewson et al., 1996; Smith & 
Leigh, 1997) and missing responses on the other hand (Musch & Reips, 2000). 
                                       62 
with other radio and satellite networks (Abbate, 1994; Hardy, 1995). Two decades 
later, the development of Ethernet111 allowed computers sharing the same physical 
space to connect to a time-sharing computer site112 (Salus, 1995) and later included 
access to the ARPANET (Musch & Reips, 2000). The final piece of the puzzle and the 
most crucial part of modern internet- the “World Wide Web” was developed at the 
European Laboratory for Particle Physics (CERN) in the early 1990s’, utilizing a 
previous project of Tim Berners-Lee (“Enquire-Within-Upon-Everything”) as a basis 
for the hypertext concept113. Musch and Reips (2000, p. 62) articulated the pretense of 
the system designed to enable collaborative work: By putting information on a web of 
hypertext documents. The documents would be put on servers and client software, 
called a browser, would allow one to access the information stored on the server. The 
software calls up the information by searching for a link's uniform resource locator 
(URL). It then uses the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) to get the document, which 
is coded in hypertext markup language (HTML).  
 Among its functions, HTML allows for interactive “fill out forms”. The 
creation of such forms constituted a genuine milestone in the development of the 
Internet; for the first time, the reader of a Web document was able to communicate 
back to the server (mostly by hitting “submit” at the bottom of the form) which would 
then pass the forms’ data to a designated program and send some kind of output back 
to the browser 114 . Drawing on forms, the WWW first offered the possibility of 
conducting surveys and experiments independent of any geographical constraints115 
(Musch & Reips, 2000, p. 64). These technical capabilities were soon enhanced by 
JavaScript, an object-based scripting language, embedded directly into the HTML 
page and could be used to create interactive Web pages116 (Flanagan, 2006). The 
                                                 
111  “Ethernet” is a blanket name for different technologies used to transfer data. It has become 
synonymous with Local Area Network before the development of the Internet and wireless networks.  
112 Due to the high costs of computers they were mostly owned by universities, institutions and offices. 
“Dumb terminals”- several sets of a monitor and a keyboard that were psychically connected to a 
“main” computer by an Ethernet cable shared its processing power. By organizing and consecutively 
executing the different “requests”, this system allowed multiple individual users to work 
simultaneously, thus “sharing the time” on the processor. 
113 In the 1980s’, Berners-Lee’s notebook program “Enquire-Within-Upon-Everything” created links 
between arbitrary nodes, which were given a title and a list of bidirectional typed links (AKA 
Hyperlinks) (Abbany, 2016; Bernes Lee, 1989, 1996).  
114 Mostly to approve receiving the data or to terminate the session. 
115 This allowed researchers to expend their subjects’ pool beyond their course, faculty or university.  
116 Java, an Internet programming language that became available in 1995 further developed the way 
applications and information could be retrieved, displayed, and used over the Internet and thus, 
extended the possibilities for the creation of more sophisticated experiments. (Musch & Reips, 2000) 
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WWW, thus, had the potential to serve both as a supplemental source (e.g., in order to 
validate results from field research or laboratory experiments, see Pohl, Bender, & 
Lachmann, 2002), or for new investigations, reasonably feasible only in this 
medium117.  
 However, using the WWW as a medium for experimental research also poses a 
unique set of challenges. An internet-based experiment, conducted by Musch and 
Reips (2000) examined the conditions and results obtained by the first ever created 
Web experiments. Alongside a discussion of the challenges embedded in using such 
medium for academic research118, their research indicated an increasing number of 
Web experiments with promising results.  
 
 
3.1.3  Web Experiments: Advantages and Challenges  
Whereas an Internet scan for “Web experiments” conducted in the fall of 1994 yield 
no results, by the winter of 1995 several online laboratories were “installed” and more 
were soon to follow119. Early web experiments include Welches’ (1995) auditory 
perception study, Weigend’s music recognition experiments and Krantz and 
colleagues’ (1997) research on the determinants of female attractiveness (which was 
also the first web experiment to use between subject design120).  
 Whereas validity and aspects of realization (low power, experimenter effects) 
were two of the main points of criticism of Experimental Psychology, voiced in the 
early 1960s’ and 1970s’ (e.g., Chapanis, 1967; Orne, 1962; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 
1969; Rosenthal & Fode, 1963; Smart, 1966), web-based research constituted a 
solution to most of these issues121. The anonymity enabled by Internet-based research 
is essential in studies that necessitate subjects to disclose private information (e.g., 
                                                 
117 Due to, for example, a required large sample size (such as in Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000) or to 
the type of the sample- a very specific population (such as in Birnbaum, 2001). 
118 Including multiple entries of the same participant and hacking attempts. 
119  Prominent examples are the Web’s Experimental Psychology Lab (online since 1995), The 
Interactive CyberLab for Decision-Making Research (online since 1996), Experimental Server Trier, 
Max-Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics Tubingen and Online Psychology Lab Padua (online 
since 1997), Decision Research Center, PsychExps and the excellently designed Internet Psychology 
Lab (online since 1998). A more comprehensive list of web experiments online can be found on the 
Psychological Research on the Net page (American Psychological Society, 2018). 
120  Between-subject designs require random assignment of participants to experimental conditions. 
Online, this can be done by using JavaScript or Java (Kieley, 1996; Reips, 1999).  
121 However, it is important to note that web experiments are not appropriate for all research projects. 
As abovementioned, in the case of chapter four, web-based research is the most suitable mode of 
experimentation due to its’ low cost, external validity, wide sample121 and a high degree of automation. 
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when researching sensitive target groups such as drug users, Coomber, 1997; Rodgers 
et al., 2001 or intimate issues such as sexual orientation or trauma, Hiskey & Troop, 
2002). 
 In order to address issues inherent to Internet-based studies, various 
methodological and technical procedures were employed in the research at hand. Upon 
presenting a summarized overview of potential issues when conducting internet-based 
experimental research, I will discuss the solutions employed in both web-based 
experiments presented in chapter five (hereinafter “Experiment I”, “Experiment II”). 
 
 Compatibility- Server-side (rather than client-side) processing was used to 
collect data in both experiments. As dynamic procedures are performed on the 
server, this method is less prone to platform-dependent issues (Schmidt, 2000). 
Similarly to offline non-internet based research, participants in Experiment I 
and Experiment II were randomly assigned to different experimental 
conditions in order to prevent confounding and order effects. 
 Interface- Whereas in the past web experimenters had to manually create their 
experiments, designated applications or web tools significantly reduced the 
necessity of HTML knowledge. Experiment I was created using Wextor122, a 
web-based tool for generating and visualizing experimental designs and 
procedures. WEXTOR-based experiments are automatically generated in a 
way that relaxes specific methodological concerns of Internet-based 
experimentation (such as non-obvious file naming, Reips, 2002a).  
Experiment II was created by Google Forms123. Not an experiment 
creating tool per se, Google Forms is often used to create online forms and 
surveys that are distributed via e-mail. Google Forms’ main advantages are 
extended compatibility (participants are able to take part in the experiment 
from most web browsers, from smartphones and tablets) and a user friendly, 
free interface (Wolber, 2012). The missing randomization, necessary for 
transforming a survey into an experiment was added with a script124 which 
                                                 
122 Wextor is a web-based tool for designing and visualizing laboratory and web experiments in a 
guided process. Wextor allows for between-subjects, within-subjects, and quasi-experimental (natural) 
factors. For more information in this regard, see http://wextor.org/wextor/en/, Reips & Neuhaus, 2002. 
123 For more information in this regard see https://www.google.com/forms/about/. 
124 Potential participants were directed to a URL address via link that was embedded in the invitation to 
take part in the experiment. The link targeted not the experiment itself, but the aforementioned script, 
which conduct the randomization in the background and sent the participants to one of the four research 
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automatically and randomly redirected participants to one of the four 
experimental conditions. The script was inspired by a blog-post125 written by 
Anna-Marie Martin from the University of Auckland. 
 Self-Selection- Since both Experiments are classical cognition-and-perception-
theory-testing experiments, self-selection isn’t considered problematic126. Yet, 
as the research is socially oriented and in order to prevent a selection bias 
which might originate in social-media recruiting, the multiple site entry 
technique 127  (Reips, 2000, 2002c) was used in order to address the self-
selection concern and increase the study’s generalizability. Consequently, 
several links to Experiment I were used in the recruiting process, attracting 
different types of participants (e.g., Political Science students or Peace and 
Conflict researchers). Although the links were identical in that they referred 
participants to the same experiment, the source link was documented by 
Wextor. Comparing the collected data as a function of the referring location 
allowed the author to control for selection bias and self-selection (Reips, 
2002c). Self-selection was not detected, thereby indicating high 
generalizability. As Google Forms does not allow for a similar documentation 
of source links, this procedure was not performed in Experiment II.  
 Participants’ Identity- As participants’ identity online cannot be easily 
determined, multiple submissions (from the same or from different IP 
addresses) is hard to detect. In Experiment I, Wextor documented participant’s 
IP address and allowed the author to delete multiple answers originating in the 
same IP address. In Experiment II, no documentation of IP address was 
available128. In order to secure data integrity in both Experiments, a seriousness 
check was included and a check for identical records documented in close 
temporal interval was performed (Musch & Reips, 2000). 
                                                                                                                                             
conditions. The Author acknowledged the assistance of Paul Higgins, a software engineer, in writing the 
aforementioned script and hosting it on his private server (Higgins.at). 
125 The blog-post was published in the Teaching statistic is awesome blog and discussed the issue of 
designing online experiments using Google Forms by adding randomized redirection (see 
http://teaching.statistics-is-awesome.org/designing-online-experiments-using-google-forms-random-
redirect-tool/). The author acknowledges the assistance of Anna-Marie in this regard.  
126 According to Reips (2002b, p. 247) theory testing is the underlying model of epistemology and 
people are not considered to vary much on the essential criteria. 
127 This technique allows the researcher to determine (often using log file analysis, Schmidt, 2000) the 
online experiments’ degree of appeal for participation associated with different referring Web sites. 
128 Yet, the rate of repeated participation (mostly below 3%) was found to pose no real threat to the 
reliability of Internet-based research (Krantz & Dalal, 2000; Musch & Reips, 2000). 
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 Generalizability- A limited generalizability argument referring to results 
obtained from Internet-based research is twofold: it was argued that differences 
exist between behaviors in computer-mediated and face-to-face situations (see 
for example Postmes, Spears, Sakhel, & De Groot, 2001) and that limited 
accessibility to computers in general, and to the WWW in particular, may 
restrict the generalizability of the research altogether. Notwithstanding the 
aforementioned challenges to generalizability, major advantages of web 
experiments point to increased generalizability through non-local samples with 
a wider distribution of demographic characteristics (Krantz & Dalal, 2000), 
eliminating effects which potentially originate from the unfamiliar settings of 
an experiment (“Ecological” validity, Reips, 1995, 1997) and a more authentic 
observed behavior in light of a higher degree of voluntariness129 (Reips, 1997, 
2000). Said issues were taken into account in designing and interpreting the 
results of both experiments130. 
 Dropouts- When compared with laboratory experiments, participants in web 
experiments are more likely to end their participation at any time during the 
experiment, aka to drop out (e.g., Bamert, 2002; Reips, 1997). Dropout may 
pose similar problems as self-selection and result in a compromised 
explanatory power 131  (Reips, 2002b). It is, thus, essential to design the 
experiment in a way that would allow measuring dropout rates (for example, 
“one-item-one-screen” design)132. In order to reduce dropouts’ negative effects, 
the following measures were taken:  
 Short experiments (average completion time was under 10 minutes133).  
                                                 
129 Participants’ voluntary motivational nature was found to be higher in web experiments compared 
with laboratory experiments (Reips, 1997). High degree of voluntariness is important in reducing 
psychological reactance effects (e.g., careless responding and ceasing participation) and as participants 
who don’t feel coerced into participation are more likely to comply with the instructions of the 
experiment and complete it. 
130 Please refer to chapter five for further discussion in this regard. 
131 Whereas Schmidt (2000) found that sophisticated technologies used in Internet research (e.g., audio 
or streaming video formats) may contribute to dropout, participants’ boredom was also found to have 
the same effect. Consequently, Experiment A was text-based and had a minimalist monochromatic 
design while Experiment B was colorful video-based (the videos were put on YouTube and thus didn’t 
result in a longer loading time of the experiment itself).  
132 Dropout rate was only reported in Experiment I due to the nature of Google Forms. 
133 Though Experiment I was text-based and thus a higher variation in completion time between non-
English native speakers vs. English native speakers was likely, the average completion time as 
documented by Wextor did not exceed 10 minutes. As Experiment II was video-based and its 
completion time was less dependent on the reading pace of the individual participant, completion time 
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 Multiple-choice questions were used in both experiments 134 and 
participants were given the choice to refuse to answer a specific 
question and still complete the experiments135. 
 Both experiments included a friendly, colorful design coupled with a 
short loading time in order to contribute to a positive and not over-
burdening participation experience. Moreover, clear, precise and short 
instructions were given in both experiments136.  
 Participants were not offered monetary compensation for taking part in 
the experiments. However, participants were given information 
regarding the importance of their participation 137  (emotional 
persuasion, see Brader, 2005; Clary, Snyder, Ridge, Miene, & Haugen, 
1994; Mullin, 2015), were thanked for taking part in each experiment 
upon its completion and were given the option to comment or 
communicate with the author regarding the experiment via email.  
 Two dropout reduction techniques often used in the Web Experimental 
Psychology Lab (e.g. Musch & Klauer, 2002) were applied in both 
experiments: seriousness check138 and warm-up. Asking participants to 
specify whether they wish to seriously take part in the experiment 
(rather than to browse through it), aka “seriousness check”, was found 
to be associated with a much lower dropout rate (Reips, 2002c). 
Whereas both experiments included a direct seriousness check, 
Experiment I also included a seriousness task139.  
As most dropouts occur at the beginning of an online study (Reips, 
                                                                                                                                             
was easier to assess (and resulted in an average of about 5 minutes), even though Google Forms did not 
document such data. Both experiments informed potential participants in advance regarding the 
estimated time needed to for completion as a positive connection was found between such practice and 
a higher number of participants (Musch & Reips, 2000). 
134 Experiment I also included a writing assignment as a seriousness check. As intuitively predicted, this 
task highly increased the dropout rate compared with the multiple-choice questions. 
135 The use of scripts that do not allow participants to leave items unanswered was found to be biasing 
(Reips, 2002b). 
136 As realized following interviews with a focus group as part of pilot version of the experiment. 
137 In assisting the completion of the authors’ doctoral dissertation.  
138 A seriousness check can also reduce the bias that may originate in the participation of experts, 
allowing them to view the experiment without potentially corrupting a colleagues’ data (Aust, 
Diedenhofen, Ullrich, & Musch, 2013).  
139 The seriousness task was also meant to establish whether the participation was affected by the 
information given to them in the first part of Experiment I (identification with an imaginary country). A 
more in depth discussion in this regard is found in chapter five. 
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2002b), The warm-up technique is aimed at lengthening participants’ 
orientation period and its implementation was found to be highly 
effective in reducing post experimental manipulation dropouts (Reips, 
2002c). Consequently, in both experiments several web pages were 
placed before the experimental manipulation. These included a 
welcome page, an introductory page 140  and several demographic 
questions141. The warm-up technique was also aimed at increasing data 
quality142 (Reips, 2002b).  
 Misunderstandings- Online experiments, unlike laboratory experiments, don’t 
enable interactive communication between the participant and the 
experimenter, potentially increasing the likelihood of misunderstandings. Yet, 
in web experiments, pre-testing of the materials and collecting feedback by 
providing participants with communication opportunities were found to 
effectively address this issue (Welch & Krantz, 1996). Whereas pre-testing of 
the experiment (a pilot run) was conducted for both experiments, only 
Experiment II provided participants with the possibility to contact the 
researcher via email at its offset (thus allowing participants to ask questions, 
make comments and to point out errors). While the problem of drawing 
conclusions concerning real behavior from Internet data is inherent to all web-
based research and experimental research in general, data ambiguity 143  is 
nevertheless an issue worth noting. Yet, in both web-based experiments no 
extreme irregularities that may point to such ambiguity were detected.  
 Data Quality- multiple submissions from the same participant, even without 
malice (e.g., due to technical errors) may result in low quality data. If done 
with malice it poses a challenge to the validity of the data altogether. By 
clicking the “back” button, built-in to all web browsers, participants are able to 
re-examine their formerly submitted data, alter is and submit it again (Schmidt, 
1997). In order to increase data quality in general, and deal with the problem of 
                                                 
140 Which contained summarized information about the experiment (such as context, subject, expected 
completion time and data protection). 
141 Frick et al (2001) found that data quality is better in Web based studies that asked for identifying 
information at the study’s onset rather than its offset. 
142 By ensuring that the data collected originated from the most highly committed participants.  
143  E.g., high dropout rates/long response times may result from technical issues or a slow 
computer/network connection rather a consequence of participant’s behavior (Reips, 2002b). 
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multiple submissions in particular, several measures were taken including 
filtering out suspicious submissions  by manually checking same-participant144 
data consistency145 (Buchanan & Smith, 1999; Smith & Leigh, 1997), reducing 
the potential for incomplete data originated in missing responses 146 , and 
excluding data that doesn’t meet specific criteria147. 
 Hacking- Hackers may try to tamper with the experimental results or even 
gain control over the web server that hosts the experiment (Schmidt, 1997). 
This concern is mostly theoretical as little to no indication of hacker attacks 
against formerly performed online experiments exists (Musch & Reips, 2000). 
Though it is likely that a successful attack would be noticed, the possibility that 
a hidden undetected attack took place cannot be entirely excluded. 
 
 
3. 2          Micro-level analysis 
  
While acknowledging the difficulty to discover the view of ordinary people (as 
opposed to governments or activists) Hobsbawm (1990) emphasised the importance of 
the "view from below" when studying questions of nationalism (Raviv, 2002). 
Consequently, I chose to embrace a “top down” approach and focus on one particular 
country within a specific time frame.  
 Whereas Israel is a developed western nation, it has several unique features 
that make it interesting in terms of national identity and social trust and concerning the 
way discrepancy in outcomes of political violence influences the latter. The next 
segment is a short review of the theoretical and methodological considerations that 
stood in the base of the author’s decision to focus on the state of Israel. 
 
 
3.2.1 Focusing on the State of Israel and Israeli Society 
Theoretical considerations for restricting the research to the land of Israel denote 
Israel’s national and social characters alongside the salient presence of political 
                                                 
144 Participants were identified by their IP addresses, while keeping their anonymity.  
145 For example, cross-referencing age/age group with highest academic degree achieved (for example, 
a teenager is unlike to have completed a PhD). 
146 E.g., by drawing attention to unanswered questions (a technique employed in both experiments). 
147 Such as when indicated that participation is not serious, when response times are extremely short 
(which may suggest clicking through the experiment randomly) or when participations ignored the 
seriousness task of Experiment I. 
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violence in the lives of Israelis. That is, primarily due to its small geographical 
space 148 , the high levels of exposure to political violence- both in scale and in 
frequency and as fighting isn’t restricted to one specific border or region149. Despite 
being predominantly Jewish, the Israeli society is characterized by high 
heterogeneity150 with religious, national, ethnic, and cultural differences separating the 
groups comprising it. The main national identities – Jewish and Arab151 – split into 
subgroups with separate identities152. In its’ early years, Israel’s cohesive value was 
pioneering (Eisenstadt, 1985) and Zionism was the notion on which the Israeli-Jewish 
identity was based (Sachar, 2013). Yet, during the last seven decades, the consensus 
about the content of Israeli identity has changed and is now differently defined by each 
of the subgroups in Israeli society.  
Recant trends in the Israeli social and academic discourse include “Post-
Zionism” or “Anti-Zionism”, casting doubt on the need for Israel’s definition as “The 
Jewish State” (Arian, Atmor, & Hadar, 2007). While globalization, individualism and 
political integration were found to be associated with a reduced general and domain-
specific pride, mainly in Europe (Smith & Kim, 2006), Israel is a unique exception 
(Cohen, 2008). Despite its high social heterogeneity, many signs of high level national 
identification and social solidarity are discerned, both in ordinary times and during 
periods of crises (e.g., Arian et al., 2010). With Judaism being a cohesive element for 
most of the county’s residents and a key element in Israel’s existence as a Jewish 
nation-state153, the importance of the Holocaust and the Zionistic values in the Israeli 
ethos create a strong but defensive nationalistic sentiment (Cohen, 2008). 
Furthermore, violence being a recurring theme in Israeli history, security challenges 
faced by Israelis and their prominence in the Israeli media make the concern over 
national identity especially salient (Cohen, 2008).  
 Methodically, as the theory developed in this dissertation requires group 
members to be exposed to varied outcomes of political violence, it was necessary to 
                                                 
148 Israel’s size is only 22,072 km², Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017. 
149 For example, military operations Pillar of Defense and Protective Edge were fought in Israel’s 
southern border whereas the Second Lebanon War was fought in its northern part.  
150 According to Raviv (2002), Israel’s social structure limited class differences.  
151 According to the Central Bureau of Statistics’ recant repot (2017), Jews constitute 74.6% of Israel's 
population, Arab/Palestinian citizens constitute 20.9%. 
152 Jews split into secularists and religious, Ashkenazi and Sephardi (European/American and Middle 
Eastern). Non-Jews include Christian Arabs, Muslim Arabs, Druze, and Bedouin. 
153 Despite undeniable religious-secular disputes (Levy, Levinsohn, & Katz, 2002). 
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identify a country that experienced such recurrent violence with varied aftermath. 
Along with several other democracies (e.g., Northern Ireland), Israel has experienced 
chronic and persistent political violence since its inception in 1948. At a constant state 
of war with most of its neighboring countries, Israel has undergone repeated fighting 
periods, terrorism and military operations. During the years of the study, from 2003 to 
2015, Israel endured several periods of political violence including initiated military 
operations and wars that had both successful and unsuccessful outcomes (from the 
Israeli point of view). It thus fulfills the aforementioned prerequisite.  
 Further methodological considerations for turning to Israel include the quality 
and extent of data available and the ability to control for country specific 
characteristics. Such quality data is available in the Israeli Democracy index (IDI), a 
part of the “Continuing Survey” conducted by the Guttman Center for Surveys 
(GCS)154. Moreover, the historical break which occurred as a majority of Jewish 
people were uprooted from other countries and relocated to a new area, contributed to 
limiting the influences of region and class variations on social and national Israeli 
identity to a minimum (Raviv, 2002), thus permitting a more focused investigation of 
the effect of political violence on social and national identities. 
As part of the micro-level analysis of the Israeli case, qualitative and 
quantitative research methods were combined. Whereas chapter five presents 
discourse155  and historical analyses156 , chapters six and seven incorporate content 
analysis with regression analysis. Content analysis was used in order to construct the 
independent variable for the quantitative analysis, namely, the perceived outcome of 
Israeli military operations (from the Israeli point of view, based on relevant 
commentaries appearing in Israeli newspapers). Before turning to the construction of 
variables, it is necessary to define and identify the body of cases/episodes of political 
violence to be analyzed. This is especially necessary in light of the ongoing nature of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and as low-level violence persists at all times.  
  
                                                 
154 For more information in this regard, please refer to sub section 3.2.5. 
155  The discourse-historical approach relates to the socio-cognitive theory of van Dijk who views 
discourse as structured forms of knowledge (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). Van Dijk perceived discourse a 
social interaction (1997), introduced the socio-cognitive approach in critical discourse (2015) and 
developed principles of critical discourse analysis (1993) as explicit socio-political discourse analysis. 
156 Textual analysis closely examines, describes and interprets either the content and meaning of texts or 
their structure and discourse. It is used in order to trace the way people (in a specific culture and time) 
interpret reality and make sense of the world around them (Lockyer, 2008; McKee, 2003). 
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Contemporary Israeli media 
Since the dependent variable used in the studies presented in chapters six and seven is 
based on a content analysis of Israeli news articles, published in three daily 
newspapers with the largest readership in the country, a short review of the state of 
present-day Israeli media is in order. Whereas general issues concerning contemporary 
Israeli media will be briefly discussed, special emphasize will be put on Israeli press 
due to its relevance for the current research.  
The “Freedom of the Press” is the most comprehensive dataset available on 
global media freedom. In its’ annual report, it assesses157 the degree of freedom of 
print, broadcast, and digital media around the world. Until 2009, Israel’s Freedom of 
the Press rating158 was somewhat stable and the country’s press status was “free”. In 
2009 press status was changed to “partly free” due to the intensification of the Gaza 
conflict, reflected in travel restrictions on reporters and official attempts to influence 
media coverage of the conflict within Israel (Freedom of press report, Israel 2009). In 
2010, “free” press status was restored and sustained until 2013. Then, Israel’s press 
status declined back to “partly free” following several significant developments, 
among which instances of politicized interference with the content of the Israeli 
Broadcasting Authority159 (IBA) radio programs and concerns surrounding the license 
renewal of television’s Channel 10 (Freedom of press report, Israel 2013). The “free” 
press status was restored in 2014 and sustained for an additional year. Since 2015, the 
status has consistently been “partly free”, mostly due to the growing impact of Israel 
Hayom (Israel today) and the unchecked expansion of paid content—some of it 
government funded—whose nature was not clearly identified to the public (Freedom of 
press report, Israel 2016).  
According to the Freedom of the Press index160, Israeli media are pluralistic and 
coverage of both domestic and international issues conveys a diversity of perspectives 
that is unusual for societies under conditions of conflict (Freedom of press report, 
                                                 
157  Freedom of the Press provides numerical scores and country narratives evaluating the legal 
environment for the media, political pressures that influence reporting, and economic factors that affect 
access to news and information. For more information in this regard, see: 
https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press. 
158 Israel’s rank reflects the freedom of press within Israel, excluding the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
159 In July 2014, the Knesset voted to close the IBA and replace it with a new entity. The law offered 
sound guarantees to protect the new authority from political pressure and to ensure that it will operate 
more efficiently. A professional manager was brought in to replace political appointees, and by 2015 the 
IBA was in the process of transitioning to its new structure. 
160 This section is highly based on Freedom of the press reports regarding Israel published 2002-2017. 
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Israel 2009). Foreign journalists, including some who are strongly critical of Israeli 
policies are generally accredited. Yet, the on-going confrontation with Palestinian 
groups and neighboring countries has led to a degree of travel restrictions161 and other 
controls on journalists162. Moreover, Israel's Government Press Office (GPO) has been 
known to pose difficulties for foreign journalists suspected of anti-Israeli political 
orientation. Israeli media, printed, broadcasted and online, offers a diverse range of 
views, which are generally free from overt political interference. However, political 
interference in the media market had become a growing concern in recent years. The 
transparency of ownership at various media outlets is greater than in the past, but is 
largely due to scrutiny from rival outlets and efforts organized on social media. Some 
members of the media have failed to comply with Israel Press Council ethical 
guidelines that require them to disclose the full range of interests behind their 
respective outlets. While the allocation of state advertising and announcements to 
newspapers are mostly guided by circulation figures, other considerations play a role, 
leaving room for discretion.  
 Freedom of the press is generally respected in Israel and its’ legal protections 
is robust. Even though the country’s basic law does not specifically address the issue, 
Supreme Court rulings have repeatedly affirmed that the freedom of expression is an 
essential component of human dignity. Hate speech and publishing praise of violence 
are prohibited in Israel and in 2002, Israeli Ministry of Interior ordered the closure of 
Sawt al-Haq wa Al-Hurriya, a weekly newspaper published by the radical wing of the 
Islamic Movement in Israel (Freedom of the Press, 2003). While confidentiality of 
journalistic sources is not explicitly protected under Israeli law, the former is upheld 
by the court163. Protected by law since 1998, the court has gradually widened its 
interpretation of the freedom of information and public’s right to know. The pluralistic 
                                                 
161 The closed military zones of the Palestinian territories and Gaza strip extend two miles into Israeli 
territory, effectively preventing local and foreign journalists from reporting on developments in the 
other side or near the border. Yet, an informal arrangement exists under which the IDF enables 
journalists to stay in the West Bank for professional purposes.  
162 For example, in 2002 the GPO, citing security concerns, did not renew the credentials of several 
Palestinian journalists working in Israel after some Palestinian militants posed as journalists in order to 
carry out terror attacks inside Israel. These controls intensified somewhat during the fighting in the 
Gaza Strip at the end of 2008. Whereas the Israeli High Court ruled in favour of a Foreign Press 
Association petition that the Gaza ban be lifted in 2009 and called for a limited number of journalists to 
be allowed entry into Gaza, the total ban remained in place (Freedom of press report, Israel 2009). 
163 In 2012, Israeli Supreme Court ruled that journalistic privilege extends to the confidential source and 
information that may reveal its identity. Yet, authorities have continued to conduct investigations and 
surveillance aimed at uncovering journalists’ sources (Freedom of press report, Israel 2017). 
                                       74 
makeup of the Israeli society is reflected in the vibrant press landscape. With more 
than a dozen daily newspapers and a wide range of weeklies and news websites, 
readers from various religious, ethnic, and linguistic groups actively consume news. 
Israel’s major newspapers are privately 164  owned by a small number of wealthy 
families, some of whom have strong connections to the political leadership. Some 
owners have been known to influence the editorial content of their papers (Freedom of 
the Press, 2009) while others freely criticize government policies and aggressively 
pursue cases of official corruption.  
Economic pressures have undermined the sustainability of key outlets in recent 
years, threatening long-term media pluralism. Israel Hayom which is circulated for 
free enjoys the largest distribution in Israel165. Its owner-subsidized business model 
has forced other mainstream newspapers to lower advertising rates, thus threatening 
their sustainability. Israel Hayom is owned and subsidized by American businessman 
Sheldon Adelson and strongly supports Netanyahu, who has been accused of colluding 
with the paper to ensure favorable coverage. Israel Hayom’s major competitor166, 
daily newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth and its website Ynet are known for criticizing the 
prime minister and for endorsing other politicians. Due to the transfer of advertising 
budgets to digital media, the fact that Israel has a small advertising market overall, and 
the continued growth of Israel Hayom, Israeli press is suffering losses. Dismissals of 
journalists and threats of papers’ shut down have become routine167.  
Deliberate violence against or harassment of journalists is relatively rare in 
Israel, but occurs at times. Whereas Jewish journalists are repeatedly subjected to 
violence from Palestinians, the Israeli police was accused of using excessive force 
against Arab journalists 168 . Such incidents occur, at times, when journalists are 
reporting from social demonstrations or contentious court hearings169. In recent years, 
                                                 
164 Regulation allowing the Interior Ministry to close newspapers without providing justification was 
revoked under the 2016 antiterrorism law. At the same time, the Israeli government was preparing 
legislation meant to cancel the 1933 Press Ordinance according requiring publishers to obtain a license 
from the Interior Ministry in order to operate a newspaper (Freedom of the Press, 2017).  
165 Since 2007, Israel Hayom has risen to capture nearly 35% of the daily market (Kitain, 2018). 
166 Once leading Yedioth Ahronot now places second at about 30% of the daily market (Kitain, 2018). 
167 The financial daily “Globes” is facing a likely sale after the assets of its owner, Eliezer Fishman, 
were placed in receivership at the end of 2016 (Freedom of the Press, 2017). 
168 E.g., George Khoury, a photographer with Al-Arabiya television, claimed that he was beaten by 
policemen while filming a demonstration in northern Israel in 2008 (Karniel, 2008). 
169 For example, In October 2016, during a very controversial trial of an Israeli soldier charged with 
killing a Palestinian assailant, well-known journalist and political commentator was verbally and 
physically assaulted by supporters of the accused (Arutz Sheva, 2016). 
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Israeli media have been facing the threat of defamation and liability lawsuits from 
prominent politicians such as the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister170.  
 
Military Censorship 
All Israeli press reports are subject to military censorship meant to ensure that national 
security is not being compromised171. According to the 1996 Censorship agreement 
between the media and the military, the censor is granted the power to penalize, shut 
down or stop the printing of a newspaper if it is believed to be endangering national 
security. In 2016, the military censor expanded the existing practice to include social 
media172.  
 In practice, the censor’s role is quite limited and under strict judicial 
oversight. A more active press and increased exposure to foreign mass media have 
also led to a loosening of censorship restriction (Kaplan, 2015). In order to 
compensate for their limited ability to use the military censor, security officials 




3.2.2  Episodes of High Intensity Political Violence 
Following Schneider, Hadar, & Bosler (2017), episodes of political violence, which 
are used in the analysis presented in chapters six and seven were identified by The 
Computational Event Data System (CEDS), based on a temporal criteria. The CEDS is 
a twenty-five year, US National Science Foundation funded project that uses 
                                                 
170 E.g., In 2016, Prime Minister Netanyahu issued statements to denounce journalists in unusually 
hostile terms, especially targeting senior reporters Dayan and Drucker. Netanyahu accused the reporters 
of pursuing a malicious agenda against him and misleading the public with propaganda and lies. In 
response, dozens of senior journalists signed a joint letter objecting such efforts to discredit the media 
and warning that they could encourage physical violence (Freedom of the Press, 2017).  
171 Editors may appeal a censorship decision to a three-member tribunal that includes two civilians 
though the scope of permissible reporting is wide. In practice, the censor’s role is quite limited, and 
journalists often evade restrictions by leaking a story to a foreign outlet and then republishing it 
(freedom of press report about Israel, 2002). 
172 The military censor instructed dozens of bloggers and administrators of major social media accounts 
to submit security-related items for prepublication review, expanding a practice previously in place for 
traditional media (freedom of press report about Israel, 2017). 
The censor also sought to place observers in WhatsApp groups used by reporters and spokespeople to 
exchange information for pending stories. Following harsh public criticism, the censor was compelled 
to clarify its operational guidelines (Freedom of press report, Israel 2017). 
173 Research published in July 2016 showed a sharp increase in the use of gag orders over the past 15 
years, with 231 issued in 2015 alone (Freedom of the Press, 2017).  
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automated coding of English-language news reports to generate political event data174. 
Such data is restricted to the Middle East, the Balkans and to West Africa. The project 
coded both Reuters and Agence France Presse (AFP) articles using two different 
coding schemes: the World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) and the Conflict & 
Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO). As in Schneider et al. (2017), the AFP 
CAMEO scheme for the Levant region was chosen over the WEIS175 scheme since the 
former is available up until 2015 and provides more observations. The AFP CAMEO 
Levant data set includes 246,382 events after duplicate filtering and covers the period 
from April 1979 to March 2015. 
 After removing events in which Israel was not involved or that did not occur 
within the timeframe of the study, the events coded as “fight176” were selected. Since 
the AFP CAMEO data set is machine-coded, it was necessary to verify that the events 
were correctly coded. As several periods of political violence were terminated with a 
ceasefire, a consistency check between events coded as “fight” and events coded as 
“ceasefire” was performed177. In light of the ongoing nature of fighting in the relevant 
time period, it was also essential to identify and list the significant fighting episodes 
and large-scale military operations. This list was cross-referenced with secondary 
sources (IDF spokesperson unit’s website, IDF’s news archive search engine, Hamas’ 
website, Al Jazeera website). The final list of fighting episodes, including military 
operations and the Second Lebanon War appears in chapters six and seven178. Due to 
data availability179, not all episodes of political violence were analyzed in the current 
research (see appendix C, D). 
                                                 
174 The CEDS was originally based in the Department of Political Science at the University of Kansas 
and referred to as the Kansas Event Data System (KEDS). It was moved to the Department of Political 
Science at Pennsylvania State University from January 2010 to June 2013 and is now hosted by Parus 
Analytical Systems. Source: http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/index.html. 
175 The CAMEO data have been selected over the WEIS data, as the former is available up until 2015, 
whereas the latter is coded only up to 2005. For the Levant area, two CAMEO datasets exist, both 
covering the period from April 1979 to March 2015. Whereas the Reuters CAMEO only include events 
generated from Reuters’ reporting (149,481 events after duplicate filtering), the AFP CAMEO data set 
includes 246,382 events after duplicate filtering generated from AFP and Reuters reports (mainly AFP). 
Source: http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/data.dir/cameo.html. 
176 The AFP CAMEO dataset uses seven different codes for conflict related events: “Use conventional 
military force”, ”Impose blockade & restrict movement”, ”Occupy territory”, “Fight with small arms 
and light weapons”, “Fight with artillery and tanks” and “Employ aerial weapons”.  
177 See figure A, appendix B. 
178 By the time the research presented in Chapter seven was conducted, an additional military operation 
(which was not included in the data analyzed in chapter six) took place and was thus included.  
179 Operation “Rainbow”, Operation “Summer Rains” & Operation “Autumn Clouds”; Operation “Hot 
Winter”, Operation “Returning Echo” occurred in the relevant timeframe but were not included in the 
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3.2.3  Perceived Outcomes of Political Violence 
Mess media, according to Frosh and Wolfsfeld (2007), is a key factor in the imagined 
social relations180. The media’s “Communicative Connectedness” shapes temporal and 
spatial experiences and supports a sense of belonging to a collective. The media181, 
thus contributes to both ethnic identification and the creation of unified (or assumed to 
be unified) communities. By producing and communicating signs, text and images 
representing 'oneness' and 'otherness' the media supports and sustains the utopia of 
ethnic identification (according to which all ethnic differences are reconciled and 
unified by the state, Väyrynen, 1997).  
According to Entman (2004, p. 24), framing takes place in three aspects of 
reporting: political events, issues and actors. It is used to define the effects of a 
problem or condition, identify its causes and set to endorse a remedy and to convey a 
moral judgment 182. Whereas press in particular, has been a forerunner to the creation 
of the nation state (Anderson, 1983), by conveying powerful national messaged and 
stories, modern press (domestic and foreign, online and offline) further supports and 
sustains the nation state (Cohen, 2008).  
In order to construct the independent variable used in the research presented in 
chapters six and seven- the perceived outcomes of Israeli military operations 183 , 
manual content analysis of a special dataset of Israeli press articles and commentaries 
was performed by the author. The unique dataset includes all articles and 
commentaries published in the three Hebrew-language newspapers with the largest 
accumulated readership in Israel (Mana, 2015): Haaretz, Maariv, and Yediot 
                                                                                                                                             
analysis due to insufficient media coverage that resulted in undetermined perceived outcomes. For 
further information in this regard please refer to chapters six and seven and the appendix. 
180 Social imaginary include the ways in which people imagine their social existence, how they fit 
together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows (Taylor 2002: 106). 
181 Discussion concerning the media’s role in shaping public opinion in general and in Israel follows.  
182 Discussion of frames in communication and their effect on shaping public opinion is forthcoming.  
183 Such data did not exist. While Uppsala’s UCDP Conflict Termination project coded Operation “Hot 
Winter” and Operation “Pillar of defense” as “ceasefires”, since this dissertation is interested in the 
effect of perceived outcomes of Israeli military operations on social and national identities, the Uppsala 
coding is not only missing (as it only refers to two military operations), it is also irrelevant. Unlike the 
(Israeli) media which frames and reports the outcome of a military operation in a way that directly 
promotes interpretations that lead to evaluations (Entman, 2004, p. 23), Uppsala’s coding does not 
directly or indirectly affect Israeli perceptions. Consequently, the Israeli media constitutes the suitable 
source of data in the context of the current research. 
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Aharonot, that relate to the outcome of each military operation, published on the day 
of and the next two days after its termination184. 
Content analysis was conducted using a four-stage evaluation assertion 
examination, developed following Krippendorf (2004) and Schneider, Hadar and 
Bosler (2017) 185. The analysis allowed the author to measure the perceived outcomes 
of Israeli military operations, framed by the Israeli media, as a binary variable 
(1=successful, 0=unsuccessful). Consequently, the variable Conflict outcomes was 
operationalized as the perceived result of each period of political violence in the same 
way. Since the research examines changes in national identification among Israelis, 
any objective outcome of political violence, if such even exists (e.g. number of 
casualties on both sides, cumulative costs or succeeding violent events) is less relevant 
than the framing of the way the violence was terminated (by the media). It is the latter 
to which Israelis are exposed and are affected by. 
 
 
3.2.4   Relevant Issues Concerning the Use of Survey Data  
Survey data, whether online or offline, has become vastly popular in the social 
sciences and is used across disciplines. In the analysis presented in chapters six and 
seven, survey data was used to construct the dependent variables, namely, Israeli 
national pride and social trust within the Israeli society. Some fundamental issues 




In our everyday life, we communicate, interpret and understand the reality around us 
using a multitude of concepts (e.g. “car”, “breakfast”, Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010). 
Research has pointed to the fact that vague 186  concepts trigger different 
associations/interpretations187 when presented to different individuals (Bauer, Barbera, 
Ackermann, & Venetz, 2014, Brady, 1985). For example, Belson (1981, p. 182) found 
                                                 
184 In the case of an operation ending on a Friday evening or Saturday when there is no press in Israel, 
the articles from the Sunday and Monday were evaluated instead. 
185 Further details of the coding procedure can be found in Appendix B. 
186 Merrian Webster dictionary defines “vague” as not clearly defined, expressed or , not having a 
precise meaning (Merriam-Webster, 2018b). 
187 Associations/interpretations here refer to the passive/active process to which individuals are required 
when confronted with a vague term.  
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a high degree of variability in the interpretation of terms like ’children’, ’ill effects’, 
’violence’, such that respondents who offer identical choice of answer may well have 
been considering rather different aspects of the matter concerned. Other terms which 
were found to trigger different associations are “immigrants” (Braun, Behr, & 
Kaczmirek, 2012), “political” (Fitzgerald, 2013) and “democracy” (Bratton, 2010; 
Canache, Mondak, & Seligson, 2001). Different quantifiers on response scales188 also 
constitute vague concepts and may be differently interpreted by different respondents 
(King, Murray, Salomon, & Tandon, 2004; Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000). This 
increasingly recognized problem is referred to as interpersonal incomparability (King 
et al., 2004) or measurement inequivalence (Davidov, Meuleman, Cieciuch, Schmidt, 
& Billiet, 2014; Freitag & Bauer, 2013).  
 The question of whether a measurement instrument leaves room for various 
interpretations is appropriate, even if the overall research in which the instrument is 
used aims at measuring subjective interpretations189. Different understanding of key 
concepts may impact respondents’ answers and consequently interfere in the empirical 
relationships observed (Bauer et al., 2014) 190. As such, the term “trust”, which stands 
at the core of the empirical analysis presented in chapter seven, is left to the 
interpretation of the individual survey respondent and is only contrasted with the need 
to be careful in relationship with people191. In the same fashion, multi-layered self-
identification issues and complex relationships between ethnic groups are reduced to a 
narrow and dichotomous classification of “good or not good?192” in the Israeli social 
surveys. Various solutions to the problem of measurement inequivalence include 
providing respondents with definitions to vague concepts, using a battery of questions 
concerning different aspects of the examined topic193 or avoiding using vague terms 
altogether. Since it was necessary to find relevant data according to a temporal 
                                                 
188 “Totally agree”, “slightly disagree”, etc. 
189 As such, the issue is relevant even concerning the research presented in chapter seven, during which 
respondents were asked to subjectively assess the level of social tensions in the Israeli society.  
190 Bauer, Barbera, Ackermann, & Venetz (2014), found that individuals attribute different meanings to 
the concepts “left” and “right” which evidently effects measurement values on the left-right scale. 
191 The original question addressing social trust in the Israel Democracy Index is: In general, do you 
think you can trust people, or do you have to be very careful in relationships with people? Possible 
answers ranged from 1: you can always trust people to 4: you always have to be very careful. 
192 The relevant question in the Israel Democracy Index is: In your opinion, are relationships between 
(e.g. Israeli-Arabs and Jews) good or not good? answers ranged from 1: not good at all to 4: very good. 
193 In the context of trust, this could be used to construct a ‘trust index” that would then be analyzed in 
accordance with advance scaling techniques such as item response theory models (see Bafumi & 
Herron, 2010; Jessee, 2009; Lord, 2012; van der Linden & Hambleton, 2013). 
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criterion (in correspondence with the conclusion of Israeli military operations), the 
author resorted to using existing data instead of collecting data independently. As 
such, the author had no control over the usage of vague concepts. That being said, 
several robustness checks were conducted in order to assure that potential 
measurement inequivalence did not impaired the validity of results obtained in 




Categorizing Identities  
The general practice of categorizing Identities and the usage of forms (such as census 
or social surveys) in order to do so is highly debated. Whereas a national Census194, 
much like social surveys, seeks to illustrate the changing structure of human 
population, it does so by directly collecting demographic data (which is often used as a 
baseline for planning and research allocation195, Wines & Baumgaertner, 2018). Yet, 
such practice creates arbitrarily groups based on common characteristics or traits. 
While conducted in a seemingly technical manner, it can be argued that such a practice 
constitutes an unnecessary division and is highly political (specific groups or 
organizations pursue acknowledgement and funding). Whereas some core 
demographic qualities are easily defined and quantified (age, education level), 
identity, ethnicity or race are not as easily measured. Moreover, questions frequently 
asked in consensuses and social surveys use vague and undefined terms. The proposed 
answers in such multiple choice forms often fail to capture the complex nature of 
human identities. Consequently, using data originated from social surveys in order to 
measure individual identification necessitates a discussion of how identity can be 
categorized and whether it is thematically justified to use such categories196. 
Addressing the next US Census, Connerly and Gonzalez’s (2018) argued that 
the U.S. Census Bureau in 2020 will again seek to shoehorn some 330 million 
Americans into official racial and ethnic categories, ignoring a growing “mixed-race” 
population that resents arbitrary racial straitjackets and supporting identity-
consciousness that is tearing the nation apart. The American Census is hardly unique 
                                                 
194 A census is a common direct method of collecting demographic data. 
195 See for example, strategic objectives 1-4 of the US Census (as part of the US Census Bureau 
Strategic Plan FY 2007-2012).  
196 By a specific government, in the case of a national census.  
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insofar as it exhibits issues inherent to such method of data gathering- reductionism. It 
is often argued that identity aspects such as “race” and “ethnicity” are complex, multi-
layered and highly subjective in nature. Consequently, they cannot be reduced to a 
ticked box (nor should they be, as this would render the data meaningless). Using open 
questions, allowing multiple answers for multiple-choice questions and extending the 
proposed categories in future surveys/censuses would constitute a proper alternative to 
abandoning the use of data collected by such means altogether.  
 In addition to the problematic nature of assessing highly personal and ever 
changing concepts by means of categories, one must also bear in mind the highly 
political nature of such surveys, especially those conducted by the state. The political 
nature of social surveys, and the various underlining motives for including and 
excluding specific questions and topics are illustrated in the heated debate over the 
new citizenship question, planned to be added to the next American Census; On March 
2018, The US Census Bureau announced that the 2020 census will include a 
citizenship question197 in order to better enforce the “Voting Rights Act”, which relies 
on accurate estimates of voting-eligible populations 198  (Wines & Baumgaertner, 
2018). A few hours later, 14 American states sued the Trump administration in an 
attempt to force it to renounce the question. Not merely a symbolic issue, the former 
contended that adding the citizenship question would result in an undercount of the 
population (it may depress responses from non-citizens or immigrants199), used to 
determine congressional apportionments for the next decade. As such, the fair 200 
distribution of federal funding would be jeopardize (Lind, 2018). Since the American 
                                                 
197 Every American household will be asked to record which members of their family are US citizens. 
The question appeared in every Census since 1965 except in 2010 (Lind, 2018). 
198 This rational was dismissed by Prof. Prewitt, former director of the Census Bureau under President 
Clinton (Wines & Baumgaertner, 2018).  
199 Even though U.S. Secretary of commerce have stated that the question already appeared in former 
censuses and other surveys and did not deter participation and that other democracies (Australia, the 
United Kingdom) routinely ask about citizenship in their surveys, the aforementioned concerns are not 
unsupported; In 2017, a bureau researcher alerted the census advisory committee to the great difficulty 
of getting immigrants to complete the survey. Field tests indicated that respondents (mainly Korean and 
Latinos and Arab) feared the possibility that information given as part of the census would be 
transferred and used to deport them. The full presentation given to the National Advisory Committee on 
Racial, Ethnic and other populations on November 2nd 2017 is available here: 
https://www2.census.gov/cac/nac/meetings/2017-11/Meyers-NAC-Confidentiality-Presentation.pdf. 
200 According to Wines & Baumgaertner several of the states suing the Trump administration are run 
by Democrats, who risk losing representation if the census undercounts people of color. Lind (2018) 
added that A skewed census would hurt the places in America where Latinos are most likely to live — 
cities and blue states — fueling both the lawsuit and the suspicion that the Trump administration is 
engaging in deliberate subterfuge. 
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constitutions sets that every resident of the United Stated should be counted in a 
decennial census 201 , adding the citizenship question may potentially violate the 
constitution (Wines & Baumgaertner, 2018). Alongside objections to the new question 
there are those who not only support the additional question, but even argue that such 
modification doesn’t go far enough (Connerly and Gonzalez, 2018). They suggested to 
discard the official categories and ask for one’s national-origin (Are your ancestors 
from Ecuador, Germany, Japan?), while allowing respondents to tick multiple boxes. 
A solution only for individuals who are bi-racial or identify with more than one 
ethnicity, adding further categories may be required in order to mirror the diverse 
nature of the population. Due to the political nature of the census, this is easier said 




3.2.5  The Israeli Democracy Index   
Data with regard to the dependent variables: levels of social trust, national 
identification (operationalized as national pride) and perceived social tensions in the 
Israeli society originated in the Israeli Democracy Index.  
The Israeli Democracy Index is the leading project of the Guttman Center for 
Public Opinion and Policy Research202, a branch of the Israel Democracy Institute 
(Asher Arian, Philippov & Knafelman, 2009). The Israeli Democracy Index is an 
annual survey of public opinion concerning the state of Israeli democracy, including 
trust in government institutions, identification with the state, the Jewish and 
democratic characters of the state, politics and political activism etc. The index 
evaluate the quality and functioning of the Israeli democracy alongside general social 
indicators by collecting quantified and comparable information with regard to three 
main aspects: institutions, rights & stability and social cohesion (Alan Arian, 
Nachmias, Navot, & Shani, 2003). The Index is often used by researchers and 
decision-makers in order to identify current challenges or trends regarding Israeli 
                                                 
201 Unlike other sample-based surveys in which researchers can use statistical modeling to “correct” a 
situation when specific groups are under-represented (Lind, 2018). 
202 The Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research holds the largest, most comprehensive 
database on public opinion surveys in Israel (https://en.idi.org.il/centers/1159). The Israel Democracy 
Institute is an independent, non-partisan think-tank dedicated to strengthening the foundations of Israeli 
democracy. The GCS holds the largest, most comprehensive database on public opinion surveys in 
Israel.  
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democratic culture, popular opinion and regime. The data is based on interviews203 
conducted in Hebrew, Arabic and Russian with representative samples (about 1,000-
1,200 individuals) of the adult population in Israel204. The dates, sample sizes and 
additional relevant methodological data are reported in the appendices.  
Utilizing relevant data originating in the Israeli Democracy Index enabled the 
author to assess the effect of the perceived outcomes of Israeli military operations on 
social rifts, social trust and national identification while controlling for socioeconomic 
considerations and individual characteristics. Quantitative data originating in the 
Israeli Democracy Index is not only the single existing social survey available which 
allows for the aforementioned examination but it is also high quality data, gathered in 
a scientific manner by an independent institute and is accessible online free of charge. 
 
 
3.2.6  Control Variables 
Since no relevant panel data is available, it was necessary to control for respondents’ 
personal characteristics, likely to affect national identification (Coenders & Scheepers, 
2003; Stubager, 2009) and social trust (Bjørnskov, 2008; Canetti-Nisim et al., 2008). 
Consequently, Religiosity, Education, Age, Gender and Socio-class were included in 
the analyses performed in chapters six and seven. Assessing respondents’ membership 
in the various ethnic groups in the Israeli society was based on the following variables: 
Origin, a dummy variable used in order to distinguish between native Israelis and 
immigrants. Social group indicated whether the respondent is Jewish, Arab or an 
Immigrant. Arab_identity and jewish_identity referred to respondents’ self-defined 
ethnic identities whereas arab_religion & jewish_religion referred to respondents’ 
religious affiliation. Residence was a coded value of respondents’ place of residence as 
one of seven districts in Israel205.  
Whereas in the past, anti-nationalist arguments were mainly wielded by the 
political left and arguments that moved from anti-universalist premises toward positive 
national values usually came from the right, left-wing liberals and social democrats 
                                                 
203 Structured interviews whereas most questions are multiple-choice questions. 
204 The collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1989 marked the beginning of a massive immigration 
wave to Israel, encouraged by the state. About 900k immigrants from the FSU arrived to Israel 1989-
2012 from which about 800k immigrated 1990-2001 (Table 1, Central Bureau of Statistics).  
205 Residence was used as a robustness check to test whether residing closer to the center of violence is 
a relevant confounding variable as suggested by Penic, Elcheroth, & Spini (2016). 
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now deploy nation-affirming set of arguments as often as conservatives206 (Benner, 
1997). Consequently, political affiliation was expected to play a pivotal role in 
moderating the impact of political-violence on national identification and was thus 
added to the analysis207.  
 Three macro-economic, country-level variables were added to the analysis as 
control variables: economic growth, economic development and inflation rate208. While 
economic growth and economic development can elevate national-pride levels, 
inflation rate might depress it. Additionally, the perceived sense of realistic threat from 





3.3  Frames   in   Communication   and   Their   Effect   on    
 Public Opinion 
 
 
Previous research has unequivocally shown that the media are powerful purveyors of 
public opinion. Since the public depends on media reports for most of its information 
about world events, media framing is especially important in shaping the public’s 
knowledge of the world (Bloch-Elkon, 2007; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997). Upon 
reading a news article or commentary, readers form opinions on the causes, actors and 
significance of the events reported. Yet, the apparently factual news items presented to 
the public often lead it to understand events from a particular perspective, or a frame, 
brought forwards (Evans, 2010). Anastasio et al. (2005) discuss the role of the media 
in building bridges or destroying them. They argue that the media is able to encourage 
group divisiveness by dissecting the world into distinct social categories and 
                                                 
206 Patriotic values are not the property of the right, Oleksy, leader of the main post-communist party in 
Poland quoted in Gazeta Wyborcza on 01.04.1996: Today's democratic left needs to cultivate patriotic 
virtues as a barrier against xenophobic and chauvinistic nationalism (Viroli, 1995). 
207 Political affiliation was measured on a 5-point right (1) to Left (5) scale.   
208 The measures are based on annual World Development Indicators for Israel for the year or the 
surveys. Economic Growth is Israel’s real GDP growth per survey year, Economic Development or 
GDP is Israel’s GDP per capita per survey year, and Inflation is the rate of inflation in consumer prices. 
Since economic development mostly correlates with economic growth, only one of the two is used in 
the quantitative analysis while the other is used as a robustness check. 
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emphasizing group differences. The media can also obscure group boundaries, 
diminish group differences and forge necessary connections.  
Building upon previous research that established a strong nexus between media 
and social, national and political identities209, the author used a political-psychological 
approach to investigate the effect of the way outcome of Israeli military operations 
were framed, on national pride and social trust between the various communities 
within the Israeli society. Through considering the additional effects of framing, I aim 
to expand our understanding of the factors affecting national pride as well as 
consolidation or breakdown of social trust in Israel.  
 
 
3.3.1  The Use of Emphasis and Equivalence Framing in Shaping Public 
Opinion  
The current research is predicated on the fact that Israelis’ national pride and social 
trust levels fluctuate following different outcomes of Israeli military operations. 
Outcomes’ assessment conducted by individuals is rarely based on objectives 
measures (damages, deaths inflicted by each party etc.). Instead, public opinion and 
preferences are shaped by messages derived from the political elite, interest groups 
and the media, and depend on the framing of the information set forth by them210 
(Mintz & Redd, 2003, p. 194). Media framing also affects governmental decision-
making, both directly (by supplying information to decision-makers) and indirectly 
(through public opinion) (Entman, 2004; Soroka, 2003). 
When presenting information, speakers and commentators often emphasize one 
dimension over. By doing so they offer alternative frames in communication. The 
latter are verbal or non-verbal statements that place clear emphasis on particular 
considerations rather than on others (Druckman & Wild, 2011; Gitlin, 1980; Iyengar, 
1990). The way issues are framed can determine how positively or negatively they are 
perceived (Anastasio et al., 2005). “Framing”, thus refers to the way the story is 
written or produced and includes the orienting headlines, specific words choices, 
rhetorical devices employed, narrative formation and so on (Jamieson & Cappella, 
                                                 
209 For example, Cohen (2008) found a strong nexus between media and social, national and political 
identities. Among Israelis he found that preferences for local television in comparison with foreign 
television were partially related to greater national pride. 
210 The fact that newspapers are bought by politicians and identify with a specific political camp 
signifies, according to Cohen (2008) their crucial role in shaping public opinion. 
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1997, p. 39). It is the process by which a communication source constructs and defines 
a social or political issue for its audience ( Nelson et al., 1997, p. 221). In organizing 
an article around certain ideas or themes, particular aspects are made more salient211 
(Dimitrova, Kaid, Williams, & Trammell, 2005). Frames are also cognitive structures 
that help individual citizens make sense of the issue212 (Kinder & Sanders, 1996, p. 
164). Through creating connections between issues and considerations, there is a 
greater chance that these considerations will be retrieved when thinking about an issue 
(Feldman, 1995: 267-268). Drukman argued that the frame leads to alternative 
representations of the problem and can result in distinct evaluations and preferences 
(2011, p. 6). When it comes to identity issues and violent events, multiple actors 
attempt to influence public perceptions and decision-making. Politicians, interest 
groups and media outlets strive to shape preferences of ordinary individuals in order to 
affect electoral (Erikson, MacKuen, & Stimson, 2002). Two main types of such 
framing is discussed next. 
Emphasis Framing is a persuasion technique that draws attention to specific 
aspects that encourage certain interpretations of the meaningful context and discourage 
others (Schutz, 2013a). For example, the same car can be presented as ‘low cost’ 
(monetary frame) as well as ‘fast and powerful’ (social frame) (Nelson, Clawson, & 
Oxley, 1997). Emphasis framing applies to a broad range of decisions involving ill-
structured problems (Purkitt, 2001, p. 6) that lacks “correct answers”. By emphasizing 
one dimension over another213, the competition over which of many substantively 
distinct values/considerations should prevail results in strategic political environment 
of competing information (Berelson, 1954; Schattschneider, 1960).  
Equivalence Framing is purposely stating or portraying of different, but 
logically equivalent words or phrases [that] cause individuals to alter their 
preferences (Druckman, 2004, p. 671). Equivalency frames are often worded in 
opposite terms (e.g., “gains” versus “losses”) and similarly to emphasis framing, are 
meant to encourage specific interpretations and discourage others- altering our 
preferences. Whereas emphasis framing focuses on presenting information, 
                                                 
211 I will elaborate on Emphasis Framing and Equivalence Framing as they are used to establish the 
underlining hypothesizes presented in chapters six and seven. For a discussion of further types of 
frames and their effects on attitudes and perception formation, see Mintz & Redd, 2003.  
212 The terms “frame” also refers to an individual's (cognitive) understanding of a given situation, or 
frames in thought (Goffman, 1974; Johnson-Laird, 1983). 
213 Thus creating alternative frames in communication (Druckman, 2011; Gitlin, 1980; Iyengar, 1990). 
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equivalence framing focuses on phrasing the same information in the most persuasive 
way (Schutz, 2013b).  
 
 
3.3.2  The Effect of Frames in Shaping Individual Perceptions 
Research on framing illuminates the ways in which media reports select and highlight 
particular elements of an issue as they present it to the public (Entman, 2000). Framing 
effects have been mostly studied in Communication, Psychology and Political Science 
(Nelson et al., 1997), whereas scholarship have commonly examined the effect of 
framing of news on public opinion 214 , election campaigns 215  and policy 
development216 (Druckman, 2001a; Esser & d’Angelo, 2006, p. 44; Nelson & Oxley, 
1999). Specific framing (as in the study of people’s willingness to allow hate groups to 
conduct a rally) indicated that the use of specific framing (e.g., free speech vs. public 
safety) significantly affect individuals’ views of such considerations217. 
In president Bush’s first post-2001 State of the Union speech (delivered on 
January 29, 2002), framing the country’s situation in terms of homeland security 
enabled Bush to potentially induce people to add weight to those issues in their 
evaluation of his functioning and the nation’s overall state (Druckman & Holmes, 
2004). Similarly, in his lengthy State of the Union speech (delivered on January 30, 
2018), American President Trump dedicated an entire hour to discuss domestic policy. 
By focusing on the way his campaign slogan “America First218” is translated to a 
policy reality Trump strategically framed the state of the union in conjunction with his 
                                                 
214 Hertog and Fan (1995) found a direct causal link between news coverage and the content of public 
opinion polls with respect to HIV transmission.  
215 One of the most salient features of US congressional campaigns is the incumbency advantage as it 
provides them with up to 10% point advantage (Ansolabehere & Snyder, 2004, p. 487). The 
incumbency advantage stems, in part, from three particular candidate characteristics: experience in 
office, familiarity (e.g., have ties to the district) and whether they have benefited the district or state 
(Jacobson & Carson, 2015). Therefore, from a framing perspective, incumbents have a strategic 
incentive to highlight experience, familiarity and benefits. In contrast, challengers will frame their 
campaigns in other terms, emphasizing alternative considerations that tend to matter in congressional 
elections (such as issue positions, partisanship, endorsements, and polls). As opposing sides 
simultaneously employ contrary frames mirrored by constant media coverage, the way individuals 
process these mixes of frames is crucial in understanding their effect on preferences’ formation. 
216 Terkildsen and Schnell (1997) found that framing women’s movement as feminist had a negative 
impact upon opinions, whereas framing it in terms of equal political rights had a positive effect.  
217 Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) found that individuals exposed to the free speech frame are 
significantly more likely to view free speech considerations as important and consequently allow the 
rally, compared to individuals who receive the public safety frame. 
218 America first/make America great again was the focus of Trump’s campaign and relate to the idea 
that Trump would concentrate on American domestic issues such as taxes, regulatory reforms, trade and 
immigration rather than on America’s place in the world (Cillizza, 2018). 
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own political achievements. This strategic framing was also partially reflected in 
media coverage of the speech.  
 
 
3.3.3  Assessing a Frame’s Strength in Political Settings 
The frame that one adopts in his/her mind, the dimensions on which evaluations are 
based and that consequently shape one’s preferences stems from various factors such 
as prior experiences and on-going world events. A common, if not defining element of 
opinion formation in political settings is that individuals lack information and 
motivation. As such, when assessing a frame’s strength or applicability in political 
settings, it was found that individuals are more likely to be persuaded by political 
arguments that evoke cognitive biases and disregard criteria seen as normatively 
desirable (Arceneaux 2012, p. 271). Arceneaux also found that frames highlighting 
averting losses or out-group threats resonate to a greater extent than other ostensibly 
analogous arguments. Druckman and Bolsen (2011) noted that adding factual 
information to frames does nothing to enhance their strength. 
A framing effect is thus the result of the influence of a frame in communication 
on an individual’s frame in thought219 . According to the psychological model of 
framing (Chong & Druckman, 2007), individuals typically base their evaluations on a 
subset of dimensions220 , rather than on the universe of possible considerations221 
(Ajzen & Sexton, 1999). The dimensions used are available222 , accessible223  and 
applicable or appropriate (Althaus & Kim, 2006; Price & Tewksbury, 1997). The 
impact of an accessible consideration can depend on its applicability or 
appropriateness to the object being evaluated (Strack, Martin, & Schwarz, 1988). The 
likelihood that a consideration raised by a frame will be judged applicable and shape 
individual’s opinion increases with conscious perceptions of its strength or relevance 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Nelson et al., 1997).  
                                                 
219 Frames in communication may not always have the same effect on individuals’ frames in thought; clearly 
defined prior beliefs may prevent the latter from exerting such an effect (Furnham, 1982). 
220 Even when they incorporate more than one dimension, individuals rarely bring in more than a few 
considerations (e.g., Simon, 1955). 
221 Individuals may even focus on a single dimension in evaluating a party. 
222  Consideration must be stored in memory to be available for retrieval and used in attitude 
construction (Higgins, 1996). It is only available when its meaning and significance are understood. 
223 Accessibility refers to the likelihood that an available consideration exceeds an activation threshold 
to be used in an evaluation (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977). Accessibility increases with chronic or 
frequent use of a consideration or temporary contextual cues- including frames in communication- that 
regularly or recently bring the consideration to mind (Bargh, Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988). 
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Yet, Individuals do not always engage in applicability evaluations. Those who 
are motivated to form an accurate attitude will likely deliberately assess the 
appropriateness of a consideration (Stapel, Koomen, & Zeelenberg, 1998) whereas 
individuals lacking personal motivation or the stimulus of being faced with conflicting 
or competitive information will likely rely uncritically on a considerations made 
accessible through exposure to a message. While media emphasis on an issue was 
found to passively increase the accessibility of that issue (Iyengar, 1990), Miller and 
Krosnick (2000) presented evidence to the contrary. The timing of frames can also be 
critical to their impact, particularly when trying to induce a “rally around the flag” 
effect concerning the use of force (Geva, True, & Mintz, 1994, p. 8). Other work 
pertaining to frame strength reveals an increase in strength when a specific emotion is 
highlighted (Aarøe, 2011; Petersen, 2007), when multiple, frequently appearing 
arguments are included (Baumgartner, De Boef, & Boydstun, 2008) and when 
revisiting familiar arguments that have been used in the past (Edy, 2006). In this 
regard, Druckman (2010) found that the perceived strength of the frame is more 
significant than repetition. Lastly, Fleming and Petty (2000) demonstrated that 
participants who highly identified with the in-group took on the attitudes of fellow in-
group members, whereas low identifiers  maintained a more neutral position on the 
issues at hand.  
In the current research, it is theorised that Emphasis Framing and Equivalence 
Framing were employed by the Israeli media in communicating the results of Israeli 
military operations (successful or unsuccessful from the Israeli point of view). The 
effects of such framing of violence’ offset on Israelis’ national and social 
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4.   The Ending Matters: National and Social 
Identification Following Discrepant War Outcomes 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The study of groups as dynamic, open systems224 raised critical theoretical issues 
about what exactly holds groups together. Research concerning group’s stability dates 
back seven decades (Durkheim, 1947; Katz & Kahn, 1966; Lewin, 1951). A cost–
benefit approach to group stability adopted by social psychologists in the 1950s’225 has 
been revised and complemented ever since, most notably by Social Identity and Self-
Categorization Theories (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). According to both theories, group membership (family, 
football team or a nation) provides individuals with a sense of social identity and 
belonging, and is an important source of pride and self-esteem for group members 
(Tajfel, 1978). Acceptance as a group member is a human need and was found to be 
associated with an increase in motivation (Hall, 2014), well-being and life satisfaction, 
better physical and mental health and better social relationships  (Allen & Kern, 2017).  
Social Identity Theory assumes that once people identify with their group, their 
welfare becomes intertwined with the welfare of the group (Van Vugt & Hart, 2004). 
As such, maintaining a positive group identity is essential for group members. 
However, social comparisons226 with other groups are unavoidable, and might result in 
negative feelings when compared with superior others. Whereas such negative feelings 
                                                 
224 To/from which individuals can enter/exit. 
225 That is, by analyzing members’ decision to enter or exit the group in terms of personal costs and 
rewards associated with group membership (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). 
226 According to social comparison Theory, individuals are driven to evaluate themselves in comparison 
to other. The social comparison process may also be an essential part in the decision making process. 
For example, a high school student who just joined the school choir will judge her singing ability in 
comparison with those of her choir-mates. If she finds that her abilities do not measure up those of her 
peers, she might choose to leave the choir and pursue other interests. Yet, this realization, based on 
social comparison, may also motivate her to improve her ability, e.g. by dedicating more time to 
practicing her singing (Cherry, 2018). 
                                       91 
can be avoided by leaving the group, Social identity theory suggests that high 
identifiers may choose not to exit the group even if it results in a personal sacrifice227.  
Group identification is thus the glue that sustains the society overtime (Van Vugt 
& Hart, 2004). Identity salience changes over time, both within the lifetime of 
individuals and in terms of wider social processes. According to Gilroy, The raw 
materials from which identity is produced may be inherited from the past but they are 
also worked on, creatively or positively, reluctantly or bitterly, in the present (1997, p. 
305). War, in particular, transforms and rigidifies that legacy; evidently, if one is 
threatened with death because of a particular identity, that identity becomes salient 
(Kaldor, 2013). Consequently, when individuals are confronted with an identity threat 
(for example, when war erupts between their home country and an adversary), an 
increase in national identity salience is expected.  
 
Do different war outcomes (victory, defeat, negotiated agreement or stalemate) have 
different effects on individuals’ national and social identities?  
 
No empirical work on the effects of group performance on group members’ social and 
national identification has so far been framed within social identity theory and applied 
in the context of conflict research. A macro-level examination of variations in social 
and national identities’ saliency among group members (citizens), generated by 
different war outcomes deemed necessary.  
Against the theoretical framework set out in chapter two, the current chapter is 
aimed at supporting the underlying hypothesis of this dissertation, namely, that 
discrepant war outcomes have different effects on national and social identification. 
Attending to nations as groups of individuals and considering the relationship between 
individuals and their nation state, the author suggests that discrepant war outcomes 
will demonstrate distinctive effects on individuals’ social and national identities. 
Put in different words, I predict that individuals will react differently to diverse war 
outcomes. Based on Social Identity Theory and Social Comparison Theory, it is 
hypothesized that victory, being valued as a positive outcome, will induce the 
                                                 
227 Either internal or external (decreased self-esteem and status). Deciding to stay part of the group 
when leaving it may benefit the individual himself/herself is a demonstrative act of “group loyalty” (see 
Levine & Moreland, 2002; Van Vugt, Jepson, Hart, & De Cremer, 2004). 
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BIRGing strategy228 and that defeat, being valued as a negative outcome, will induce 
the CORFing strategy229. Whereas victory and defeat present a “clear cut” distinction 
between (objective) positive and negative outcomes, other possible conclusions of 
wars or warfare such as stalemate and a peace agreement do not. Consequently, the 
effect of the latter war outcomes on individual identification is likely to relay on the 
framing of such outcomes and/or their subjective interpretation (victory or defeat)230.  
While chapters six and seven are dedicated to exploring the effect of different 
war outcomes on social and national identities, this chapter focuses on establishing the 
mere existence of such a distinctive effect. 
 
Two web-experiments were designed in order to empirically test the aforementioned 
predictions. Both experiments asked participants to imagine they are citizens of a 
fictional county named Narvia. Participants were provided with information about life 
in Narvia, meant to incite identification with the imaginary space. Next, a conflict 
scenario was introduced (war between Narvia, the imaginary home nation and a 
neighboring country). Participants were then randomly assigned to four experimental 
condition, the different ways in which the war ended. As a final step, participants were 
asked to grade their consent with several statements, relating to their national and 
social identities as citizens of the fictional country in light of the way the war was 
terminated. Whereas experiment I was text-based, Experiment II was video-based231. 
Both experiments were constructed following an extensive research concerning 
the “do’s and don’ts” of web-based research and in light of the potential challenges 
arising from the use of the web for conducting experimental research (as discussed in 
the methodological chapter). In the process of naming the fictional countries, an 
attempt to avoid resemblance to existing countries that might induce positive or 
                                                 
228 Basking in Reflected Glory is a self-serving cognition whereby the affiliation of another's success 
enhances one’s self-esteem and evaluation in the eyes of others. BIRGing was found to be an important 
impression management technique used when a person’s public image is threatened in order to counter 
any threats to self-esteem (Lee, 1985). 
The term is thoroughly discussed in chapter two, subsection 2.11.2.  
229 Cutting Off Reflected Failure is an image protection technique used by individuals to distance 
themselves from their losing group (Bizman & Yinon, 2002; Boen & Vanbeselaere, 2002; Cialdini & 
Richardson, 1980). The term is thoroughly discussed in chapter two, subsection 2.11.3.  
230  The described effect is expected assuming “normal” individuals. High Identifiers constitute an 
exception, as they were found to be less likely to CORF, even following failure (Abrams & Hogg, 
1988). Social identity theory dictates that high identifiers would attribute the negatively evaluated 
outcome to external factors of the situation but not a poor group performance. 
231 A discussion concerning the use of text vs. video follows.  
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negative feelings was made232. The semi-realistic conflict scenario was created in 





4.2  Experimental Study I 
 
Experimental study I was constructed using WEXTOR233, a Web-based tool, used to 
design laboratory and Web experiments in a guided step-by-step process and a 
platform for hosting web experiments (Reips & Neuhaus, 2002). WEXTOR 1.0 was 
released back in 2000. Its current version (2.4) was released in 2005. WEXTOR 
creates customized web pages and Java-scripts needed for the experimental procedure. 
It supports complete and incomplete factorial designs with between-subjects, within-
subjects, and quasi-experimental factors. WEXTOR implements client-side response 
time measurement and includes a content wizard for creating dependent measures 
(such as multiple-choice items) on the experiment pages. 
 
 
4.2.1   Procedure and Experimental Design 
The experiment included eight pages; each was presented individually with a “next” 
button appearing at the bottom of the screen. The first page welcomed participants to 
the experiment, informed them of the estimated completion time and noted that the 
information provided during the experiment will only be used for scientific purposes. 
The introductory page also included a seriousness check 234  by asking participants 
whether they intend to seriously participate in the experiment or just browse through 
it. Data originating in participants who indicated a serious participation was analyzed.  
To identify which denizens of the web chose to participate in the online 
experiment, participants were asked to provide information regarding their gender, age 
group and to indicate whether they lived in a country which experienced a war or 
conflict during the time of their presence235. Throughout the experiment, participants 
                                                 
232 E.g., seven central Asian Muslim countries have the suffix “stan” as part of their name (Afghanistan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan etc.)  
233 For more information, see wextor.org. 
234 Further discussion is forthcoming.  
235 This question was included in order to test for possible covariates that would be later discussed. 
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were given the option not to answer a specific question or to choose “no answer” or “I 
don’t know” as a valid response. In the third page of the experiment, participants were 
presented with a backstory according to which they are citizens of a fictional country 
called Narvia. A short paragraph describing the country and its people followed236. 
Narvias’ description was purposely detailed so to enhance sympathy and induce a 
sense of ‘national’ identification. In order to assess the initial effect of the story on the 
participants and as an additional seriousness check, in the fourth page of the 
experiment participants were asked to write a short paragraph describing their life as 
citizens of Narvia. Only data originating in participants who fulfilled the task by 
providing at least one relevant sentence were kept. As expected, this task largely 
increased the number of dropouts237. Whereas some participants did not provide any 
answer, hardly any participants wrote an irrelevant text. The typically positive texts 
corresponded to the pastoral way used to describe Narvia. 
Subjects were then presented with a war scenario between their “home-
country”, and a neighboring country- Barekia. The war was allegedly induced by a 
golden meteor that landed on the border between the two countries (a classic conflict 
over resources). The conflict scenario was identical for all participants. As mentioned, 
it was designed so not to resemble any realistic conflict, yet was not as far-fetched as 
to prevent serious participation in the experiments and the projection of their findings 
on real life conflicts.  
Next, Participants were randomly assigned to one of four different 
experimental conditions, namely war’s aftermath (defeat, victory, stalemate and a 
peace agreement) from the point of view of their home country. With the intention of 
enhancing the differences between these outcomes (and consequently, their effect on 
participants’ answers in the last stage of the experiment), each war outcome was 
described in a clear and distinct manner238. On the seventh page of the experiment, 
participants were presented with five statements and were asked to grade their consent 
                                                 
236 For the complete text please refer to table A-1 in appendix a.  
237 Wextor documented the IP addresses of visitors to each page in the experiment and so, I was able to 
assess the dropout rate following the seriousness check. 
238 For example, the “victory” group was presented with a scenario according to which the Narvian 
army managed not only to cease the meteor but also to conquer 15% of the territory of Barekia, 
including Barekia’s most fertile land. The “defat” scenario was reverse.  
                                       95 
with each statement on a one to five scale. The eighth page thanked the participants 
and concluded the experiment.  
 
 
4.2.2  Measures 
Participants were presented with five statements, aimed as assessing the effect of 
war’s aftermaths on their national and social identification. The statements related to 
participants’ sense of belonging to Narvia, their feelings toward other Narvians, their 
aspiration to stay in Narvia in the future and see it prospering and their national pride 
in being Narvians. Using Likert-type scaling239, participants were asked to grade their 
consent with the statements240 on a five points scale, ranging from “strongly disagree” 
to “strongly agree”. Likert Scale questions are particular suitable for understanding 
specific feedback, while allowing respondents a range of options to choose from.  
Accordingly, the independent variable in the experiment was war’s aftermath 
and the unit of analysis was its type (victory, defeat, stalemate and a peace agreement), 
whereas the dependent variables were national identification (operationalized as 
national pride) and social identification (operationalized as a sense of community and 
camaraderie and the sense of belonging), derived from participants’ consent with the 
relevant statements.  
 
 
4.2.3  Results  
 
Participants 
321 visits of unique IPs were registered in the introductory page. 238 participants 
completed the entire experiment, out of which, only 135 provided a respond to the 
seriousness check/writing task presented to them on the forth page of the experiment. 
53.34% of participants (n = 135) reported that they were males, 45.92% reported that 
they were females and a single participant chose not to disclose his/her gender. 
                                                 
239 A Likert scale is a psychometric scale, most widely used to gauge respondents’ opinions or feelings 
in survey research. A Likert scale refers only to a scale proper which emerges from collective responses 
to a set of items. When responding to a Likert questionnaire item, respondents specify their level of 
agreement or disagreement on a symmetric agree-disagree scale for a series of statements. Thus, the 
range captures the intensity of their feelings for a given item (Burns & Bush, 2008, p. 245).  
240 “Narvia is my home”, “I don’t consider other Narvians as my friends”, “Staying in Narvia is 
important for me”, “I would like to see Narvia prospering”, and “I’m proud to be Narvian”. Note that 
the second statement was phrased as a negative statement in order to check participation alert and 
consistency with other data provided. 
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Participants were aged 15 to 69 with an estimate mean of 29.09241. Three respondents 
chose not to disclose their age. As the recruiting process was mainly conducted 
through social networks, it was essential to verify that the sample was not biased in 
favor of youngsters. In light of the estimated mean age and as 14.07% of participant 
were reportedly over 40 years, this concern did not materialize.  
 
In order to examine the effect of discrepant war outcomes on social and national 
identifications, a one-way analysis of variation (ANOVA 242 ), often used in 
experimental psychological research was conducted across experimental conditions 
(defeat vs. victory vs. agreement vs. stalemate) and in reference to each statement. 
When no variance was detected (if P > α), no further statistical tests were necessary 
and it was concluded that there is no significant difference between war outcomes in 
relation to the specific statement. However, when a significant ANOVA result 
emerged (if P < α), post-hoc t-tests243 were conducted, comparing two war outcomes 
at a time in order to specifically determine where the significance difference lies. In 
order to reduce the chances for type I errors (false positive) and as the statistical tests 
were performed on a single dataset, I used the Bonferroni correction244 to adjust the P 
values. The statistical power of the study was then calculated based on the 
modified P value245. 
 
 “Narvia is my home” 
A highly significant effect was determined by the one-way ANOVA: F(3, 130)=7.25, 
p= 0.0001. Post-hoc t-tests revealed significant differences in means between 
“victory” & “defeat” (two-sample t(46)= 3.61, p= 0.0007), between “defeat” & 
                                                 
241 As participants indicated their age group and not their actual age. 
242 ANOVA is a statistical technique that assesses potential differences in a scale-level dependent 
variable by a nominal-level variable having 2 or more categories (Statistical Solutions, 2013). Though 
ANOVA tests differences between two or more means, it constitutes an analysis of variance as 
inferences about means are made by analyzing variance (Online Statistics Education, n.d.). Here a one-
way analysis was used as the experiment has only one independent variable (war’s aftermath). 
243 Two Sample Assuming Unequal Variances to be exact.  
244 The Bonferroni correction is a multiple-comparison correction method. It is used when several 
dependent or independent statistical tests are being performed simultaneously. While a given alpha 
value may be appropriate for each individual comparison, The alpha value used in such statistical tests 
needs to be lowered to account for the number of comparisons being performed in order to prevent false 
positive findings  (Armstrong, 2014; Bonferroni, 1935; Napierala, 2012; Weisstein, 2004). 
245 As α= 0.05 and as there are 4 groups/experimental conditions, the equation for calculating the 
Bonferroni correction is: 0.05/4 and the new p value threshold for statistical significance is 0.0125.  
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“stalemate” (two-sample t(55)= -2.97, p= 0.004), and between “stalemate” & “peace 
agreement” (two-sample t(61)= 2.99, p= 0.004). In absolute values, the largest 
difference was demonstrated between “victory” and “defeat”. Figure I depicts the 
average rank of consent with the aforementioned statement across experimental 





Figure I: Average rank of consent with "Narvia is my home" across war outcomes 
                               
 
 
“I’m proud to be Narvian” 
A highly significant effect was found following the one-way ANOVA test, F(3, 131)= 
5.04, p= 0.002. Post-hoc t-tests revealed significant differences in means between 
“victory” and “defeat” (two-sample t(3)= 2.83, p= 0.006) and between “defeat” and 
“stalemate” (two-sample t(3)= -3.13, p= 0.003) war outcomes. Figure II illustrates the 
average rank of consent with the aforementioned statement across experimental 
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Figure II: Average consent with "I’m proud to be Narvian" across war outcomes 
 
        
 
 
The average consent scores with the statements are reported in table A. 
 
 
No significant differences between war outcomes were found in relation to the 
statements “I don’t consider other Narvians as my friends246”, F(3, 131)= 0.56, p = 
0.639, “Staying in Narvia is important to me”,  F(3, 129)= 2.39, p= 0.071 and “I 
would like to see Narvia prospering”, F(3, 130)= 0.75, p= 0.524. Whereas the highest 
average scores were registered with regard to the statement “I would like to see Narvia 
prospering247”, the lowest average scores concerned the statement: “Staying in Narvia 
is important to me248”.  
 
                                                 
246 This negatively phrased statement was recorded in the process of the analysis.  
247 With average scores of 3.33 (victory), 3.03 (defeat), 3.36 (stalemate) and 3.31 (Peace agreement).  




























TABLE A: Average ranks of consent across war outcomes 
  Victory Defeat Stalemate Peace Agreement 
Narvia is my 
home 
Mean 4.424 3.394 4.303 3.457 
N 33 33 33 35 
S 0.708 1.478  0.951 1.358 
I’m proud to 
be Narvian 
Mean 3.606 2.636 3.588 2.857 
N 33 33 34 35 
S 1.390 1.388 1.258 1.438 
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4.2.4  Discussion  
 
Serious Check 
The large diversity of participants taking part in Web surveys constitutes “a blessing 
and a curse”: whereas a diverse sample increases the validity of the results obtained in 
the experiment, people who are just browsing the web in the lookout for interesting 
content may click through a questionnaires out of curiosity, thus providing useless 
data (Reips, 2009). Furthermore, researchers and students wishing to review ongoing 
research or learn about research design are often forced to submit invalid data. Yet, the 
most problematic issue brought about by non-serious participation is the increased 
“noise”, resulting in reduced experimental power. The latter poses a serious threat to 
the validity of online research (Aust, Diedenhofen, Ullrich, & Musch, 2013, p. 527; 
Reips, 2002a).  
Several measures were taken in order to address the problem of non-serious 
answering behavior. Concerning the experimental design, a seriousness check in the 
form of a straightforward question (Aust et al., 2013; Reips, 2006) was performed in 
an initial stage of the experiment. The writing task on page four of the experiment 
constituted an indirect seriousness check (many respondents lack the motivation for 
answering an open question that necessitates writing and prefer the more popular 
multiple-choice questions)249. Lastly, while four out of the five statements presented 
were affirmatively phrased (e.g. “Staying in Narvia is important to me”, “I would like 
to see Narvia prospering”), one statement was negatively framed (“I do not consider 
other Narvians as my friends”). Such alternations minimize extreme response bias 
alongside acquiescent bias (Sauro & Lewis, 2011) and keep participants alert.  
Another way to identify non-serious data is by measuring and observing 
significantly short reaction times. Extreme cases may indicate respondents’ flipping 
through pages or clicking on random answers. Inconsistent data may also indicate non-
serious behavior (e.g., high earning minors). In order to ensure high quality data and 
                                                 
249 However, I contemplate that the check was necessary in light of the topic of the experiment, which 
necessitates a serious participation in order for the experimental manipulation to take effect and in order 
to guarantee a high-quality data. Moreover, the data obtained from serious participants who also 
fulfilled the writing task and completed the experiment (n= 136) is sufficient in order to test the 
aforementioned hypotheses in accordance with the present experimental design. This is especially true 
when participants are not compensated for their time (money/academic credit). 
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before turning to the quantitative analysis, a manual consistency check of data 
originated from the same participant was performed250.  
 
National Identity 
Four of the statements with which respondents were asked to rank their consent 
addressed different aspects of their national identification; “Narvia is my home” 
related to the sense of belonging with the imaginary country, “staying in Narvia is 
important to me” and “I would like to see Narvia prospering” reflected the secure 
relationship between individuals and the fictional country. Lastly, “I’m proud to be 
Narvian” echoed a sense of national pride, addressing a deeper, more emotional level 
of national identification (Sullivan, 2014). Whereas no significant effect of wars’ 
aftermath was found concerning the statements “Staying in Narvia is important to me” 
and “I would like to see Narvia prospering”, a highly significant effect was identified 
concerning the sense of belonging and national pride.  
Traditionally, people’s sense of safety and security has been viewed as related 
to their sense of belonging, that is, to the communion identity dimension. Belonging to 
a community offers individuals the opportunity to make and maintain social contacts 
(Woratschek et al., 2007) and to enhance their sense of safety in a world perceived as 
insecure (Bauman, 2001). Individual’s affinity with the state, a high level of national 
identification or “patriotism251” is defined by Webster dictionary (2015) as the feeling 
of loving your country more than any other and being proud of it. Whereas Rorty 
posited that, a sense of shared national identity is not evil. It is an absolutely essential 
component of citizenship, of any attempt to take our country and its problems seriously 
(1994), national identification was repeatedly instrumentalized for political purposes, 
often by a political leadership with diminishing legitimacy (e.g., in Bosnia-
Herzegovina) in a process Kaldor (1999) coined “Identity Politics”252. 
The results observed concerning participants’ sense of belonging and national 
pride are consistent with Social Identity Theory and the aforementioned concepts of 
                                                 
250 For further discussion in how consistency checks support quality data in web experiments, please 
refer to chapter three, sub-section 3.1.3. 
251 Fur an extensive discussion concerning national identification and patriotism please refer to chapter 
two, subsections 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10. 
252 Also used by the political elites to stay in power, fill the vacuum left by crumbling state structures 
and provide legitimation for ‘shadowy’ economic activities (Kaldor, 2013; Mueller, 2004) 
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BIRGing and CORFing. Further evidence is found in Table A, which shows the 
average ranks of consent with the statement proved significant across war outcomes. 
While the average score of consent with both statements was the highest following a 
positively valued war outcome- victory (4.42 and 3.60 respectively), the lowest score 
was observed following defeat, an indisputably negatively valued war outcome (3.39 
and 2.63 respectively). This finding is only substantial regarding the statement “I’m 
proud to be Narvian” as higher mean of agreement with said statement points to high 
identification253. It should also be noted that in relation to both statements, the average 
score of consent following a stalemate was very similar, yet slightly lower than 
following a victory. An identical effect was observed following defeat vs. agreement. 
In accordance with the statistical results, respondents seemed to have considered 
stalemate to be a positive outcome, and peace agreement to be a negative one. This 
finding is troublesome since most modern-day wars alongside other forms of political 
violence (predominantly military operations) are concluded with a negotiated 
agreement (ceasefire, interim agreement, etc.) rather than with a military 
victory/defeat.  
Various explanations may account for the non-significant effect of war 
outcomes on respondents’ desire to continue to reside in the fictional country and to 
see it prospering. One possible explanation is that the experimental design and 
information provided during the experiment resulted in a large number of high 
identifiers. High identification constitutes an exception to the general predictions 
arising from social identity theory; Whereas BIRGing and CORFing are ego 
enhancement/protection techniques, employed as a coping mechanism with a 
threatened identity, high identifiers were found to employ broader socio-psychological 
factors that effectively “fix” the level of social identification at the interpersonal 
place254 (Abrams & Hogg, 1988). High identification is often a symptom of a self-
                                                 
253 This is not necessarily the case in relation to the other statements. E.g., the statement “I would like to 
see Narvia prospering”, though suggests a bond between the individual and the country, is not directly 
related to increased national identification. It can be speculated that high identifiers with the nation state 
would not be affected by any war aftermaths and so the statistical analysis would reveal a non-
significant result. It can also be speculated that high identifiers would agree with the statement “I would 
like to see Narvia prospering” to a higher degree following defeat, rather than following victory, as the 
country is in a more desperate need of future success. In the latter scenario, appearing in Experiment II, 
a significant finding following the statistical tests affirms the predictions set forth in the introduction of 
this chapter insofar as they focus on identification salience and variance between war outcomes and 
don’t include a prediction of the strength or outcomes of the explored effect.  
254 Such as Tajfel’s hut experiment mentioned in chapter two, footnote 118.  
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embedded identity 255  (Dimmock & Gucciardi, 2008; Sloan, 1979; Wann & 
Branscombe, 1990; Wann et al., 1995), namely, a strong bond between the self and the 
group256. Put in other words, individuals who highly identify with their country would 
support it for better and for worse, and thus, are not affected by an increase/decrease 
in groups’ status (following a negatively/positively valued war outcomes). It can 
certainly be argued that a self-embedded condition is rarely observed in the context of 
an experimental research (which is not based on true group membership).  
Another possible explanation to the non-significant results may be that the 
experimental manipulation was not successful in making participants’ national 
identification salient in the context of the fictional scenario. A prove to the contrary in 
this case would be the significant results concerning not one but two other aspects of 
the dependent variable and the level of significance, all point to an effective 
experimental manipulation.   
 
 
Social Identity  
The statement “I don’t consider other Narvians as my friends”, with which 
respondents were asked to rank their consent, addressed their social identification and 
expressed a sense of camaraderie, mutual trust and togetherness. According to 
Simmel, conflicts trigger a social dynamic that can help integrate and stabilize a given 
society. Conflict may serve to remove dissociating elements in a relationship and to re-
establish unity (Simmel, [1908] 1955). In an analysis of the effect discrepant outcomes 
of wars have on individuals’ social identification, no significant effect was found (F(3, 
131)=0.56, p = 0.639). This non-significant finding is consistent with Simmel’s theory 
of conflict as an integrative force in groups. Whereas a conflict strengthens group 
consciousness and awareness of separateness from other groups, its’ outcome does not 
seem to significantly affect the latter. Also consistent with said theory is the high level 
of agreement with the above statement (average score of 2.923) that was found across 
conditions.  
Yet, the insignificant result may also be attributed to the experimental design: 
whereas four out of the five statements presented in the experiment concerned various 
                                                 
255 See chapter two subsection 2.11.4. 
256 Such a bond is usually observed among real group members (e.g. the ethnic majority in a nation 
state) and will be explored in the next chapter. 
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aspects of national identity, only one statement referred to social identity. Alongside a 
relatively small sample size, the potential for insignificant results (which are not 
necessarily the result of an insignificant effect) is abundant. Further research is 
necessary in this regard. 
 
 
4.3  Experimental Study II 
 
 
Experimental study II was directed at replicating results obtained in Experimental 
study I. In order to ascertain the validity of said results and verify that the observed 
effect of discrepant war outcomes on national and social identification spanned across 
mediums, Experiment II was based on short videos, rather than texts. While the 
conflict scenario presented in Experiment II was similar to the one used in Experiment 
I, it was adjusted following feedback257 attained from peers when the original study 
was presented in different forums (departmental seminars, working groups and 




4.3.1  Using Video vs. Text in Experimental Research  
With the increased popularity of online video portals such as YouTube and Vimeo, 
familiarity with video-based content has increased in the last decade. Information 
videos thus constitute a suitable substitute for text-based instructions 258 . This 
statement is consistent with recent literature, mainly within the framework of 
educational media and technology, comparing video-based and text-based content. 
The underlining argument for conducting such exploratory research stems from an 
increased interest is visual context259 alongside observed difficulty to follow written 
text260. Further studies point to improved skills when studying foreign languages when 
                                                 
257 Feedback mainly was that the scenario in unrealistic and thus does not trigger identification.  
258 Even though video-based instructions did not measurably improved conceptual learning (Breimer, 
Cotler, & Yoder, 2012) and no statistical significant effect was found between video-based and text-
based instructions concerning correctness in answering lab questions and slight differences in 
completion time and impression (Breimer, Conway, Cotler, & Yoder, 2011). 
259 See, for example (Khan, Richards, & Wu, 2010). 
260 Breimer, Cotler & Yoder (2012) found that students struggle to follow written instructions displayed 
on monitors in their lab. It was even reported that Students will sometimes skip or misinterpret steps, 
resulting in errors that require students to redo earlier tasks (Breimer et al., 2012, p. 43). 
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using video- rather than text-based instructions (e.g. Herron, Morris, Secules, & 
Curtis, 1995).  
 
 
4.3.2   Procedure and Experimental Design 
The experiment consisted of four parts: warm-up, identification inducing video and 
identification check (also used as a seriousness check), presentation of the war 
scenario + experimental manipulation and an assessment of the effect of the 
manipulation on the defendant variables. All videos used in the experiment were 
accompanied by relevant voiceover text (in a computer generated male voice261) and 
images262. The videos were intentionally short263 (in order to decrease dropouts) and 
the voice-over allowed non-native English speakers to easily follow the storyline. 
 Part I of the experiment constituted the “warm-up phase” and included a 
welcome page, a demographic questions page and summarized information regarding 
the context of the experiment, its goal264, estimated completion time and a reminder 
that the participants may stop the experiment at any given time.  
Part II constituted the identification inducement phase. Participants were asked 
to imagine that they recently moved to a fictional country (aka Ardena). Participants 
were then asked to watch a short video 265  titled “Welcome to Ardena” which 
familiarized them with their new “home”. The images depicted in the video were 
meant to create a relaxed and pleasant atmosphere (beaches, forests, mountains etc.). 
All videos referred to the participants as Ardenians or used the pronouns “we” or 
“ours” (aka “we won”). That was conducted in order to increase the identification 
                                                 
261 Voice over was generated using http://www.fromtexttospeech.com. The specific voice- an American 
English male voice was chosen as it is lacking any identifiable accent. The pace of speech was chosen 
in order to accommodate, and in accordance with comments made by both native and non-native 
English speakers and obtained in the pilot version of the experiments,  
262 The images used in the experiment originated in https://pixabay.com & https://www.pexels.com/ and 
are not protected under any copyright law. The chosen images were specifically aimed to correspond 
with the message conveyed by the voiceover text used in each stage of the experiment. Moreover, the 
images used were photoshoped to make them unrecognizable (e.g., images do not include flags, soldiers 
that can be recognized by uniform or iconic locations).  
263 The videos used in Experiment I did not exceed 01:13 whereas the average duration per video was 
significantly shorter- 37.67 seconds. 
264 The goal of the experiment was described to the participants in a general manner only, namely, to 
explore the effect of conflicts on Identities. 
265 This video was significantly longer than other videos used in the experiment (1:13 vs. 0:25-0:40), but 
still quit short objectively. Moreover, as this video was aimed at creating a sense of identification 
between the participant and the fictional country, without which the experimental manipulation would 
be rendered pointless, it was necessary to provide more information at this point. 
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between the participants and the fictional country. The following page consisted of a 
short identification test; participants were asked to answer a multiple-choice question 
concerning their feelings towards Ardena subsequent to the short introductory video. 
This page also constituted a semi seriousness check as participants were asked to 
reflect on the content they were presented with.  
Part III of the experiment presented participants with a video titled “The War” 
according to which, an accidental discovery of a vast oil reservoir on the border 
between Ardena and Talhus, its peaceful neighbor incited a dispute over the ownership 
of the oil. Following unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a solution, a war erupted. 
Next, participants were randomly assigned to four different war outcomes (victory, 
defeat, stalemate and a negotiated peace agreement) presented to them by video clips. 
The distinction between the outcomes was emphasized266 across videos. 
 Part IV asked participants to rate their consent with statements referring to the 
dependent variables on a Likert scale of 1 to 5 (ranging from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree). A “thank you” page, which also included an email address for 
potential communication with the researcher concluded the experiment267. 
 
 
4.3.3  Measures 
The Independent variable used in the experiment was war outcome268 and the unit of 
analysis was the type of said outcome (victory, defeat, stalemate and peace 
agreement). The dependent variable was national and social identification. The unit of 
analysis used for the dependent variable was participants’ graded consent with 







                                                 
266 For example, the “victory” video specified that not only that Ardena won the war, it also managed to 
conquer some Talhusian territory and referred to the conclusion of the war as a “great victory”. 
Similarly, under the “defeat” scenario, Ardena not only lost access to the oil and was defeated in the 
war, it also lost some of its territory in what was referred to as humiliating overwhelming defeat. 
267 An elaborate page by page description of the experiment is found in table A-2, appendix A 
268 Based of general description of the conclusion of violence presented and not on objective data. 
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225 participants completed 269  the experiment. The vast majority of participants 
(96.4%) indicated serious participation and thus the analysis of the data they provided 
is presented below. 44.91% of participants (n = 216) reported that they were males and 
55.09% reported that they were females. Participants’ mean age is estimated at 
36.38270 whereas 17.59% of participants reported they are 45 years old and older. 
Consequently, the data does not point to a bias in favor of youngsters, as often argued 
when web-experiments are concerned and especially in this case, since the recruiting 
process was mainly conducted through social networks. 
Similarly to Experiment I, in order to examine the effect of discrepant war 
outcomes on social and national identification, a one-way analysis of variation 
(ANOVA) was conducted across experimental conditions (defeat vs. victory vs. 
agreement vs. stalemate) and in reference to each statement (representing different 
aspects of the dependent variable). The ANOVA tested whether variance exists 
between the four experimental conditions. When variance was detected (P < α), post-
hoc t-tests were conducted, comparing two war outcomes at a time in order to 
specifically determine where the significance difference lies. In order to reduce the 
chances for type I errors and as the statistical tests are performed on a single dataset, I 
used the Bonferroni correction to adjust the P values 271 . When no variance was 
detected following the ANOVA (P > α), no further statistical tests were necessary and 
it was concluded that there is no significant difference in mean values of consent with 
the individual statement following different war outcomes.  
 
 “Narvia is my home” 
                                                 
269 As Google Forms only saves the data when forms are submitted, I was unable to find the overall 
number of visitors. Likewise, I’m unable to know exactly where the dropout occurred. However, a 
similar information was deduced from experiment I and is not critical at this point.  
270 This is an approximation as participants indicated their age group and not their actual age. 
271 As α= 0.05 and as there are 4 groups/experimental conditions, the equation for calculating the 
Bonferroni correction is: 0.05/4= 0.0125.  
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A highly significant effect was determined by the one-way ANOVA (F(3, 213)=7.25, 
p = 0.008). Post-hoc t-tests revealed significant differences in means between the 
“victory” & the “defeat” war outcomes (two-sample t(98)= -2.841, p=0.005). Figure 
III depicts the average rank of consent with the aforementioned statement across 
experimental conditions, the results of the t-tests and error bars corresponding to 95% 
confidence intervals.  
 
 
Figure III: Average consent with "Narvia is my home" across war outcomes 
                        
 
Table B reports the average consent scores with the aforementioned statements. 
 
 
TABLE B: Average ranks of consent across war outcomes 
  Victory Defeat Stalemate Peace 
Agreement 
Narvia is my home Mean 2,571 3,238 3,433 2,789 
N 63 49 58 47 
S 1,119 1,300 1,382 1,357 
I would like to see Narvia prospering Mean 3,698 4,143 4,155 3,894 
N 63 49 58 47 
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“I would like to see Narvia prospering” 
A somewhat significant effect was determined by the one-way ANOVA (F(3, 213)= 
3.31, p= 0.021). Post-hoc t-tests revealed significant differences in means between 
“victory” and “defeat” (two-sample t(109)= -2.58, p= 0.011) and between “victory” 
and “stalemate” (two-sample t(118)= -2.771, p= 0.006). Figure IV illustrates average 
rank of consent with the aforementioned statement across experimental conditions, the 




Figure IV: Average consent with “I would like to see Narvia prospering” across war outcomes 
 
                     
 
 
No significant effect was found in relation to the statements “I don’t consider other 
Narvians as my friends” (F(3, 213)=1.87, p = 0.134), “Staying in Narvia is important 
to me”, (F(3, 213) =1.52, p= 0.208) and “I’m proud to be Narvian”, (F(3, 213) =0.93, 
p= 0.426). Though no significant effect of war outcomes on the said statements was 
found, it should be noted that the highest average scores within these three statements 
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friends272” whereas the lowest average score was registered concerning the statement: 







Several measures were taken in order to address the problem of non-serious answering 
behavior. Concerning the experimental design, a direct question, placed on the first 
page of the experiment (Aust et al., 2013; Reips, 2006), inquired what is the nature of 
the visit (to browse through or seriously participate in the experiment). An indirect 
seriousness check was conducted by manually checking the consistency of the data 
provided from the same participant. Both measures were aimed at ensuring high 
quality data274 before turning to the quantitative analysis. 
 
National Identity275 
Four of the statements with which respondents were asked to rank their consent 
addressed different aspects of their national identification; “Narvia is my home” 
related to the sense of belonging with the imaginary country, “staying in Narvia is 
important to me” and “I would like to see Narvia prospering” reflected the secure 
relationship between individuals and the fictional country along with their aspiration 
to remain living there. Lastly, “I’m proud to be Narvian” echoed a sense of national 
pride, addressing a more emotional level of national identification (Sullivan, 2014).  
Similarly to the results of Experiment I, a significant effect of war’s aftermath 
was found in relation to two out of the four statement. However, whereas in both 
experiments a significant effect was detected in relation to the statement “Narvia is my 
                                                 
272 With average scores of 3.30 (victory), 3.49 (defeat), 3.51 (stalemate) and 3.061 (Peace agreement).  
273 With average scored of 2.47 (victory), 2.79 (defeat), 2.75 (stalemate) and 2.48 (Peace agreement). 
274 For example, data originating in the same participant who indicated that he is under the age of 18 and 
that the highest level of education which he completed was a Ph.D. were disregarded. 
275 I will focus on the significant results as the non-significant results may be explained in a similar 
manner to those obtained in Experiment I. 
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home276”, here, further significant effect was found concerning the statement “I would 
like to see Narvia prospering” and not in relation to participants’ national pride. As 
predicted, a significant difference between the “victory” and the “defeat” war 
outcomes was detected. This finding is explained by participants’ tendencies to CORF 
and BIRG triggered the discrepant war outcomes. That is, to share in the glory of a 
successful other (a victorious nation) and distance themselves from an unsuccessful 
group (a defeated nation). The significant variance between the “victory” and the 
“defeat” war outcomes resulted in an inverse effect concerning participants’ ranks of 
consent with the two statements. Whereas in experiment I a higher mean was 
registered following victory and a lower mean following defeat, in the present 
experiment a lower mean was demonstrated following victory and a higher mean was 
demonstrated following defeat concerning both statements277.  
 
 
4.4  Limitations 
 
The goal of the current research was to establish the underlying hypothesis that 
supports the premise of this dissertation278, namely, that different war outcomes have 
distinctive effects of individuals’ national and social identification. The research thus 
focused on differentiating between war outcomes and did not take into account 
diversity within the examined population (e.g. high identifiers vs. low identifiers279, 
males vs. females, etc.). It also did not examine the strength and extent of the found 
effect (long/short lasting).  
 Since both experiments did not offer participants any reward and in order to 
avoid high degree of dropouts (and obtain a large enough sample size), it was essential 
to design short experiments. However, this tradeoff between content and participation 
                                                 
276 Consequently, the discussion of the meaning of the significant effect concerning the first statement is 
found under subsection 5.2.4. 
277 According to table B, the highest mean documented concerning the statement “Narvia is my home” 
was demonstrated following stalemate, though the statistical tests suggest that it was not as a result of 
the outcome of the war. 
278 Which is further developed in chapters six and seven. 
279 Qualitative studies stemming from an interpretivistic research paradigm (cf. Black, 2006; Harris, 
1981) discovered that not all individuals employ the BIRGing and CORFing strategies equally.  
According to (Wann et al., 1995), individuals who chose to maintain their association with a losing 
group were higher in identification than those not displaying their membership. This finding was 
replicated in numerous other researches, mostly with regard to sport fans’ loyalty to their clubs 
(Dimmock & Gucciardi, 2008; Wann & Branscombe, 1990; Woratschek, Horbel, Popp, & Roth, 2007). 
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time also meant that only one statement referred to a specific identity aspect. 
Examining further aspects of individuals’ social and national identities and a more 
extensive examination (by using multiple statements per identity aspect) would have 
contributed to a more robust conclusion. Additionally, a longer experiment could have 
established a base-line level of identification, assessed before the experimental 
manipulation took place and afterwards. Comparing pre and post manipulation 
identification levels would further control for potential within population covariates.  
A larger sample size and a more diverse one would not only increase the 
robustness of the findings but also allow for better control of experiencing a “real life” 
conflict as a potential covariate280. Using a panel data, or designing an experiment 
which presents each participant with all four war outcomes as part of similar but 
distinguished scenarios would control for personal characteristics, presently 
unexplored.  
As mentioned, since both experiments related to fictional nations, it can be 
argued that the findings of the study cannot be generalized or applied to real conflicts. 
Though Mullen, Brown, and Smith (1992) found that in-group bias effects were 
stronger in magnitude in studies that focused on real, rather than artificial groups281, a 
significant finding, consistently obtained by both experiments indicates that the 
studied effect exists.   
 
 
4.5  Conclusions   
 
Whereas the literature supports the notion that identity threats, such as wars and 
military operations increase identity salience, the former are often treated as unitary 
events. The underlying assumption of this chapter, against the theoretical framework 
described in chapter two is that different outcomes of political violence (wars, in the 
context of this chapter) have distinctive effects on individual identification, both 
nationally and socially. This chapter constitutes a macro-level analysis, set out to 
examine the aforementioned assumption and to lay the foundations for an extensive 
micro-level analysis. Predictions derived from Social Identity theory and Social 
                                                 
280 See appendix A.3 in this regard. 
281 Mullen et al. believed that this effect is due to the greater salience of the in-group in real as opposed 
to laboratory-created categorizations (Lalonde & Silverman, 1994). 
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Comparison theory anticipated significant differences between positively and 
negatively valued war outcomes. While victories and defeats are clear examples in this 
regard, the effects of stalemates and peace agreements were assumed to largely depend 
on individuals’ subjective interpretation of these events as positive or negative, from 
their nation’s point of view.  
Two web experiments (a text-based experiment and a video-based experiment) 
were carried out in order to examine whether diverse war outcomes will result in 
distinctive effects on individual social and national identities. Various aspects of the 
latter were specifically addressed in both experiments: the sense of community, 
comradery and belonging were used as indicators of social identification, whereas 
national pride indicated national identification.  
Results obtained in Experiment I affirmed the existence of significant 
differences across war outcomes with regard to two out of the four examined aspects 
of national identification; the sense of belonging (victory vs. defeat vs. stalemate vs. 
peace agreement) and national pride (victory vs. defeat vs. stalemate). Results 
obtained in Experiment II are primarily consistent with those obtained in Experiment 
I; significant differences between war outcomes were found with regard to two out of 
the four statements concerning national identification. However, whereas in both 
experiments a significant difference across war outcomes was detected in relation to 
the sense of belonging (victory vs. defeat in Experiment II), In Experiment II, further 
significant difference was found as to the secure relationship between individuals and 
their country (victory vs. defeat, victory vs. stalemate) and not in relation to national 
pride. The overall results are consistent with Social Identity Theory and affirm the 
underlying hypothesis.  
The significant differences between war outcomes (mainly between victories 
and defeats) can be explained by individuals’ tendencies to share in the glory of a 
successful other (aka to BIRG, following a positively evaluated war outcome) and to 
distance oneself an unsuccessful group (aka to CORF, following a negatively valued a 
defeated nation), triggered by discrepant war outcomes. No significant differences 
between war outcomes were found in relation to individuals’ social identity in either 
of the experiments. This finding is consistent with Simmel’s conflict theory according 
to which, conflicting interactions straighten the internal cohesion of pre-existing 
groups. In this regard, individuals react to the conflict itself, regardless of its 
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conclusion. However, the insignificant result may also be attributed to the 
experimental design. Further research is necessary in this regard. The overall 
outcomes thus establish the null hypothesis according to which, the effect of wars on 
identity salience is mitigated by the way they were concluded, and allow for further 
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5 Focusing on the State of Israel and Israeli Society 
 
When I was a child, Israel was a legend more than a reality. It emerged 
from a dream, and today it has surpassed that dream. 
                               --- Shimon Peres282 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
The goal of this chapter is to set the stage for the examination of Israeli national pride 
and social rifts following political violence in the first decade of the 21st century in the 
current and next two chapters. The following analysis will commence with an 
historical review of Jewish nationalism and the birth of the Zionist movement in 
Europe in the late 19th century, which preceded the establishment of the state of Israel.  
 Following the examination of the role of the state in constructing a new 
Jewish-Israeli identity during Israel’s early years, I will turn to the discussion of post-
Zionism and current challenges to contemporary “Israeliness”. Against the backdrop 
of the inherent tension derived from Israel’s Jewish and democratic nature, I will 
discuss Israeli national particularism and pay special attention to a recent discourse of 
a proposed basic law: Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people. The second part 
of this chapter will be dedicated to the exploration of Israeli patriotism. This will be 
done by tracing and discussing main ingredients of Israeli national pride and the role 
of sports in shaping Israeli collective identity. Special attention will be given to the 
role of the Israeli defense forces in shaping Israeli national identity alongside its 
contributing to social inequalities and tensions. 
 
 
5.2  Jewish Nationalism and the Zionist Movement in Europe 
 
The awakening of both Jewish nationalism and the Zionist movement in Europe in the 
late 19th century was largely a response to rising anti-Semitism in Europe and the 
persecution of Jews283 . Recognizing that anti-Semitism would prevent them from 
                                                 
282 Quote from a keynote delivered by late president Shimon Peres for his 90th birthday celebrations. 
The full text is available here: https://www.timesofisrael.com/full-text-of-shimon-peress-speech/. 
283 Major events in this context include the anti-Jewish large-scale repeated pogroms that took place in 
the Russian empire and the Dreyfus affair in France (Wylen, 2000). 
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assimilating in their native countries in Europe, Jews concluded that they had to seek, 
and often fight for self-determination. Yet, the nature of the quest for sovereignty was 
under heated debate. The national solution to the “Jewish Question284”, eventually 
accepted by the international community was the Zionist solution, directed at 
establishing an autonomous and independent Jewish state in Eretz Israel, the historic 
homeland of the Jewish people285 (Roshwald, 1900). The term “Eretz Israel” (“The 
Land of Israel” in Hebrew) refers to the territory roughly corresponding the biblical 
Canaan, the “Holy Land” or the geographic region of Palestine286 (Palaestina, “Land 
of the Philistines,” the Latin name given Judaea by the Romans, Stone et al., 2018).  
The Zionist movement was established as a political organization founded by 
secular Ashkenzi Jews in 1897. It was headed by Theodor Herzl and was later chaired 
by Chaim Weizmann (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2016; Oxford Dictionaries, 2018). 
The word “Zionism” derives from the Hebrew word “Zion” which is one of the 
biblical names of the land of Israel and the city of Jerusalem, still used today. The term 
Zionism was first used by Nathan Birnbaum287 in the journal Selbstemanzipation (Self 
Emancipation) in 1890 (De Lange, 2000). Over the years it became synonymous with 
“Aliyah” (immigration to Israel), the founding of the state of Israel and its 
development and included Jewish patriotism, fulfillment, the extolling of the State of 
Israel and the like (Arad & Gal, 2006). Advocates of Zionism view it as a national 
liberation movement, aimed at repatriating persecuted people residing in the diaspora 
to their historical homeland (Aaronsohn, 1996; Troen, 2007). Critics of Zionism 
regard it as a colonialist and racist ideology that led to the exodus of Palestinians 
following the 1948 war (Pappe, 2007; Said, 1979).  
In comparison to other national unions or movements which existed in Europe 
in the 19th century, three aspects made the Zionist Movement stand out. First, most of 
the Jewish public did not support or identify with the goals of the Zionistic movement. 
                                                 
284 The Jewish question was an extensive debate Europe during the 19th and 20th centuries concerning 
the civil, legal, national and political status of the Jewish minority (R. J. Bernstein, 1996; Marx, 1975; 
Ragussis, 1995). 
285 Religiously, it can be argued that the Messianic prophecy (the religious belief of future Jewish 
redemption in Eretz Israel) was given a contemporary earthly dimension in the form of the 
establishment of a Jewish state (Kaufman & Galily, 2009). 
286 This geographical territory was controlled by the Ottoman Empire until 1917, by a joint British and 
French military administration referred to as the “Occupied Enemy Territory Administration” or OETA 
between 1917 and 1920, and by British civil administration or “British Mandate” between 1920 and 
until the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. 
287 Birnbaum founded Kadiman, a nationalist Jewish students’ association in Vienna (Encyclopaedia 
Judaica, 2007). 
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In fact, popular movements among the Jewish people at that time intensely opposed 
Zionism. Second, the majority of those who supported Zionism lived outside of what 
they perceived as their national homeland, and it should be noted that the initial desire 
to establish a Jewish homeland wasn’t restricted to the region of Palestine288. Third, at 
the time of its establishment, Zionism lacked a clear definition and most of its 
supporters did not share a common culture. This led to many critical disputes vis à vis 
the goals of the Zionistic movement (for example whether to establish a Jewish or a 
bi-national state with a socialist or a capitalist society) and means to achieve them 
(e.g., whether to support physical settlements in Eretz Israel or political activity in 
Europe).  
In light of the aforementioned concerns, the difficulty in gaining territory under 
the Ottoman rule and the Arab majority that resided in Palestine at that time- the 
Zionist solution appeared unrealistic. Yet, political events that took place at the end of 
the 19th century (such as the Balfur Declaration) turned the Zionist solution into a 
viable plan once Eretz Israel came under the British Mandate. The Zionist goal of 
Jewish statehood was violently opposed by the local Arab leaders who saw the 
Ottoman defeat as an opportunity either to create their own state or to join a larger 
Arab entity (Stone et al., 2018). 
Some thought should be given to the term “Zionism”. Though an exact and 
agreed upon definition is hard to come by even in present times, three general aims 
were agreed upon by all factions of the Zionistic movement following Herzel’s death 
in 1904: First, with the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Eretz Israel, Jewish 
exile should end. Second, creating a national culture and a common identity for the 
culturally diverse settlers must be centered around the Hebrew language (and its 
revival is thus one of the greatest achievements of the Zionist Movement’s). Third, the 
creation of the “New Jew”, a positive physical image of Israelis which would refute 
the negative stereotypical anti-Semitic image of the gaunt Diaspora Jew 289 290 
(Conforti, 2011; Kaufman & Galily, 2009).  
                                                 
288 In his book Der Judenstaat (1896) Theodor Hertzel, the founder of the Modern Zionist movement, 
envisioned the founding of a future independent Jewish state during the 20th century, but did not 
actually focus on Eretz Israel (Herzl, 1896). Herzl viewed assimilation as most desirable yet impossible 
to realize in view of increased anti-Semitism (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2016). 
289  The term Muscle Judaism was coined by Max Nordau, the co-founder of the World Zionist 
Organization together with Hertzel in the Second Zionist Congress in 1898. The term expressed the will 
to change the Jewish character and establish a new Jewish ethos. It expresses Jewish power to fight 
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Not only that Zionism wasn’t unanimously supported within the Jewish diaspora, the 
Yishuv291 (Hebrew for “settlement”, referring to the body of Jewish residents in Eretz 
Israel prior to the establishment of the land of Israel) was also divided into conflicting 
political camps292. The labor camp was established prior to the first World War and 
significantly grew after the war. It was the most consolidated of the groups and its 
various parties were unionized under the Histadrut (General Organization of Workers 
in Israel). The Histadrut, apart from being a professional union, assumed positional 
responsibilities and national tasks such as immigrant absorption, settlement, defense, 
and caring for the range of personal, cultural and spiritual needs of its members 
(Horin, 1981; Margalit, 1980). 
Another camp was The Civilian/Liberal Camp, formed by the urban 
“bourgeois”. Less consolidated in terms of ideology, it was mainly characterized by its 
support of private enterprise and capitalistic economy and by its opposition to socialist 
ideology and the Histadrut’s hegemony in the Jewish Yishuv (Kaufman & Galily, 
2009). Each party within the civilian camp represented private professional sectors 
(farmers, merchants, craftsmen, etc.).  
Additional camps included The Religious Camp (religious Zionists and ultra-
Orthodox anti-Zionists) and The Ethnic Camp (comprised of parties whose aim was to 
promote the interests of their ethnic groups, such as Georgians, Yemenites, etc.). The 
political camps not only fought against one another ideologically, but also established 
their own institutions that were instrumental in the ideological struggle. Health 
organizations, educational factions, labor unions, youth movements and secret military 
organizations were associated with a clearly defined political identity in the 20’s at the 
start of the British Mandate (Kaufman & Galily, 2009).  
                                                                                                                                             
against anti-Semitism in the diaspora and to develop military skills as a means of building a Hebrew 
defense force. The term also referred to ancient Jewish heroism depicted in the stories of Samson, Judea 
the Maccabi and Bar-Kochva (Presner, 2007; Zimmerman, 2003). 
290 The image of the new muscular Jew coincided with the practice of sports and athletics in order to 
cultivate group spirit and discipline, and for serving the goal of nationalism by fostering unity and 
cohesion. Accordingly, the image of the Tzabar, a nickname for a native Israel (which is the Hebrew 
name for the fruit of the Cactus plant), turned into a central component in Zionist terminology, and was 
widely expressed by Modern Hebrew literature, most profoundly in Israel’s yearly years (see, for 
example (Almog, 1997; Gluzman, 2007). 
291 The failure of the Russian Revolution (1905) and the wave of pogroms that followed resulted in 
increased numbers of young Russian Jews who immigrated to Palestine as pioneer settlers. By 1914 
there were about 90,000 Jews in Palestine (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2016). 
292 The first ideological waves of immigration to Eretz Israel originated in Eastern Europe at the start of 
the 20th Century. They supported the concept of taking over labor and security from “Arab hands” as a 
mean of creating a Hebrew working class and defense force.  
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5.3 Zionism, National Identity and Hebrew Culture Following 
the Establishment of the State of Israel 
 
 
The establishment of the State of Israel constituted a turning point for the Zionist idea. 
The large-scale extermination of European Jews by the Nazis led many Jews to seek 
refuge in Eretz Israel/Palestine and many others, especially in the United States, to 
embrace Zionism. The Zionist Movement has thus won the ideological struggle for the 
solution to the Jewish problem293 and with it, earned the right to realize its vision – a 
Jewish state in Eretz Israel (Kaufman & Galily, 2009). No longer focused on internal 
and external political struggles (to establish both its dominance and a Jewish state), 
Zionism became the official ideology of the new state. As such, Zionism faced new 
challenges, most notably national building and legitimizing the status of the nation in 
the world and among Jews in the diaspora294. Zionism had thus become The central 
symbol of Jewish unity and identity, and the accepted ideology among all those Jews 
who related positively to their Jewishness. It was only later that hard questions began 
to be asked about the relevance of Zionism in the era of “state-ism” 
(mamlackhtiyut)… Zionism also involved solidarity with the Jewish people, accepting 
emotional responsibility for the lot of the people after the Holocaust, loyal citizenship 
of the state, and a sympathetic attitude toward, the social absorption of the Aliya 
(Schweid 2002). 
 
 With the creation of the state of Israel, the Yishuv culture transformed from a 
“Hebrew Culture” to an “Israeli Culture”. While the founding ideology of the state 
was established on the basis of Jews who fought for realizing the Zionist ideal, the 
newly established state of Israel was in fact a state of immigrants who turned to it as a 
result of distress in their home countries. The Yishuv, which on the eve of the War of 
Independence accounted for 600,000 Jews 295  absorbed more than a million six 
                                                 
293 The Holocaust allegedly proved that Jewish existence in the Diaspora was hopeless and placed the 
Jewish people in continuous existential danger.  
294 In the next decades several Zionist organizations continued to raise financial support for Israel and to 
encourage diaspora Jews to emigrate (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2016). 
295 Whereas in March 1925 the Jewish population in Eretz Israel/Palestine was officially estimated at 
108,000, it rose to about 238,000 (20% increase) by 1933 and reached 600.000 by the end of the Second 
World War (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2016). 
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hundred thousand Jews in its first 15 years of existence (Kaufman and Galily, 2009; 
Vital statistics: Population of Israel; 1948- Present). 
 According to the Declaration of Establishment of the State of Israel (1948), 
Israel is not only “the state of the Jews” but also “a Jewish state”. Consequently, new 
laws and regulations were formulated in order to shape a policy of Jewish-national 
education, enable and support ingathering of exiles as well as their social-national-
cultural integration, and shape the Jewish public realm (Schweid, 2002). Most of the 
Olim (Jewish immigrants from the diaspora to the Land of Israel) were Holocaust 
refugees and survivals who concentrated in displaced camps after the second would 
War, or Jews who abandoned their countries due to political strife and/or Pogroms 
(Poland and Hungary being the most obvious examples).  
 It is important to mention that Eretz Israel was a last resort for many Jews who 
could not return to their countries of origin or immigrate to other countries. 
Furthermore, the Jewish-Arab conflict brought hundreds of thousands of Jewish 
refugees and immigrants from Muslim countries (such as Iraq, Morocco, Syria, 
Yemen, Libya and Lebanon) to the newly established country, most of whom, apart 
from religious tradition, had a weak connection to the modern Zionist ideology (Basri, 
2002; Roumani, Goldman, & Korn, 1975). Consequently, in its early years, Israel 
functioned as a “melting pot”, aimed at shaping a collective cultural-national identity 
and bonding a diverse population (comprised of native and immigrant, Ashkenazi and 
Sefardi, religious and secular segments). This “melting pot” intended to produce a new 
Jewish-Israeli identity and common culture (literature, art, school curricula, and sport). 
However, a byproduct of the described process was the growing distance between the 
identities and cultural sources of young native Israelis who grew up and were educated 
in the state, and those of their parents296.  
 
 
5.3.1  The Israeli Defense Forces  
Central to the discussion of the Israeli “melting pot” culture is the Israeli defense 
forces and its role in supporting the nation-building efforts in Israel’s first years. After 
Israel’s independence, seven decades ago, new instruments for the articulation of 
                                                 
296 Against this backdrop Schweid (2002) concluded: The effort to integrate and to unite the people 
within the melting pot of a national state culture led to the decline of the pre-state culture and the 
emergence of a multi-compartmentalized and fragmented Israeli culture. 
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Israeli identity became available. The Israeli army (aka the Israeli Defense Forces, or 
IDF) became one of the most important socializing agents and provided the setting for 
the creation of a shared Israeli cultural base (Raviv, 2015). Alongside an analysis of 
IDF’s role in shaping Israeli national identity, a discussion of Israeli militarism and its 
effect on the Israeli society will follow. 
 
 
Serving in the Israeli Defense Forces 
National consensus regarding the constant threat to Israel’s survival 297as well as the 
compulsory army service for the majority of the Israeli population (Jewish men and 
women298) secured the IDF’s role as a staple of the Israeli experience and a key to the 
Israeli-Jewish identity (Herzog, 1998). Not only is service in the IDF mandatory by 
law, it also involves a large portion of the population through the reserve forces299 and 
the care provided for family members of soldiers (Raviv, 2002). For many years, this 
had endowed the IDF with the character of “a people’s army” and justified the 
classification of the Israeli society as a paradigmatic “nation in arms” (Cohen, 2004). 
Although both depictions have lost some of their strength300, and while the Israeli civil 
society no longer solely evaluates individuals on the basis of rank achieved or the 
prestige of units in which they served301, the overwhelming majority of Israeli citizens 
are still strongly influenced by the IDF’s culture (Perko, 2003). Since it has become 
easier to avoid the draft, those who enlist do not do so out of mere legal duty (Cohen, 
2004). For many young Israelis (natives and immigrants) the IDF still constitutes a 
stage for first encounters with each other as well as with a “common” Israeli 
                                                 
297 The justification to serve in the IDF is often explained by the threat to the group and the good of the 
community which justifies the sacrifice of the individual (Arad & Gal, 2006). 
298 Whereas the law only refers to Jews, religious woman and ultra-orthodox men and woman are 
exempted. In addition, an increasingly large Jewish population is excused from duty (due to 
incompatibility, medical condition or on religious grounds) and some enlisted soldiers may receive an 
early discharge. Non-Jews (Muslims, Bedouins, Druze etc.) may choose to volunteer for service.  
299 As of 2018, men are called to serve for a minimum three years and women for two years. The IDF 
may summon discharged service personal (mostly men) under the age of 45 for compulsory stints of 
duty within the framework of the reserve forces, which can total at 30 days per year (Cohen, 2004). 
300 That is, due to the growing segments of the Jewish population which are being excused from duty: 
The proportion of Jewish Israeli youngsters enlisted in the IDF declined from 75% in 1990 to roughly 
66% in 2002. Amongst males, Cohen (2004) suggested that this rise in the number of exemptions reflect 
the exponential growth in the number of ultra-orthodox Jews (Haredim). According to recant data, 
which shows an enlistment rate of 65% in 2017 (Hizki, 2017), numbers seem to have stabilized.  
301 This was the state of affairs in the past (Schiff, 1985). For further reading regarding the motivation 
for serving in the IDF in the mirror of time see (Gal, 1999). 
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culture302. Even nowadays, serving in the IDF is regarded by many Israelis as a rite of 
passage to full citizenship when immigrants are concerned. 
In November 2015, James Sanzi, vice president of development at the Jewish 
Alliance of greater Rhode Island visited Israel as part of an Alliance-
sponsored Interfaith Leadership Mission. In a piece written for “the Jewish voice”303, 
Sanzi (2016) discusses an anecdote from his visit to the holy land. The short story 
demonstrates the centrality of IDF service in identity formation and social inclusion: I 
recall an Ethiopian Jew working at the “Yemin Orde” village for at-risk and 
immigrant youth, who told our group that she did not truly feel like an Israeli until she 
served in the country’s military. This remarkable woman made an incredibly long and 
courageous trek from Ethiopia to Israel years ago, but it was not until she put on the 
uniform of her nation that she felt truly at home. Sanzi further notes that the 
mandatory army service law requires most Israelis to “train, fight and sacrifice 
against”, rather than live through the ongoing Middle East conflict.  
 
 
Education, Socialization and Nation Building 
Whereas mass education is known to be a crucial element of the modern nation-state 
(Meyer, 1999, p. 131), for immigrant nations like Israel, schools have become critical 
elements in the process of nation building. Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-
Gurion, acknowledged304 the importance of education for immigration absorption as 
well as the IDF’s key role in uniting Israelis around a state and in defining the new 
Jewish identity (Don-Yehiya, 1995). While the military stands apart from society as an 
agency for maintaining social order (Bourdieu & Farage, 1994), it is both an agency of 
indirect nation building (similarly to the education system) and a product of emerging 
nationhood (Perko, 2003). The combination of the two, with an education role, as in 
the case of the IDF makes for a compelling case. Israeli scholars have pointed out that 
                                                 
302 The army even solidified a common ‘Israeli’ diet in a conscious attempt to create and shape a unified 
Israeli cuisine in the country’s first years (soldiers were presented with food choices, which were mostly 
oblivious to ethnic differences and preferences). This idea seemed as important to the establishment of a 
national culture as a common repertoire literature or art (Raviv, 2002). This attempt seemed to have 
been a successful one as suggested by this quote from the IDF: Encyclopaedia for army and security: 
Few are the soldiers, whether from Russian or Moroccan origins, that finish lunch hungry or 
dissatisfied (Kline, 1983, p. 148).  
303 An online newsletter of the Jewish community of Rhode Island and southeast Massachusetts. 
304 Extensive and rapid mass immigration is a primary element of our security, unequaled by war and 
security efforts (Lissak, 1995, p. 580). 
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one of the major functions of common education undertaken by the IDF was the 
socialization of immigrants into Israeli life (Rothman, 1972; Young, 1982)305. Perko 
concisely formulated this important point: Self-consciously structured to create an 
official nationalism, such education becomes critical in the development of the nation, 
especially given that its constituents are the very individuals charged with ensuring 
the well-being of that very state. This is precisely the situation of much of the 
education conducted by the Israel Defense Forces. 
 Since its inception, the Israel Defense Forces has been the most universal 
social institution in Israel (Perko, 2003). The pre-state ideology of a “people’s 
army306” encouraged the IDF’s understanding of itself as being in service to society 
rather than being served by Israelis. It is an army of the people in the most literal 
sense: it serves as both a reflection of socio-economic changes and, often, their 
instigator (Raviv, 2002). Moreover, given the central role of military defense in the 
national life, when Israel was established, the IDF had taken upon itself to fulfill tasks 
that civilian institutions were unable or unwilling to realize (such as socializing 
immigrants into the national culture307, Azarya and Kimmerling, 1980). These political 
as well as ideological factors supported the creation of an army which is linked to 
society in a fairly unusual fashion. Fundamentally, the army was to be a social as well 
as defense agency (Interview with Col. (Ret.) Mordechai Bar-On, 2 June 1994 as 
quoted in Perko, 2003). Within the army, the Education and Youth Corps (formerly, 
Education Department) are the formal agencies that are responsible to develop highly 
motivated soldiers who would, supposedly, become productive members of the nation. 
                                                 
305 Similar effect of common schooling was highly researched by American educational historians (see, 
for example Boorstin, 2010; Ravitch, 2011). For a comparison between the Israeli and the American 
experiences in this context see Perko, 2003. 
306 Inherited from the Haganah and Palmach-Jewish paramilitary organization active during the British 
Mandate of Palestine (1921–48) which constituted the core of the IDF after the establishment of Israel 
in 1948 (Allon, 1970). 
307 In the late twentieth century and even in the eve of the 21st century, Israel was and demonstrably still 
is a society of immigrants. Whereas nearly half a million people arrived between 1919 and statehood 
(1948) to Erez Israel (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1969). In the two and a half years that followed, 
687,000 immigrants, mostly from Europe, entered the new state. 1.6 million Immigrants from Arab 
speaking countries in the region and in North Africa followed. Whereas in 1970’s about 163,000 former 
USSR immigrants arrive to Israel, this number grow to more than a million in the period after the 
collapse of the USSR and until the early 2000s. About 35,000 Ethiopian Jews immigrated to Israel since 
the 1980s (The Jewish Agency For Israel, n.d.). Providing immigrants with wide exposure to the 
nation’s heterogeneous population, integrating the former to the Israeli society are civilian issues, they 
had profound military implication (Perko, 2003). 
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The rapid growth of the state of Israel and the vast immigration have established the 
two corps as key agencies in pursuit of cultural formation within the Israeli society. 
The Education Department’s greatest task in its early years was the remedial 
education and assimilation of immigrants (Perko, 2003). The instruction of the 
Hebrew language became the flagship of the education effort, since the majority of the 
citizens were not native speakers of the national language (Popper, 1998, p. 169). At 
the same time, addressing the cultural disjuncture and social tensions resulting from 
the massive Sephardic immigration was also one of the army’s missions 308 . The 
Education Department responded with an extensive elementary educational program 
serving a largely Sephardic population309. In light of its educational successes and 
positive image in the Israeli society, the Education Department was awarded the 
annual Israel Prize for Education in 1965 (Rothman, 1972). As the IDF grew in size 
and evolved in structure, so did its influence on the society at large. 
The breakdown of the Soviet Union unleashed a wave of Eastern European 
Jewish immigration that cause a major demographic shift in Israel. This, in turn, 
created new challenges for both army and the Israeli society 310 . The Education 
Department supported the new immigrants with intensive language instruction and 
introduced them to basic elements of the national culture. The Corp also supported the 
civilian sector in dealing with this national challenge by making its teachers and 
counselors available in absorption centers (Perko, 2003).  
 
 
The Effect of the IDF on the Israeli Society  
Since the Israeli army is highly intertwined with a feeling of Israeli national identity, 
the issue of the effect of the military on the Israeli society should be addressed. Due to 
its relevance to the discussion of the nexus between perceived outcomes of military 
                                                 
308 In the early 1960’s, about 83% of residents of substandard or slum housing were Sephardic Jews. 
Moreover, less than a quarter of Sephardic Jews passed the university matriculation examination in 
1965 (Sachar, 2013). 
309 By late 1960s, soldiers (who didn’t manage to do so in the civilian school system) were ordered to 
complete secondary school by the end of their national service. In line with the country’s Jewish and 
democratic nature, study of national geography, Israeli history, Bible and civics meant to indoctrinate 
immigrant soldiers with both Israeli and democratic ideals, values and culture (Roumani, 1979). 
310 The oppressive conditions of service in the Red Army and its anti-Semitism made immigrants from 
the former Soviet Union wary of service in the IDF. Moreover, most of the latter lacked the strong 
Zionist or religious ideological roots which characterized former immigration waved (Perko, 2003). 
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operations and social trust, further discussion is dedicated to the effect of 
militarization on the Israeli society.  
Two prevalent perspectives exist in the study of the relations between the 
military, society and the state: the “Armed Forces and Society” and the “State-making 
and War” approaches. The “Armed Forces and Society” approach was developed 
against the backdrop of American success in the second World War. It emphasizes the 
inter-linkages between institutions and elites (Ben-Ari, 2018) while focusing on the 
military’s social and political functions, the arrangements that link/separate it from the 
civilian sector, and the mechanisms by which it is controlled and supervised, usually 
by political elites (Burk, 1995; Janowitz, 1971, 1976). The “State-making and War” 
approach was formulated during the cold war and was highly critical of prevailing 
social and political arrangements (Ben-Ari, 2018). It emphasizes the role armed 
struggles had in mobilizing human and capital sources that were used in the creation, 
strengthening and maintaining of states (Ben-Ari, 2018; Giddens, 1985; Tilly, 1985). 
According to the “Armed Forces and Society” school of thought, Israel is a 
non-militaristic society in which the military is “civilianized” and the civilian sector 
“militarized” (Ben-Ari, 2018). However, the “state-making and war” approach 
perceive the Israeli society as characterized by cultural militarism in which the 
military intentionally used (by the elites) for nation-building purposes in Israel’s first 
years (Sasson-Levy, 2002, 2003). The abundant discussion based on the two 
aforementioned approaches had contributed to a scholarly shift concerning the Israeli 
society; from a society that maintains democracy under conditions of protracted war 
and the centrality of the military (Ben-Ari & Lomsky-Feder, 1999), to a complex 
examination of Israel as a democracy who normalizes militarism and the IDF’s dual 
role in establishing the state’s legitimacy and enabling the mobilization of the 
population for collective goals (Ben-Eliezer, 1988, 1997; Ehrlich, 1987). 
The IDF is an integral component of the Israeli society. As a central institution, 
it wields considerable influence in Israeli society. The Israeli army is generally 
perceived as a "nation builder", an instrument of conveying a sense of national identity 
and unity among Israelis. As such, in addition to its primary role of defense, the IDF 
carries out important social and economic functions, and it serves as a symbol of 
Israeli strength, efficiency and effectiveness (Kaplan, 2015). During the mandatory 
service, activities offered to Israeli soldiers (museums and theater visits etc.) extend 
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beyond the professional training required for the effective execution of military 
objectives (Kaplan, 2015). The army also offers Hebrew courses for new immigrants 
and contributes to education of deprived population sectors, increasing their 
employment potential in their civil lives. 
Framed as a social duty, integration in the Israeli society was highly 
conditioned on military service, most notably in Israel’s first decade. The mandatory 
army service thus serves a social task of bringing together individuals from different 
social subgroups within Israeli Jews311 (immigrants and natives, rich and poor, rural 
and urban, religious and secular) as well as bringing together Jews and non-Jews that 
may have little or no contact otherwise. Whereas the IDF mainly consists of regular 
and permanent soldiers, a grand system of reserve forces was established in order to 
cope with larger Arab armies and in light of the continuous security threat; numerous 
men (and women is specific positions and cases) in good health, who completed their 
regular army service are annually called for up to one month of reserve duty. The latter 
continue to serve in the IDF as a reserved force until their mid-forties or early 
fifties312. The army is thus a major source of long lasting contact, relationships and 
friendships between different subgroups in the Israeli society, sustained by the 
reserves service.  
 The stretching of the military into civilian spheres is evident in Israel, which 
has long topped the list of the world’s most militarized nations, according to Bonn’s 
International Centre for Conversion’s313 Global Militarization Index314 (GMI). Funded 
by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, the 
index presents the relative weight and importance of a country's military apparatus in 
relation to its society as a whole (Mutschler & BICC, 2017, p. 2). Since the creation of 
the index in 1990 and until 1998, Israel was ranked the most militarized country in the 
                                                 
311 Arab Israelis and ultra-orthodox Jews are exempt from the mandatory draft and thus generally do not 
serve in the IDF (though members of these ethnic groups may volunteer for service). 
312 Reserve soldiers support the standing army in carrying out different military functions alongside 
training sessions.  
313 https://gmi.bicc.de/index.php?page=gmi-publications. 
314 The GMI uses numerous variables divided into three categories: expenditure, personnel and heavy 
weapons, in order to determine a country’s level of militarization in comparison to other countries314. 
Each variable is given a certain score, which is then “weighted” according to a set formula to determine 
a total quantitative score. The more militarized a country, the higher the score. 
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world. Between 1998 and 2006, Eritrea was ranked the highest followed by Israel. 
Since 2007 Israel is back on the lead 315.  
 Militarism was imposed on Israelis by the mandatory army service law, for 
men and women, which came into force soon after Israel’s war of independence in 
1948 (Tamari, 2015). According to Tamari, the conditions under which the State of 
Israel and its wars were designed necessitated the total mobilization of human and 
material resources (translated from Hebrew, M.H). Ben-Eliezer316 (1988) argued that 
Israeli militarism is rooted in the Jewish political community (the Yishuv) during the 
time of the British mandate over Palestine. Ben-Eliezer stipulated that force was 
conclusively adopted as an instrument to solve the Israeli Palestinian conflict, a 
perception that persisted ever since. As a result of this social construction of reality, 
the social elite became entwined with security or military functions.  
In Israel’s militaristic society, military norms and values permeates into the 
civil society in areas such as education, culture, entertainment, politics and family life. 
Streets are commonly named after wars, battles, military units and generals and young 
recruits wearing military uniform can be frequently seen in Israel’s larger cities as well 
as on buses and trains317 (Kaplan, 2015). Whereas reserve duty necessitates a leave of 
absence from civilian jobs, it may also require men (rarely women) to leave their 
families for the duration of the duty.  
Unlike army radio stations in many other countries, Israel's "Galei Zahal" (IDF 
Waves), staffed by well-known Israeli broadcasters as well as soldiers in regular 
service, has a large civilian audience (Kaplan, 2015). The military has tremendous 
influence on defense and foreign policy in Israel; military recommendations have been 
central in many important government decisions and much of the contact between 
Israel and Arab states has been handled by high-ranking members of the military 
(Kaplan, 2015). Moreover, since Israeli military and political elites are socially linked 
                                                 
315 For 2016 (latest available data), the top ten militarized countries are Israel, Singapore, Armenia, 
Russia, South Korea, Kuwait, Jordan, Cyprus, Greece and Brunei. The least militarized countries are 
Papua New Guinea, Liberia, Gambia, Cape Verde, Malta, Malawi, Trinidad and Tobago, Albania and 
Ghana. Out of 151 countries, Germany is graded 104, the United States is graded 31 and Russia is 
graded 4. Current and historical data is available at: https://gmi.bicc.de/index.php?page=ranking-
table&year=1990&sort=rank_asc. 
316 Prof. Ben-Eliezer is currently the head of the sociology department in the University of Haifa and 
one of the country’s most esteemed experts in military and society relations. 
317 Wearing uniforms entitles soldiers to free public transport, museum entry, and further discounts. 
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(Lissak, 1985), many retired Generals became cabinet ministers and headed state-
owned corporations and agencies. Some have even led political parties (Kaplan, 2015). 
Viewed by Kimmerling (1993, p. 199) as one of the central organizational 
principles of the Israeli society, Tamari (2015) notes that one must not be alarmed by 
the usage of the term “militarism”. He set that it is but a cultural phenomenon, 
suggesting that a perception of reality exists (or imposed), according to which wars or 
organized violence are a proper solution for political disputes318. However, there are 
those who highly criticize 319  Israel’s extreme militarization, suggesting that a 
byproduct of such militarism is the glorification of the military/war ethos as well as 
the development of a militarized mindset.  
A militarized mindset (or “militarism of the mind”, Ross, 1987) is an 
expression of a cognitive dimension of militarism which refers to both structural and 
cultural state of mind of the collectivity (Kimmerling, 1993). In such a state the 
civilian leaders and the led both regard the primary military and strategic 
considerations as being self-evidently the only or the predominant considerations in 
most of the societal and political decision or priority ordering (Kimmerling, 1993, p. 
206), as such militaristic presumptions become normalized and military functions, 
such as war, are facilitated (D’cruz, 2010). This mindset is closely interwoven with 
cultural militarism 320  obtained when armed forces become essential to the social 
experience and collective identity321, when they rank as one of the collectivity’s central 
symbol and the very embodiment of patriotism (Kimmerling, 1993, p. 202). In this 
respect, and since the IDF is perceived as the defender of the Jewish nation state, it can 
                                                 
318 Tamari quotes the said definition of “militarism” put forward by Ben-Eliezer (Tamari, 2015, p. 29). 
319 For example- “New Profile” (http://www.newprofile.org/english/), an anti-militaristic organization 
established in Israel in 1998 was the first Israeli political group with demilitarization as its top priority. 
The NGO questions the heavy presence of the army in Israeli civilian life and culture. Alongside 
providing support for Israeli adolescents who resist the draft, New Profile attempts to affect the Israeli 
militaristic mind-set through education. The latter, according to Dorothy Naor, a co-founder of the 
NGO, does not only concern Jews but also the non-Jewish population of Israel who are also living in a 
militarized society (Beauzamy, 2012). 
320 Cultural militarism was particularly common in Israel during the 1950s and 1960s. For example 
during military parades commemorating the nation’s independence day, participants hoisted slogans 
such as “Israel trusts the IDF- it is your defender and savior” (Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1983, p. 93) or 
a similar slogan “The guardian of Israel neither sleeps nor slumbers” (Kimmerling, 1993, p. 203). 
Nowadays military parades no longer exist in Israel though Independence Day is commenced with a 
military ceremony and includes an air force flyover.   
321 It bares mention that such collectivity only related to Jewish Israelis, contributing to social exclusion 
of non-Jews and social inequality. 
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very well be argued that the national collective, the Jewish society in Israel 322 
perceives military actions as unavoidable. As such, matters of “national security” are 
prioritized and supersede ideological, economic or political issues323 (Lincoln, 2014). 
The Israeli society is both institutionally and mentally oriented towards 
permanent and existential war preparation. Being part of the “normal” social life, 
existing dissident Israeli voices fail324 to fundamentally challenge the IDF’s “security-
military discourse” (Sela, 2010, p. 72). In fact, semi-critical perspectives adopted by 
the media often reinforce the military security ethos (Peri, 2010, p. 111). Similarly, the 
Israeli Palestinian conflict was routinized by the accumulated experience of combat, 
war and terrorism, but also by states’ institutions325. As such the conflict became a 
determinative factor that shaped a fair measure of the social structure and the 
collective identity in Israel (Kimmerling, 1993, p. 2010) 
 In an extremely militarized country such as Israel, the military is the institution 
through which professional and personal status in the civil society may be achieved. 
As a result of an unchallenged centrality of the military in the Israeli society, the IDF 
as a state agency might not only reflect social inequalities but also reproduce them, 
thereby increasing the tension between the different social groups. Whereas inequality 
is built into the structure of a military in the formal and hierarchical levels 326 , 
inequality in the military is also determined by the degree to which positions provide 
their holders with control over resources, involve prestige and enable monitoring of 
information. (Levy, 1998). While social networking in the Israeli civil society often 
depends on one’s friends and acquaintances from his/her mandatory service or reserve 
training, the transferability of skilled learned in the military to the civilian labor 
market327 is yet another example for military practices that reinforce class inequality 
                                                 
322 Since the 1970s, Yeshiva students (mainly orthodox Jewish men studying traditional religious texts) 
are able to combine Jewish studies with army service in a combat unit (Kaplan, 2015).  
323 Barzilai (1992) found that civil rights were always considered inferior to “security needs”, the 
concept of “security” in Israel is not restricted to the military term and is far more wide sweeping in 
both institutional and conceptual senses (Kimmerling, 1993). 
324 A latest example is the Second Lebanon War fought in 2006, during which and thereafter the media 
and public were intensively engaged with the issues of supervision and control of the army. It was also 
the first time in Israeli history that a chief of staff resigned as a result of public-civil criticism. While the 
critic addressed operational issues and the principle of proportionality in the using military force, it 
failed to address the possibility of political alternatives to violent conflict.  
325 See Arian, Talmud, & Hermann, 1988; Kimmerling & Backer, 1985. 
326 Such as between front and rear-line units, elite and non-elite combat troops, high and low ranks, etc.  
327 For example, it can be argued that Mizrachi, less educated, or soldiers from the periphery or from 
lower economic families assigned to labor-intensive jobs in the army are being prepared to hold blue-
collar low status jobs in civilian life. In contrast, officers and soldiers given technology-intensive posts 
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and contribute to extra military inter-ethnic tension (Levy, 1998). Moreover, as 
Ashkenazi men dominate both the combat units (the most respectable and desirable 
positions) and the chain of command, it was argued that they also dominate the Israeli 
society (D’cruz, 2010). This notion is supported by Enloe (1980) who stipulated that 
in ethnically divided societies, inter-ethnic power relations and the army’s role as an 
entity biased toward/controlled by one ethnic group leads to the enhancement of 
political identities of ethnic groups and thus to intensifying inter-ethnic tensions.  
Since everyday life is also militarized, it can further be argued that the use of 
force in solving disputes (personal, professional, social etc.) is prominent in the Israeli 
society. In this regard, militarism and grounded masculine culture were linked to 
chauvinistic behaviors towards women and a general inequality of women in Israel 
(Sasson-Levy, 2002, 2003,). Whereas some jobs (specific positions in security or 
ministries) are only open to veterans, certain welfare benefits are available only to 
veterans328. Since Ultra-orthodox Jews as well as Arab Israelis rarely serve in the IDF, 
they are not eligible for such benefits.   
 
 
5.3.2           Sport as an Integrative Tool for Shaping Israeli Collective Identity 
Studies have shown that sports are today one of the few instruments to glue together 
emotional consciousness and bond collective identity (Kaufman and Galily, 2009).  
 In the early days of Israel, a country comprised of a diverse population 
(immigrants, refugees, holocaust survivors and natives), sport served as a tool for 
national design and was instrumental in supporting the newly established national 
identity. Israeli athletes carrying the flag of the country, singing its national anthem, 
and competing alongside the nations of the world inspired burst of national pride and 
the formation of an integrative collective identity crossing all social classes and 
                                                                                                                                             
which tend to be Ashkenazi men from the larger cities who have been introduced to hi-tech practices 
already in high school are more prepared to hold white-collar jobs after their discharge (Weede, 1993). 
328 Young adults who successfully completed the mandatory army service are awarded a sum of money 
equivalent to one year of tuition in a state university. The money can also be used for any kind of 
vocational training or in order to fund the completion of a High-School diploma. Those who serves in 
combat unites receive a larger sum of money. The money is saves in a special account and is available 
for third parties and only (e.g., the university) except in rare cases (such as if the young adult wished to 
found a business). Young adults who successfully completed a mandatory service and choose to work 
full time in specific jobs favored by the government are except from paying taxes for the first year 
following the completion of their army service.  
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political sectors329. In Israel’s first years, the public tended to identify with the new 
nationalism by means of political parties whose common ground was their 
commitment to the Zionist ideal330.  
 Yet, differences concerning the defense, social and economic means to 
achieving the Zionist aims of the nation persisted. Against this backdrop, one aspect of 
the Zionist ideology at that time was associated with the political nature of sports. 
Sport was instrumental in achieving the national ideal and the division of fans into 
camps reflected their political affiliation. Sports clubs were established in order to 
recruit political supporters, especially immigrants from the periphery331. However, as 
the political differences between the parties gradually diminished over the years 
(nowadays those mainly revolve around the future of the occupied territories and the 
Arab-Israeli conflict rather than differences in socio-economical perceptions), so did 
the role of sports centers as instruments of political influence332. Fans no longer 
politically identify with teams but rather identify with “community” teams who share 
the same geographic location or following teams’ success. In view of this, Kaufman 
and Galily (2009) set that The process of globalization has also contributed to the 
blurring of tribalism and nationalism, and has led to the creation of multi-national 
teams and spectatorship beyond borders, cultures and status.  
From the 90’s onwards, with the mechanization of sports control over teams 
and athletes shifted to private owners who treated it as a business opportunity rather 
than anything else. Nowadays, foreign players are extremely dominant in the Israeli 
football and basketball leagues. Likewise, gifted Israeli coaches and players who are 
active abroad are perceived as local heroes333.  
                                                 
329 A football game between Israel and the USSR in 1956 stimulated sweeping national enthusiasm 
illustrates that point. The game aroused. Although the Israeli team was defeated, an Israeli goal (by 
Stalmach) produced a wave of pride and joy which was felt across the country and is still remembered 
as the moment which best expressed the new national spirit (Harif, 2009). For a discussion of the 
functional use of sports for the new state’s foreign needs (forging friendly ties, cooperation with other 
nations, spreading propaganda) see Kauman and Galily, 2009. 
330 That is, apart from the Communists, the Arabs and Ultra-Orthodox who were at the margins of the 
political spectrum (Kaufman and Galily, 2009). 
331 Immigrants on the periphery didn’t culturally identify with the Zionist ideology to the same extent as 
those in the epicenter. Their association with a sports club was perceived as the first link in the chain 
connecting them to state-national identity (Ben-Porat, 2007). 
332 Symbols and colors are still used today, such as by the various “Maccabi” and “Hapoel” teams in 
both football and basketball are reminiscing the once political origin of the teams. 
333 Memorable Israeli football players include Mordechai Spiegler, a former international footballer 
(played for Paris Saint Germain football club for the New York Cosmos soccer club) and manager who 
remains Israel’s record goal scorer, Yossi Benayoun (who played for Chelsea, Liverpool and Arsenal) 
                                       131 
Another noteworthy modern phenomenon, which isn’t uniquely Israeli, is the 
diminished public support (beyond the support of their fans) for teams who officially 
represent their nation in international sporting events. Whereas the national team is 
Israeli, it is no longer all-Jewish334 (An Israeli example in this regard is “Maccabi” Tel 
Aviv basketball team335). Having Arab and naturalized non-Jewish Israeli players as 
part of the national teams undoubtedly transformed the teams into a source of 
identification for the nation’s non-Jewish citizens336. This makes the Israeli national 
sports teams, according to Kaufman and Galily (2009), the only source of collective 
identification with the State of Israel unrelated to the state’s national Zionist values. 
Consequently, only in the sport field can Israel be defined as a state of all its citizens. 
 Negative events that generate a sense of common fate and their unifying power 
aside, most of the positive and memorable moments engraved in the Israeli collective 
memory despite its diverse population are related to the fields of sports. International 
Sports tournaments as well as Olympic games337 serve as a positive distraction and a 
breath of fresh air from the Arab Israeli conflict which dominant the lives of Israelis 
(Kasnett, 2012). In its early years, successes of the Israeli national team in football, 
basketball and athletics received significant media attention and served as a source of 
pride beyond their genuine athletic value. That being said, a few sore defeats occurred 
as well (such as Israeli defeat in a football game against Poland in Warslav in 1959). 
Consequently, “Maccabi” Tel Aviv’s past achievements in international basketball 
tournaments and medals awarded to Israeli athletes in various Olympic Games (The 
                                                                                                                                             
and Roni Rosental, nicknamed “Rocket Ronny” who became the first non-British player to move to an 
English club for more than £1million (played for Liverpool, Tottenham Hotspur and Warford). 
Information obtained from https://www.national-football-teams.com/. 
334 The national teams’ Jewish character is preserved in a mere ceremonial sense (the national uniform 
are colored blue and white similar to the colors of the national flag and the anthem which represents the 
aspirations of the Jewish people is played in international tournaments). 
335 Whereas the team used to serve as the national “tribal bonfire” and as an apolitical source of national 
identity, today it mostly arouses the interest of its fans (Kaufman & Galily, 2009). Yet, it can be argued 
that the poor representation of native Israelis in the team (only four out of the current 14 Maccabi Tel 
Aviv players are born and raised Israelis, one of whom is a Christian Arab-Israeli, 
http://www.maccabi.co.il/team.asp) contributed to the erosion of the team’s status.  
336 A large body of literature is dedicated to the discussion on Arab-Israelis’ identity in sports. Recent 
studies include Bernstein and Mandelzis, 2009; Carmeli and Bar, 2003; Sorek, 2003. 
337 Following the return of the Israeli delegation to the special Olympics world games which was held in 
Los Angeles in 2015, in which the delegation had won 62 medals (25 of which-gold) Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu was quoted congratulating the athletes for bringing great pride and honor to the 
State of Israel and to yourselves adding We are proud of you; everyone in Israel is proud of you (Israeli 
Ministry of foreign Affairs, 2015). 
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Judoka Yael Arad brought home Israel’s first Olympic medal from the 1992 Barcelona 
games) are noteworthy events which inspired nationwide Israeli identification. 
Whereas for other countries winning is the national goal and failure to win a 
medal at an Olympic event may be viewed as a major setback for the country’s 
athletes and citizens (Kasnett, 2012), Israel’s mere participation in such events and 
opportunity to parade its national flag side by side with all the other nations was, and 
still is, being perceived as a worthy achievement by itself338. After failing to win an 
Olympic medal in London in 2012, a promising Israeli athlete was quoted saying I 
hope that everyone will still love me even though I failed. Kasnett (2012), answered 
the quote in a piece published in the Jerusalem Post by stating without a doubt, our 
country’s setbacks at the Olympics are a huge disappointment for our athletes, 
trainers and fans at home…But Israelis have so much more than sports. We have our 




5.4 The Jewish and Democratic Nature of the State of Israel  
 
The sense of collective identity generated by the Zionist legacy in Israel’s first decades 
raised an important question regarding the essence of such identity in modern times: 
Can contemporary Israeli identity be characterized as Zionist or has it morphed into a 
more national and cultural-based identity? To answer this challenging question, we 
must first consider the origin of this state of duality- the Jewish and democratic nature 
of the State of Israel.  
Israel’s Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992)340, anchors the values 
on which the State of Israel was established: a Jewish and democratic state341. The 
                                                 
338 Kasnett (2012) wrote in this regard Just the fact that we are a Jewish country participating in a 
major international event is an achievement. Who would have thought in 1936 that the next time the 
Olympics came around, a Jewish state would exist? We Jews know how to move on, because we’ve 
always had to. 
339 Kasnett (2012) continued along the same line by stating We have the highest level of Torah study 
that has occurred here in centuries. As a highly popular tourist destination, our country clearly has 
much to offer in the way of academia, leisure, history, archeology and nightlife. We have the Dead Sea, 
Judea and Samaria, the Ramon Crater, Masada and, of course, Jerusalem and the Western Wall. We 
have innovation in technology, science and art. We have our history. Israelis – Jews everywhere – have 
so much to be proud of … As a nation, we’ve had our failures, mistakes and tragedies. We’ve had our 
rough winds, choppy waters and missteps, our close calls and defeats. But we have always triumphed. 
We have a fabulous past and a bright future ahead. So what’s a few missed Olympic medals to us?” 
340  The full text of the law, its amendment and declared purposes can be found here: 
https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm. 
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Jewish pillar expresses the Zionist vision of a Jewish return to Eretz Israel (and is 
conveyed, among other things, in the country’s symbols, national anthem and official 
holidays), whereas the democratic pillar entrenches democratic principles in the 
nation’s character (such as denouncing discrimination). As more than a quarter of 
Israel’s population is non-Jewish342, the democratic pillar is aimed at securing equal 
rights for its non-Jewish citizens. 
Notwithstanding the importance of the democratic pillar, the core value of the 
“Jewishness” of the state has remained an “unwavering tenet” among the Israeli 
public. Thus, the dominant sense of national attachment (or patriotism) among the 
majority group in Israel revolves around the country’s contemporary and future 
existence as a Jewish state343 (Arad & Gal, 2006, p. 4). The precise nature of Israel’s 
Jewish as well as democratic pillars as well as the way to balance both is continuously 
determined by its political arena. In the political and legal realm, this discussion had 
focused on the status of established religion in a secular democracy and the status of 
non-Orthodox Jewish religious movements in the state. Over the years, such persistent 
social-cultural debates have transformed into a Kulturkampf, shaping the nature of 
Israeli-Jewish society (Schweid, 2002) and the varying answer to the questions “what 
is means to be Israeli?”. 
By virtue of Knesset344 legislation, Jewish cultural characteristics are found in 
the public domain. These include respect for the Hebrew calendar, observation of 
kashrut (Jewish dietary law) and the Jewish holidays by state institutions345 and the 
army (Rubinstein, 1967; Yadin, 1951). Whereas in the diaspora, observant Jews would 
conduct their everyday lives in accordance with Halachic (Jewish law), in Israel, such 
religious rules became part of the Israeli book of laws and directives and turned into 
                                                                                                                                             
341 While it was repeatedly argued that this definition constitutes an internal contradiction, attempts 
were made to diminish the alleged contradiction (see, for example, Gavison, 1999; Peled, 1992; 
Rouhana, 2006; Smooha, 2002). 
342 According to the Israeli central Bureau of Statistic report as of 31.12.2017, Israel’s population is 
8.793 Million, 74% are Jews (6.5M), 20.9% Arabs (1.8M) and 4.5% identify as other nationalities 
(Central Bureau of Statistic, 2017). 
343 Arad & Gal (2006) also argue that the Disengagement Plan, the withdrawal of the Israeli army from 
Gaza and the dismantling of all Israeli settlements in the Gaza strip (and four further settlements in 
northern West Bank) which was executed in the summer of 2005 is a testimony for the existence of this 
powerful drive to preserve the Jewish nature of the state (Morley, 2005). 
344 The Knesset is the Israeli parliament. 
345 The latter also observe Kashrut, dietary rules which relate both to the type of food allowed to be 
eaten (specific animals, no seafood) and the way it is cooked (e.g., separating meat and dairy in 
cooking, serving and seating). Kashrut also refers to the way animals that are killed to be consumed as 
food are to be slaughtered (in accordance with Jewish Law that prohibits causing pain to animals). 
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social norms. While these norms maintain and express a connection between the 
individual and the community (circumcision, Bar/Bat mitzvah, burial and mourning), 
thus increasing a sense of belonging and strengthen Jewish aspects of ones’ identity, 
they effectively govern the lives of both religious and secular Israelis (e.g., as they 
pertain to marriage and divorce). The latter may still uphold Jewish traditions in a 
similar way secular Christians celebrate Christmas, while rebelling against the 
imposed nature of religious symbols and norms (Cohen & Susser, 2000; Efron, 2003). 
As a result of this “cultural war”, the former had progressively removed themselves 
from uniquely religious practices (Schweid, 2002). 
The topic of whether Israel’s non-Jewish residents are expected to identify 
with the country and the extent of such identification is another intricate issue that 
should be addressed when examining the developments of the Israeli identity. While 
non-Jewish Israelis share neither the country’s Zionist notion nor its “Jewishness”, and 
as the country’s official symbols do not represent their ethnic identity, the latter do not 
necessarily negate the existence of patriotic feelings among Arab Israeli, the largest 
ethnic minority group in Israel (Arad & Gal, 2006). Arab Israelis who identify as 
Palestinians are likely to support the Palestinian quest for self-determination and 
emancipation from Israel’s occupation of the West Bank. Further tension between the 
Israeli and Arab identity aspects for Arab-Israel stems from the status of the Jewish 
state as reflected by the majority of Arab states and the Palestinian leadership346. 
 
 
5.5  Current Challenges to Contemporary “Israeliness” 
 
As noted, ideological changes have followed social and political developments in the 
Israeli society, in recent decades. During the years of the Yishuv and the early years of 
Israel as a sovereign state, political camps were clearly defined and parties were 
associated with specific social, economic and defense issues. The Six Day War have 
somewhat distorted Israel’s ideological identity as the debate concerning the future of 
the captured territories took center stage and have essentially eradicated the discussion 
regarding the character of the Israeli society (Kaufman & Galily, 2009). Since the 
                                                 
346 The Arab league has continuously rejected acknowledging Israel as a Jewish state the Palestinian 
leadership has recognized Israel as a severing state (as part of the Oslo agreement), but denied the 
Jewishness of the state (Agencies, 2013, 2014).  
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1960 the socialist policy retreated and its institutions (Histadrut, kibbutz) collapsed. 
This paved the way to the creation of a new economic-social foundation which was 
highly influenced by American mass-culture and thus portrayed relevant values (e.g. 
competitiveness, capitalism) (Schweid, 2002). Since the debate concerning the 
economic future of Israel was won by capitalism, significant differences between what 
is considered today the political “left” and “right” revolve around the future of the 
occupied territories rather than essential differences in social-economic perceptions. 
That being said, contemporary Israeli society is still sectarian, as the political-
ideological sectarianism has been converted to sectarianism of social character: ethnic, 
religious and economic status (Kaufman & Galily, 2009). This “tribalism” that 
characterizes today’s segmented Israeli society makes the formation of a cohesive 
identity among all branches of society challenging.  
For the majority of those who identify themselves as “Israelis”, the term 
implies civil political-linguistic-territorial belonging which typically incorporates a 
degree of “Hebraism” and of Judaism in the religious, traditional or national sense. 
Yet, these factors are generally partial and often fragmented (Schweid, 2002). 
Although Zionism is still considered the ideological foundation of the State of Israel, 
emerging post-Zionist concepts view Zionism as an archaic notion and support its 
forsaking. It can thus be argued that Post-Zionism reflects a disassociation from 
patriotic values that were part of the founding ethos of the State of Israel. A growing 
trend within various segments of the Israeli society points to prioritizing democratic 
values and supporting the idea of Israel as a dual or multi-national country347 (Arad & 
Gal, 2006). 
During the past decades, dramatic changes occurred within the Israeli society 
regarding religion and state. While a positive attitude towards tradition persisted, the 
desire of the Israeli public to subordinate itself to religion has greatly diminished. 
Contributing factors in this regard were the coming of age of native Israelis (who are 
connected to the Israeli culture rather than to the Jewish tradition) and the mass 
immigration from the former Soviet Union (as most of the immigrants had neither 
knowledge nor connection to Jewish life). Moreover, the debate concerning the future 
of the occupied territories polarizes religious and secular Jewish Israelis and weakens 
the sense of Jewish unity.  
                                                 
347 And not a Jewish nation-state. 
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While “religious legislation” (“status quo”) still exists, the Israeli public domain has 
become more and more secularized, a feature felt particularly on the Sabbath 
(Saturday) and during festivals. Opposition to religious legislation has become a 
central tenet in the new defining ideology of secular Israeli identity (Schweid, 2002). 
Israel’s continuous challenge is to satisfy the demands of secular Jews and non-Jewish 
Israelis in sensitive issues (such as family matters) in an appropriate way without 
denying the status of the Jewish religion as an influential factor in both society and 
culture, or damaging the Jewish and Zionist identity of Israel as such. 
 
 
5.5.1  Ethnic Classification of Israelis: Between Citizenship & Nationality 
For Germans, the definition of national affiliation is straightforward: it goes hand in 
hand with citizenship. If you are a German citizen, you are also German by 
nationality. The same applies to Americans, French, and many others. In Israel, 
however, citizenship and nationality are distinguished upon. The State of Israel 
maintains a national population registry in which every resident is classified by both 
"citizenship" and "nationality."  
 Whereas the Israelis are listed as such under “citizenship”, “nationality” refers 
to their ethnic religiosity (Jewish, Arab, Druze, etc.) (Stern & Ruderman, 2014). In 
2008, several prominent Israelis348 appealed to the Israeli Supreme Court contesting 
the current ethnic-religious classification of Israelis. They did so by requesting a new 
category of nationality: "Israeli" that would encompass both Jewish and non-Jewish 
Israelis. It was argued that such institutionalized distinction between (predominantly) 
Arab and Jewish citizens contributes to the discrimination and infringement of the 
rights of Israeli Arabs. Stern & Rudman (2014) supported the status quo in this regard, 
voicing an interesting argument. They set that while both Jewish and Arab Israelis 
share a common citizenship and are thus entitled to, and must be accorded with 
identical civil rights, they are not members of the same nation. Consequently, they 
held that it is imperative for the State of Israel to distinguish between citizenship and 
nationality.  
                                                 
348 Including a former Education Minister, a former Knesset Member, a celebrated playwright, and 
several Arab citizens. 
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In its decision349 (given in October 2013), the Israeli Supreme Court denied the 
request. According to the court, nationality is derived from objective traits such as 
religion, culture, and collective historical memory and thus it is reasonable to assume 
that a person cannot have two nationalities. As such (according to the court’s ruling), 
the requested change would compel Jewish Israelis to choose between being "Israeli" 
and being "Jewish" though one doesn’t exclude the other. The court further stated that 
the implication of classifying Jewish Israelis as “Israelis” would be that Judaism will 
no longer constitute a nationality but only a religion, an idea antithetical to the 
fundamental doctrine of Zionism (the national movement of the Jewish people). 
Lastly, the court stipulated that by defining the nationality of Jewish Israelis as 
“Israeli”, the bond between Israeli Jews and diaspora Jews will be severed. In its 
ruling, the court paid special attention to Israel's Jewish nature (an essential part of the 
state of Israel, according to the court), Israel’s responsibility for the fate of the entire 
Jewish people, including Jews living in the Diaspora350 and Israel’s duty to protect 
Jewish individuals as a profound expression of global Jewish solidarity.  
 
 
5.5.2  Israeli National Particularism 
I do not believe that the constitution of any state should include special 
clauses that explicitly guarantee its "national" character. Rather, I 
believe that it would be better for the constitution to contain a minimum 
of such clauses. The most natural and best way is for the "national" 
character of the state to be guaranteed by the fact that it has a certain 
majority group.  
                  --- Ze’ev Jabotinsky 
 
As previously discussed, Israel was established as both Jewish (and the nation state of 
the Jewish people) and democratic. However, under a coalition agreement between the 
Likud and Habayit Hayehudi, an Orthodox Jewish religious Zionist political party351 
                                                 
349 The court decision is available here: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/elyon/08085730-m15.htm 
350 For example, the Israeli penal code applies to crimes that are committed against Jews due to their 
Jewishness even if those crimes are committed outside of Israel. Likewise, the code also applies to 
vandalized property of Jewish institutions (Israeli Penal Law, 1977 Chapter Three). 
351 Formed as a successor to the National Religious Party. 
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in 2013, the Knesset at that time was set to work toward the enactment of a new basic 
law352: “Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People”353.  
 Originally submitted by former Kadima354 MK Avi Dichter and MK Ze’ev 
Elkin (Likud Beytenu), several versions of this highly contested law (including a 
“softened” form) were brought up for consideration355. The bill was proposed against 
the backdrop of the breakdown of peace talks with the Palestinian leadership in 
summer 2013 and in light of what MK Levin, one of the bill’s advocates, referred to as 
a "post-Zionist” process of eroding Israel’s Jewish nature by High Court rulings356. 
The legislation featured sections concerning the Israeli flag, anthem and symbol of 
Israel, and reinforced the Law of Return357. It does not specifically mention Israeli 
Arabs. For the last five years Israelis have been passionately debating the proposed 
law, both politically and socially. 
MK Levin affirmed that the State of Israel is a Jewish state with a democratic 
system of government, not a country of all its citizens or all its infiltrators, in which 
Jewish life takes place on the fringes (Harkov, 2014). Likewise, MK Ilatov and MK 
Shaked358 supported the proposed law while claiming that entrenching Israel’s Jewish 
nature in a Basic Law is long overdue and necessary. 
                                                 
352 While Israel does not have a codified constitution, its “basic laws” (which can only be changed in a 
supermajority vote in the Knesset) act as a de facto constitution. They deal with the formation and role 
of the principal institutions of the state, the relations between the state's authorities and protect the 
country's civil rights. 
353  The proposed Basic law: Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People was nicknamed the 
“Nationality Bill”. 
354 Kadima was a centrist, liberal political party established in 2005 by moderates from the Likud-
National Liberal Movement (a secular, center-right to right-wing political party founded in 1973) to 
support former prime minister Ariel Sharon's unilateral disengagement plan from Gaza. 
355 The Levin-Shaked-Ilatov version states the State of Israel is the national home of the Jewish people, 
where they realize their aspiration for self-determination according to their cultural and historical 
legacy … the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish people... 
Unlike a previous draft that said Israel is a Jewish state with a democratic system of government, the 
Levin-Shaked-Ilatov version referred to it as Jewish and democratic state while adding based on the 
foundations of liberty, justice and peace according to the visions of the prophets of Israel, and 
committed to the personal rights of all its citizens as detailed in every Basic Law initially granting 
personal rights but not national rights to non-Jewish Israelis. Moreover, unlike the original version, the 
current one doesn’t deal with the official status of Arabic (Harkov, 2014). 
356 This basic principle, on which the State of Israel was established, is being eroded by High Court 
rulings, and we need to stop the post-Zionist process by anchoring Israel’s identity and basic values in 
a Basic Law (Harkov, 2014). 
357 Enacted by the Knesset on July 5, 1950, the law of return declares the right of Jews to immigrate to 
Israel. It is based on the principle of “the right of return” from international law which guarantees 
peoples' right of voluntary return to or re-enter their country of origin. For the full text of the law see 
https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/heb/chok_hashvut.htm. 
358 A Knesset member for The Jewish Home party since 2013 and Minister of Justice since 2015. 
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Fuchs & Kremnitzer (2013) strongly objected the proposed law, stating that it 
would undermine, rather than safeguard, the character of the State of Israel. While 
Kremnitzer (2014) referred to the proposed bill as a mortal blow to the democratic 
character of the State of Israel, Fuchs (2013) recants the bill’s endeavor to define 
Israel first and foremost as a “Jewish state” and downgrade Israel’s democratic 
character, hereby alienating non-Jewish Israelis and effectively excluding them a 
Jewish-based Israeli identity. The two renounce the fact that the law lacks any 
entrenchment of the role of the Israeli high court and its function as the defender of 
human rights. By stipulating that all previous legislation is to be interpreted in 
accordance with the new law, Fuchs & Kremnitzer maintain that by depriving 
minorities of the last defense at its disposal in situations when the majority infringes 
its rights: an appeal to the High Court of Justice, the bill will essentially undermine 
the existing constitutional order in Israel. They point out that the bill shamefully 
discriminates against Israel's Arab minority (by prioritizing Jewish heritage) and 
would anchor residential segregation in a Basic Law.  
While affirming Israel’s prerequisite Jewish nature, Fuchs argues that only A 
balanced constitutional initiative, which defines the national character of the State of 
Israel while granting recognition to Israel's minorities and enacting a full 
constitutional Bill of Rights, would be extremely justified and would establish Israel as 
a member of the family of democratic nation states. By omitting the democratic 
component that applies to all Israeli citizens as mentioned in Israel’s Declaration of 
Independence359, Fuchs argues that the proposed law isn’t only anti-democratic but is 
anti-Zionist as well. Kremnitzer (2014) also notes that adopting a law that essentially 
uses the term “Jewish state” as a code for discrimination against Arabs will grant 
detractors of Israel throughout the world excellent ammunition for their arguments 
that Israel is not a democracy but rather a racist, apartheid state. Lastly, Fucks & 
Kremnitzer contend that while the Israeli public opposes anti-Arab racist behavior, the 
proposed bill is disseminating a message of exclusion and institutionalized 
discrimination.  
                                                 
359 [The State of Israel] will promote the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; 
will be based on the principles of liberty, justice and peace as conceived by the Prophets of Israel; will 
uphold the full social and political equality of all its citizens, without distinction of religion, race, or 
sex; will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, education and culture (Israeli Ministry of foreign 
Affairs, 1948). 
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More recently, Leaders of the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI, 2007) 
maintained that while there is no need to codify the principle according to which Israel 
is a Jewish nation-state360, such legislative process aimed at shaping Israel's character 
must encompass the overall character of the state, not just one aspect. IDI's leadership 
warned that a one-sided move will tip the balance between Israel's Jewish and 
democratic components, thereby deepening the existing rifts in Israeli society (IDI, 
2017). This notion is consistent with Fuchs (2013) and Kremnitzer (2014) conclusion 
that the appropriate place for anchoring Israel’s identity is in a preamble to a 
constitution that would also include a Bill of Rights and would grant full rights to 
minorities according to universal liberal and civic principles.  
 Indeed, the Israeli society has come a long way. No longer a society of 
immigrants, a blend of cultures, languages and traditions united only by a dormant 
language and an ancient holy book. Not only did Israel change in the last seven 
decades, so did Israelis. Strangers in the land of their fathers, the social and political 
landscape of the young country greatly contributed to the formation of an Israeli 
identity. But whereas the content of such identity rested solely on religious 
distinctiveness, contemporary Israeliness is comprised of much more.  
 Decades of surviving, developing and prospering together, a highly diverse 
group proved to be greater than the sum of its parts have put under scrutiny the 
predominantly Jewish basis of Israelism. United by shared culture, values and 
mentality, the borders that define who is included and who is excluded are constantly 
being redrawn by Israelis themselves. As a country that holds itself as both a 
democracy and the homeland of the Jewish people, debates will continue as to who is 
a Jew and who is an Israeli. What matters most is that we approach these debates in a 





5.6  Israeli Patriotism and Ingredients of Israeli National Pride 
 
Israeli patriotism and its manifestations are unique in that they reflect the dual 
underlying principles of the state. Rooted in Jewish concepts (such as Tzedakah, 
                                                 
360 As it is already entrenched in the Declaration of Independence and Basic Laws (ibid).   
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Gemilut Hasadim and Tikun Olam) or in universal values (helping others), the 
following examples illustrate the distinctive way in which Israeli social and national 
identities, interwoven with Israeli Patriotism are both constructed and witnessed. 
These examples were chosen as they mirror the duality of values inherent to the state 
of Israel in light of its democratic and Jewish characteristics. Moreover, the examples 
reflect projects which integrate the state, army and civil society.  
 
 
5.6.1  Tzedakah, Gemilut Hasadim and Tikun Olam361  
Tzedakah is a Hebrew word literally meaning justice 362  or righteousness but 
commonly used to signify charity or charitable giving. Yet, the two concepts greatly 
differ. While charity is typically understood as a spontaneous act of goodwill and 
generosity, in Judaism “Tzedakah’ refers to the religious obligation to do what is right 
and just and to aid those in need (Eisenberg, 2008). A famous quote of Maimonides363 
sets that while the second highest form of tzedakah is to give donations anonymously 
to unknown recipients, the highest form constitutes a contribution (such as a gift, a 
loan, or a partnership) that will result in the recipient supporting himself instead of 
living upon others (Twerski, 1972).   
The concept of Gmilut Chasadim (Hebrew for "acts of kindness") is rooted in 
the general Biblical commandment to do kindness, "Love your neighbor as yourself" 
(Leviticus 19:18). Traditionally, Gemach referred to a Jewish free money-lending 
fund364 and has been extended to include free loans of household items, clothing, 
books, equipment, services and advice365.  
                                                 
361 Hebrew for Acts of Kindness, Good Will and Repair of the World respectively. 
362 “Tzedakah” is based on the Hebrew word Tzedek meaning righteousness, fairness or justice. 
363 Rabbi Moses Ben Maimoat, known in Hebrew literature as the Rambam and in Western culture as 
Maimonides, is unquestionably one of the outstanding figures of Jewish history (Twerski, 1972).  
364 Which subscribes to both the positive Torah commandment of lending money: You shall lend money 
to my people (Exodus 22:24) and the Torah prohibition against charging interest on a loan to a fellow 
Jew: You shall not give him your money for interest, nor may you give him your food for increase 
(Leviticus 25:37). The idea of contributing to or forming one's own gemach was popularized by Rabbi 
Yisrael Meir Kagan (the Chofetz Chaim), who addressed it in his landmark book, Ahavat Chesed 
("Loving Kindness"). 
365 The proliferation of free loan societies (gemachim) is one of the identifying characteristics of all 
religious Jewish community (Rosenblum, 2007). Nowadays, one can primarily find such religious 
lending organizations among communities of Orthodox Jews in Israel and abroad. For further reading in 
this regard, see Shai, 2008.  
                                       142 
Tikkun olam (literally, "repair of the world") is a Jewish concept that dates 
back to the Mishnaic period366 (200 C.E). Traditionally interpreted as an aspiration to 
behave and act constructively and beneficially (Rosenthal, 2005), it conforms to the 
idea that Jews bear responsibility not only for their own moral, spiritual, and material 
welfare, but also for the welfare of society at large (Shatz, Waxman, & Diament, 
1997). In the modern era, Tikkun Olam has come to connote social action and the 
pursuit of social justice since the 1950’s. In subsequent decades, the term was used in 
reference to social action programs; tzedakah (charitable giving) and gemilut hasadim 
(acts of kindness); and progressive Jewish approaches to social issues. Tikkun Olam 
has become a commonly used term in liberal Jewish circles367 often referred to work 
for the improvement of society (My Jewish Learning.com). 
In the discussion of Israeli Patriotism, I chose to briefly explore two state 
sponsored initiatives: Mashav, Israel’s agency for international Cooperation and 
providing humanitarian and medical assistance to victims of the Syrian civil war. 
While the latter is rooted in liberal and democratic values (solidarity, altruism 
philanthropy), the former demonstrate how Jewish values (acts of kindness and 
goodwill) are implemented in modern day Israel. The discussion is aimed at exploring 
both sources and manifestations of contemporary Israeli national pride. Despite the 
difference in underlying values and their origins, both projects are Israeli in nature and 
thus constitute a source of national pride to both its Arab and Jewish citizens. 
 
 
5.6.2  Mashav 
Israel’s official international development cooperation program, aka Mashav368 was 
launched in late 1957 by Israel’s prime minister at the time, Golda Meir following her 
visit to Africa (Bruder & Parfitt, 2012). Mashav was aimed to share the “know-how” 
and technologies, which provided the basis for Israel’s own rapid development, with 
other developing countries. A modest program focused on grassroots-level human 
                                                 
366 The term “mipnei tikkun ha-olam” (perhaps best translated in this context as “in the interest of public 
policy”) originally referred to social policy legislation providing extra protection to those potentially at 
a disadvantage (just conditions for the writing of divorce decrees and for the freeing of slaves) (My 
Jewish Learning.com). 
367 A known Joke in this regard is “an American Jew visiting Israel asks his tour guide: “How do you 
say tikkun olam in Hebrew?””. 
368 MASHAV is the Hebrew acronym for Israel’s Agency for International Development Cooperation, a 
division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For further details see: 
http://www.mashav.mfa.gov.il/MFA/mashav/Pages/default.aspx. 
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capacity building (at a time when Israel itself was still very much a developing 
country), had grown into an extensive program of cooperation throughout the 
developing world. Following the conceptual footsteps of Maimonides, Mashav is 
focused on ensuring social, economic and environmental sustainable development by 
means of poverty alleviation, provision of food security, empowerment of women and 
upgrade of basic health and education services. 
MASHAV activities focus on areas in which Israel has a comparative 
advantage: The expertise and technology acquired in cultivating areas affected by 
water scarcity has underwritten many projects in both Africa and in south America 
(Aynor, 1990; Parada, 2011; Thompson, 2017). With the belief that training education 
and the transfer of skills and capacities lead to empowerment, the surest guarantee of 
sustainable growth, MASHAV grew gradually and organically in response to the 
needs of host countries369. From its inception, MASHAV have trained more than 
270,000 individuals from about 132 countries both in Israel and abroad using 
innovative technologies and tested methodologies adaptable to developing country 
needs. Its’ professional training program is aligned with current global challenges 
(such as adaptation to climate change and food security). In events of natural disasters 
or national emergencies Mashav provides humanitarian assistance and participates in 
reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts370. A segment taken from Mashav’s mission 
statement clearly articulates the fundamental connection between Israel’s Jewish 
origins and its’ contemporary actions: MASHAV, representing the State of Israel and 
its people, focuses its efforts on capacity building, sharing relevant expertise 
accumulated during Israel's own development experience to empower governments, 
communities and individuals to improve their own lives. Supporting those who face 
                                                 
369 E.g., Israel has been collaborating with Myanmar for over two decades in the agriculture sector (such 
as an agriculture-training program, part of which students from Myanmar spend 11 months in Israel). 
Projects are diverse, ranging from greenhouses to husbandries (Thompson, 2017). 
370 By tragic circumstance, Israel is a world leader in handling mass casualties ready to provide search 
and rescue teams and field hospitals in a speedy and effective way. The Israeli field hospital that was set 
up following the devastating Haiti earthquake treated more than 1,110 patients, conduced 319 
successful surgeries and delivered 16 babies. The IDF Search and Rescue force rescued or assisted in 
the rescue of 4 individuals (Israeli Ministry of foreign Affairs, 2010). Israel was one of the first 
countries to send aid according to the needs and request of the Japanese government following the 
earthquakes in Japan in March 2011 (Israeli Ministry of foreign Affairs, 2011). Israel also provided 
relief to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina (Israeli Ministry of foreign Affairs, 2005), and first 
response aid in the wake of the 2004 tsunami with 60 tons of international aid to Indonesia, and 82 tons 
of relief to Sri Lanka (Israeli Ministry of foreign Affairs, 2013). The latter are only a few current 
examples of Israel’s humanitarian aid efforts around the world.  
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great development challenges goes to the heart of what it means to be a Jewish State. 
MASHAV is both a manifestation of Israel's political will, foreign policy and 
Development Diplomacy, as well as the ideological commitment of the Jewish State to 
the traditional Jewish ideals of tikun olam – repairing the world. In the words of 
David Ben-Gurion, the founder and first Prime Minister of Israel: “For Israel, 
development cooperation is both a moral and a political issue, and from both aspects 
Israel must look upon such aid as a historic mission”371.   
 MASHAV is, evidently, a source of great national pride for both the State of 
Israel and the people of Israel. In his meeting with UN Sec. Gen. Ban Ki-moon in 
Jerusalem in June 2016, Israeli President Rivlin had explicitly addressed Israel’s sense 
of national pride in the context of the international community: Israel is proud of the 
role it plays in the international community; from technology and medicine, to 
academia and culture. Israel is proud of the help it offers through MASHAV, and other 




5.6.3  Operation “Good Neighbor” 
In recent years, Israel has been providing humanitarian assistance to victims of the 
Syrian civil war. Since March 2013 and as the fighting in Syria continues, the Israeli 
government’s humanitarian decision to provide life-saving treatment for the wounded 
from Syria (made long before humanitarian assistance was requested by the UN) 
opened the door for an ever-growing number of injured Syrians. Those are being 
brought in for treatment in Israel’s Galilee Medical Center in Nahariya, located only 
70 kilometers from the Syrian border.  
 In July 2017, the IDF disclosed that for the past year, it has carried out a 
massive, multi-faced humanitarian relief operation referred to as “Operation Good 
Neighbor372”. Whereas Israel and Syria are officially at war373, humanitarian concerns 
                                                 
371 http://www.mashav.mfa.gov.il/MFA/mashav/AboutMASHAV/Pages/Guiding_ Principles.aspx 
372 Whereas Israel’s Operation, continuous medical support and humanitarian assistance in this regard 
were acknowledged by many Syrians who were brought to Israel for treatment (see for example, Gross, 
2017), one manifestation of gratitude stood out. In December 2015, Aboud Dandachi, a displaced 
Syrian refugee currently living in Istanbul created www.thankyouamisrael.com, a webpage aimed at 
recognizing and thanking all the Jewish and Israeli individuals and groups who have done so much for 
Syrians in need over the past few years (Dandachi, 2015). Dandachi periodically acknowledges the 
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underpinned Israel’s decision to provide Syrians who reside near the Israeli border 
with food and medical assistance (both are unattainable due to on-going fight). 
Consequently, Israel has sent hundreds of tons of food, medical equipment and 
clothing across the border to Syria374.  
 Operation “Good neighbor” also included facilitated the construction of two 
medical clinics within Syria, which are to be run by locals and NGO workers, and 
support 80,000 Syrians living in the area near the Syrian city of Quneitra. Lastly, 
Israel operates Mazor Ladach (Hebrew for “Bandaging Those in Need”), a field clinic 
located in an unused military post in the southern Golan Heights on the Syrian 
border375 (Aharonheim, 2018; Gross, 2017). As of February 2018, More than 4,000 
Syrians have been brought into Israel to receive medical treatment. Some 1,000 
children have been treated in Israel since the operation began, including 685 in 2017 
alone. About a dozen babies have so far been born in Israel to Syrian women. Both 
combatants and civilians arrive at the border to receive treatment376. In a commentary 
published in “The Times of Israel” magazine (2017), IDF Lieutenant Colonel “A” who 
commands Operation “Good Neighbor”, acknowledged the sense of national pride as 
well as the Jewish values which underpinned the operation: I remember the beginning 
of Operation Good Neighbor … we had serious doubts … whether the Syrians would 
actually arrive. Then, at 3:00 am in the freezing cold of the Golan Heights, we noticed 
them walking along the fence. Twenty-five children holding their mothers’ hands 
passed through the gates in what seemed like a modern Exodus ... Across the border 
                                                                                                                                             
numerous Jewish and Israeli individuals and organizations who have gone out of their way to provide 
aid, assistance and medical care to Syrian refugees while referencing relevant information published 
my international media. 
373 Israel and Syria have officially been at war since Israel was established in 1948. Following the Six 
Days War in 1967, Israel took control of the 1,200 square kilometers of the Golan Heights from Syria. 
Israel annexed the area in 1981 in a move contested by the international community. The Golan Heights 
were considered by some to be foundational in the negotiation of a peace treaty. However, along with 
outbreak of the Syrian civil war, the uncompromising stance of Prime Minister Netanyahu regarding the 
region (see Keinon, 2016) undermined the prospect of any agreement. 
374 According to the IDF, over 360 tons of food were sent to Syria between 2013 and 2017. The supply 
of clothes, baby food, medical supplies, diesel fuel and generators has also significantly increased in the 
later timeframe. To tackle food shortage on the border, Israel also sends hundreds of tons of flour, oil, 
sugar, salt, canned beans and dry goods (Gross, 2017). 6,351 packages of diapers have been sent across 
the border as well as 600 meters of piping to re-establish ruined water infrastructure, providing running 
water to 5,000 people in the villages (Aharonheim, 2018). According to the IDF, while humanitarian aid 
was mostly donated by NGOs, a part was provided directly by the Israeli government. 
375 This clinic is run by the American “Frontier Alliance International”. The IDF helped train the staff 
and can support the medical team, providing care to more than 500 patients daily (Aharonheim, 2018). 
376 According to officials, nearly three-quarters of the wounded treated by Israel are men of fighting 
age; the remainder are women and children (Aharonheim, 2018). 
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there is a civil war – the cruelest of its kind — and our job was to make history and be 
remembered as the ones who did the right thing. Today ... I realize that that very first 
moment at the fence was historic. A moment … of Israeli pride and Jewish 
compassion.  
 
 Alongside an organized humanitarian action taken by the IDF and the state of 
Israel, one can also spot grassroots initiatives such as #Israel4Allepo. Hashtag 
Israel4Allepo had been widely used in social Media in solidarity with the victims of 
the Syrian Civil war. As part of a campaign titled “Israelis for Haleb” of the “Israel 
Shali” (My Israel) national Zionists movement, Israelis were able to protest against the 
violence in Syria online but were also directed at help organizations which have 
proved useful in aiding Syrian victims- offline. Recalling dark periods for the Jewish 
people, during which the world stood by, Haezni Cohen, chairwoman of “Israel Sheli” 
(my Israel) argued, It is our job to raise the flag in the face of mass massacres. 
Reuveni who started the campaign threw caution to the wind stating: The world, and 
particularly human rights organizations are as silent as they have always been in 
every genocide that has taken place since World War II. We are used to hear them 
only when there is a potential political gain or when it comes to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. True, Syria is an enemy state and the belligerents there are among the 
cruelest terrorists in the world, but it does not change the fact that children are 
slaughtered and women are raped. We do not call on Israel to physically intervene in 
Syria but to express solidarity with innocent civilians and lead a global wake-up call. 
It is precisely we, who claim that the IDF is the most moral army in the world who 
must fill the void left by the world and human rights organizations (Shneior, 2016). 
 
 
A Human to a Human, Is a Human 
According to Sharon Mann, International Liaison official at the Galilee Medical 
Center’s Department of International Affairs, nearly 2,200 injured Syrians have been 
treated at the Galilee Medical Center since 2013, 40% of them women and children 
(Aharonheim, 2018). On the entrance to every building in the medical center is a sign 
with the message “A human to a human, is a human” (Barhoum, 2017). In April 2017, 
Israeli President Rivlin visited the Western Galilee Medical Center in Nahariya, and 
met with the medical staff and well as with some of the Syrian patients. Rivlin spoke 
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of the unique nature of the hospital that serves the entire region: Your [medical staff] 
business is pride … Israeli pride, Jewish pride. It is proof that the world is built on 
kindness. Israel will continue to do everything it can with responsibility and wisdom in 
order to alleviate the suffering of the people who experience daily slaughter on the 
other side of the border … we, who have risen from the ashes of the Holocaust, know 
very well that silence cannot be an option (Roberts, 2017).  
 Evidently, President Rivlin links both Israel’s moral responsibility and 
manifestation of national pride in being able to provide much necessary humanitarian 
assistance with the traumatic experience of the Holocaust, an experience shared by 
Jews. Yet, this sense of national pride isn’t only shared by Jewish Israelis. The most 
prominent example in this context can be found in a quote by Dr. Barhoum, chief 
executive officer of “Galilee Medical Center” and first Arab to run a medical hospital 
in Israel. Although as an Arab-Israeli, Dr. Barhoum isn’t part of the existing national 
Jewish ethos and Zionistic narrative, and even though his moral obligation to assist the 
wounded isn’t connected to the traumatic experience of the Holocaust, he 
demonstrated a great sense of national pride and an undisputable sense of inclusion to 
the predominantly Jewish Israeli public: We live in a difficult and demanding reality in 
the heart of the Middle East: our mission to provide professional and humane medical 
treatment will continue … this is our way; this is the way of Israel, my country377 
(Barhoum, 2017). 
 
Unlike President Rivlin, Dr. Barhoum’s manifestation of national pride is not rooted in 
the Holocaust but in a “professional duty and a paramount moral prerogative” and in 
an apparent sense of “shared faith” with the state of Israel. Dr. Barhoum acknowledges 
                                                 
377 A similar sentiment was expressed by Joseph Hadad, an Arab Israeli, IDF combat soldier in reserves 
and the CEO of “Arevim Ze la Ze” (an association which works towards strengthening the nexus 
between Arab Israelis and the Israeli society) following Israel’s recent win in the Eurovision 2018 song 
contest. In a piece titled “Netta Barzilay won for us, Arab Israelis, too” (2018), published soon after the 
Israeli victory in the song contest, Hadad describes the joy expressed “even by” his neighbors in 
Nazareth, a city known as the “Arab capital of Israel” (Emmett, 1995) as they applauded Barzilay’s win. 
After all, he writes, she is singing about accepting the different, and in Israel we are also different. 
Hadad continues to describe both the interest and the pride expressed by Arab Israelis in light of the 
Israeli win, even if the event [the win, M.H.] was not covered by the Arab-Israeli media and isn’t 
something one openly talks about in the city … Neta Barzilai's win is an important and unifying event. 
For us, too, the Arab sector in Israel. Hadad continues to argue that unlike the Arab Knesset members 
who are using the mandate given to them in order to deepen the rift between Arab and Jewish Israelis in 
order to promote their own interests, both groups must learn to live together, side by side, especially in 
light of the Iranian threat and the backlash from moving the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. 
Hadad ends by stating: This win … brings pride to every Israeli citizen. 
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the contribution of such assistance in turning those wounded Syrians from enemies to 
friends (from the perspective of the state of Israel) alongside taking personal pride in 
the center’s becoming one of the world leaders in providing care for complex and 





This chapter refocused the attention on the state of Israel and the Israeli society. It 
provided a historical analysis of Jewish-Israeli nationalism, rooted in the Zionistic 
movement in Europe in the late 19th century, which receded the establishment of the 
state of Israel. The analysis centered on the role of the state of Israel, after it was 
granted statehood in 1948, in constructing a new Jewish-Israeli identity, mostly by 
means of institutionalizing the Hebrew language as an official language, immigrants 
integration and the usage of the Israeli defense force as a melting pot. The study of the 
origins of Israeli national pride, both in the country’s first years and in contemporary 
times is entwined with the concept of the Jewish Israeli identity. Along the course of 
transforming the newly established state of Israel into a homeland to an immigrant 
Jewish population, part of which were holocaust survivors, robust and highly 
institutionalized nation and community-building processes took place.  
Although founded as a democracy, the analysis suggests that Israel was never a 
space of ethnic diversity. As a homeland of the Jewish people based on a Zionist 
Jewish narrative and highly influenced by the Holocaust, no plurality of ethnic 
discourse existed in Israel in over 50 years. A state-sponsored dominant Jewish and 
Zionist narrative morphed into an Israeli one and created a uni-dimensional Israeli 
identity. This, in turn, prevented the Arab-Israelis, the largest ethnic minority in Israel, 
to be incorporated into the Israeli society. Recurrent political violence as part of the 
on-going Israeli Palestinian conflict (wars, military operations or terrorism) further 
contributed to the development of a militarized mindset, social tensions and the 
exclusion of Arab-Israelis from the original Israeli narrative. The latter also served as a 
bonding mechanism for Jewish Israelis. It was only in the last decades and against the 
backdrop of significant changes endured by the Israeli society that place-making 
processes and a discussion of the inclusion of non-Jews into an Israeli rather than 
Jewish or Zionistic narrative were put on the political and social agenda. The 
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discussion of ethnic plurality and the place of Arab-Israelis within the Israeli society is 
repeatedly contested. A contemporary example in this regard is the ethnic-religious 
classification of Israelis and the discussion of Basic Law: Israel as the Nation State of 
the Jewish People. Evidently, the Israeli society has been undergoing significant 
changes that put into question its core values. Whereas nation and community-building 
processes are still prominent in contemporary Israel (though to a lesser degree 
compared with its first six decades), they now exist side by side a vibrant and vocal 
discourse of post-Zionism, Jewish secularism and “Israelism” which is not based on 
Judaism but on an Israeli cultural narrative. It can very well be that the existence of a 
persisting violent conflict may substitute Judaism and Zionism as the common 
denominators of a contemporary Israeli identity. As such, the boundaries between 
Arab and Jewish Israelis would potentially diminish. Such new “Israelism”, in turn, 
will allow for the inclusion of the Israeli non-Jewish population that have been thus far 
regarded as an “out-group” by the Jewish majority in Israel. Yet, drifting away from 
the original Jewish unifier and common denominator of more than 75% of the 
country’s citizens may also result in social fragmentation within the Jewish 
communities of Israel. Against this backdrop, the analysis of the effect of political 
violence on Israeli national pride and the relationship between Jewish and non-Jewish 
communities in Israel presented in the upcoming chapters is of great importance for 
Israel’s future.  
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6.  Together We Stand? The Effect of Perceived 




If the state is at peace and is as well-governed as a human community can 
be, then the citizen’s loyalty to his country, his services to it in the forms 
of energy, devotion, and funds, in general coincide with his own vital 
interests. The fatherland repays his loyalty by giving him safety, justice, 
and sometimes even freedom. In fulfilling his patriotic duties he is not 
performing an act of love. Only when the fatherland is in danger does his 
giving become a sacrifice, his serving a suffering, his loyalty a love.  




6.1  Introduction 
 
Scholarship suggests that identities are subject to repeated cycles of construction and 
reconstruction (Putnam, 2007, p. 159). Exposure to violence is widely agreed to have 
significant effect on both individual and group identities, particularly within multi-
ethnic societies.  
Israelis are not just geographically close to the ongoing Middle East conflict; 
they are noticeably emotionally close to it (Sanzi, 2016). Notwithstanding differences 
between social subgroups in contemporary Israeli society, a majority of both Jewish 
and Arab Israelis proclaim their pride in being Israeli and have done so in the last 
decade despite experiencing frequent political violence. Given that Israeli Arabs 
constitute an ethnic minority who suffer from ongoing discrimination (even in the eyes 
of a majority of the Jewish public, see Hermann, Heller, Cohen, Bublil, & Omar, 
2016), who doesn’t share the Jewish Zionistic narrative, and who is in a “tight spot” in 
light of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this is a very interesting figure which 
illustrates the complex nature of group identification.  
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How resilient Israelis’ national identity is in the face of persistent political violence? 
Do distinct outcomes of such violence affect national identification differently? Does 
group performance (success vs. failure) or membership in an ethnic/social group 
(minority vs. minority) moderate the effect?  
 
Whereas the macro-level analysis presented in chapter four had statistically proven 
that discrepant war outcomes affect national and social identification in distinctive 
ways, thereby supporting the underlying assumption of this work, this chapter 
constitutes a micro-level analysis, examining the effects of  aftermaths of Israeli 
warfare 378 on Israeli national identification. Focusing on the State of Israel and Israeli 
society allows for an empirical assessment of predictions derived from Social Identity 
Theory regarding the relations between group performance and group identification. I 
will distinguish between successful and unsuccessful outcomes of Israeli warfare 
(from the Israeli point of view) and evaluate their effect on Israeli national 
identification (operationalized as national pride). 
 
 
6.2  Hypotheses 
 
Against the theoretical framework set forth in chapter two and drawing on Social 
Identity Theory, the underlying argument employed in this chapter is that diverse 
outcomes of political violence will have distinct effect on Israeli national 
identification. Attending to nations as groups of individuals and considering that 
individual’s self-concept is derived from perceived membership in different groups, I 
suggest that whereas Israelis are expected to BIRG (Bask in reflected glory) following 
a positively valued outcome of Israeli warfare (in order to raise their self-esteem), a 
negatively valued outcome would likely to lead them to CORF (cut off reflected 
failure), so as to counter a potential decrease in self-esteem. Namely, Israelis are likely 
to identify more with the state following a successful military operation and less 
following an unsuccessful military operation. 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned, it is important to acknowledge the multi-
layered nature of individual identities when discussing national identification. Past 
                                                 
378 Military operations and the Second Lebanon war. 
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research has found asymmetric attitudes of ethnic minorities and majorities towards 
their country as well as to the ethnic nature of the violence. Israel is a unique case in 
this regard. As a Jewish state and “the national home of the Jewish people”, Arab 
Israelis do not only constitute an ethnic minority but are effectively excluded from the 
Israeli society insofar that it is constructed around a Zionist and Jewish ethe. 
Consequently, I hypothesize that Arab-Israelis may not perceive the states’ victory as 
“their victory” and thus will not demonstrate BIRGing tendencies. Hence, an increase 
in national identification among Arab Israelis following a successful conclusion of 
Israeli warfare will not be registered. 
Lastly, based on the “Embedded Identity” scholarship and since Jewish 
Israelis constitute an ethnic majority in a Jewish nation state, Israeli warfare 
(regardless of its outcome) is not expected to significantly affect national identification 
among Jewish Israelis Put differently, National identification levels will not be 
mitigated by the outcomes of military operation, among Jewish Israelis. 
 
 
Figure V summarizes the main concepts, hypotheses and expected effects, examined 
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6.3  Data, Measures and Method  
 
 
6.3.1  Focusing on Israel 
 
In order to test the aforementioned hypotheses at the micro-level, I chose to restrict the 
study to the land of Israel due to theoretical and methodological considerations. As the 
theory developed here requires group members to respond to varied outcomes of 
political violence, it was necessary to identify a country that experienced recurrent 
violence with varied outcomes. Along with several other democracies (e.g., Northern 
Ireland), Israel has experienced chronic and persistent political violence, characterized 
by repeated military operations and wars. During the years of the study, from 2003 to 
2013, Israel endured nine periods of political violence which included initiated 
military operations and wars. Consequently, Israel fulfills the aforementioned 
prerequisite379. Furthermore, political violence has a salient presence in the lives of 
Israelis as Israel’s size is only 22,072 km² (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017), and as 
the relevant fighting regarded both its’ southern (“Pillar of Defense” and “Protective 
Edge”380) as well as northern borders (“Second Lebanon War”). Given the high levels 
of exposure to political violence, both in scale and in frequency, and the availability of 
micro-level survey data, Israel allows for the examination of the way discrepancy in 
political violence aftermath influence national identification.  
Whereas Judaism is a cohesive element for most of the county’s residents and 
is a key component in Israel’s existence as a Jewish nation-state381, the Israeli society 
is characterized by high heterogeneity with class, religious, national, ethnic, and 
cultural differences separating the groups comprising it. The main national identities – 
Jews and Arabs382 – split into subgroups with separate identities383. In its’ early years, 
Israel’s cohesive value was pioneering (Eisenstadt, 1985) and Zionism was the notion 
on which the Israeli-Jewish identity was based (Sachar, 2013). However, during the 
                                                 
379 Further methodological considerations for turning to Israel also include the quality and extent of data 
available and the ability to control for country specific characteristics. 
380 Named by the Israeli defense forces (aka “IDF”). For a brief review of the naming process of 
military operations, see Handelzalts, 2012. 
381 Despite undeniable religious-secular disputes (Levy, Levinsohn, & Katz, 2002). 
382 According to the Central Bureau of Statistics’ recant repot (2017), Jews constitute 74.6% of Israel's 
population, Arab/Palestinian citizens constitute 20.9%. 
383 Jews split into secularists and religious, Ashkenazi and Sephardi (European/American and Middle 
Eastern), new immigrants and natives. Non-Jews split into Christian/Muslim Arabs, Druze & Bedouin. 
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last six decades, the consensus about the content of the Israeli identity has changed 
and is, nowadays, differently defined by each of the subgroups in Israel. Recant trends 
in the social and academic discourse in Israel include “post-Zionism” or “anti-
Zionism”, casting doubt on the need for Israel’s definition as “the Jewish state” (Alan 
Arian, Atmor, & Hadar, 2007). Despite its high heterogeneity, high levels of national 
identification and social solidarity are witnessed, both in ordinary times and during 
periods of crises (see for example, Asher Arian et al., 2010).  
 
 
6.3.2  Military Operations  
 
As relevant survey data (used to construct the dependent variable, namely, Israeli 
national pride) is unavailable before 2003, and as the research was carried out during 
Operation Protective Edge in 2014, the period 2004-2013384 was chosen for the current 
analysis. Table C depicts the military operations (hereinafter- including the Second 
Lebanon War) used in the current study385. 
 
 




















incursion into Gaza 
since the start of the 
Al-Aqsa intifada in 
September 2000, 
launched following 
the death of two 
Israeli children from 
a rocket lunched by 
militants in the strip. 









Israeli Air Force 
weeklong offensive 
23.09.2005 01.10.2005 IDF, Hamas 
& Islamic 
Success 
                                                 
384 The last episode of high intensity violence took place in 2014 but the survey used was held in 2015.  
385 During the relevant timeframe nine military operations involving Israeli took place. However, due to 
data variability, only five of these were analyzed in the current research. For information regarding all 
nine operations please refer to appendix B.   
386 There were a number of other operations (Operation “Rainbow”; Operation “Summer Rains” & 
Operation “Autumn Clouds”; Operation “Hot Winter”, Operation “Returning Echo” (March 2012 
Gaza–Israel clashes)) during this period, however, due to insufficient media coverage, the author was 
unable to establish they perceived outcome and as such, they have not been included in this analysis. 
For more information in this regard see appendix C. 
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in Gaza launched 
following extensive 
firing of rockets at 
Israeli communities 
in the western Negev 
and the city of 







airstrike and ground 
invasion of southern 
Lebanon precipitated 
by the firing of 
rockets, from 
Lebanon, at Israeli 
border towns and the 
abduction of two 
IDF soldiers by 
Hezbollah. 









military operation of 
the Israeli air, naval, 
artillery and ground 
forces in the Gaza 
Strip. Resulted in 
high rates of 
casualties. 






An eight-day IDF 




response to the 
killing of Gaza 
military wing of 
Hamas’s chief and 
the launch of over 
100 rockets towards 
Israel during a 24-
hour period. 
















6.3.3  Survey Measures: National Identification 
 
In this study, I seek to measure the levels of Israelis’ national identification following 
discrepant outcomes of political violence. National identification, the dependent 
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variable in the analysis is proxied by national pride387. This operationalization is 
proper in light of Smith & Kim’s definition of “National Pride” as the positive affect 
that the public feels towards their country, resulting from their national identity 
(Smith & Kim, 2006, p. 127).  
 National-pride was found to be a function of a variety of individual-specific 
characteristics (e.g. Evans & Kelley, 2002), national identity (Dimitrova-Grajzl, 
Eastwood, & Grajzl, 2016), market conditions (Lan & Li, 2015) and contemporary 
events (Kavetsos, 2012). Since national pride reflects the relationship between 
individuals and their state, according to Social Identity Theory and Social Comparison 
Theory, it is likely to be affected by political violence (as a threat enhance identity 
salience) and thus is a suitable proxy for the examination of national identification. 
In order to construct the dependent variable for the empirical analysis, I 
utilized survey data from five Israeli Democracy Indices388, administered between 
2005 and 2013. The dates, sample sizes and additional relevant methodological data 
are reported in Appendix B. While nine surveys were conducted in the aforementioned 
timeframe, only relevant 389  surveys were analyzed. National Pride was 
operationalized through respondents’ answers to the question “how proud are you to 
be Israeli” on a 4 (very proud) to 1 (not at all proud) scale.  
Though using survey data was necessary in order to conduct a quantitative 
analysis, I acknowledge the problematic nature of using surveys in measuring vague 
concepts such as “Pride” or “Trust’390. The usage of vague concepts is a common 
problem when survey questions are regarded, as the former may trigger differential 
associations, affect respondents’ answers and thus interfere in the empirical 
relationships observed between the dependent and independent variables (Bauer et al., 
2014).  
The term “Pride”, for example, used in the aforementioned question is vague 
and difficult to quantify. Since it was not complemented by a given definition of what 
                                                 
387 “Pride” is defined by Webster dictionary as delight or elation arising from some act, possession, or 
relationship (Merriam-Webster, 2018a). 
388  For more information regarding the Israeli Democracy Index or for a general discussion of 
categorizing and measuring identities through social surveys, please refer to chapter three, subsection 
3.2.4.  
389 Surveys conducted during or prior to a specific military operation/war were disregarded. If the 
military operation/war terminated after the annual survey was administered, the following survey was 
used.  
390 Further discussion of using vague concepts and categorizing identities in social surveys is found 
under subsection 3.2.4. 
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“pride” actually is, it was left to be interpreted by the individual respondent 391 . 
Different ways in which pride could be demonstrated together with a proposed scale of 
level of pride would have surely support a more unified interpretation of both the 
concept and its measure. A possible solution to the problem of using vague concepts is 
favouring a battery of questions addressing different aspects of the examined topic 
(Bauer et al., 2014). For example, instead of inquiring what is one’s political 
affiliation on a “left” to “right” scale, question should address concrete attitudes for 
immigration, taxes etc. 
Since it was not possible to collect data concerning Israelis national pride shifts 
following the conclusion of military operations (due to the chosen timeframe of the 
research), the author resorted to using existing data which, sadly, incorporates vague 
concepts in its survey questions. Whereas several robustness checks were conducted in 
order to validate the research’s conclusions, future research should try to replicate the 
current findings while addressing the limitation arising from using vague concepts392. 
 
 
6.3.4  Perceived Outcome of Military Operation 
 
Since relevant data with regard to the independent variable, perceived outcomes of 
military operations, does not exist393, it was manually constructed by the author based 
on framing of such warfare by the Israeli media.  
The construction of the independent variable was twofold; first, a unique 
dataset was created, encompassing articles and commentaries extracted from the three 
most popular Israeli newspapers (with the largest readership) following the 
conclusion394 of each military operation appearing in table C. Articles that did not 
relate to the newly concluded operation were removed. Next, Evaluative Assertion 
Analysis395  (or EAA) was conducted in order to evaluate the messages relating to the 
                                                 
391 What constitutes pride? Is pride “a mere” emotion or must it be demonstrated?   
392 This can be done, for example, by relying on more specific questions and constructing a trust index 
based on their aggregation in combination with advance scaling techniques such as item response theory 
models (see, for example (Bafumi & Herron, 2010; Jessee, 2009). Using existing quantitative data 
together with relevant qualitative data is another alternative.  
393 Data concerning 2 of the 9 violent conflicts is available (Uppsala’s UCDP Conflict Termination 
project coded Operation “Hot Winter” and Operation “Pillar of defense” as “ceasefires”). However, this 
paper examines the effect of perceived successful and unsuccessful outcomes of Israeli warfare as they 
are frames by the Israeli media, this coding is irrelevant.  
394 News articles are commentaries were extracted from issues published during three consecutive days 
following the termination of Israeli warfare.  
395 Further discussion of EEA and the full coding scheme is found in appendix B. 
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aftermath of military operations. The analysis followed Krippendorff (2012) and 
Osgood, Saporta & Nunnally (1956) and distinguished between attitude objects and 
common meaning items. The messages were then coded by substituting numerical 
values for the attitude objects and connecting them with common meaning items (the 
coding scheme is based on Schneider, Hadar, & Bosler, 2017 and appears in appendix 
B).  
The product of the aforementioned analysis is an evaluative scaling of attitude 
objects as used in these messages (Osgood et al., 1956, p. 47), namely the way the 
aftermaths of each warfare was framed396 by the Israeli press (Druckman, 2001b). 
Consequently, outcomes was operationalized as the perceived aftermath of every 




6.3.5  Control variables 
 
As the survey data used in order to construct the dependent variable (Israeli national 
pride) is based on a representative sample of the Israeli population rather than on a 
panel398, it was necessary to control for respondents’ personal characteristics that are 
likely to affect national-identification (Coenders & Scheepers, 2003; Stubager, 2009). 
Consequently, Religiosity, Education, Age, Gender and Socio-class are also included 
in the analysis.  
Assessing respondents’ membership in the various ethnic groups was based on 
the following variables: Origin, a dummy variable used in order to distinguish 
between native Israelis and immigrants, Social group (Jews/Arabs/Immigrants), 
arab_identity & jewish_identity referring to respondents’ self-defined ethnic identity 
and arab_religion & jewish_religion referring to respondents’ religious affiliation. 
Residence is a coded value of respondents’ place of residence as one of seven districts 
in Israel. It was used as a robustness check to test whether residing closer to the center 
                                                 
396 A related study conducted by Cohen (2008) considered the nexus between national pride and the 
viewing of local and foreign television in Israel. Cohen found that to the extent that favorite television 
characters can be seen as role models and that national pride reflects national identity, Israeli media 
figures seem to serve an important role in maintaining national identity.  
397 It is important to note that this measure is not always identical to the official statement of the 
outcome, if the latter exists, and that it is the perception of the outcome as framed by the Israeli media. 
398 Panel or longitudinal data are multi-dimensional data involving measurements over time. It contains 
observations of multiple phenomena obtained over multiple time periods for the same individuals. 
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of violence is a relevant confounding variable as suggested by Penic, Elcheroth, & 
Spini (2016). Political affiliation was measured by a 5-point scale. Three macro-
economic indicators were also added as controls; economic growth, economic 
development and inflation rate399.  
 
 
6.4  Findings and Discussion 
 
6.4.1  Preliminary Findings 
 
Contemporary Israeli society is highly diverse and is comprised of different ethnic and 
religious minorities; Whereas Israeli-Jews constitute the majority group, Israeli Arabs 
constitute the largest ethnic minority. The Israeli public chronically and persistently 
experienced political violence: between 2004 and 2013, Israel endured nine periods of 
fighting, each lasting from a few days up to several months.  
In order to get a preliminary sense of variations in national pride levels in the 
relevant timeframe, Figure VI charts the perceived outcomes of such Israeli warfare 
alongside mean national-pride values400 across the three largest social groups in Israel, 
namely Jews, Arabs and immigrants. Jewish-Israelis demonstrate the highest levels of 
national-identification whereas Arab-Israelis demonstrate the lowest levels, in 










                                                 
399 The measures are based on annual World Development Indicators for Israel for the year or the 
surveys. Economic Growth is Israel’s real GDP growth per survey year, Economic Development is 
Israel’s GDP per capita per survey year and Inflation is the rate of inflation in consumer prices. Since 
economic development correlates with economic growth only one is used in the quantitative analysis 
while the other is used as a robustness check. 
400 Respondents were presented with the question: “how proud are you to be Israeli?” Possible answers 
were (1) very proud, (2) quire proud, (3) somewhat proud & (4) not proud. Thus, a lower mean marks a 
higher level of national pride. 
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Figure VI. Mean values of National Pride levels following victories and defeats across ethnic groups 








National-identification levels among Israeli immigrants 401  are similar to those 
observed by the overall population: low in comparison with the majority group 
(Jewish-Israelis) and high in comparison with the largest minority group (Arab-
Israelis). When considering the difference in mean values following victories and 
defeats, an increase in overall national-pride levels is apparent subsequent to the 
successful termination of operations “First Rain” and “Days of Penitence” in 2004-
2005 (-.11). A sharp decrease is observed following the unsuccessful termination of 
the Second Lebanon War (and failing to secure the return of captured Israeli soldier 
Shalit) in 2006 (+0.22). The successful termination of operation “Cast Lead” (aka the 
Gaza war) and the relative peaceful period of 2009-2012 seems to bring about a slight 
increase in national-pride (-.8).  
Finally, a very mild increase in national-pride (-.5) appears in 2013 following 
the unsuccessful termination of operation “Pillar of Defense”. With the exception of 
                                                 
401 Jewish immigration to Israel was established in the “Law of Return” enacted in 1950, which stated 
the right of every Jew to immigrate to Israel. Immigrants originating in the former Soviet Union 
qualified for citizenships under the said law if they had or were married to someone who had one 
Jewish grandparent. As per Rabbinical law, Jewishness passes through the maternal line more than 
300,000 of the Russian-speaking immigrants are religiously non-Jews. For the sake of the current study, 
such immigrants are considered Jewish.  
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the latter increase in national-pride402, fluctuations in national-identification align with 
the first hypothesis, according to which unsuccessful termination of Israeli military 
operations are associated with low levels of national-identification whereas successful 
termination bring about the opposite effect. The data is only partially consistent with 
the minority hypothesis as a decrease in national pride level among Arab Israelis is 
apparent following the Israeli victory in 2005 (+.3) but also following the Israeli defeat 
in 2006 (+.55). National-pride fluctuation among Jewish Israelis follows a pattern 
similar to the one observed by the general population 403 , supporting the initial 
hypothesis and rejecting the embedded-identity hypothesis.  
As apparent from the preliminary analysis (although it is descriptive in nature 
and does not assume causation), a decade of multiple fighting periods with various 
outcomes has profoundly affected the special relationship between Israelis and their 
state. I will now turn to the statistical analysis of these effects.  
 Table E depicts the results of two ordinal logistic regression models404. In 
Model 1, I examined the effects of individual-level predictors alongside perceived 
outcomes of Israeli warfare405 on national-pride levels among Israelis. In Model 2, 
macro-level predictors were added to the analysis. In both models, perceived outcomes 
of Israeli warfare achieve high significance. In both modals Israeli military successes 
are highly associated with increase406 in national pride. 
 The results establish a consistent positive effect of successful outcomes of 
Israeli military operations on national-pride across models. Consistent with the 
literature, most of the control variables reach significant levels as well; I find strong 
evidence that both age and religiosity have a positive effect on national-pride and that 
social-class, education and political-identity are consistently significant and negatively 
affect national-pride. While gender, origin and economic growth did not reach 
significant levels, inflation appears to highly and negatively affects national-pride. 
                                                 
402 Which may result from a smaller sample-size used for the 2013 survey (1,000 respondents compared 
with 1,200 in previous years) and a larger maximum sampling error (3.2 compared with 2.8 in previous 
surveys). 
403 Increase in pride following victories in 2004-2005 (-0.15) and 2009 (-0.13) and a decrease following 
defeats (+0.16 in 2007 and +0.02 in 2013). 
404 Due to consistently lower BIC and AIC values, the ordinal logistic models are superior to the 
multilevel mixed effects ordered logistic models. Consequently, results from former are reported in the 
main text whereas results from the latter are reported in the appendix.   
405 Since Outcomes is a binary variable, specifying a reference group (unsuccessful outcomes or “0”) 
was necessary. 
406 Due to the operationalizing of the dependent variable a decrease in value marks an increase in pride. 
                                       162 
Whereas membership in Arab-Israeli and immigrants’ subgroups is highly significant 
in decreasing national-pride in general, the combined effect of such membership 
alongside the perceived outcome of Israeli warfare necessitates further investigation. 
 
Table E: The Effects of Conflict Outcomes on National Pride in Israel 




Outcomes (-defeats) -0.303*** -0.177*** 
 (-5.97) (-3.46) 
 
Individual-level variables  
Observing Tradition -0.092*** -0.094*** 
 (-3.31) (-3.43) 
Social Class 0.009 0.011 
 (0.22) (0.30) 
Ethnic Group: Arabs 1.946*** 1.963*** 
 (9.80) (9.47) 
Ethnic Group: Immigrants 0.772*** 0.760*** 
 (3.57) (3.67) 
Education 0.055** 0.054** 
 (2.93) (2.84) 
Gender 0.036 0.037 
 (0.99) (1.00) 
Age -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (-6.40) (-6.12) 
Political Identity 0.196*** 0.190*** 
 (4.83) (4.78) 
 
Country-level variables 
Economic Growth  0.016 
  (1.16) 
Inflation  0.067*** 
  (8.41) 
cut1_cons 1.062*** 1.380*** 
 (9.05) (5.74) 
cut2_cons 2.593*** 2.912*** 
 (18.61) (11.93) 
cut3_cons 3.858*** 4.178*** 
 (34.38) (20.22) 
AIC 10184.02 10178.48 
BIC 10203.5 10197.96 
LogL (model)  -5089.009 -5086.24 
N 4,886 4,886 
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6.4.2.  Disaggregating the Israeli society 
 
The results of the analysis of the relationship between perceived outcomes and 
national-pride among the three largest groups comprising the Israeli society: Arabs, 
Jews and immigrants are presented in Figure VII407. Outcomes reach high significance 
(-1.083, p<0.001) and indicate a positive effect on national pride. Yet, the described 
effect is only exhibited among members of the Arab ethnic group. 
 
 
Figure VII: Disaggregated Effects of Political Violence Outcomes on National Pride 
 
 
Consistent with the embedded identity hypothesis, national-identity levels among 
Jewish Israelis and Jewish immigrants, members of the majority ethnic-group, are not 
                                                 
407 Full regression results are found in the Appendix. 
Note: The estimations are the result of ordinal logit regression (STATA 14). The table reports 
coefficients whilst t statistics can be found in parentheses. Clustering according to survey year.  
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
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significantly affected by conflict outcomes (p=0.820 and p=0.174 respectively). In 
addition, political identity also reaches high significance across models: the more 
individuals identify with the political left, the less proud they are following a 
successfully perceived termination of political violence. 
 
 
6.4.3.  Interaction Analysis 
 
A further analysis, reflected in table F, was conducted in order to assess the effect of 
interactions between membership in the various social groups (model 1), political 
identity (model 2), and social class (model 3) with the perceived outcomes of Israeli 
warfare, on Israeli national pride. 
 
 Table F: The Effects of Victories on National Pride in Israel: Interaction Models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
National Pride 
 
   
Outcomes  -0.139* -0.132 -0.482*** 
 (-1.98) (-1.06) (-7.62) 
Individual-level variables     
Observing Traditions -0.091*** -0.100** -0.093*** 
 (-3.69) (-3.15) (-3.39) 
Social Class 0.006 0.015  
 (0.17) (0.40)  
Ethnic Group: Arabs 2.563*** 1.971*** 1.958*** 
 (93.05) (9.90) (9.73) 
Ethnic Group: Immigrants 0.449*** 0.750*** 0.756*** 
 (9.35) (3.81) (3.69) 
Education 0.053** 0.052** 0.054** 
 (2.66) (2.67) (2.83) 
Gender 0.04 0.036 0.039 
 (1.12) (0.90) (1.05) 
Age -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (-6.95) (-6.07) (-6.10) 
Political Identity 0.199***  0.190*** 
 (4.56)  (4.78) 
Country-level Variables    
Economic Growth 0.027*** 0.03** 0.016 
 (12.32) (3.29) (1.17) 
Inflation 0.071*** 0.097*** 0.067*** 
 (23.53) (11.75) (8.79) 
   
Victory X Arabs -0.759***   
 (-6.79)   
Victory X Immigrants  0.419*   
 (2.29)   
Political Identity: Moderate Right  0.089**  
  (2.72)  
Political Identity: Center  0.173***  
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  (6.25)  
Political Identity: Moderate Left  0.725***  
  (16.79)  
Political Identity: Left  1.217***  
  (16.38)  
Victory X Moderate Right  0.265  
  (1.70)  
Victory X Center  0.175  
  (1.35)  
Victory X Moderate Left`  -0.012  
  (-0.11)  
Victory X Left  -0.580*  
  (-2.50)  
Upper-middle Class   -0.365*** 
   (-11.14) 
Middle Class   -0.193*** 
   (-5.06) 
Lower class   -0.363*** 
   (-8.27) 
Victory X Upper-middle Class   0.456*** 
   (72.51) 
Victory X Middle Class   0.256*** 
   (3.82) 
Victory X Lower Class   0.490*** 
   (3.74) 
cut1_cons 1.478*** 1.344*** 1.113*** 
 (7.73) (4.83) (4.56) 
cut2_cons 3.016*** 2.880*** 2.646*** 
 (18.62) (11.74) (9.80) 
cut3_cons 4.299*** 4.153*** 3.913*** 
 (44.70) (22.09) (17.25) 
AIC 10152.58  10162.74  10175.05 
BIC 10172.06 10182.22  10194.54 
LogL (model) -5073.29 -5078.371 -5084.526 
N 4,886 4,886 4,886 
Note: The estimations are the result of ordinal logit regression (STATA 14). The table reports 
coefficients whilst t statistics can be found in parentheses. Clustering according to survey year. * p<0.05 
** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
 
 
While the interactions between a successful outcome and membership in the Israeli-
Arab & immigrants groups are significant, membership in the Arab-Israeli group is 
highly associated with an increased national-pride following successful termination of 
Israeli military operations (-0.759, p<0.001). This finding supports the general 
hypothesis while rejecting the minority hypothesis.  Membership in the immigrants 
group is mildly associated with a decrease in national-pride (0.419, p<0.05), 
supporting the minority hypothesis when considering immigrants a minority compared 
to native Israelis.  
Concerning political identity, the interaction between successful outcomes of 
Israeli warfare and the political left demonstrated a mild and positive effect on 
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national-pride (-0.580, p<0.05). This is puzzling at first sight as the political right is 
assumed to be associated with higher levels of national identification and is more 
prone to nationalistic approaches in comparison with the political left. However, when 
left and right are defined on the political spectrum in terms of degrees of force vs. 
freedoms, it is the political left, which is widely used to denote social systems and 
ideologies of force …  and the term “right” is substantially used to denote social 
systems and ideologies of freedom (Biddle, 2012). As such, support for the political 
left and an increase in national pride following Israeli military successes are coherent. 
Important to bear in mind that in contemporary Israel, public support for the political 
left is law altogether (Lavie, 2014; Paw research Centre, 2016; Tatour, 2016).  
Lastly, whereas membership in all social classes is highly significant and 
positively related to national pride, Israeli military successes were associated with a 
decreased national identity across social classes. 
Table G presents the results of a regression analysis concerning the effects of religious 
(model 1 and 3) and ethnic (model 2 and 4) identities of Arab and Jewish Israelis on 
national-pride and their interactions with the way Israeli warfare was terminated408.  
Arab identities include Palestinian, Arab and religious identification 
(referencing Arab-Israelis), whereas Arab religious categories included Christians and 
Druze (referencing Muslims). Jewish identities included ethnic (Ashkenazi/Mizrahi) 
and religious (Haredi/secular) identifications and referenced Jewish-Israelis. Jewish 
religious-identity included traditional, religious and ultra-religious categories, 
referencing secular Jews. 
Affirming previously discovered findings, Consistent with the general 
hypothesis and inconsistent with the minority hypothesis, a highly significant and 
positive effect of Israeli military successes on national-pride among Arab Israelis is 
apparent across models (-1.327 and -2.433, p<0.001). Consistent with the embedded 
identity hypothesis, Israeli military successes did not yield statistical significance in 
either model with regard to Jewish Israelis.  
 
Whereas a Palestinian, Arab or religious identity was found to be associated with a 
decrease in national pride among Israeli Arabs (0.025, p<0.05, 0.289, p<0.001, 0.259, 
p<0.001) respectively), identifying as a Christian or Druze (-0.398 and -1.435, 
                                                 
408 Unfortunately, immigrants were not explicitly asked in this regard. 
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p<0.001 respectively) was linked to increased national identity. This can be explained 
by the fact that while the former groups may be associate with the “out-group” or the 
enemy in the Israeli-Palestinian group and thus do not identify with the country of 
Israel, the latter are both minorities within minorities. As such, members of these 
groups may follow the general social processes explained by Social Identity Theory 
despite not sharing the collective ethnic identity. In this regard, it is important to 
mention that many Druze men serve in elite IDF units in high ranked positions which 
better to explain the increased level of national pride.  
The only significant interaction concerning Arab religiosity was found between 
Israeli military successes and members of the Christian religion (0.39, p<0.01). Here, 
consistent with the minority hypothesis, Israeli military successes are associated with a 
decreased national pride. However, one must take into account the small sample size 
(N=646). Turning to Arab Identity, the only significant interaction  was found between 
Israeli military successes and religious Arabs (-0.785, p<0.05). This positive effect 
may be attributed to the fact that the Qur’an, the central religious text of Islam, 
believed to be a revelation from God, recognizes the Land of Israel as the heritage of 
the Jews409 and points to the existence of the state of Israel as a fulfillment of the 
divine prophecy (the return of the Israelites’) (Al Hussaini, 2009; Palazzi, 1998b). As 
such, an Israeli success may be perceived as proud worthy. It should be noted, 
however, that the meaning of religious texts in general and these verses of the Qur’an 
in particular is contested among both Muslim religious leaders and scholars410.  
                                                 
409 For example, Qur’an 5:21(for an English translation see Arberry, 1996). 
410 Jewish claims to the Holy Land rest on verses appearing in the book of Genesis in which God 
repeatedly and unequivocally promises the Holy Land to Abraham and his descendants/the Children of 
Israel/the Israelites (Genesis 13:15, 26:3) (Al Hussaini, 2009).   
Many Muslims derive meanings from the Qur'an (17:1) that censure the Jews and exalt the city of 
Jerusalem through reference to the "Night Journey" when Prophet Muhammad is said to have traveled 
from Mecca to Jerusalem in a single night and then ascended to heaven to come before God (Arberry, 
1996). However, Muhammad Al-Hussaini, for example, a scholar of Islamic studies, grasps that 
although the Jews come in for severe criticism in the works of Muslim apologists and theologians, there 
are no grounds in religious law to entertain the conceit that God's promise to the Children of Israel has 
been broken, and none to support the view that Israel is now the property of the Muslims (Al Hussaini, 
2009). This notion is further based on Tabari’s (one of the earliest and most revered fathers of Qur'anic 
commentary and interpretation) interpretation of Qur’an 5:21 as an affirmation of god’s aforementioned 
promise to the Israelites (“From the Commentary of Tabari,” 2009). Though a minority, further pro-
Israeli notions were publicly expressed by other dominant Muslim religious and political figures such as 
Shrikh Prof. Palazzi (for example, (Palazzi, 1998a, 2001), Shaykh Abdurrahman Wahid, former 
President of Indonesia and leader of Nadwat al-Ulema (main Islamic organization of the most populous 
Muslim country of the world), Shaykh Ahmad Sillah the Mufti of Sierra Leone, Shaykh Tajuddin the 
Grand Mufti of the Russian Federation, and the Muftis of European Russia, Chechnya, Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan (IsraPundit.com, 2003). 
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 Concerning Jewish Identities, the interaction between Israeli military successes 
and religious identity was the only one yielding a significant result (0.358, p<0.05). 
This negative effect of Israeli military successes on national pride contradicts both the 
general hypothesis and the embedded identity hypothesis. As most Israeli Jews are 
either traditional or secular411, Jews who share an accentuated religious identity can be 
considered a minority within the general Jewish population and thus, exhibit the same 




Table G: The Effects of Victories, Religious and Ethnic Identities on National-
Pride Among Arab and Jewish Israelis 








National Pride     
Outcomes  -1.327*** -2.433*** -0.04 -0.189 
 (-17.66) (-4.93) (-0.55) (-1.50) 
Observing tradition 0.021 -0.166*** -0.188*** -0.251*** 
 (0.33) (-4.07) (-5.52) (-4.50) 
Social Class -0.037 0.038 0.092 0.085 
 (-1.03) (1.65) (1.18) (1.01) 
Education  0.087** 0.054** 0.054** 0.055* 
 (3.18) (2.62) (2.75) (2.52) 
Gender 0.351** 0.0006 0.006 -0.007 
 (3.25) (0.01) (0.07) (-0.08) 
Age -0.02*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (-5.47) (-3.37) (-5.07) (-5.46) 
Political Identity 0.126* 0.146** 0.152*** 0.148*** 
 (2.55) (2.75) (4.06) (4.75) 
Economic Growth -0.109*** -0.844*** 0.023*** 0.0008 
 (-6.01) (-13.50) (5.51) (0.18) 
Inflation -0.066*** -0.935*** 0.088*** 0.086*** 
 (-4.12) (-28.93) (21.74) (28.42) 
Arab Identity= Palestinian  0.025*   
  (2.20)   
Arab Identity=Arab  0.289***   
  (17.88)   
Arab Identity=Religious  0.259***   
  (12.92)   
Arab Religion=Christian -0.398***    
 (-6.83)    
Arab Religion=Druze -1.435***    
 (-30.82)    




   
Conflict Outcome=Victory X Arab 0.016    
                                                 
411 A recent report (April 2017) of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistic’s shows that 44% of Israeli 
Jews consider themselves secular or non-religious, 24% identify as traditional and 32% religious. See 
also Rosenberg, 2017. It should also be pointed out that religious Israeli women as well as ultra-
orthodox men are exempt from mandatory army service which bounds all Israeli Jews. 
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Religion=Druze (0.16) 















Jewish Religion=Traditional   0.003  
   (0.63)  
Jewish Religion=Religious   -0.086***  
   (-6.37)  
Jewish Religion=Ultra-religious   -0.058***  
   (-7.52)  
Conflict Outcome=Victory X Jewish 
Religion=Traditional 
  -0.05 
(-0.40) 
 
Conflict Outcome=Victory X Jewish 
Religion=Religious 
  -0.085 
(-0.52) 
 
Conflict Outcome=Victory X Jewish 
Religion=Ultra-religious 
  0.018 
(0.04) 
 
     
Jewish Identity=Jew    -0.01 
    (-0.66) 
Jewish Identity=Ethnic group    0.950*** 
    (54.67) 
Jewish Identity=Religious    0.750*** 
    (23.40) 
Conflict Outcome=Victory X Jewish 
Identity=Jew 
   0.189 
(0.73) 
     Conflict Outcome=Victory X Jewish 
Identity= Ethnic 
   -0.516 
(-1.12) 
Conflict Outcome=Victory X Jewish 
Identity= Religious 
   0.358* 
(2.48) 
     cut1_cons -2.203*** -8.032*** 1.440*** 1.271*** 
 (-6.16) (-19.56) (20.38) (22.14) 
cut2_cons -0.418 -6.563*** 2.932*** 2.799*** 
 (-0.99) (-17.08) (26.48) (66.18) 
cut3_cons 0.583 -5.160*** 4.364*** 4.293*** 
 (1.80) (-12.19) (34.53) (48.70) 
AIC 1,667.004 5,059.858 8,503.562 8,338.012 
BIC 1,680.416 5,077.209 8,522.608 8,357.048 
LogL(model) -830.502 -2526.929 -4248.781 -4166.006 
N 646 2,401 4,225 4,211 
Note: The estimations are the result of ordinal logit regression (STATA 14). The table reports 
coefficients whilst t statistics can be found in parentheses. Clustering according to survey year. * p<0.05 





6.5  Robustness Checks  
 
To verify the robustness of the empirical findings, I conducted additional tests.  
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6.5.1  Israel’s General Situation 
 
The study is predicated on the assumption that the Israeli public’s national-
identification levels are affected by media messages framing the outcomes of recently 
terminated episode of political-violence as victories and defeats (or 
successful/unsuccessful outcomes of military operations). I now turn to affirm this 
assumption by utilizing data concerning Israelis’ perception of Israel’s general 
situation412. As the security situation is, beyond doubt, the most prominent issue in 
Israel413 affecting Israelis’ daily lives, it is logical to expect that the perceived state of 
the nation will be tightly related to fighting outcomes as they are framed by the media. 
Figure VIII offers a comparison of Israel’s general situation and conflict outcomes in 
the relevant period. 
 
 





A steady increase in Israelis’ perception of Israel’s general situation is apparent 
between 2003 and 2006 (+11.4%), presumably following the successful termination of 
                                                 
412 Respondents were asked: “What’s Israel’s general situation?” with possible answers on a scale from 
1 (very good) to 5 (bad).  
413 Throughout the decade, the largest part of the Israeli public pointed to security and political issues 
when asked, “What is Israel’s most important problem?”, see the Appendix for the exact data. 
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Operations “Rainbow”, “Days of Penitence” and “First Rain”. A sharp decrease 
follows, aligned with 2006’s perceived defeat in the second Lebanon war (-7.7%). The 
victories of 2007 and 2013 align with the evident increase in Israel’s perceived state. 
 The sharp drop occurred in 2011 might be a result of a vast social protest 
occurring then414 as no active fighting is documented then. Israel’s perceived defeat 
following operation “Pillar of Defense” does not, in fact, contradict the underlying 
assumption of Israeli attendance to media’s framing of conflict outcomes: although an 
increase in the perception of Israel’s state is apparent in comparison with 2011, when 
compared with the successful termination of the previous conflict in 2009, a decline In 
the nation’s state is apparent (-3.5%). Ordinal logit regression of Israel’s situation with 
the variables used in the primary analysis (found in the appendix) supports the premise 
that the Israeli public’s national-pride levels are, in fact, affected by the framing of the 
termination of political-violence. 
 
 
6.5.2  Proximity to the Center of Violence  
 
Following Penic et al. (2016) who argue that individuals residing closer to the center 
of political-violence experience it differently from those who reside elsewhere, I have 
re-run the main regression models using only data originating in respondents who 
reside in the heart of political violence, and then again while excluding the latter from 
the analysis.  
Consistent with Penic et al. (2016), the results demonstrate that while the effect 
of perceived outcomes of Israeli warfare on national-pride achieved low significance 
among the general population, the effect was insignificant amid respondents who 
directly experienced such violence. This result may be contributed to the sample size 
(534 respondents, compared to the overall sample of 4,970). However, it can also be 
argued that in Israel, high intensity political-violence is repeatedly experienced both 
near its’ northern and eastern borders and thus the non-significant finding is likely to 
be attributed to low sensitivity or a certain numbness of individuals who reside in 
regions which are especially prone to repeated fighting. This assumption is supported 
by the increased significance of the studied effect (from -0.335, p<0.05 to -0.44, 
p<0.01), when the analysis was conducted using data originating in respondents who 
                                                 
414 The vast social-justice protest opposed the continuing rise in the cost of living and housing.  
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did not reside in the centers of violence only. Consequently, the findings415 are both in 
line with Penic et al. (2016) and constitute a further robustness check for the results 




6.6  Conclusion 
 
How resilient is national pride in the face of chronic political violence? Former studies 
considered exposure to political violence a unitary phenomenon while consistently 
overlooking the effect of warfare’s aftermath on group identification. 
In this chapter, I raised some important yet neglected questions: What is the 
effect of different outcomes of political-violence (military operation and wars) on 
group-identification? Is the effect mitigated by group-performance (success/failure) 
and does it vary across ethnic and social groups within the society (minority vs. 
majority)? These critical questions concern the longevity of national identity and the 
sustainability of nation-states in the face of violence (often repeated violence).  
Israel has proved to be an excellent case in order to examine the 
aforementioned questions due to the composition of its’ social society, the occurrence 
of multiple episodes of political-violence with varied aftermaths and data availability.   
The current study explored the validity of predictions derived from Social Identity 
theory on national Identification of Israelis (Jewish, Arab and Immigrants) across a 
tempestuous ten-year period (2004-2013). I find that the effect of recurrent warfare on 
national identification, operationalized as shifts in national pride, among Israelis is 
highly mitigated by the perceived outcome of such warfare (success or non-success, 
from the Israeli point of view) and by sub-group membership (majority vs. minority).  
Experiencing persistent political-violence, framed as successfully or 
unsuccessfully terminated by the local media had an interesting effect on the Israeli 
public: consistent with social identity theory and the self-esteem 
protection/enhancement strategies derived from it (BIRGing and CORFing), an Israeli 
military success was highly associated with increased national identification for the 
general Israeli population, affirming the general hypothesis. 
                                                 
415 Full analysis and findings are found in appendix B. 
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However, contrary to conventional wisdom and to H2 (which suggested that 
minorities will not exhibit increased national pride following Israeli military successes 
(as the latter are not perceive as “their own”), the same effect was also registered 
among Israeli Arabs. While Israeli Arabs, the largest minority group in Israel may 
share neither the country’s Jewish narrative nor its Zionist ethos, they are part of a 
larger in-group which shares personal and economic interests. Those, are equally and 
existentially threatened when Israel is experiencing political violence badly 
terminated. Consequently, Israeli Arabs are indeed prouder in their nationality when 
Israel is successful. This positivistic evidence suggests that Israeli Arabs’ 
identification with Israel lies in the area of an “Israeliness that is beyond Jewishness”.  
While Jewish Israelis maintained the highest levels of group-identification in 
relation to Israeli Arabs and Israeli immigrants, the analysis also affirmed the 
existence of an “embedded identity effect”. Unsurprisingly, Israeli Jews, the majority 
ethnic group in Israel, maintained high national-identification levels regardless of the 
outcomes of warfare. Israel being the “Jewish state” and “homeland of the Jewish 
people”, this finding can be attributed to Jewish Israelis’ embedded ethnic and national 
identities. 
Further examination of the interactions between victories and Arab identity 
components revealed a mix effect: whereas a decrease in national pride following 
victories was registered among Arab Christians, a minority within a minority, 
supporting H2, the opposite effect was exhibited among Religious Arabs. These 
inconsistent results suggest a mix effect of victories on minorities’ sense of national 
pride in Israel. Concerning Jewish Identities, a mild and negative effect of victories on 
national pride was revealed among religious Jews. As currently, only about 30% of 
Israeli Jews are religious, they constitute a minority within the Jewish population and 
as such, follow the “minority hypothesis”. 
The implications of the current study extend beyond the Israel case: the 
research of national identification shifts following violent events contributes to the 
discussion of the stability and durability of nation states in light of protracted violent 
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7.   In Us We Trust? The Effect of Military Operations on 
Social Cleavages & Social Cohesion in Israel                 
 
For it is mutual trust, even more than mutual interest that holds human 
associations together.  
             -- H. L. Mencken 
 
 
7.1  Introduction 
The increased heterogeneity of modern societies has led to the growing awareness of 
the role of social trust as the glue that enables the smooth working of these societies. 
The breakdown of social trust is therefore a predictor of rising political intolerance and 
potential instability in today’s pluralistic societies. 
 Social Trust is defined as the confidence people have that strangers will not 
take advantage of them (Bjørnskov, 2008, p. 271) or the belief that at worst others will 
not knowingly or willingly do [them] harm and at best they will act in his interests 
(Newton, 2001, p. 202). The breakdown of social trust is thus a predictor of rising 
political intolerance and potential instability in today’s pluralistic societies. 
Exposure to violence is widely agreed to have significant effect on both 
individual and group identities, particularly within multi-ethnic societies. Building 
upon integrated threat theories, the increased perception of threat that emerges from 
exposure to political violence can ultimately decrease trust between those associated 
with the threat (Riek et al., 2006), acting as a coping mechanism for distress (Canetti-
Nisim et al., 2009). However, the extent to which political violence builds or erodes 
social trust within the community itself is disputed. 
Does exposure to political violence unifies communities or lead to a breakdown of 
social trust between them? It is generally posited that unifying effects emerge as a 
reaction to external threat as an enhanced desire for internal conformity, and that 
cohesion can serve as a coping mechanism for dealing with the stress of threat. Yet, 
the increased perception of threat and vulnerability from exposure to violence can also 
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create psychological stress leading to political exclusionism, particularly against 
minorities.  
 Increasingly, studies are pointing to reduced social cohesion and social trust 
amongst all communities when highly fractionalized societies are exposed to conflict 
and violence. In the Israeli context, research often focuses on attitudes of political 
exclusionism towards the largest out-group, namely the Arab Israeli community. Less 
attention, however, has been directed at the effect of political violence on inter-group 
cohesion and trust between the multiple social and identity groups within the Israeli 
society [new immigrants vs. Israeli-born, Ashkenazi vs. Sephardic Jews, rich vs. poor, 
religious vs. secular].  
 
In this chapter, I will examine the impact of exposure to Israeli warfare on social trust 
and social rifts across the different groups compiling the diverse Israeli society. I will 
determine whether exposure to repeated warfare (military operations and to the 
Second Lebanon War) has led to a decline in social cohesion and trust between the 
non-Arab communities of Israel. By distinguishing between successfully and 
unsuccessfully terminated military operations (from the Israeli perspective), I will 
ascertain whether the framing of such outcomes can result in incompatible narratives 
that erode social trust and may lead to increased social tension. 
 
 
7.2    Hypothesis 
 
Increasingly, studies are pointing to reduced social cohesion and social trust amongst 
all communities when highly fractionalized societies are exposed to conflict and 
violence. Traditional approaches from the sociological and psychological literature (cf. 
Coser, 1956; Sherif, 1966) posit that external conflict has a galvanizing effect and 
should increase cohesion. Nonetheless, recent research has pointed to the effect of 
violence in decreasing community cohesion and increasing community 
fractionalization (Kalyvas, 2008), particularly in relation to immigrant communities 
(Stephan & Stephan, 2000). 
Building upon integrated threat theories, the increased perception of threat that 
emerges from exposure to political violence can ultimately decrease trust between 
those associated with the threat (Riek et al., 2006), sometimes acting as a coping 
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mechanism for distress (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009). The described decrease in social 
trust can partly be ascribed to the strategic framing and timing of a military operation 
or warfare.  
The framing of the outcome of such military operation as either successful or 
unsuccessful can trigger a range of contradictory effects. On the superficial level, one 
expects that the framing of an outcome as successful should lead to greater collective 
pride, often seen as the unifying force for group members and vital to helping the 
group achieving its goals (Halperin, 2015, pp. 145–146). Within intractable conflicts, 
collective pride can be built from emphasizing victories, resilience, sacrifice 
mobilization, and heroism. Collective pride can emerge from a military victory as well 
as from a sense of perceived moral behavior during such warfare. Pride can both be 
constructive and destructive in the framework of intergroup relations. According to 
Čehajić et al. (2011), pride can contribute to increased in-group self-esteem that allows 
groups to acknowledge and accept responsibility for wrongdoing and consequently 
lead to increased trust between groups (cf. Halperin, 2015, p. 149). Conversely, 
nationalistic, hubristic, glorification-based pride (ibid.) can lead to decreased social 
cohesion. Schori-Eyal et al. (2015) have found that inducing group-based pride can 
also increase group-based guilt for actions conducted during episodes of political 
violence, potentially eroding inter-group cohesion. As feelings of national guilt and 
pride cannot co-exist, political violence which preceded an unsuccessful outcome may 
lead to a sense of collective humiliation.  
Humiliation, whilst less easily defined, is generally thought to imply a feeling 
of having been demeaned or put down by others (Torres & Bergner, 2010; Walker & 
Knauer, 2011). Humiliation can result from extreme feeling of subjugation and harm 
to dignity as well as feelings of being unjustly downgraded and devalued as a result of 
the intentional behavior of the other (Halperin, 2015, pp. 145–146). As with collective 
pride, collective humiliation can trigger conflicting emotions ranging from aggressive 
action to withdrawal and inertia (Halperin, 2015). At the other end of the emotional 
spectrum, humiliation can cause shame which can result in a desire to distance oneself 
from the source of the shame (similarly to the CORFing strategy). In the context of 
inter-group relations, when the source of shame comes from another person or group 
of people, the options for distancing are expanded including distancing from the event, 
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the group member who committed the wrongdoing, or the group identity (Johns, 
Schmader, & Lickel, 2005; Lindner, 2000; Schmader & Lickel, 2006).  
Whilst on one level the expectation would be that feelings of humiliation 
should create greater social cohesion between the wider in-group and the out-group, it 
is also possible that both dynamics would lead to create inter-group fragmentation, as 
groups seek to blame or distance themselves from those that they perceive to be 
sympathetic to the source of humiliation. Therefore, in the case of Israel, one might 
expect the breakdown of social trust towards those perceived as sympathetic to the 
Palestinian cause, such as Arab Israelis, the political left, Ashkenazim, and potentially 
those of lower socio-economic status. 
From the perspective of Social Identity Theory (see extensive discussion in 
chapter two) any threat to the in-group as a result of the perceived outcome of warfare 
is likely to result in derogation of the out-group and those who support it. The framed 
outcome may generate perceptions of threat and amplify cognitive biases such as 
reinforcing in-group stereotypes (Stephan & Stephan, 2009). Riek et al. (2006) have 
highlighted that threats can promote animosity towards out-groups not directly related 
to the threats. Immigrants, for example are often seen as both realistic threats to the 
political and economic power of the in-group and symbolic threats as they may have 
differences in values, beliefs, morals and attitudes (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & 
Armstrong, 2001; Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan, & Martin, 2005; Stephan & 
Stephan, 2000). Further, threats towards the in-group can affect group dynamics by 
triggering negative reactions towards “defectors or deviants” within the in-group 
(Stephan & Stephan, 2009, pp. 52–53). Whilst these reactions may vary according to 
whether the in-group feels a sense of realistic or symbolic threat, in both instances it 
can lead to the breakdown of social trust between groups that may interpret the 
outcome of the events differently. Therefore, even in times of perceived success, I 
conceive that a potential decline of social trust and decreased social cohesion within 
the in-group itself may be registered. 
In the model presented in Figure IX, I view the breakdown of social trust as 
part of the dynamic by which perception of threat can be increased and therefore lead 
to political exclusionism hypothesized in other models. Stephan et al. (2009) 
emphasise that intergroup threat theory is premised on perceptions of threat that have 
consequences irrespective of whether the perceptions are accurate. 
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It was found that political response tendency is affected by the unique framing of an 
event, in conjunction with the standing ideology about the conflict and pre-existing 
emotional sentiments about the opponent, shape (directly or via cognitive appraisal) 
the emotional reaction to a certain event (Halperin, 2011, p. 24). Therefore, I theories 
that the framing of the outcome of Israeli political violence along with the ideology 
that accompanies group-affiliations will consequently induce emotions towards out-
groups leading to the breakdown of social trust. Namely, the evaluation of warfare as 
successful or unsuccessful can trigger feelings of pride or humiliation that may, in 
turn, impact groups’ perception of threat and their trust of out-groups416.   
 
 
Figure IX: The Expected Effect of Political Violence on In-Group Social Trust as Mitigated by its 
Outcome, Pride and Humiliation 
 
             
 
                                                 
416 According to Gunther (1998), the media is assumed to inform, shape and reflect public opinion. He 
found that people tend to deduce public opinion based upon the perspective taken by newspaper articles, 
assuming that the general public will be affected by how positively or negatively the subject of the 
article is treated. 
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7.3  Data, Measures and Method  
 
7.3.1  The Israeli Society in Context 
 
The study focuses on Israel due to both theoretical and methodological 
considerations. Since its establishment and especially in the last decade, Israel 
experienced recurrent Israeli military operation.  
During the years of the study, from 2004 to 2015, Israel endured 10 Israeli 
military operation including initiated military operations and wars that had both 
successful and unsuccessful outcomes. Due to the intensity and recurrence of such 
violence, the latter has a profound effect on the lives of Israelis. The availability of 
micro-level survey data in Israel since 2003 allows for the investigation of the effect of 
such violence on social rifts. Such quality data is available in the Israeli Democracy 
index (IDI), a part of the “Continuing Survey” conducted by the Guttman Center for 
Surveys (GCS)417. Utilizing relevant data originating in seven such surveys enables me 
to assess the effect of military operations on social rifts and whether the outcomes of 
such operations impacts the effect, while controlling for socioeconomic considerations 
and individual characteristics. Further, the choice to focus on a specific country is to 
be able to control for specific characteristics of the country. 
With its communities of multiple origins, Israel is a multi-ethnic, deeply divided 
society that splits along social, intra-cultural, inter-cultural, inter-religious, intra-
religious and political lines. Numerous studies have examined the development of 
negative attitudes between a range of groups at the extremes of the political, religious, 
or economic spectrum (Canetti-Nisim & Pedahzur, 2003; Pedahzur & Yishai, 1999;  
Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1993).  
A large number of the studies have explored the effect of political violence or 
acts of terrorism on increasing levels of political intolerance towards specific groups, 
primarily Palestinian citizens of Israel (PCIs) or towards some immigrant groups (cf. 
Canetti-Nisim, Ariely, & Halperin, 2008). More recently, research is turning to 
                                                 
417  http://en.idi.org.il/projects/the-guttman-center-for-surveys/. The GCS is a branch of the Israel 
Democracy Institute (http://en.idi.org.il/about-idi/), an independent, non-partisan think-tank dedicated to 
strengthening the foundations of Israeli democracy. For more information regarding the IDI see Asher 
Arian, Philippov, & Knafelman, 2009. 
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investigate more deeply the micro-emotional responses leading to political 
exclusionism of these groups (cf. Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009). Conversely, questions 
still remain as to the societal level factors that trigger these individual and 
consequently group responses. 
 
The Israeli society with its high heterogeneity of various groups representing class, 
religious, national, ethnic, and cultural differences is often seen as the ultimate 
“laboratory conducive to the study of the development of negative political attitudes 
towards various minority groups” (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2008, p. 91).  
The main ethnic groups, Jewish and Arab Israelis418 split into subgroups with 
separate identities. Jews divide according to levels of religiosity (secular or religious), 
ethnic background (Ashkenazi Jews exiled to Europe and Sephardic/Mizrachi Jews 
exiled to Spain, North Africa and Middle Eastern countries) as well as their time of 
immigration (new immigrants419 and old-timers). Non-Jews split into Christian Arabs, 
Muslim Arabs, Druze, and Bedouin. Despite its high heterogeneity, many signs of 
high level of national identification and social solidarity can be observed, both in 
ordinary times and during periods of crises. External threats are known to act as 
cohesive factors and as such, Israel’s security situation and past wars have served to 
entrench a deep sense of shared destiny, such as the rapid Israeli victory during the 
Six-Day-War in 1967 (Bar-Tal, 2013).  
However, studies demonstrate that negative attitudes and fragmentation 
between various iterations of these groups during all levels of political violence (cf. 
(Canetti-Nisim & Pedahzur, 2003; Pedahzur & Yishai, 1999; Sullivan et al., 1993). 
Consequently, the frequent episodes of high-intensity violence are constantly affecting 
the structural bases of trust in Israeli society, which could lead to either increased or 
decreased levels of social trust depending upon the perceived outcome of the episode. 
 
 
                                                 
418 According to the Central Bureau of Statistics’ current reports (2015b), Jews constitute about 75% of 
Israel's population, Arab/Palestinian citizens constitute about 20%.  
419 The collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1989 marked the beginning of a massive immigration 
wave to Israel, which has actively encouraged and promoted immigration from its inception. About 900 
thousand immigrants from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) arrived in Israel between 1989 and 2012, 
about 800 thousand of which immigrated between 1990 and 2001. Immigration from the FSU continues 
to this day but at a much slower pace (Table 1.16, Kushnirovich, 2013 & Table 1, Central Bureau of 
Statistics). 
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7.2.2  Military Operations 
 
As IDI data is unavailable before 2003, and as, to date, Operation Protective Edge is 
the latest episode of high intensity violence involving Israel, the period 2002-2015420 
was chosen. Table H depicts the military operations (hereinafter- including the Second 
Lebanon War) used in the current study. 
 


















Part of the second 
Intifada and the 
largest operation in 
the West bank since 
the 1967 war. Came 
to be following a 
suicide bombing that 
took place two days 
prior to the beginning 
of the operation 
during Passover 
Seder. The operation 
included IDF’s 
incursion into most 
of the largest cities in 
the West bank (not 
Gaza). 
















incursion into Gaza 
since the start of the 
Al-Aqsa intifada in 
September 2000, 
launched following 
the death of two 
Israeli children from 
a rocket lunched by 
militants in the strip. 









Israeli Air Force 
weeklong offensive 
in Gaza launched 




                                                 
420 The last episode of high intensity violence took place in 2014 but the survey used was held in 2015.  
421 There were a number of other operations (Operation “Rainbow”; Operation “Summer Rains” & 
Operation “Autumn Clouds”; Operation “Hot Winter”, Operation “Returning Echo” (March 2012 
Gaza–Israel clashes)) during this period, however, due to insufficient media coverage, the author was 
unable to establish they perceived outcome and as such, they have not been included in this analysis. 
For more information in this regard see appendix C. 
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following extensive 
firing of rockets at 
Israeli communities 
in the western Negev 
and the city of Sderot 





airstrike and ground 
invasion of southern 
Lebanon precipitated 
by the firing of 
rockets, from 
Lebanon, at Israeli 
border towns and the 
abduction of two IDF 
soldiers by 
Hezbollah. 









military operation of 
the Israeli air, naval, 
artillery and ground 
forces in the Gaza 
Strip. Resulted in 
high rates of 
casualties. 






An eight-day IDF 




response to the 
killing of Gaza 
military wing of 
Hamas’s chief and 
the launch of over 
100 rockets towards 
Israel during a 24-
hour period. 


















A 7 weeks military 
operation launched 
by Israel in the 
Hamas-ruled Gaza 
Strip following the 
kidnapping and 
murder of three 
Israeli teenagers by 
Hamas members and 
an increase in rocket 
fire from Gaza into 
Israel.  
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7.2.3 Perceived  Levels  of   Tension  and   Trust  in   the    Israeli    Society 
 
Social trust is arguably the product of experience and is revised in relation to new 
experiences and circumstances. As a result, levels of trust reported in social surveys 
are a good indicator of the trustworthiness of the societies in which respondents live. 
Such surveys are designed to capture the variation in trust to reported feelings about 
the intensity of conflict in society422 and about political freedom, public safety and 
satisfaction with democratic institutions (Delhey & Newton, 2003, p. 97). In this 
study, I seek to measure the levels of social trust between the various ethnic and social 
groups within the Israeli society following Israeli military operations.  
The dependent variable in the research is thus the perceived level of tension 
and trust within the Israeli society. Through using questions asked in national surveys 
I can gain insights into the potential effect of military operations on the Israeli society. 
The survey data consist of seven Israeli Democracy Index (IDI) surveys administered 
between 2003 and 2015. The dates, sample sizes and additional relevant 
methodological data are reported in the Appendix. As the purpose of this study is to 
examine the effect of the framing of the outcome of military operations, only the 
surveys conducted in the years following such operations (see Table H) were 
analyzed. 
The perceived levels of tension within the Israeli society were operationalized 
through respondents’ assessment of the level of tension concerning the key social rifts 
in the Israeli society: the intercommunal rift between the Israeli Jewish community 
and the Israeli-Arab community; the Jewish intercommunal rift between Jews of 
Ashkenazi and Sephardic/Mizrachi origin; the religious rift between the orthodox and 
non-orthodox Jewish communities; the socioeconomic rift; the ideological rift between 
the political left (who are traditionally more dovish in their outlook towards solutions 
with the Palestinians) and the political right (who support more hard-line policies) and 
the nativist tension between native Israelis and immigrants423. This data was derived 
from respondents’ answers to the question: “In your opinion, are relationships 
between ….. (e.g. Israeli-Arabs and Jews) good or not good?” on a 1 (not good at all) 
to 4 (very good) scale424. In addition, an overall level of social trust was measured. 
                                                 
422 Conflict in general and specifically between income groups and between nationals and immigrants. 
423 Russian immigrants, presumed Jewish for the context of this research. 
424 Here, an increase in value reflects an improved relationship. 
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The generalised level of social trust was operationalized though respondent’s answers 
to the standard question on social trust (Hardin, 2002) “In general, do you think you 
can trust people, or do you have to be very careful in relationships with people?” This 
was measured on a 1 (you can always trust people) to 4 (you always have to be very 
careful) scale425. 
Similarly to the research presented in chapter six, using survey data was 
necessary in order to conduct a quantitative analysis. Yet, I acknowledge the 
problematic nature of using surveys to collect such data426. Both questions concerning 
the perceived level of tension between various groups in the Israeli society and 
concerning social trust use undefined terms and vague conceptualisation of the latter. 
Vague concepts in survey questions is a general problem. Such concepts may trigger 
differential associations and impact respondents’ answers. When these associations 
vary alongside other explanatory variables they may interfere in the empirical 
relationships observed (Bauer et al., 2014)427.  
The term “trust”, for example, is left to the interpretation of the individual 
respondent and is only contracted with the need to be careful in relationship with 
people. whereas this question has been used to measure social trust since the 1950s’ 
(see for example, Rosenberg, 1956), a large variability in respondents’ associations 
with the term “most people” was detected (Uslaner, 2002). According to Sturgis and 
Smith (2010), among the different categories of people respondents think of are 
“unknown others” to “known others” which in turn impacts measurement values of 
trust (Bauer et al., 2014). In the same fashion, complex and multi-layered relationship 
between ethnic or social minority groups and the majority group are condensed to a 
narrow and dichotomous classification of “good or not good?”.  
Various solutions include providing respondents with specific definitions to 
such concepts or avoiding using vague terms altogether. The latter can be simply 
achieved by favouring a battery of specific questions concerning different aspects of 
the examined topic (for example, questions about issues with more specific ideological 
content rather than the “left” to “right” scale of political affiliation, according to Bauer 
                                                 
425 Here, an increase in value reflects a decrease in trust and thus, a worsening of relationship. 
426 Further discussion of using vague concepts and categorizing identities in social surveys is found 
under subsection 3.2.4. 
427 Bauer, Barbera, Ackermann, & Venetz (2014), found that individuals attribute different meanings to 
the concepts “left” and “right” which evidently effects measurement values on the left-right scale. 
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et al., 2014) over a question which includes vague concepts. Collecting data 
independently was not a feasible option in light of the timespan chosen (starting in 
2003) and other limitations of time and funding. Accordingly, the author resorted to 
using existing data which, sadly, incorporates vague concepts in its survey questions. 
Whereas several robustness checks were conducted in order to validate the research’s 
conclusions, future research should try and replicate the current findings while 
addressing the limitation arising from using vague concepts. 
 
 
7.2.4  Perceived Outcome of Israeli Military Operations 
 
Since data with regard to the independent variable, the perceived outcomes of Israeli 
military operations appearing in Table H does not exist, a new dataset was created 
based on a content analysis of Israeli press to measure the way the narrative of the 
violence was framed (Druckman, 2001b).  
The perceived outcome of each military operation was manually coded by the 
author based on evaluative assertion analysis as described in chapter xxx. 
Consequently, Conflict outcomes was operationalized as the perceived result of 
military operation (1 success, 0 failure). It is important to note that this measure is not 
always identical to the official statement of the outcome, if one exists, and that it is the 
perception of the outcome as framed by the Israeli media. 
 
 
7.2.5  Control variables 
 
 A number of socio-economic control variables were included to account for other 
indicators of social fractionalization. Differences such in income inequalities, ethnic 
diversity, educational orientation, political orientation, religiosity can inhibit social 
trust by making people rationally cautious when deciding how much to trust each 
other when belonging to different groups or having difficulties in interpreting the 
motives and context of people outside one’s own situation (Bjørnskov, 2008, p. 273). 
As such, socio-demographic variables are both significant theoretically to intergroup 
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relations and have been found relevant in similar studies on political exclusion 
(Canetti-Nisim et al., 2008, p. 101). Consequently, I have included the following 
variables: age, social class, gender, ethnic group (Jews, Arabs and immigrants), 
holding an academic degree (a dummy variable), religious observance, political 
affiliation/identity and the year of immigration to Israel (relevant to Israel only).  
For the interaction models, I also controlled for Arab and Jewish identity. 
Moreover, economic growth, GDP and inflation rate are country-level control 
variables that were added to the analysis428 to allow for the possibility that perceived 
sense of realistic threat from out-groups, and consequently reduced social cohesion 
could be greater during times of economic decline. 
 
 
7.4  Findings and Discussion 
The quantitative analysis was performed in five stages: First, a preliminary analysis of 
mean values of tension perception following successful and unsuccessful termination 
of Israeli military operations was performed. Though it only suggests correlation, not 
causation as not statistical regression was conducted, it provides a general basis for 
continuing analysis. Second, a regression analysis of a baseline model containing only 
the dependent and independent variables was concluded. This second step was 
performed in order to assess a primary statistical nexus between the variables429. 
Third, as the literature points to quite a few potential covariates originating in personal 
and characteristics and since no panel data is available in Israel, a regression analysis 
of the independent variable with several control variables was performed.  
 Personal attributes proved to be significant in the former analysis were 
used in the fourth step- a comprehensive regression analysis of discrepant outcomes of 
Israeli military operations on social tensions in Israel while controlling for both 
individual and country level variables. This core analysis stands at the heart of the 
                                                 
428 Based on annual World Development Indicators for Israel for the year or the surveys. Economic 
Growth is Israel’s real GDP growth per survey year, ranging from 1.2 to 6.9%, GDP is Israel’s GDP per 
capita per survey year, and Inflation is the rate of inflation in consumer prices, ranging from -.1% to 
3.92%. Since GDP mostly correlates with economic growth, only one of the two is used in the 
quantitative analysis while the other is used as robustness check. 
429 Complete results are found in the appendix. 
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study and its results will be thoroughly analyzed. However, in order to further refine 
the explored effect, a final analysis of the interactions between a successful 
termination of Israeli military operation and perceived level of social tensions was 
performed (stage five) while paying special attention to religious, political and 
national identification of Israeli. 
 
 
7.4.1  Preliminary Findings 
Before turning to the analysis of the effects of successful and unsuccessful outcomes 
of political violence on social tensions and social trust in the Israeli society, Figure X 
provides a visual representation of the difference in mean values of tension perception 
across the three ethnic groups in Israel: Israeli Jews, Arabs and immigrants and across 
fighting outcomes. 
The figure presents mixed results; whereas distinct differences between mean 
values are clearly visible across ethnic groups and fighting outcomes with regards to 
intercommunal tension, religious tension and overall social trust, fighting outcomes 
appeared to have a similar effect across ethnic groups with regard to nativist tension, 
ideological tension and the Jewish intercommunal tension. These findings are further 
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7.4.2 The Effect of Individual Level and Country Level Variables on Social  
 Tensions and Social Trust 
 
Before turning to analyzing the effect of a successful and unsuccessful termination of 
Israeli military operations on the various tensions in the Israeli society, I explore the 
effects of the aforementioned control variables (on both the individual level and the 




When examining the intercommunal tension between the Arab Israeli and Jewish 
communities I find that whereas political identity is mildly significant in predicting 
increased inter-communal tension (0.037, p<0.05), Arab-Israelis are strongly 
associated with higher levels of tension (1.389, p<0.001), confirming that Arab-
Israelis perceive their ethnic identity as being the source of inter-communal tension. 
Both country level variables (economic growth and inflation rate) achieve significant 
levels (0.014, p<0.01 & -0.088 respectively). It is important to note that while 
economic growth is associated with increased tension, a higher inflation rate is 
associated with the opposite. This could reflect increased tension between the two 




The control models revealed that perceptions of tension are somewhat affected by 
levels of religious observance (0.207, p<0.05). A gender cohort and/or effect is also 
apparent, as gender achieves strong significance (-0.172, p<0.001) and is negatively 
associated with increased tension, suggesting that men tend to perceive religious 
tensions to be more intense than women.  
 Similar to the intercommunal tension, both country level variables achieve high 
significance, though in opposite directions (0.086 & -0.184, p<0.001, respectively): 
whereas economic growth is associated with a perceived increase in religious tension, 
the inflation rate is linked to a perceived decrease in religious tension.  
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Figure XI: The Effect of Control Variables on Social Tensions and Social Trust 
 
                                       192 
Jewish intercommunal Tension  
When examining the effect of large-scale Jewish immigration on tensions in Israel, the 
results suggest that Jews who have immigrated from the FSU are seen as a source of 
considerable tension, being strongly and negatively associated with increased tension 
(0.314, p<0.001) in comparison with the immigration non-Russian Jews, the reference 
group. Findings also suggest a mild age cohort effect on the Jewish intercommunal tension 
in that younger respondents tend to perceive the Jewish intercommunal tension as lower in 
comparison with older respondents (-0.006, p<0.05).  
A mild gender effect (-0.147, p<0.05) suggests that men tend to perceive this tension 
as lower than women. Lastly, holding an academic degree achieves a mild significance (-
0.157, p<0.05) and had a negative effect, pointing to the fact that respondents who don’t 
hold an academic degree perceive the Jewish intercommunal tension to be more intense.  
Unlike the last two tensions, both economic growth and inflation rate are positively 





When analyzing the effects of individual-level variables on the socioeconomic tension, most 
variables prove to be significant. While age, political identity and academic degree are 
negatively associated with increased socioeconomic tension (-0.009, p<0.01, -0.066, 
p<0.001 & -0.076, p<0.01, respectively), Arab Israelis are highly associated with an 
increased tension (0.510 p<0.001). Both country-level variables are found to be negatively 
linked to increased tension (-0.065, p<0.05 & -0.046, p<0.001).  
Unlike the previous tensions, both economic growth and inflation rate demonstrated 




Nativist tension  
Turning to the nativist tension in the overall Israeli society (not necessarily among Jewish 
Israelis), both ethnic groups, that is Arabs and Jewish Russians were significantly related to 
the nativist tension (in reference to Israeli Jews/non-Russians). However, while membership 
in the Russian ethnic group was mildly and positively associated with an increased tension 
(0.945, p<0.01), membership in the Arab ethnic group was highly significant and negatively 
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(-2.488, p<0.001) associated in this regard. As seen before, both country-level variables 
proved to be highly significant, though in opposite directions: economic growth was found 





In analyzing the effect of individual-level variables on the ideological tension, only two such 
variables reach significant levels. Gender is highly and negatively associated with decreased 
tension (-0.483, p<0.001) suggesting that perceptions of political polarity in Israeli society 
differ significantly between men and women. In line with expectations, membership in the 
Arab ethnic group (0.137, p<0.001) is associated with increased perceptions of ideological 
tension between the left and the right. Economic growth is also highly and positively 




When it comes to the overall levels of social trust within the Israeli society, the regression 
suggests that political identity has a mild negative effect (-0.077, p<0.05) resulting in greater 
social trust.  Similar to other studies, the models show that membership in the Arab ethnic 
group is highly and positively associated with perceptions of greater social tension and 





7.4.3 Examining   the   Effect   of   Military   Operations  on  Israeli   Inter-Group  
 Tensions 
 
A baseline statistical model849 regressing only the dependent and independent variables 
(without controlling for personal characteristics and country level variables) have 
established a significant relationship between political violence and some social tensions in 
Israel. After exploring the effect of individual level as well as country level variables on the 
                                                 
476 Inflation rate was omitted from the analysis due to collinearity and adding the individual-level variable 
“religious observance” resulted in an empty group (no observation in the database). 
477 Full results are reported in the appendix. 
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latter, I now add the explanatory variable, successful termination 850  of Israeli military 
operations to create a comprehensive analysis851 (table I). 
The models demonstrate that overall, a perceived successful termination of political 
violence is highly significant in increasing the intercommunal tension (-0.130, p<0.001)852, 
the religious tension (-0.308, p<0.001), the socioeconomic tension (-0.074, p<0.001) and the 
ideological tension (-0.478, p<0.001). The Jewish intercommunal tension is the only 
exception to the overall trend of increased fractionalization among the different 
communities in Israel as it was significantly reduced following a successful termination of 
an Israeli military operation (0.088, p<0.01).   
Whilst there may be a belief that tensions between Ashkenazi and Sephardi/Mizrachi 
Jews may have declined over the years, statements such as those made by Professor Amir 
Hetsroni in 2014 suggesting that it would have been better if Moroccan Jews had been left to 
rot in North Africa (Masalha, 2015), indicates that these tensions are still present. The 
improvement in Jewish intercommunal relations suggests that the Jewish population, the 
majority group in Israel, is united behind the idea that Israel is a homeland for the Jewish 
people (and possibly necessary refuge from rising anti-Semitism around the globe, Pew 
Research Center, 2016). Consequently, the decrease of Jewish intercommunal tension in the 
face of the perceived defeat of a common enemy, lends a measure of support to the cohesive 
potential of in-group pride. The result is also consistent with the analysis of the construction 
of an Israeli identity based on a Jewish/Zionistic narrative and goes hand in hand with the 
role of the IDF (in which all Jewish Israelis are called to serve) as a source of Israeli 
patriotism. Moreover, the decreased Jewish intercommunal tension is also consistent with 
the existence of an embedded Jewish-Israeli identity. 
Whereas it has long been observed that groups unify in the face of common threats, 
at the level of the nation state this phenomena is referred to as “rally around the flag”. An 
underlying motive for this surge in national unity is linked to patriotism, as individuals 
respond to a threat by identifying with an in-group (the nation itself and to an extent- fellow 
                                                 
478 As the outcome of warfare/military operations is a binary variable (successful/unsuccessful), the analysis 
essentially points to the effect of successful termination/Israeli victories (unsuccessful termination being the 
reference group) on social rifts. In the following analysis I use the terms “successful termination” and “Israeli 
victory” interchanging as the perceived outcome is viewed through an Israeli eye. 
479 For each tension, two models were design. The first model only included the explanatory variable as well as 
individual level variables whereas the second model also included country level variables. The table here 
reports the results of the more inclusive models for all of tensions except the inter-communal tension and 
ideological tensions in which they the country level variables turned insignificant whereas the significance of 
the explanatory variable was lost. 
480 I report the results of Model 1, as neither of the country-level controls added to Model 2 reache significant 
levels. 
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citizens, Murray, 2017). Whilst no scholarship has yet explored the relationship between an 
unsuccessful termination of a war or a military operation and the described phenomena, it is 
reasonable to assume that the former are likely to induce a “rally around the flag” effect, 
intensifying or prolonging its duration853. Yet, it is often the case that when wars end, 
politics quickly revert to normal and existing social rifts resurface. Consequently, the 
seemingly rising tensions between various communities in Israel observed following an 
Israeli military success is consistent with a reverse “rally around the flag” effect and reflect 
the diverse nature of the Israeli society.  
The observed trend of increased tensions within sections of the Israeli society may 
also be linked to the experience of in-group guilt or shame despite a successful outcome. 
Such in-group gilt, in turn, leads to surging tension with those who are more supportive of 
the outcome, or perhaps feel that more should have been done to achieve a more solid 
outcome. Finally, the increased tensions speak to the theorized dynamic at the heart of the 
present and similar work of Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter (2006) and others that reflects the 
more destructive side of pride and in-group glorification. According to that scholarship, out-
group hate can extend to people perceived to be “hostile minorities”. The latter are 
perceived to be sympathetic or associated with the out-group.  
Whilst the increase in intercommunal tension is expected and in line with the results 
of similar studies focused on examining the effect of violence or stress on the relationships 
between Jews and Arab Israelis/Palestinian communities in Israel  (cf. Canetti-Nisim et al., 
2008), the increase in religious tensions, socio-economic tension and ideological tensions 
could be reflective of this second circle of out-group hate (Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006). 
Supporters of the political left together with the less observant and wealthier elements of the 
Israeli society, who are traditionally more associated with the political left may, despite the 
perceived successful outcome, experience in-group guilt and possibly shame and therefore 
distance themselves from those experiencing pride at the outcome. 
 
                                                 
481 Wars and large scale terrorist attacks were found to consistently provoke sizable rallies, elicit an emotional 
reaction from citizens and a self-identification with the nation (Murray, 2017). 
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Table I: The Effects of Political Violence on Social Tensions and Social Trust in Israel  















































Social Class -0.049 
(-1.41) 


































Sex -0.067 -0.164*** -0.147* -0.005 -0.088 -0.500*** 0.015 
 (-0.77) 
 
(-5.07) (-1.97) (-0.13) (-1.37) (-5.11) (0.31) 
Age -0.002 -0.0009 -0.006** -0.012*** -0.0007 0.011 -0.002 
 (-0.81) 
 
(-0.50) (-2.85) (-3.83) (-0.18) (1.61) (-0.71) 















County level variables 
 













GDP       -0.00002** 
       (-3.11) 
N 2,832 2,576 2,558 2,848 3,864 1,625 5,048 
Estimations are the result of ordinal logit regressions. The table reports coefficients whilst t statistics is in parentheses. Clustering according to survey year. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
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7.4.4  Exploring the rise and fall of social trust 
 
To complement the previous analysis, and to investigate further the theoretical 
framework that I believe underpins the breakdown of social trust, I run several 
interaction models for each examined tension, looking into the effects of political 
identity, ethnic group, social class, Jewish and Arab identity together with a 
successful termination of Israeli military operations on the various tensions.  
This analysis allows me to examine more closely the path of the relationship 
between the outcome of the Israeli military operation and the increases or decreases of 
social trust and tensions. As different community groups perceive different levels of 
threats to their goals and interests as a result of the outcome of Israeli military 
operations, these models provide further insights as to where intergroup hostility may 
most likely arise. The significant findings are discussed below and the full analysis 




When examining the factors that could affect intercommunal tension following a 
successful termination of a military operation, a mildly significant, positive 
interaction was detected between such successful termination and respondents who 
politically identify with the moderate right (0.654, p<0.05). In addition, a positive and 
somewhat significant interaction was also seen with members of the Arab ethnic 
group who define themselves as Christian.  
Whilst the increase of inter-communal tension is to be expected and follows 
similar studies examining the effect of threats on exclusionist attitudes towards 
minorities (cf. Canetti-Nisim et al., 2008, 2009), the interaction effect of these 
particular groups proves interesting. 
 The Christian Arabs are one of the smallest minorities in Israel438 their 
perception of greater inter-communal tension as a result of a successful outcome, 
could be based on dynamics of successful termination leading to in-group pride and 
glorification that can lead to greater exclusion of minorities. As a small minority 
within a minority, their perceived sense of threat would likely be high. 
                                                 
482 According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, December 2016, the Christian population in Israel 
was approximately 170,000 people representing 2% of the overall population.  78.9% of there are of 
Arab origin. See http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=201611394 [last 
accessed 5 September 2017]. 
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Jewish Intercommunal Tension 
Similarly, when I examined effects of a successful outcome on Jewish inter-
communal tensions, I’ve found a mildly significant, positive interaction between a 
successful termination of an Israeli military operation and those on the political right 
(0.546, p<0.05). This perception of increased tension between Ashkenazi Jews and 
Sephardi/Mizrachi Jews by the political right might reflect the fact that traditionally 
the Ashkenzi Jews have been more associated with the political left and 
Sephardi/Mizrachi Jews with the political right. The increased tension might be 
indicative of Ashkenazi Jews who are more affiliated with the left experiencing a 
measure of in-group guilt and distancing themselves from communities supportive of 
the violence.  
A mildly significant, positive interaction was also observed between a 
successful outcome to an Israeli military operation and Christian Arabs (1.812, 
p<0.05). The middle-class respondents, however, perceived a decrease in Jewish 
intercommunal tension as evidenced by a mildly significant negative interaction (-
0.708, p<0.05). This suggests that rally-around-the flag effect is most sustainable 
within the Jewish communities of a similar socio-economic demographic. 
 
 
Ideological Tension  
The investigation into communities that perceived increased tensions between those 
with differing political ideologies revealed a mildly significant, positive interaction 
between a successful outcome to an Israeli military operation and members of the 
lower class (0.761, p<0.05). This might reflect that many of the lower classes in Israel 
are associated with communities that are traditionally on the right side of the political 
spectrum such as more orthodox and Sephardic/Mizrachi Jews, as well as Arab 
Israelis who are more likely aligned with the political left.  
As noted above, a successful outcome may lead to pride that creates in-group 
glorification and consequently distancing from those who might derogate from the 
sense of pride, such as the political left. Alternatively, the political left might 
experience a level of in-group guilt and therefore seek to distance itself from 
communities that are experiencing in-group glorification.  
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In addition, a somewhat significant and negative interaction was detected between a 
successful termination of political violence and holding an academic degree (-0.578, 
p<0.01), suggesting that those who are more highly educated are likely to perceive 
lower levels of tension and more nuanced relationship between the political right and 
left. This finding supports widely acknowledged theories that education leads to 
greater civil engagement and political participation, as Helliwell and Putnam 
highlight: Education is one of the most important predictors – in fact, the most 
important predictor – of many forms of social participation. (2007, p. 1)  
 
This greater participation will often result in increased social trust and consequently 
lower perceptions of tension. 
 
 
Social trust  
At the heart of this research is the question is the effect of the successful outcome of 
Israeli military operations with regards to the overall level of social trust in Israeli 
society. The exploration of social trust showed that a successful termination of an 
Israeli military operation led to a mildly significant finding of increased mistrust from 
the Arab Israeli (0.396, p<0.05) and Russian Israeli (0.477, p<0.05) communities. In 
addition, a found mildly significant indication of increased mistrust following a 
successful outcome and supporters of the moderate left (0.494, p<0.05) was detected.  
The most significant interaction was observed between a successful 
termination of an Israeli military operation and levels of mistrust held by the lower 
class (1.397, p<0.001). These findings confirm Bjørnskov’s (2008) assertion that 
ethnic diversity, economic inequality and political orientation can inhibit social trust.  
Despite, an outcome that is framed as successful, this is not perceived as positive 
within all communities but possibly as a source of potential threat of social or 
economic marginalization. Alternatively, in the case of the moderate left, it may 
reflect feelings of in-group guilt at the outcome, if it could diminish prospects for 
renewal of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Consequently, feelings of shame would 
lead to distancing from those supportive of the outcome, resulting in diminished 
social trust. 
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Conversely, two mildly significant, negative interactions were discovered between a 
successful termination of political violence and holding an academic degree (-0.321, 
p<0.05) and supporters of the left wing (-0.794, p<0.05).  As noted earlier, education 
is often an indicator of greater participation and consequently who have higher 
education would be more exposed to people from other communities, reducing social 
distance and therefore perceiving increased levels of trust.   
Given that many on the far-left of the political spectrum were traditionally of 
Ashkenazi origin and, due to higher socio-economic status in the early years of the 
State of Israel, were more likely to continue to higher education, their perception of 
increased social trust may also be a result of their education.  Further investigation 
would be required to confirm this. Alternatively, the successful outcome might trigger 
the constructive elements of pride allowing for forgiveness and acknowledgment of 




7.5  Conclusion  
A vibrant and functioning pluralistic, heterogeneous society requires thriving civic 
institutions and networks based on political tolerance.  These are grounded upon the 
social trust that is built and nurtured between the communities.  Stressful situations 
such as terror attacks and Israeli military operation, particularly in the context of 
intractable conflicts, are constantly testing the tolerance and trust that may have been 
built.  Intergroup attitudes and emotions are constantly revised in relation to their 
environmental, societal and psychological context and therefore situations of extreme 
threat and conflict are challenging (Bar-Tal, 2007).  
Whilst societies subjected to external threat may unite in the face of a common 
enemy leading to a period of increased social trust and cohesion, this study sought to 
examine whether this is a temporary phenomenon or whether trust lasts.  Further, I 
attempted to understand the dynamic by which even successful outcomes may lead to 
the breakdown of social trust, and in which sectors of Israeli society the cracks are 
most likely to show. 
In line with many of the other studies on social trust and particularly those 
        201 
examining the effects of political violence on political exclusionism in Israel, I found 
that even successful outcomes to Israeli military operation can lead to increased 
fractionalization and decreased social trust.  Although a “rally around the flag” or 
increased cohesion effect was observed between Ashkenzi and Sephardic/Mizrachi 
Jews, overall, I observed rising tensions between other elements of the Jewish 
communities in Israel.  This may be reflective of communities experiencing in-group 
guilt or shame despite a successful outcome, leading to tension with those who are 
more supportive of the outcome, or perhaps feel that more should have been done to 
achieve a more solid outcome  
The effect of economic inequalities as well as ethnic difference was also 
observed, with improved economic outlook being associated with increased social 
trust.  Whilst there is a potential endogeneity in the relationship between economic 
well-being and increased social trust (Bjørnskov, 2008; Fukuyama, 1995), the 
perceived realistic threat of minority groups that results following even successful 
outcomes highlights the need to provide assurances to these groups following the 
Israeli military operation in order to prevent the erosion of inter-group trust.  
The effect of education, in particular higher education, in reducing tensions 
and increasing social trust emerges as an important finding of this research.  Whether 
education provides the sense of optimism and control over one’s life that allows 
people to trust (Uslaner, 2002), reflects the fact that degree holders are the “winners 
in society” and therefore more likely to trust (Delhey & Newton, 2003, p. 96), or 
provides opportunities for contact and to create networks with others, this study 
confirms the potential role of education in reducing social tension even in most 
stressful situations.  
When examining the effects of violence on social cohesion or political 
tolerance in Israel, many of the studies tend to focus on one or two minority groups, 
namely the PCIs and immigrant communities. In this paper, I sought to provide a 
more thorough overview of the potential fissures in Jewish-Israeli society following 
Israeli military operation. Whilst I only found a mildly significant decline in social 
trust, I was able to observe other fractures to societal cohesion that could be exploited 
by political entrepreneurs to lead to further polarization in Israeli society, the erosion 
of social capital, and a decline in economic and social well-being.  
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Ultimately, successfully reviving the peace process and to sit at the 
negotiating table in confidence requires a strong, cohesive society. A society that is 
underpinned by strong intergroup trust that can withstand painful concessions, as 
Trust is the glue of life. It is the most essential ingredient for communication. It’s the 
foundational principle that holds all relationships (Steven R. Covey436). 
 
  
                                                 
436 Stephen Covey Quotes. (n.d.). BrainyQuote.com. Retrieved April 28, 2019. 
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8     Conclusion                  
 
Against the backdrop of repeated political violence437 between Israel and different 
belligerents in the first and second decades of the 21st century (2003-2017) and by 
employing a social-psychological theoretical framework, this dissertation explores the 
effects of political violence on Israelis438’ social and national identities.  
Whereas a vast literature has been studying the effects of exposure to violence 
on individuals and groups for over a century, it mainly focuses on type (civil wars 
were highly discussed over the last decades), duration or location of such violence. 
Moreover, since the relevant literature seems to consider the occurrence of political 
violence a unitary phenomenon, it consistently fails to attend to a most important 
factor in this regard- the outcome of such violence. By overlooking the discrepancy in 
violence’ aftermath and by neglecting any analysis derived from it, I argue that the 
comprehensive literature examining the social effects of political violence and post-
conflict societies is missing a vital piece of the puzzle. 
Accordingly, the contribution of this dissertation to the extensive conflict 
literature is twofold: first, it disaggregates the aftermaths of two common forms of 
political violence, wars439 and military operations440 and explores their effects on 
individuals, groups and the Israeli society as a whole441. Second, it closely examines 
some of the central assumptions of Social Identity Theory, one of the most 
comprehensive theories of group’s relations in the context of a concrete political 
violence. It does so while paying special attention to highly fascinating identity 
components and basic social building blocks: national identification, social trust and 
social rifts in Israel.  
 
                                                 
437 Whereas “political violence” is a broad term used to describe violence perpetrated in order to 
achieve political goals and includes various manifestations such as social movements and terrorism 
(Daphna Canetti, Hall, Rapaport, & Wayne, 2013; Hibbs, 1973) this dissertation focused on military 
operations and wars when researching political violence. 
438 Bearing in mind the multidimensional nature of conflicts that necessitates a multilevel study of their 
effects, in the course of the research the Israeli public is disaggregated into different ethnic and social 
groups (such as Arab Israelis, Jewish Israelis and immigrants). 
439 By distinguishing between victory, defeat, stalemate and a negotiated agreement. 
440 By distinguishing between successful and unsuccessful aftermath. 
441 Bearing in mind the multidimensional nature of conflicts that necessitates a multilevel study of their 
effects, in the course of the research the Israeli public is disaggregated into different ethnic and social 
groups such as Arab Israelis, Jewish Israelis and immigrants. 
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The overall findings support the discussion of the social consequences of political 
violence in Israel, be them increased cohesiveness among different social groups 
(such as ethnic minority vs. majority) or social fragmentation and increased 
polarization between other groups (such as rich vs. poor or political right vs. left). 
Whereas Social Identity Theory constitutes the theoretical base for the explored 
hypotheses, Israeli social place-making practices are also discussed.  
The dissertation employs various methodologies: First, a macro-level, 
statistical examination of the relationship between different war outcomes and socio-
national identities was conducted using two web-based experiments. Second, a 
qualitative analysis of Zionism in Europe and in Israel’s early years complemented a 
discussion of Israeli narratives of belonging, memory politics, ingredients of national 
pride and contemporary social challenges. Third, a quantitative micro-level analysis 
of the effect of successful and unsuccessful military operation on the Israeli society 
was conducted. The latter utilized a unique self-compiled database, following an 
extensive manual content analysis 442 , alongside data originating in annual social 
surveys conducted in Israel by the Guttmann institute.   
 After laying out the theoretical framework and methodology employed in 
exploring the relationship between discrepant outcomes of political violence and 
socio-national identities in Israel, I will now turn to examining the contribution of 
each chapter to the overall conclusion. 
Chapter four, the first empirical chapter is titled “the ending matters”. It was 
set to establish the underlying assumption upon which the dissertation is based. 
Namely, that different outcomes of political violence have distinctive effects on 
individual identities. In this chapter, predictions derived from Social Identity Theory 
were put into an initial macro-level analysis through two original web experiments. 
The latter explored the effect of different war outcomes (distinguishing between 
victory, defeat, stalemate and a negotiated agreement) on social and national 
identities443. The goal of this chapter was not to assess the specific effect of each war 
outcome on multiple identity aspects, but to establish that “the ending matters”. Put in 
other words, that distinctive war outcomes are associated with distinctive effects 
when individual identities are concerned.  
                                                 
442 Namely, evaluative assertion analysis of relevant news articles appearing in the Israeli press. 
443 Operationalized as a sense of community and camaraderie, a sense of belonging and national pride. 
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Whereas the research supported the underlying hypothesis concerning national 
identification, no significant differences between war outcomes were found in relation 
to individuals’ social identities. These results are consistent with Social Identity 
Theory and the self-esteem protection/enhancement strategies derived from it 
(BIRGing and CORFing 444 ); The significant differences between war outcomes 
(mainly between victories and defeats) are explained by individuals’ tendencies to 
share in the glory of a successful other (to BIRG) following a positively evaluated 
war outcome, and to distance themselves from an unsuccessful group (to CORF), 
following a negatively valued war outcome. The non-significant results concerning 
social identities are consistent with Simmel’s conflict hypothesis suggesting that 
conflicting interactions straighten the internal cohesion of pre-existing groups. In this 
regard, it appears as though individuals react to the conflict itself whereas its 
aftermath did not play any significant role. The overall outcomes obtained in this 
chapter thus establish the underlying hypothesis according to which different war 
outcomes resonate with the individuals who experience such violence in distinctive 
ways. The effect of wars on identity salience (rather national than social) was found to 
be mitigated by the way they were concluded. This, in turn, laid the foundations for 
an extensive micro-level analysis of the effect of outcomes of political violence on 
socio-national identities among Israelis. 
 Chapter five refocused the attention on the state of Israel and the Israeli 
society. It provided a historical analysis of Jewish-Israeli nationalism, rooted in the 
Zionistic movement in Europe in the late 19th century, which receded the 
establishment of the state of Israel. The analysis centered on nation-building 
processes which took place in Israel’s first years, namely, the constructing of a new 
Jewish-Israeli identity by means of institutionalizing the Hebrew language as an 
official language, integration of new immigrants and the role of the Israeli defense 
force as a melting pot. The study of the origins of Israeli national pride, both in the 
country’s first years and in contemporary times, complemented the discussion as it is 
entwined with both Jewish and Israeli identities. The analysis suggests that while 
Israel was established as a democracy, it was never a space of ethnic diversity. As the 
national home for world jury based on a Zionist narrative and highly influenced by 
the Holocaust, no plurality of ethnic discourses existed in Israel in over 50 years. 
                                                 
444 Basking in Reflected Glory and Cutting Off Reflected Failure.  
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The research describes the way state-sponsored dominant Jewish and Zionist 
narrative morphed into a uni-dimensional Israeli identity. This, in turn, prevented 
Arab-Israelis, the largest ethnic minority in Israel, from being incorporated into the 
Israeli society. Recurrent political violence as part of the on-going Israeli Palestinian 
conflict (including wars, military operations and terrorism) further contributed both to 
the exclusion of Arab-Israelis from the original Israeli narrative and to the bonding of 
Jewish Israelis. It was only in the last decades and against the backdrop of significant 
changes endured by the Israeli society that place-making processes were put on the 
political and social agenda445.  
Whereas nation and community-building processes are still prominent in 
contemporary Israel446, they now exist side by side a vibrant and vocal discourse of 
post-Zionism, Jewish secularism and “Israelism” which is not based on Judaism but 
on an Israeli cultural narrative. Persistent political violence that contributed to social 
fragmentation in Israel’s first decades alongside cultural commonalities between 
Jewish and Arab Israelis now begin to serve as a common denominator in 
contemporary Israeli society. If those continue to resonate among Israelis, it is thus 
not implausible that they would eventually substitute Judaism and Zionism as social 
unifiers in the process of creating a “same boat” society. Under such circumstances 
and with diminishing boundaries between Arab and Jewish Israelis, the former will no 
longer be construed as an “out-group” by the Jewish majority in Israel. Nonetheless,  
drifting away from the original Jewish integrator and common denominator of more 
than 75% of the country’s population may threaten the Jewish communities of Israel 
with social fragmentation. Consequently, the study of the effect of political violence 
on both Jewish and non-Jewish communities in Israel set forth in the upcoming 
chapters is of great importance for the future of Israel. 
 Chapter six set out to examine the relationship between Israelis and their 
nation-state following different outcomes of Israeli military operations. Special 
attention was paid to changes in levels of national pride among Jewish Israelis, Arab 
Israelis and new immigrants across a tempestuous ten-year period (2003-2013) and in 
conjunction with successful and unsuccessful conclusions of Israeli warfare, as 
                                                 
445  The discussion of ethnic plurality and the place of Arab-Israelis within the Israeli society is 
repeatedly contested. A recent example in this regard is the discussion of the proposed basic law: Israel 
as the nation state of the Jewish people (as part of chapter five). 
446  The contemporary discussion of an ethnic-religious classification of Israelis provides further 
evidence in this regard. 
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perceived by the Israeli public. Using a regressing analysis of data originating in 
social surveys, the research tested the validity of predictions derived from Social 
Identity Theory in both the individual and the social447 levels. Results indicate that the 
effect of recurrent warfare on national identification among Israelis is highly 
mitigated by the perceived outcome of such warfare as well as by sub-group 
membership (ethnic/social majority vs. minority). Consistent with Social Identity 
Theory, an Israeli military success was highly associated with increased national 
identification for the general Israeli population. However, contrary to conventional 
wisdom and to the “minority hypothesis440”, the same effect was also registered 
among Israeli Arabs.  
While Israeli Arabs, the largest ethnic minority in Israel, might share neither 
the country’s collective Jewish narrative nor its Zionist ethos, they are Israeli citizens 
who nonetheless feel a sense of belonging to the state of Israel441. As such, they are a 
part of a larger in-group, which shares personal and economic interests. Those are 
equally and existentially threatened when Israel is experiencing unsuccessful military 
operations. This positivistic evidence suggests that Israeli Arabs’ identification with 
the state of Israel lies in the area of an “Israeliness that is beyond Jewishness”.  
While Jewish Israelis maintained the highest levels of group-identification in 
relation to Israeli Arabs and to new immigrants, the analysis also affirmed the 
existence of an “embedded identity effect” concerning national identification among 
Jewish Israelis. Israeli Jews, the majority ethnic group in Israel, maintained high 
national-identification levels regardless of the way the warfare was concluded. This 
finding is unsurprising considering Israel’s Jewish character448 and the circumstances 
of its creation. 
Whilst societies subjected to external threat may unite in the face of a common 
enemy, chapter seven sought to examine whether this is true in the Israeli context and 
if so, whether the outcomes of political violence mitigate this effect. Whereas a large 
scholarship examined the effect of violence on social cohesion or political tolerance 
in Israel, it mostly focused on Arab-Israelis and immigrant. The research presented in 
chapter seven examined the effect of discrepant outcomes of Israeli warfare on social 
                                                 
447 Examining national pride shifts among the different ethnic groups in the Israeli society. 
440 Which suggested that minorities would not exhibit increased national pride following Israeli 
military successes, as they do not perceive them as “their own. 
441 Even if to a lesser degree compared with Jewish Israelis. This statement is also supported by the 
growing numbers of Arab Israelis joining the IDF (Goldman, 2017). 
448 Israel was founded as both a Jewish state and the homeland of the Jewish people.  
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cohesion, social tensions and trust between the various communities of Israel (both 
Jewish and non-Jewish). The research was set to find whether exposure to violence 
leads to a decline in social cohesion and trust between communities in Israel, to assess 
whether a breakdown of social cohesion is more likely to follow a specific outcome 
(success/failure from the Israeli point of view) and to identify the sectors of the Israeli 
society in which the cracks are most likely to show. The research thus focused on the 
general level of social trust in society alongside six specific social rifts, prevalent in 
present-day Israel: the intercommunal rift (between the Israeli Jewish community and 
the Israeli-Arab community), the Jewish intercommunal rift (between Jews of 
Ashkenazi and Sephardic/Mizrachi origins), the religious rift (between orthodox and 
non-orthodox Jewish communities), the ideological/political rift 449 , the socio-
economic rift and the nativist tension (between native Israelis and new immigrants).  
In order to assess the existence, strength and direction of the effect of 
successful445 termination of military operations on inter group tensions and social 
trust in Israel, a five stages quantitative analysis was performed; A preliminary 
analysis laid the foundations for further examination of the explored effect. Upon 
identification of potentially significant individual and country level variables, those 
were added to the analysis. These results were then further refined in a statistical 
examination of interactions between political, religious and national identification of 
Israelis, intergroup tensions and social trust. Results revealed a highly significant 
effect of Israeli military success concerning all six social rifts and a very mild effect 
concerning social trust. For all but one rift (the Jewish inter-communal rift), 
successful termination of Israeli warfare was associated with an increased social 
tension between the different communities in Israel (though in different levels of 
significance). This unfortunate finding which points to increased fractionalization 
among the different communities in Israel following Israeli military successes is in 
line with several other studies examining the effects of political violence on political 
exclusionism in Israel. Whereas the literature supports the notion that in time of crisis 
social cohesion increases, it is not surprising to find increased tensions following 
military successes rather than failures. An exception to the observed rise in social 
                                                 
449 Bbetween the political left, who are traditionally more dovish in their outlook towards solutions 
with the Palestinians, and the political right, who support more hard-line policies. 
445 As the outcome of warfare/military operations is a binary variable (successful/unsuccessful), the 
analysis essentially points to the effect of successful termination/Israeli victories (unsuccessful 
termination being the reference group) on social rifts. 
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tensions in Israel is the increased cohesion between Ashkenzi and Sephardic/Mizrachi 
Jews (the Jewish intercommunal rift). The result support the conclusion that the 
Jewish population, the majority group in Israel, is united behind the idea that Israel is 
a homeland for the Jewish people (and possibly necessary refuge from rising anti-
Semitism around the globe, Pew Research Center, 2016). A decrease in Jewish 
intercommunal tension following Israeli victories supports the cohesive potential of 
in-group pride and is consistent with the Jewish foundation and Zionistic narrative of 
Jewish Israelis (as discussed in chapter four) and with the existence of an embedded 
Jewish-Israeli identity (as suggested by chapter six). 
As for the national level, a “rally around the flag” effect is a term used to 
describe the uniting power of common threats. An underlying motive for this surge in 
national unity is linked to patriotism, as individuals respond to threat by identifying 
with their in-group450. However, with the crisis is over, politics and society quickly 
revert to normal and existing social rifts resurface. Whereas an unsuccessful 
termination of an Israeli military operation is likely to induce a “rally around the flag” 
effect, a military success demonstrates the opposite effect. Consequently, the 
seemingly rising tensions between various communities in Israel observed following 
an Israeli military success is consistent with a reverse “rally around the flag” effect 
and reflects the fractionalized nature of the Israeli society. Another explanation to the 
observed trend of increased tensions following a successful warfare may be directly 
linked to the experience of in-group guilt or shame despite a successful outcome. 
Such gilt might lead to surging tension between those who are more/less supportive of 
the outcome, or perhaps feel that more should have been done to achieve a more solid 
outcome. Finally, the increased tensions speak to the theorized dynamic at the heart of 
the present and similar works that reflects the more destructive side of pride and in-
group glorification. According to that scholarship, out-group hate can even extend to 
people perceived to be “hostile minorities451”.  
Whilst the increase in intercommunal tension is expected and in line with the 
results of similar studies examining the effect of violence or stress on the relationships 
between Jewish and Arab Israelis, the increase in religious tensions, socio-economic 
tension and ideological tensions could be reflective of a second circle of out-group 
                                                 
450 the nation itself and to an extent- fellow citizens, Murray, 2017. 
451 Which are perceived to sympathize with the out-group. 
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hate; Supporters of the political left alongside less observant and wealthier elements 
of the Israeli society452, may experience in-group guilt and possibly shame despite the 
perceived successful outcome, thus distancing themselves from those experiencing 
pride at the outcome. The effect of education, in particular higher education, in 
reducing social tensions and increasing social trust emerges as another important 
finding of this research. Whether education provides a sense of optimism and control 
over one’s life that allows people to trust or whether it provides opportunities for 
contact and networks’ creation with others, the study confirms the potential role of 
education in reducing social tension even in a highly diverse and conflict-torn Israeli 
society.  
Moreover, since social divisions may be exploited by political entrepreneurs, 
and since increasing social tensions might result in a further polarization in the Israeli 
society and in the erosion of social capital, raising the alarm would be the first step in 
directly addressing such important issues (for example, by policy making). Lastly, 
any serious peace negotiation with a Palestinian leadership would require difficult 
concessions to be made by both parties. As such, the way towards a peaceful 
conclusion of the Israeli Palestinian conflict would inevitably depend, among others, 
on the social strength and cohesion of the Israeli civil society.   
 
 
8.1     Limitations 
 
Limitations to the research presented in this dissertation, as to any scientific research, 
are twofold and refer to both theory and methodology.  
Concerning the theoretical background, whereas this dissertation focuses on 
Social Identity Theory and Social Comparison Theory as the analytic framework 
through which the effect of the way Israeli military operations were concluded on the 
Israeli society is examined, another framework could have been chosen. While I 
chose to focus on the BIRGing and CORFing strategies in explaining changes in 
national pride and in-group pride or guilt in explaining shifts in social trust, this is but 
one possible explanation to the changes at hand. Canetti and colleagues, For example, 
extensively researched the effect of violence on political extremism in Israel based on 
stress and threat perception (see for example, Canetti, Russ, Luborsky, & Hobfoll, 
                                                 
452 who are traditionally more associated with the political left 
        211 
2012; Daphna Canetti, Hall, Rapaport, & Wayne, 2013; Canetti-Nisim, Halperin, 
Sharvit, & Hobfoll, 2009). Bleich, Hobfoll and their colleagues followed this line of 
argumentation while mainly focusing on the effect of exposure to terrorism on stress 
related mental health symptoms in Israel (Bleich, Gelkopf, & Solomon, 2003; 
Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, & Johnson, 2006; Hobfoll, Mancini, Hall, Canetti, & 
Bonanno, 2011). Similarly, Hall and colleagues (2009), examined the relationship 
between reports of positive changes occurring subsequent to terrorism exposure 
(referred to as “Benefit Finding”), post-traumatic stress disorder, symptom severity 
and negative out-group attitudes towards Palestinian citizens of Israel during the 
second Intifada. Other relevant work emphasized the role of the national ethos (Lavi, 
Canetti, Sharvit, Bar-Tal, & Hobfoll, 2014), resilience and risk assessment (Hobfoll et 
al., 2008) in affecting both Israelis and Palestinians. Halperin and colleagues focused 
on the role of group-based hatred in explaining political intolerance in Israel 
(Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009). Consequently, while this 
dissertation concentrates on the perceived outcome of violence against the backdrop 
of social-psychology and the concepts of group belonging, national attachment, pride 
and guilt, even within the disciplines of Psychology and Sociology446, more than one 
theory may account for the social changes which occur in conflict-torn Israel. 
 Further limitations originate in the methodology employed in this dissertation. 
Regarding chapter four, a larger sample size would have contributed to the validity of 
findings and would have allowed the author to conduct a further robustness check in 
order to disprove experiencing a “real-life” conflict as a confounding variable. Since 
the timeframe of the research conducted in chapters six and seven (2003-2017) did 
not enable the author to conduct her own surveys or interviews, survey data collected 
as part of the Israeli Democracy Index by the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and 
Policy Research was used. Whereas this high quality data is based on a yearly survey 
of a representative sample of the Israeli society, using a panel rather than a 
representative sample would have account for respondents’ personal characteristics in 
a more precise way. Moreover, the annual surveys being a general measure of Israeli 
democracy were not conducted in conjunction with the termination of military 
                                                 
446 The effects of political violence on the Israeli society was also researched by experts from other 
disciplines such as media, game theory and rationality, political science etc. 
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operations453. These data constrains resulted in inconsistent gaps between the time in 
which a military operation has ended and the time the surveys were conducted.  
Whereas the theory developed in this dissertation does not account for the 
duration or strength of the effect of discrepant outcomes of political violence on the 
Israeli society, an independent survey conducted soon after the conclusion of each 
military operation would have contributed to greater validity of the conclusions 
presented here. Conducting independent surveys would have also allowed the author 
to refrain from using vague concepts such as “trust” while concluding public attitudes 
based of multiple specific question devoted to the examined topics. Quality data, 
originating in semi- structured interviews with Israelis from the various ethnic and 
social subgroups (Israeli Arabs, Israeli Jews, immigrants, seculars, orthodox, ultra-
orthodox, etc.) conducted shortly after the conclusion of the aforementioned military 
operation would have further substantialize the conclusions obtained by the research. 
Lastly, as Israel has been facing intervals of political violence since its very 
establishment seven decades ago, this research cannot account for the accumulative 
effect of multiple and repeated violence on the Israeli society.  
 
Generalization of the Israeli case 
Varied scholarship focusing on the centrality of both the IDF and violent political 
struggles in Israel contributed to disciplines centering on military issues, applied 
psychology and psychotherapy (Beit-Hallahmi, 2012; Breznitz, 1983) dynamics of 
small groups (Rosenhek, Maman, & Ben-Ari, 2003; Shalit, 1988) etc. Accordingly, 
Ben-Ari posited that Israel encapsulates in a very explicit manner many of the 
tensions in the relationships between the military, state and society found in other 
advanced industrial democracies (Ben-Ari, 2018, p. 2). However, and though this 
dissertation does not pretend to construct a general theory of the effect of discrepant 
outcomes of political violence of national pride and social trust and is specific to the 
Israeli case, it is unclear to what degree the results obtained in this dissertation 
(mainly in chapters four to seven) are nevertheless generalizable to other national 
                                                 
453  For example, in case the (annual) survey was conducted before the termination of a military 
operation, the next survey was used in the research. 
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contexts. This is mainly due to the very nature of the state of Israel (established as a 
Jewish and democratic and the national home of the Jewish people) and the 
perception of national pride454. The latter may be quite different in different nations 
(compare for example, Germany with the United States). National pride may thus, 
stand in different relations to sense of belonging and social trust which this thesis 
focused on, as well as other relevant issues such as cosmopolitanism, openness to and 
acceptance of foreign cultures and religions and public support of the peace with the 
Palestinian people. Moreover, while a person’s origin often shapes his/her individual 
identity455 , it has been argued that: Israel’s special circumstances of continuous 
conflict make the nation a more central and more contentious center of identity 
(Cohen, 2008), in comparison with other nations. 
 
 
8.2     Going forward: Ideas for future research 
 
Ideas for future research are many and relate to the topic of the research, the 
methodology employed and the context. Future research is thus needed to further 
advance and expend existing theories of social and national identification shifts 
following political violence 
In the Israeli context, whereas this dissertation focused on national pride and 
                                                 
454 Whereas high levels of national pride observed is Israel are consistent with the continuing state of 
conflict and its special nature, they may pose a further limitation to the research; limited variability in 
the study’s dependent variable (chapter six) may have led to underestimation of the size of the real 
effects. 
455  A man is but an imprint of his native landscape is the most famous line penned by Shaul 
Tchernichovsky, a much-appreciated Russian-born Hebrew poet (whose work is traditionally part of 
the mandatory curricular for high school graduation tests in Israel). The phrase is part of a poem titled: 
“A man is but…”, wherein Tchernichovsky articulates the immense influence impressions from a 
person’s past experiences of home and land have on his identity, and the aspiration to return to his 
home country and rediscover it before he dies. The phrase “a man is but an imprint of his native 
landscape” is coined in the Hebrew language and is used in order to explain that individual identity is 
shapes by local culture and past experiences.  
The first verse of the poem it the following  
A man is but a small piece of land 
A man is but an imprint of his native landscape 
Absorbed by his ear while it was still willing 
Absorbed by his eye not yet sated with sight … 
And so in the expanse of days and in personal battle 
The parchment of his life unscrolls 
And as one by one come up and are interpreted 
Every character and character, Symbol and symbol evoked, engraved early in the day  
Man is but the imprint of his native landscape 
* Translated from Hebrew by the author. The original text is available here: 
http://benyehuda.org/tchernichowsky/haadam_eino_ela.html#_ftn1 
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social trust in the examination of the social effects of discrepant outcomes of Israeli 
military operations, similar research may explore other aspects of such potential 
influence. Possible aspects are such as political and ethnic tolerance, social pluralism 
(such as in relation to foreign workers and homosexuals) and willingness to engage in 
peace talks. A more comprehensive outlook of social processes derived from specific 
outcomes of political-violence should attempt to assess whether such social processes 
are likely to lead to a resilient and cohesive civil society or result in a fraying social 
fabric. 
A qualitative analysis of the social effects of discrepant outcomes of political 
violence in Israel (based on individual interviews and focus groups) would 
complement the present research. Whereas the current study examined frames in 
communication while focusing on newspaper articles, future research may consider 
how the conclusion of warfare is framed by other media outlets (television), foreign 
press (either online or offline), local political elite or by Israelis themselves (bottom 
up approach using social media, online forums, etc.). 
Whereas this dissertation explores the effect of discrepant outcomes of 
political violence on the Israeli society, further research should be dedicated to tracing 
similar (or different) effects in other war-torn or post conflict societies (such as 
Northern Ireland or in the Balkans). When analyzing national pride shifts in 21st 
century heterogeneous/western/eastern/conflict torn/peaceful societies, a 
comprehensive study based on large-scale social surveys (Afrobarometer, 
Latinoberometer, Asia/Asianbarometor, Euroberometer) may be able to describe the 
evolution of the concept, identify regional or global trends in attitudes towards or 
manifestations of national pride, and offer an educated guess concerning the future of 
nation states in light of the observed processes. Similar studies based on relevant 
barometers may focus on social trust, social tensions (ethnic, socio-demographic, etc.) 
and the sense of belonging in light of repeated conflict (Middle East, central Africa), 
the refugee crisis (Europe, Middle East) or new expressions of social protests against 
police brutality or in a political context  (USA). Such studies may further concentrate 
on a territorial aspect (specific society, region or continent) or on a temporal one 
(analyzing the changing nature of these concepts in the last decades, century etc.).   
Lastly, by focusing on other types of political violence, such as terrorism, it would be 
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highly interesting to compare and contrast local, social effects of global terrorism and 
try to identify transnational trends in this regard.  
 
 
8.3     Final remarks/Epilogue 
 
Israel is a very diverse society. Its social fabric is composed of many different ethnic 
groups and subgroups (“Edot” in Hebrew). These, are characterized by a particular 
place of origin, distinct culture, religious traditions, language and even Hebrew 
pronunciation; Whereas “Ashkenazim” (Ashkenazi Jews) are principally the 
descendants of the medieval Jewish communities in Franco-Germany, they can be 
further divided to whose originating in eastern European countries, kin of Orthodox 
Ashkenazim who formed communities in Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed and Tiberius in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries or those who immigrated to the 
United States, Canada, Argentina etc. Though Sephardim (Sephardic Jews) trace their 
ancestry back to the Jewish population of medieval Spain, many have settled in major 
ports and economic centers in Europe, the Middle East and the Galilee town of Safed 
following the Jewish expulsion from the kingdom in 1492. “Oriental/Eastern 
Jews” refers to Jewish communities from Arab or Muslim countries which did not 
undergo a direct European experience. Some of these communities (such as Iraqi 
Jewry) date back thousands of years. While often denoted as Sephardim, they have 
their own unique traditions.  
Since Israel was established as the national home of the Jewish people, it is 
unique in its official and longstanding encouragement of Jewish immigration. A 
constant flow of “Olim” (immigrants, as opposed to “sabras”- native Israelis) had 
highly influenced the emerging Israeli society.  
The majority of Israel’s non-Jewish population is Muslims, the rest being 
Christians, Druze and other smaller groups. The vast majority of Israeli Muslims and 
Christians identify as Arabs or Palestinians (who share feelings of solidarity with their 
Palestinian comrades outside Israel's borders). By and large, the Druze population 
fully identifies with the State of Israel while maintaining their own religious beliefs 
and traditions. Among those groups, one can find various religious identities (secular, 
orthodox or ultra-orthodox). Spanning notions of religion, ethnicity, nationality and 
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family456- the issue of Israeli identity is particularly complex. Living together in a 
small country- conflicts, discrepancies and rifts457 are not unexpected.  
While it is likely to find a certain degree of social tension in any modern, 
heterogenic society, in Israel, social tensions are always presented in a highly 
negative way. At times it appears as though the Israeli society is “broken” and needs 
to be amended. This perception of diversity as a threat is rooted in David Ben-
Gurion’s (first Israeli prime minister) “melting pot” doctrine, which dominated the 
early years of the state (as discussed in chapter four). Ben Gurion’s ideal nation was 
based on (an imagined) social homogeneity, which inevitably came at the expense of 
distinctive attributes of individual identities. Consequently, new immigrants were 
highly encouraged to “Hebrewtize” their foreign names458 in order to conform to the 
national Hebrew/Israeli narrative.  
In this dissertation, I have presented a positivistic evidence to the existence of 
“Israelness” which stretches beyond Jewishness when it comes to Israelis’ national 
identification. Against this backdrop and as the country prepares to celebrate its 70th 
anniversary, it is high time to break free from the shackles of the past and 
acknowledge the wonderful plurality that exists in the Israeli society. The “melting 
pot” doctrine had undoubtedly contributed to the creation of a new Israeli identity and 
enabled a sea of individuals to form a functioning society while avoiding a 
Babelonian state of affairs. Yet, Israel is no longer a predominantly immigrant 
society, and the old elites who established and led the state under the “melting pot” 
doctrine are no longer in power. Domestic social processes (such as secularization, 
                                                 
456 When asked, “What is your present religion, if any?” in a survey by Pew research center in 2016, 
nearly all Israeli Jews identified as Jewish and almost none said they have no religion,  even though 
roughly half describe themselves as secular and about 20% alleged that they do not believe in God 
(Pew Research Center, 2016). Moreover, whereas most secular Jews in Israel say they see themselves 
as Israeli first and Jewish second, traditional and religious Jews take the opposite position. (Pew 
Research Center, 2016) 
457 For example, while Israeli Jewry are united in their support of Israel as a Jewish homeland and 
almost unanimously agree that all Jews should have the right to citizenship in Israel (this 
overwhelming support for Jewish immigration and the perception that a Jewish state is necessary for 
the long-term survival of the Jewish people may be partially linked to rising anti-Semitism around the 
world), they are deeply at odds over the role that religion should play in their country’s public life. 
Disagreements over what it means to live in a Jewish state are not merely hypothetical as they are 
translated to concrete attitudes and policies regarding marriage, divorce, conversion, military 
conscription, transportation, public prayer and gender segregation. 
458 When my Austrian grandfather immigrated to Israel in the early 1960’s, Felix Handler became 
Shmarjahu Hadar. Even a decade later, when his son, born in Vienna as Edward Handler, enlisted to 
the IDF as a reporter in Galei Tzahal, a nationwide Israeli radio network operated by the IDF (a highly 
prestigious and desirable assignment), he was highly encouraged to change his name to Adi Hadar, as a 
foreign first name was inconsistent with the Hebrew/Israeli nature of the network.   
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the massive influx of Russian immigrants who arrived in Israel in the early 1990s and 
the high birthrate in the ultra-Orthodox and Arab sectors459) are changing the face of 
the Israeli society.  
As a mature society who endured a protracted violent conflict (with no end in 
sight), economic crises, problematic climate and less then friendly neighbors and still 
managed to prosper, it is no longer necessary to subordinate neither the general 
population nor new immigrants to a notion which essentially invalidate plurality. 
Instead, Israelis should accept the tribal nature of their society and embrace the 
diversity of its people, regardless of their political affiliation, ethnicity, origin and 
religious believes. As the analysis of social rifts following discrepant outcomes of 
Israeli military operation suggests, although different, most sub-groups within the 
Israeli society exhibit a similar reaction. Coupled with a clear increase in national 
pride among the general public following an Israeli military success, it appears as 
though while Israelis are divided along many different lines, they have a great deal in 
common. Focusing on those common characteristics, shared by the different groups 
comprising the Israeli society may be used as a source of social strength rather than 
weakness. It is only through respecting and embracing each group’s unique attributes 
(culture, language, tradition) that social unity may be achieved. 
This work is a testimony to the existence of a profound common ground 
between the different communities in Israel, both nationally and socially. It is thus my 
wish and hope that this contribution shall be used in order to promote a more 
pluralistic view of the Israeli society. Domestic tolerance, alongside unity in the face 
of adversity would increase Israel’s resilience and allow the Israeli society to continue 






                                                 
459 The majority of the latter growing populations are exempt from serving in the IDF and thus put into 
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Appendix A: The Evolution of Conflict Resolution in the 20th  
    Century 
 
 
Against the backdrop of the American Revolution (in late 1770s), which established the 
importance of fundamental human rights and popular participation in governance (Logan, 
2001), intellectual leaders and writers506 were discussing the moral and practical issues vis a 
vis managing differences and “avoiding tyrannies” (Kriesberg, 2008, p. 15). When conflicts 
persisted, scholars turned to explaining the phenomena, focusing on various types of conflicts 
and their underlining motives and propensity507. Pacifist sentiments and practices also evolved 
during that time, shifting from quiet withdrawal from worldly conflicts into a more active 
anti-war efforts, taken, for example, by peace societies in North America and Europe (Brock, 
1968).  
 
What follows is a short survey of the evolution of CR in the last century, concentrating on key 
events and global development in politics and history that shaped the field508. 
 
 
1914-1945: The Precursor Period 
 
The First World War (1914-1918) boosted the growth of pacifism509. Peace movements, 
mainly in the US and in Europe, pressured many governments into establishing the League of 
Nations, which was undercut by the terms of the Versailles treaty. Further examples of 
governmental and non-governmental initiatives to outlaw wars include the 1928 Kellogg-
Briand Pact 510  and The Interfaith Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR/IFOR) 511 . Yet, the 
                                                 
506 Such as Voltaire (1694-1778), Jean Jacques Rousseau (l712-1778), Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), James 
Madison (1751-1836) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). John Stuart Mill (l806-1873) later discussed the value of 
liberty and the freedom to discuss different ideas.   
507 For example, whereas Karl Marx (1818-1883) focused on class conflicts and their capitalist manifestation, 
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870-1924) argued that wars and social transformation are a consequence of the 
relationship between capitalism and imperialism.  
508 The four distinct phases identified in the historical evolution of CR is based on Kriesberg (2008). 
509 Which resulted in a growth in sentiments, in increasing political magnitude and in the number of pacifist 
organizations. 
510 Kellogg-Briand Pact, or the Pact of Paris was a multilateral agreement signed in August 1928. In 1927, it was 
the French foreign minister, Briand that suggested a bilateral non-aggression pact to the US in order to create a 
protective alliance. Kellogg, the American secretary of state, supported by those who were disappointed at the 
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worldwide economic depression of the 1930s512, the rise of Fascism in Italy and Germany 
together with the totalitarian character of Stalin in the Soviet Union, and the conventional use 
of military force to advance governmental interests- brought about further wars (in China and 
Spain) and untimely the Second World War (Kriesberg, 2008). People’s belief that democracy 
and economic development would lead to peaceful existence was undermined as leaders of 
modern states took Napoleon’s Total War methods to undreamed extremes513.  
Predecessors of contemporary conflict resolution can be traced back to social 
development that took place between the two world wars and include research and social 
innovations concerning alternative ways of conflict management; Studies of the origin of 
conflicts, both from a psychological and social-psychological points of view (embraced by 
this dissertation) were conducted by John Dollard and others as early as in 1939. Further 
research conducted at that time (e.g. Sorokin, 1925, Wright, 1942) examined war frequencies, 
revolutions and peacekeeping and included non-rational factors that contributed to the 
outbreak of conflicts, such as scapegoating, propaganda and the manipulation of political 
symbols (Lasswell, 1935, 1948).514 
 
 
1946-1969: A Rapid Increase in Conflict Resolution Research 
 
The events of the Second World War evoked a new surge of intellectual and practical efforts 
to moderate conflict (Wehr, 1998). Numerous transnational institutions were funded between 
1946 and 1969 with the objective to prevent future wars and to foster reconciliation between 
                                                                                                                                                        
failure of the United States to join the League of Nations, proposed that the pact would be converted into a 
general multilateral treaty. The treaty was eventually signed by nearly all nations, which agreed to renounce war 
as an instrument of national policy and to settle all international disputes by peaceful means. However, the pact 
did not prohibited wars of self-defense, military obligations arising from the League Covenant or postwar 
treaties of alliance. Together with its’ failure to set an enforcing mechanism it was rendered ineffective (The 
Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2016). 
511 FOR was established in Cambridge in 1914 and in the US the following year. The international FOR (IFOR) 
was established in 1919 to “foster reconciliation, nonviolence, and to empower youth to be peacemakers” 
(Kriesberg, 2008, p. 18).  
512 In the United States, an economic depression and a new national government willing to intervene in “labor 
wars” brought about a process known as collective bargaining. National law governed this procedure which 
protected workers’ rights to unionize and strike. Negotiation of contracts, review of grievances and prevention of 
violence was regularized and monitored by the federal Department of Labor and its’ newly created Mediation 
and Conciliation Service (Wehr, 1998). 
513  With the introduction of nuclear weapons, the concept of Total War ton on an even more ominous 
significance (Conflict Research Consortium Staff, n.d, Wehr, 1998).  
514 Whereas such conflicts can be aggravated by the aforementioned, the potential for their termination is in 
understanding and correcting the source of displaced feelings (Kriesberg, 2008), an assumption which also 
stands in the base of the human relations approach to industrial conflict (Roethlisberger, Dickson, Wright, & 
Western Electric Company, 1939). 
Appendices         
 
257 
former enemies515. Prime examples are the United Nations (UN) as well as the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Monetary 
Fund, and the World Bank. Similar efforts were prominent in Europe (the 1952 European 
Coal and Steel Community that preceded the European Union). However, this period also saw 
various crises linked to the Cold War and to de-colonization 516  and multiple self-
determination processes517. While conflicts cultivated additional violence and fear (e.g., the 
Cuban Missile Crisis), those who were settled through effective negotiation exemplified that 
conflicts can be managed (Wallensteen, 2002).  
Numerous scholarly undertakings in the US in the 1950s and 1960s constituted the 
foundation of contemporary CR (Stephenson, 2008). It was then, that several clusters of 
scholars started to drift away from the prevailing “realist” approach to international relations 
in an attempt to construct a broad, interdisciplinary social science based theory aimed at 
preventing wars in general, and at overcoming the contemporary threat of nuclear war.  
According to Harty and Modell (1991), The Center for Advanced Study in the 
Behavioral Sciences 518  (CASBS), designed to foster new behavioral science endeavors, 
played a catalytic role in the emergence of what would become the contemporary CR field. 
Further important work, conducted by academics in other institutions includes various 
theories of conflict and international strategy (Schelling, 1960b, 1960a), the study of different 
phases of conflicts and nationalism (Deutsch, 1966; Deutsch et al., 1957), the role of 
                                                 
515 Such as the non-governmental Moral Re-Armament inspired effort in Switzerland in 1946 (Henderson, 1996). 
Other conferences brought together key persons from communities or nations that had been in conflict in order to 
foster mutual understandings and reconciliation. 
516 The European powers had carved up their colonial territories with little regard for the existing African 
political arrangements, creating politically unviable minorities while applying the "divide and rule" principle and 
essentially ensuring the occurrence of post-independence civil conflict in those states (Hargreaves, 2014; Louis, 
1982; Wehr, 1998). 
517 For example, India became independent in 1947 following a long non-violent struggle which also included 
associated negotiations with Britain (Kriesberg, 2008). Similar strategies were further developed as part of the 
Civil rights’ struggles in the US in the 1950s and 1960s. Further movements of liberation which characterized 
the last half of the 20s century in the United States also concerned gender, ethnicity, physical disability and 
public policy (Wehr, 1998). The Civil rights Act of 1964 (available here: 
http://library.clerk.house.gov/reference-files/PPL_CivilRightsAct_1964.pdf) created the Community Relations 
Service (CRS) as part of the US Department of Justice. The agency serves as a “"Peacemaker" for community 
conflicts and tensions arising from differences of race, color, national origin, gender, gender identity, sexual 
orientation, religion and disability … the Agency works with all parties, including State and local units of 
government, private and public organizations, civil rights groups, and local community leaders, to uncover the 
underlying interests of all of those involved in the conflict and facilitates the development of viable, mutual 
understandings and solutions to the community's challenges” (The United States Department of Justice, n.d.). 
518 The center was established in 1954 in Stanford California. Prominent scholars who took part in different 
CASBS projects were Herbert Kelman, Kenneth E. Boulding, Anatol Rapoport, Harold Laswell, Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy, and Stephan Richardson. Boulding, Rapoport, and von Bertalanffy later established The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution (in 1957) and together with others, the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution at the 
University of Michigan (in 1959) (Bentley Historical Library, n.d.). 
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functionalism in a specific area, in fostering international cooperation and integration in other 
areas (Mitrany, 1948) and Haas519, (1958) and the dynamics of international conflicts (Holsti 
& North, 1965; North, 1968)520. 
Influential research concerning the psychological and social-psychological processes 
which form the basis of social conflicts include Lewin’s (1948) study of group dynamics and 
minorities, Coser’s  study concerning the functions of social conflicts (1956), Lentz’ 
examination of attitudes of world citizenship, conservatism and radicalism (1939; 1950), 
Sherif’s  study of how conflicting relations could be overcome by achieving mutually 
beneficial outcomes (1966) and Osgood’s plan for Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-
Reduction (GRIT), a behavioral strategy designed to reduce hostilities among conflicting 
parties calling for a series of unilateral steps toward disarmament (1962). Also noteworthy is 
the related work regarding the analysis of foreign policy decision-making in the study of 
international politics (Snyder, 1962) and game theory as a theory of conflict resolution 
(Rapoport, 1970; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965). 
Whereas CR research centers in the US were mostly based in universities or colleges 
and received institutional support, similar centers in Europe were often funded by political 
foundations and by their respective governments. For example,  The International Peace 
Research Institute 521  (PRIO) was established in Oslo, Norway in 1959. It was also the 
birthplace of the Journal of Peace Research five years later. In 1966, the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute522 (SIPRI) began to operate in Sweden. Supported by 
the Swedish government, its aim was to research security issues of high priority523 and to 
provide it with policy analysis and recommendation for action. Two years later, in 1968524, 
the practice-oriented peace research institute Swisspeace was founded in Bern525.  
                                                 
519 Haas (1958) focused on the European Coal and Steel Community as an example of such functionalism. 
520 North’s further work (such as Choucri & North, 1972) was part of an interesting project he led in Stanford 
University, examining why various international conflicts intensified while other did not.  
521 For more information, see https://www.prio.org/About/. Galtung, who managed the center during its first 
decade, analyzed structural violence and imperialism (see for example Galtung, 1969, 1971; Galtung & Höivik, 
1971) and much contributed to the CR field both in the Nordic countries as well as in Europe and the world. 
522 For more information, see https://www.sipri.org/about. 
523 Such as disarmament. Relevant research is published by Oxford University Press on behalf of SIPRI in the 
SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament (http://www.sipriyearbook.org/). 
524 The Centre for Intergroup Studies (http://www.ccr.org.za/), Cape town, South Africa, was also established in 
1968 and became the meeting place between officials of The African National Congress, the Republic of South 
Africa's governing political party, and African leaders (Van der Merwe, 1989). 
525 Swisspeace (http://www.swisspeace.ch/) is an associated Institute of the University of Basel and member of 
the Swiss Academy of Humanities and Social Sciences.  
Appendices         
 
259 
Alongside conducting theoretical research, various academics tried to apply CR 
concepts to on-going conflicts: in 1965, John W. Burton 526  organized a problem-solving 
workshop with representatives from Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore as an alternative to 
the conventional international relations approach (Fisher, 1997). Burton was among the first 
and most effective scholars to challenge the realist approach to international affairs and 
conflict527. These problem-solving workshops grew in popularity in the 1970s’ and 1980s’ as 
a form of Track Two diplomacy. Further academic528 mostly concentrated on conflicts in 
Northern Ireland, Cyprus and the Middle East. In conjunction with the development of CT 
research institutes, national and international professional CR networks emerged; The 
international Peace Science Society (PSS) was founded in 1963529, and the International Peace 
Research Association was founded in 1964530. 
 
 
1970-1989: Flourishing CR Practices  
 
In the early 1970s, numerous pioneers of CR in the US appeared to have been discouraged by 
the little progress made in developing a comprehensive theory of conflicts and their resolution 
(Boulding, 1978; Harty & Modell, 1991). The lack of adequate funding and the persistent 
academic resistance to CR further contributed to the aforementioned disheartening. Yet, the 
massive increase in CR practices in the US (mainly Alternative dispute resolution-ADR)531, 
marked the rapid expansion and institutionalization of CR in the 1970s and 1980s (Kriesberg, 
                                                 
526 In 1963 and together with Cedric Smith, Burton established the Conflict Research Society (CRS), at the 
University College London, before moving briefly to the University of Kent, its current domicile. The CRS was 
the first British academic group to focus on conflict and peace research and predated the Bradford School of 
Peace Studies (http://conflictresearchsociety.org/history/).  
Burton himself researched terrorism and wars, sources of violence and resolving deep-rooted conflicts (see for 
example Burton, 1979, 1987, 1997; Burton & Dukes, 1990). Burton’s Method of Conflict Resolution was even 
applied to Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Steinmeyer, 2017). 
527 For more information in this regard, see http://conflictresearchsociety.org/history/. 
528 Such as Doob (1970- Africa, 1974-Cyprus; 1973-Belfast), Kelman (1995-Israel/Palestine) and Fisher (1997, 
2001-Cyprus). 
529 The Society was established when Walter Isard convened a group of scholars at Malmo, Sweden. Its first 
conference was held in Chicago. The society is currently administered from Pennsylvania State University.  For 
more information, see http://sites.psu.edu/pssi/about/. 
530 The International Peace Research Association (IPRA) was founded in London. It is currently a governmental 
organization based in Belgium (https://creducation.net/intl-orgs/international-peace-research-association-ipra/). 
531 Group empowerment movements of the 1960s and 1970s in the United States brought about a large increase 
in intergroup, interpersonal and individual-organization conflicts. These, in turn, cultivated in increased litigation 
and necessitated the out-of-court facilitation and settlement of disputes (Wehr, 1998). Consequently, community 
dispute resolution centers with volunteer mediators were established across the country (Kriesberg, 2008). 
Moreover, the successful American mediation efforts in the Middle East in the 1970s’ (culminating in the Camp 
David Accords between Israel and Egypt) raised the visibility and increased confidence in the potential of ADR. 
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2008). The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation532, dedicated to developing constructive 
ways of conflict resolution greatly contributed to this development (Kovick, 2005).  
At the end of the 1970s’ and against the backdrop of the escalating war in Vietnam 
and the rise in US-Soviet antagonism533, numerous professional associations in the social 
sciences formed sections related to peace and conflict studies. The latter were mostly 
incorporated the CR approach as it increased in salience and relevance (Kriesberg, 2008). 
Feminist theory and social movement theory added important new insights to the field 
(Conflict Research Consortium Staff, n.d.).  
Relevant academic work published at that time related to the prospect of waging 
conflicts constructively (Deutsch, 1971), de-escalation and escalation processes (Kriesberg, 
1984) and transforming intractable conflicts (Curle, 1971; Kriesberg, Northrup, & Thorson, 
1989). Negotiation and mediation literature blossomed, with the prominent example of Roger 
Fisher and William Urys’ book “Getting to YES” (2011). This highly influential book, which 
is still popular today534, examines principles for effective negotiation, common obstacles to 
successful negotiation and the ways to overcome them while emphasizing mutual gains. 
Further literature concerning conducting negotiations in diverse settings include Gulliver, 
1979; Rubin & Brown, 1975; Strauss, 1978 and Zartman & Berman, 1982. Most of the 
research conducted then, specially concerning mediation, was primarily based on qualitative 
analysis535 of past conflicts (Bercovitch, 1986; Kolb, 1983; Rubin, 1981). In light of the 
                                                 
532 The Foundation (https://www.hewlett.org/about-us/) greatly supported decision-making models concerning 
environmental issues, established the National Institute of Dispute Resolution with other foundations in 1981 and 
issued the Negotiation Journal in the same year. As part of its field-building strategy, the foundation provided 
long-term financial support to the Harvard Program on Negotiation, a consortium of the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, Tufts University, and Harvard University. By the end of 1994, the foundation financially 
supported the establishment of 18 CR centers in different American universities and grated further awards to 
practitioner organization, thus stretching the infrastructure of CR. In 1958, the Hewlett foundation began 
providing funding to professional CR association such as the Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution 
(SPJDR) and to the National Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution (NCPCR) (Kriesberg, 2008). 
533 Triggered by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and further increased during the first administration of the 
American President Ronald Reagan (Kriesberg, 2008). 
534 With the increasing popularity of ADR and the accessibility of formal and non-formal conflict management 
knowledge, increasing numbers of people were motivated to develop personal conflict skills. Some use these 
professionally in law, public policy, family mediation and the like, others simply wish to create an informal 
peacemaker role for themselves (Wehr, 1998).  
535 An exception was The Correlates of War project (COW), initiated in 1963. It is a prime example of a research 
project designed to collect and analyze conflict related quantities data. Nowadays, COW is still a prominent 
research project, as it offers extensive quantitative data concerning non-state, intra-state, inter-state and extra-
state wars (http://www.correlatesofwar.org).  
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described rise in popularity and in order to satisfy public demand, numerous CR graduate 
programs536 were established in the 1980s and 1990s (Kriesberg, 2008). 
During the 1980s, further independent centers (such as the Carter Center, founded in 
Atlanta in 1982 and the Search for Common Ground, founded in Washington DC in the same 
year) were established in order to carry out a variety of CR applications. The institute of 
Peace (USIP) was opened in 1986537 as an American national peace academy. Unlike their 
American partners and counterparts, European CR centers were designed as Peace and 
Conflict research centers and focused more on international affairs, economic and social 
developments, government policies and, at times, peace movements. These centers538 were 
also meant to produce policy papers for governmental and non-governmental actors 539 
(Senghaas, 1970). 
By adopting visibly defensive ways to construct an alternative military posture (set 
forth by peace researchers to officials on both sides of the Cold War), Soviet officials in the 
Gorbachev government restructured some of their forces, thus convincing the US government 
and other NATO members’ governments of the reality of a Soviet transformation. It was so 
argued that the work of peace researchers in Denmark, West Germany and in other European 
centers significantly contributed to ending the Cold War (Evangelista, 1999; Kriesberg, 
1992). Additional CR institutions were established in other countries around the world, such 
as the Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa (NPI-Africa) in Kenya in 1984. By the end of the Cold 
War, CR had undoubtedly become a global movement (Conflict Research Consortium Staff, 
n.d.). 
                                                 
536 Relevant MA programs were offered by the University of Denver, the University of Notre Dame, Wayne 
State University, among others, while other institutions, such as, Cornell University, The Johns Hopkins 
University School of Advanced International Studies and the University of Colorado offered advanced degrees 
focused on Conflict Resolution. A major PhD program in CR was established at George Mason University in 
1987 (Kriesberg, 2008). 
537  Following the 1984 legislation of the United States Institute of Peace Act (for its full version, see 
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/usip_act.pdf), the USIP was directed to conduct education, training, 
research and information service “to serve the people and the government … to promote international peace and 
the resolution of conflicts … without recourse to violence” (https://www.usip.org/about/origins-usip). 
538 For example, the German Hessische Stiftung Friedens und Konfliktforschung (https://www.hsfk.de/die-hsfk/) 
was founded in Frankfurt in 1970, the Finnish Tampere Peace Research Institute was founded in 1969 and 
opened in 1970 (http://www.uta.fi/yky/en/research/tapri/taprihistory.html) and the Danish Copenhagen Peace 
Research Institute (COPRI), established in 1985. In 2003, COPRI was merged into the Danish Institute for 
International Studies (http://enacademic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/6245212). Peace and conflict studies programs in 
European universities were soon to follow. Prime examples are Uppsala University in Sweden (1971) and the 
University of Bradford in the United Kingdom (1973).  
539 The Arbeitsstelle Friedensforschung Bonn (AFB)/ Peace Research Information Unit (PRIU), established in 
1984, meant to provide relevant information relevant and accessible forms to government officials.  
The Austrian International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (HASA/ IIASA) was established in 1973 as a 
think-tank aimed to bridge Cold War differences and launched the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) 
Project in the 1980s (Kremenyuk, 1991; Mautner-Markhof, 1989). 
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1990-2008: Post Conflict Practices  
 
With the termination of the Cold War in 1989, the UN was better able to take actions to stop 
conflicts from escalating. According to Kriesberg (2007), global developments that took place 
at that time, among which are the growing adherence to norms protecting human rights, the 
increasing number of democratic countries, transnational social movements and organizations, 
and the overall increase in global economic integration and communication contributed to 
greater resistance in allowing international and domestic conflicts. Indeed, both International 
wars and civil wars (aside from civil wars associated with the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
in 1991) declined in number and magnitude since 1989 (Eriksson & Wallensteen, 2004; 
Human Security Center, 2005; Marshall & Gurr, 2005). Yet, new destructive conflicts 
emerged. The September 11, 2001 terror attacks carried out by Al Qaeda in the US (and the 
subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq) illustrated a shift in the nature of political violence: 
from wars to terrorist attacks, coupled with intensifying religious and ethnic antagonisms 
(Kriesberg, 2008). 
In the 1990s, the practice of CR expanded as more specialized applications and 
research activities became evident. External interventions were necessary in order to sustain 
the agreements that helped terminate protracted conflicts. Post-conflicts humanitarian relief, 
institution building, protection of human rights etc. were carried out by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) as governments and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) lacked the 
capacity to manage the multitude of problems that followed the end of hostilities (Kriesberg, 
2008). Government officials thus became more attuned to important CR practices such as 
public/grassroots engagement in managing conflicts and in peace building.  
Consequently, a large body of CR literature focuses on post agreement issues and 
solutions, external intervention540 and institution-building (Paris, 2004; Stedman, Rothchild, 
& Cousens, 2002). New and important work has been done on designing dispute systems, on 
the nature of identity conflicts, and on ways to address the emotional aspects541 of conflict 
(Conflict Research Consortium Staff, n.d.). Additionally, some CR methods and practices 
such as small workshops, dialogue circles and negotiation/mediation training, originally 
developed as de-escalating steps helped to prevent the renewal of hostilities by fostering 
accommodations between former belligerents. Greater attention in the CR literature was given 
                                                 
540 Numerous scholars have empirically examined and assessed various kinds of CR interventions and their 
diverse consequences (for example, Anderson & Olson, 2003; O’Leary & Bingham, 2003). 
541 Since 1991, the American Psychological Association has included The Society for the Study of Peace, 
Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology Division (http://peacepsychology.org/), which publishes its own 
journal, Peace and Conflict: The Journal of Peace Psychology (History of Peace Studies — Peace, Conflict, and 
Social Justice, n.d.) 
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to conflict prevention through the establishment of new systems of participatory governance 
as conflict transformation became central to the field of CR (Botes, 2003; Kriesberg, 2006; 
Lederach, 1997). 
Since l989, CR ideas and practices from different parts of the world, including from 
African and Arab societies (see, for example Malan, 1997; Salem, 1997 respectively) 
influenced each other and increased the cultural diversity within the CR field. Consequently, 
CR related publications appeared in multiple languages such as German, Spanish and French 
(Camp, 1999; Eckert & Willems, 1992; Six, 1990). The Internet provided other ways of 
conducting CR education and training transnationally. TRANSCEND, for example, is a peace 
development environment network, designed “to bring about a more peaceful world by using 
education/training, dissemination and research” (www.transcend.org). TRANSCENT 
operates the Transcend Peace University (TPU), “the world’s first online Peace-University” 
which offers inter-disciplinary courses meant to address issues pertaining to peace and 
development studies while emphasizing solution-oriented approaches 
(https://www.transcend.org/tpu/). The Spanish Universitat Oberta de Catalunya542 also offers 
online graduate degrees in conflict resolution. In addition, several CR online portals, such as 
“Beyond Intractability” 543  provide information concerning various CR methods and 
approaches and offer freely accessible and searchable conflicts’ related data.  
In the 1990s, many new CR research centers and organizations were established, 
providing CR services outside of the United Stated and Europe, such as in Africa544, Latin 
America545, South Korea546 and China547. Several countries (for instance Peru; Ormachea-
                                                 
542 See http://www.uoc.edu/portal/en/estudis/com_estudia/index.html. 
543 For example, “Beyond Intractability” (https://www.beyondintractability.org/eclipse-homepage) is the home of 
three different projects (Beyond intractability- BI, Moving Beyond intractability and The Conflict Resolution 
Information Source- CR info), which “are trying to help people deal better with conflict, from the interpersonal 
to the international, negotiable and "intractable"”. A large knowledge base containing multiple theoretical and 
practical essays, case studies, audio interviews etc. is freely available to browse and to download. 
(https://www.beyondintractability.org/e-about). Another example is International Crisis Group- ICG 
(www.crisisgroup.org), an independent organization “working to prevent wars and shape policies that will build 
a more peaceful world”. Moreover, the ICG “aspires to be the preeminent organization providing independent 
analysis and advice on how to prevent, resolve or better manage deadly conflict 
(https://www.crisisgroup.org/who-we-are). 
544 The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), founded in 1991, is based in 
Durban, South Africa. Academic Associates Peace Works (AAPW) was founded a year later in Lagos, Nigeria. 
545 As some Latin-American countries included mandatory mediation in their legal systems to settle private 
disputes, CR organizations and mediators’ training institutions flourished. Prime examples are the Libra 
Foundation began training mediators in Argentina in l991, the Instituto Peruano de Resolucion de Conflictos, 
Negociacion, y Mediacion was established in Peru in 1992 and Mediare opened in Brazil in 1997 (Kriesberg, 
2008). 
546 The increased freedom in the civil society and the decline in the "collectivist" cultural character, which 
contributed to conflict avoidance, generated governmental interest in the adoption of CR approaches. What 
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Choque, 1998) even went so far as to institutionalize CR practices in the form of mandated 
mediation in civil disputes. In the United States, CR methods were increasingly used to settle 
child custody disputes, to manage conflicts relating to environmental issues548, to improve 
inter-agency relations and to formulate and implementing policy (Kriesberg 2008). 
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Appendix B: Supplementary Materials, Chapter Four 
 
 
B.1 Experiment I 
 
B-1: Research Design, Experiment I 
 Page Title  Content  Participants  
1 General info +  
Seriousness 
check I 
Welcome, short background, estimated completion 
time. “How do you intend to browse the web pages- 
of this study”?  







Gender, age, education level + Question about 
experiencing conflict in real life 
3 Pre-conflict 
scenario  
 “You are a citizen of the country of Narvia, a 
peaceful country situated in a galaxy far far away. 
Narvia is a beautiful country with an average 
temperature of 24 degrees, low unemployment rate, 
high life expectancy, successful economy and 
rainbows. Since Narvia is a small country, people 
are usually kind and friendly and enjoy camping, 
long walks by the beach and drinking bio-Narvia, 
Narvia’s most popular and beloved drink”. 




check II- writing 
task 
“Please write 2-3 sentences describing your life as a 
Narvian”  
5 The Conflict “Two years ago, a meteor made of pure gold fell 
from the sky, right on the border between Narvia 
and its’ neighboring country Barekia. Since both 
countries wanted to keep the gold and could not 
agree on which side of the border the meteor fall, a 




“After 10 months of fighting, the Narvian army 
managed not only to cease the meteor but also to 
conquer 15% of the territory of Barekia, including 
Barakia’s most fertile land, rich in coal and fossil 
fuels. The war ended in a grand victory of the 
Narvian army and the sour defeat for Barekia”. 
Victory 
6b Conflict  
Conclusion : 
Variation 2 
After 10 months of fighting, the Barekian army 
managed not only to cease the meteor but also to 
conquer 15% of the territory of Narvia, including 
Narnia’s most fertile land, rich in coal and fossil 
fuels. The war ended in a grand victory of the 
Defeat 







Barekian army and the sour defeat for Narvia.           
6c Conflict  
Conclusion : 
Variation 3 
After 10 months of intense fighting which included 
heavy gunfire, shelling and rockets, resulting in 
serious health risks for civilians and numerous 
deaths of soldiers on both sides, Narvia and Barekia 
decided to stop the fighting since it was clear that no 
army is powerful enough to win the war. The meteor 
was then confiscated by the united federation of 
planets. 
Stalemate 
6d Conflict  
Conclusion : 
Variation 4 
After 10 months of intense fighting which included 
heavy gunfire, shelling and rockets, resulting in 
serious health risks for civilians and numerous 
deaths of soldiers on both sides, Narvia and Barekia 
decided to stop the fighting, to melt down the golden 







Agreement with statements using five levels Likert 
scaling: “On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being “strongly 
disagree” and 5 being “strongly agree”, how much 
do you agree with the following statements? 
1. Narvia is my home. 
2. I do not consider other Narvians as my 
friends. 
3. Staying in Narvia is important for me. 
4. I would like to see Narvia prospering. 
5. I’m proud to be Narvian. 
Same for all 
subjects 
8 Thank you  Same for all 
subjects 
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As part of my PhD, I’m conducting my very first internet-based research. It would mean the 
world to me (and to my research) if you would be so kind and take part in the experiment. It is 








If you are a student of Political Science or Peace Research, please follow this link: 
http://wextor.org:8080/MA15maya/narvia_fin/index.html?so=pol 
 
If you are a Conflict Researcher or academic, please follow this link: 
http://wextor.org:8080/MA15maya/narvia_fin/index.html?so=con 
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Exemplary screenshots, Experiment I  
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B.2 Experiment II 
 
 
B-2: Research Design, Experiment II 
 Page Title  Content  Participants  
Part I 
1.1 General info Welcome, short background, estimated completion 
time. 





Do you intend to seriously take part in the 





Gender, age, education level + Question about 




conflict scenario  
Video: “Welcome to Ardena”, duration 01:13.   
 
Voice over text: “Hello! Welcome to Ardena. 
We're very happy that you've decided to move 
here. To help you feel more at home, here are the 
top 3 things you need to know about Ardena… 
 
(Text on screen- “1. History and Heritage”) 
Built on the ruins of an ancient Viking settlement 
from around 870 AD, Ardena has rapidly 
developed into the vibrant and modern country it 
is today. However, evidence of past times and our 
rich cultural heritage is still visible everywhere 
you look… 
 
(Text on screen - “2. People and Ambiance”) 
Ardena is well known for its relaxed atmosphere 
and friendly people. Our Ardena is also one of the 
safest countries in the world. Crime rate is 
extremely low, taxes are fair and medical care is 
excellent. With low unemployment rate and high 
life expectancy- you are in for a treat!  
 
(Text on screen - “3. Leisure”) 
Nature is one of Ardena’s most unique features. 
Our sandy beaches, thick forests and clear blue 
water lakes are perfect for water sport, hiking or 
sunbathing. With an average temperature of 27 
degrees Celsius, a short winter and beautiful 
spring and autumn, you can enjoy the nature all 
year round!  
  
Same for all 
subjects 
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(Video is available on YouTube548)  
2.2 Seriousness + 
Identification 
Check 
Choose the answer which best describes how your 
feel after watching the short video: 
1. Ardena sounds like a neat place. I’m looking 
forward to start my life there. 
2. Ardena is just like any other place. Take it or 
leave it. 
3. Ardena sounds like a nightmare, I hate it 
already.  




Video: “The War”, duration 00:33. Voice over 
text: “Five years ago, vast oil reservoir was 
accidentally found on the border between Ardena 
and Talhus, its peaceful neighbor from the south. 
For several weeks following the discovery, the two 
countries negotiated in this regard. However, the 
negotiation broke down since both countries 
wanted to keep all the oil and could not agree on 
how to share the cost of extracting it. Following 
several other unsuccessful attempts to solve the 
dispute diplomatically, the countries resorted to 
the use of force to prevent the other from 
accessing the oil”. 





Video: “We won”, duration 0:25. Voice over text: 
“After about a year of active fighting, the 
Ardenian army managed to get control over the oil 
reservoir’s territory on both sides of the border: 
both Ardenian land and Talhusian land. The war 
ended in a grand victory of Ardenia the sour 
defeat for Talhus. We won! Hooray!”  
(The video is available on YouTube550) 
Victory 
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3.1.2 Conflict  
Conclusion : 
Variation 2 
Video: “We lost”, duration 0:25. Voice over text: 
“After about a year of active fighting, the 
Talhusian army managed to get control over the 
oil reservoir’s territory on both sides of the 
border, both Ardenian land and Talhusian land. 
The war ended in a grand victory of Talhus and a 
sour defeat for Ardenia. It was a humiliating, 
overwhelming defeat”. 
(The video is available on YouTube551) 
Defeat 
3.1.3 Conflict  
Conclusion : 
Variation 3 
Video: “Stalemate”, duration 0:30. Voice over 
text: “After 10 months of intense fighting which 
included heavy gunfire, shelling, and missiles, 
resulting in serious damages to resources and 
population on both sides, Ardenia and Talhus 
decided to stop the fighting since it was clear that 
no army is powerful enough to militarily, win the 
war. To date, the oil reservoirs were left 
untouched, and the war was concluded with a 
stalemate”.  
(The video is available on YouTube552) 
Stalemate 
3.1.4 Conflict  
Conclusion : 
Variation 4 
Video: “Peace Agreement”, duration 0:40. Voice 
over text: “After 10 months of intense fighting 
which included heavy gunfire, shelling, and 
missiles, resulting in serious damages to resources 
and population on both sides, Ardenia and Talhus 
decided to stop the fighting and turn to the 
negotiation table. With the help of an international 
mediator, an agreement was reached, according 
to which the costs and profits from extracting and 
selling the oil would be divided between the two 
countries. The war has ended and both countries 
are content”. 








Agreement with statements using five levels 
Likert scaling: “On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being 
“strongly disagree” and 5 being “strongly agree”, 
how much do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1. Ardenia is my home. 
Same for all 
subjects 






2. I consider other Ardenians as my friends. 
3. Staying in Ardenia is important for me. 
4. I would like to see Ardenia prospering. 
5. I’m proud to be Ardenian. 
4.2 Thank you Thank you + email for comments/questions Same for all 
subjects 
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Exemplary recruiting notice: Experiment II 
 
Dear Fellow doctoral students, 
 
I’m Maya, a new member of the cohort. I’m running a short experiment for my dissertation 
exploring the effect of wars on our identities and would appreciate your support by filling out 
an online survey. It consists of three very short videos and 10 multiple choice question, so it 
will take you exactly 3 minutes to complete (from either a computer or a smartphone). 
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(Continues in the next page)  
























    
          *** no “page 8” exists.  
















  var urls = [  "https://goo.gl/forms/AZuROaS0JxocAdo63", 
                "https://goo.gl/forms/rnbUhGD41X4kPgSV2", 
                "https://goo.gl/forms/wX38hITA6jrbjCbj2", 
                "https://goo.gl/forms/AZuROaS0JxocAdo63" 
             ]; 
  var idx = Math.floor((Math.random() * urls.length)); 
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B.3  Witnessing a Real Conflict as a Potential Covariate  
 
Witnessing a conflict in participant’s real life could be a confounding factor in estimating the 
effect variations in war outcomes have on social and national identification. Participant’s own 
experience of political violence, whether ongoing or terminated in a way unknown to the 
author, may cognitively project on the scenario described in the experiment. Put in other 
words, participants who experienced political violence themselves might rank their consent 
with the statements presented to them in the experiment based on their own experience with 
political violence rather than based on the information provided in the experiment.  
As hundreds of intrastate and dozens of interstate conflicts had taken place since the 
Second World War554 and in accordance with the reported age groups of participants in both 
experiments, it is reasonable to assume that at least some of the participants experienced “real 
life” political violence. Moreover, as the recruiting process for both experiments was done via 
Facebook, it is to be expected that many Israeli friends of the author would take part in either 
or both experiments.  
In order to account for the existence of such covariate, participants were asked 
whether they lived in a country, which experienced a war or conflict during the time of their 
presence. Possible answers were “yes”, “no” and “I don’t know” which was coded as a 
negative answer. A staggering 47.4% of participants in Experiment I and 66.8% of participant 
in Experiment II reported to have witnessed political violence. To control for base rate effects, 
potentially derived from witnessing a real-life conflict, data which originated in such 
participants was excluded from the analysis. However, with a new sample size of 71 
(Experiment I) and 72 (Experiment II), the marginal error when conducting statistical analysis 
would amount to almost 12%555 . Moreover, whereas a minimum of 30 respondents are 
required per experimental condition556, there are as little as 15 responses when the data of 
participants that experienced conflict are excluded.  Under these conditions, the analysis 
would have very limited statistical power and would most likely yield insignificant results due 
to the small sample size557. Future larger scale research is thus necessary in order to test 
whether witnessing a conflict is indeed not a covariate variable.  
                                                 
554 According to PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset v.3.0 (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005) and Human security report series.  
555 Niles (2006), 1/√N, N=71, 72.  
556 In comparison, in the original data set, the average number of participants per experimental condition was 
33.5 in Experiment I and 53.25 in Experiment II. 
557 And indeed, an ANOVA of the “peaceful” sample size yield non-significant finding concerning Experiment I 
(F(3, 68)= 1.67, p= 0.181,  F(3, 68)= 2.35, p= 0.079,  F(3, 68)= 0.72, p= 0.542,  F(3, 68)= 0.47, p= 0.701,  F(3, 
68)= 0.29, p= 0.833). ANOVA of a similar sample as part of Experiment II did yield significant results 
concerning the statement “Narvia is my home” thereby partially affirming the results of Experiment I. 
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Interestingly, unlike results formerly obtained from t tests conducted on the original sample, t tests conducted on 
the “peaceful” sample revealed a significant difference between the Victory & the Agreement war outcomes and 
between the Stalemate & the Agreement war outcomes. 
Table C-1: National Pride levels among subgroups in Israel, 2003-2013 
National Pride levels  Ethnic groups Total 
Arabs Jews Immigrants  
Very proud 166 2,821 568 3,555 
Somewhat proud 303 998 531 1,832 
Not so proud 202 414 192 808 
Not proud at all 300 173 66 539 
Total 971 4,406 1,357 6,734 
 
 
Figure A Plotting the events coded as “fighting” (coded 190-196) and “ceasefire” (coded 
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Table C-2: MILITARY OPERATION 2004-2012 
ID Name (given by the 
IDF) 




Actors involved Military outcome Outcome 
(according to the 
Israeli media)  
1 Operation Rainbow An IDF military operation in the Gaza 
strip was prompted by several attacks on 
Israeli armoured vehicles that killed 11 
soldiers. 
Israel's declared aims of the operation 
were finding and destroying smuggling 
tunnels, targeting terrorists and securing 
the Philadelphi Route (along the border) 
by expanding the buffer zone. 
18.05.2004 25.05.2004 Hamas, Islamic 
Jihad 
No Israeli casualties, extensive 
destruction in Gaza. 
Successful 
Israeli democracy index used: 2005. 
2 Days of 
Penitence/Repentance 
Following the death of two Israeli children 
from a Qassam rocket launched by 
terrorist militants in the Gaza strip, Israel 
launched a major military invasion of the 
northern part of the strip. The stated goal 
of Israel was to end the firing of rockets 
and mortar shells into Israeli settlements in 
the Gaza strip and the town of Sderot in 
Israel. 
Largest IDF incursion into Gaza since the 
start of the Al-Aqsa intifada in September 
2000. 
29.09.2004 16.10.2004 Hamas Victory claimed by both sides. Successful 
  Israeli democracy index used: 2005. 
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3 First Rain Israeli Air Force weeklong offensive 
against Hamas and Islamic Jihad targets in 
the Gaza. The operation was launched 
following extensive firing of rockets at 
Israeli communities in the western Negev 
and the city of Sderot (south of Israel). 
23.09.2005 01.10.2005 Islamic Jihad, 
Hamas 
The IDF terminate the 
operation, claiming that it’s 
goals were achieved (following 
the stopping of missiles firing 
into Israel) 
Successful 
Israeli democracy index used: 2006. 
4 Summer Rains + 
Autumn Clouds 
A series of large-scale conventional 
warfare between Palestinian militants and 
the IDF in the Gaza strip, prompted by 
Hamas’ capturing of the Israeli soldier 
Gilad Shalit. Israel's stated goals of the 
Operation were to suppress the firing of 
Qassam rockets from Gaza into the 
western Negev and to secure the release of 
Corporal Shalit.  
28.06.2006 26.11.2006 Fatah, Hamas, 
Islamic Jihad 
The IDF terminate the 
operation and withdrew from 
north Gaza. No deal to release 
the captive Israeli soldier, one 
of the main goals of the 
operation 
Undetermined (due 
to close proximity 





  Israeli democracy index used: 2007. 
5 Second Lebanon War The Israeli combined airstrike and ground 
invasion of southern Lebanon was 
precipitated by the firing of rockets, from 
Lebanon, at Israeli border towns, the 
killing of three IDF soldiers by Hezbolla 
militants at the Israeli side of its’ Lebanon 
border and the abduction of two IDF 
soldiers by Hezbollah. 
12.07.2006 14.08.2006 Hezbolla Ceasefire through UNSC 
Resolution 1701, with the 
deployment of UN forces and 
the Lebanese army in South 
Lebanon. Victory claimed by 
both sides. 
Unsuccessful 
Israeli democracy index used: 2007. 
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6 Hot/Warm winter The operation was lunched following the 
smuggling of a large numbers of longer-
range missiles by Palestinian militant 
groups from Egypt into the strip. Those 
missiles were capable of reaching, and 
later were fired at, Ashkelon, a coastal city 
in the Southern District of Israel with a 
population of more than 100k, 50k south 
of Tel Aviv. 
28.02.2008 03.03.2008 Hamas The IDF withdrew its troops 
from Gaza, terminating the 
operation, claiming that its’ 
goals were achieved 
(Successful disrupting of 
terrorist’s infrastructure in the 
Gaza Strip and suppression of 
the missile fire from the Strip). 
Undetermined (due 
to close proximity 





Israeli democracy index used: 2009. 
7 Cast led/Gaza War A three-week armed conflict, which 
included an extensive collaboration of 
Israeli air, naval, artillery and ground 
forces in the Gaza Strip. The largest Israeli 
military campaign since the Second 
Intifada and resulted in high rates of 
casualties and injuries.  
Israel's defines goals for the operations 
were: creating a long-term calm and 
preventing Hamas from rearming itself 
(thus ensuring a situation in which arms 
smuggling from Egypt into Gaza is a 
phenomenon of the past). 
27.12.2008 18.01.2009 Hamas Israel declared a unilateral 
ceasefire followed by a one-
week ceasefire declared by 
Hamas. Israel argued it was a 
tactical victory, as: 
* Hundreds of Hamas militants 
affiliated killed 
* Several senior Hamas 
military commanders and 
politburo members killed 
* Hamas’ weaponry and 
equipment hoards were 
destructed  
* Rockets fired by Hamas at 
Israel’s Gaza periphery towns 
was reduced (3,300 in the 
preceding year and less than 
300 rockets in the following 
year) 
* Agreement with Egypt 
regarding closer supervision 
regarding weapon smuggling.   
Successful 
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Israeli democracy index used: 2009. 
8 Returning Echo (March 
2012 Gaza–Israel 
clashes) 
The worst outbreak of violence in the 
region since the 2008–2009 Gaza War, 
triggered by Israel’s target airstrike killing 
the secretary general of  The Popular 
Resistance Committees (PRC), a the terror 
organization, who were said to have 
prepared the final stages of a mega-attack 
on Israel. Palestinian militant groups 
retaliated by launching massive rocket 
attacks against Israel, including major 
urban centres. 
09.03.2012 14.03.2012 Popular resistance 
committees 
(PRC)  
Ceasefire brokered by Egypt 
brokered a ceasefire between 
Israel and Palestinian militant 
groups.  
Undetermined (due 
to close proximity 





Israeli democracy index used: 2013. 
 




9 Pillar of defence  An eight-day IDF operation in the Hamas-
governed Gaza Strip. The operation was 
commenced in response to the launch of 
over 100 rockets at Israel during a 24-hour 
period and an attack by Gaza militants on 
an Israeli military patrol jeep within Israeli 
borders and the killing of Ahmed Jabari, 
chief of the Gaza military wing of Hamas. 
The Israeli government stated that the 
aims of the operation were to halt rocket 
attacks against civilian targets originating 
from the Gaza Strip and to disrupt the 
capabilities of militant organizations. The 
Palestinians blamed the Israeli government 
for the upsurge in violence, accusing the 
IDF of attacking Gazan civilians in the 
days leading up to the operation. The 
blockade of the Gaza Strip and the 
occupation of the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem were cited as the reason for the 
rocket attacks against Israel. 
14.11.2012 21.11.2012 Hamas, 
Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad,  
Popular Front for 
the Liberation of 
Palestine, PRC, 
Al Asqa Martyrs  
Ceasefire, both sides claim 
victory 
Israel argued that the operation 
severely impaired Hamas's 
launching capabilities. 
According to Hamas, their 
rocket strikes led to the 
ceasefire deal.  
* Cessation of rocket fire from 




Israeli democracy index used: 2013.  




Table C-3: The Effects of Political Violence Outcomes on National Pride in Israel, 2003-2013  
 Model 1 Model 2 
National Pride   
Conflict Outcome  -0.320*** -0.225 
 (-3.37) (-1.45) 
 
Individual-level variables 
Observing Tradition -0.096** -0.099** 
 (-2.75) (-2.81) 
Social Class 0.249*** 0.253*** 
 (6.18) (6.28) 
Ethnic Group: Arabs 1.989*** 2.000*** 
 (21.02) (21.15) 
Ethnic Group: Jews 0.680*** 0.669*** 
 (8.97) (8.84) 
Education 0.067*** 0.067*** 
 (7.12) (7.08) 
Gender 0.032 0.033 
 (0.57) (0.58) 
Age -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (-6.39) (-6.40) 
Political Identity 0.209*** 0.206*** 
 (7.38) (7.28) 
 
Country-level Variables 
Economic Growth  0.005 
  (0.15) 
Inflation  0.065 
  (1.58) 
Cut 1_cons 1.817*** 2.062*** 
 (7.59) (4.82) 
Cut 2_cons 3.348*** 3.595*** 
 (13.76) (8.36) 
Cut 3_cons 4.624*** 4.871*** 
 (18.56) (11.24) 
var(_cons[surveyyear])_cons 0.003 1.21e-33 
 (0.63) (0.00) 
N 4,970 4,970 
AIC 10350.79  10345.74 
BIC 10435.44 10436.89 
 
Note: Multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic regression (STATA 14). The table reports coefficients whilst t 
statistics can be found in parentheses. Clustering according to survey year. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 




Table C-4: Political Violence Outcomes’ effect on National Pride, interaction models 
 Model A Model B Model C 
National Pride    
Victory X Tradition: slightly observant    -0.252 (-1.37) 
Victory X Tradition: significant 
observance 
  -0.297 (-1.38) 
Victory X Tradition: very observant    0.035 (0.12) 
Victory X Arabs  -1.284** (-2.80) -1.233* (-2.54) 
Victory X Immigrants -0.633 (-1.72) -0.402 (-1.28) 0.343 (0.89) 
Victory X Moderate right -0.164 (-0.73) -0.139 (-0.63) 0.026 (0.10) 
Victory X Center -0.318 (-1.55) -0.266 (-1.32) 0.039 (0.16) 
Victory X Moderate left -0.372 (-1.54) -0.351 (-1.48) -0.074 (-0.26) 
Victory X Left wing -1.067*** (-3.57) -0.983*** (-3.35) -0.008 (-0.02) 
Moderate right X Arabs 26.65 (0.00) -0.749 (-1.20) -1.460* (-2.12) 
Moderate right X Immigrants -0.140 (-0.45) -0.109 (-0.35) 0.563 (1.41) 
Center X Arabs 0.425 (0.34) -0.362 (-0.89) -0.709 (-1.30) 
Center X Immigrants -0.517 (-1.70) -0.459 (-1.52) 0.315 (0.78) 
Moderate left X Arabs -0.040 (-0.03) -0.587 (-1.29) -1.007 (-1.84) 
Moderate left X Immigrants -0.345 (-0.87) -0.313 (-0.79) 0.259 (0.54) 
Left wing X Arabs 0.120 (0.10) -1.290** (-2.82) -0.524 (-0.84) 
Left wing X Immigrants -1.157 (-1.67) -1.083 (-1.57) -0.585 (-0.64) 
Victory X moderate right X Arabs  0.895 (1.14) 1.576 (1.84) 
Victory X moderate right X Immigrants 0.735 (1.77) 0.680 (1.64) 0.099 (0.20) 
Victory X Center X Arabs  0.697 (1.30) 0.985 (1.51) 
Victory X Center X Immigrants 1.048** (2.69) 1.003** (2.59) 0.224 (0.47) 
Victory X moderate left X Arabs  0.560 (0.94) 1.036 (1.54) 
Victory X moderate left X Immigrants 0.573 (0.97) 0.550 (0.94) 0.047 (0.07) 
Victory X Left wing X Arabs  0.995 (1.70) 0.261 (0.36) 
Victory X Left wing X Immigrants 1.127 (1.00) 1.052 (0.94) 0.590 (0.46) 
Victory X Origin -0.203 (-0.97)   
cut1_cons 1.559*** (6.50) 1.052*** (6.71) 0.306 (1.34) 
cut2_cons 3.040*** (12.53) 2.551*** (15.96) 1.852*** (8.07) 
cut3_cons 4.432*** (17.77) 3.804*** (22.98) 3.134*** (13.38) 
var(_cons[surveyyear])_cons 0.023 (1.30) 0.02 (1.29) 0.006 (0.84) 
N 5,407 6,181 5,240 
Note: Multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic regression, clustered at survey year. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001 










Table C-5: Israeli Arabs, Statistical Analysis Of National Pride 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
National Pride    
Conflict outcome -1.191*** (-7.24) -0.573* (-2.48) -2.338*** (-4.97) 
Tradition -0.107* (-2.08) -0.132* (-2.51) -0.162** (-3.28) 
Social Class 0.195*** (3.29) 0.189** (3.16) 0.230*** (4.08) 
Ethnic group 0.482*** (3.41) 0.482*** (3.39)  
Origin (Native Israeli/immigrant) 0.208 (1.54) 0.242 (1.77)  
Political Identity 0.203*** (4.75) 0.203*** (4.74)  
Education 0.058*** (4.25) 0.056*** (4.02) 0.056*** (4.24) 
Sex -0.058 (-0.71) -0.066 (-0.80) -0.0006 (-0.01) 
Age -0.008** (-3.01) -0.007* (-2.52) -0.008** (-3.25) 
Growth -0.563*** (-9.24) -0.506*** (-8.13) -0.915*** (-10.14) 
Inflation   -0.980*** (-10.39) 
Arab Identity -0.109** (-2.86)   
Victory X Palestinian  -0.328 (-1.40) -1.120 (-1.34) 
Victory X Arab  -0.748* (-2.50) -0.857 (-1.40) 
Victory X Arab religious  -1.111*** (-4.52) -1.009 (-1.84) 
Victory X Palestinian X Moderate Right   0.463 (0.45) 
Victory X Palestinian X Center   1.285 (1.40) 
Victory X Palestinian X Moderate Left   2.645* (2.52) 
Victory X Palestinian X Left   0.124 (0.09) 
Victory X Arab X Moderate Right   0.640 (0.73) 
Victory X Arab X Center   0.651 (0.82) 
Victory X Arab X Moderate Left   1.699 (1.66) 
Victory X Arab X Left   1.089 (0.70) 
Victory X Arab religious X Moderate Right   -0.260 (-0.34) 
Victory X Arab religious X Center   0.026 (0.04) 
Victory X Arab religious X Moderate Left   1.815* (2.08) 
Victory X Arab religious X Left   -0.024 (-0.02) 
Cut1_cons -1.935*** (-3.52) -1.280* (-2.24) -8.188*** (-8.59) 
Cut 2_cons -0.494 (-0.90) 0.171 (0.30) -6.700*** (-7.07) 
Cut 3_cons 0.964 (1.76) 1.636** (2.86) -5.277*** (-5.59) 
var(_cons[surveyyear])_cons 6.85e-34 5.10e-34 2.63e-32 
N 2,310 2,310 2,470 
Note: Multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic regression (STATA 14). The table reports coefficients whilst t 
statistics can be found in parentheses. Clustering according to survey year. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 




Table C-6: Israeli Jews, Statistical Analysis Of National Pride 
 Model 1 Model 2 
National Pride   
Conflict outcome  0.080 (0.46) 
Ethnic-group: Jews  -0.903*** (-6.97) 
Jewish Identity X Jews  0.177 (1.10) 
Ashkenazi Mizrahi identity X Jews  -0.363 (-1.03) 
Religious identity X Jews  0.541* (2.48) 
Tradition -0.234***(-5.69) -0.172*** (-4.13) 
Origin (Native Israeli/immigrant) -0.233** (-3.22) 0.231* (2.39) 
Social class 0.331*** (7.18) 0.278*** (6.04) 
Education 0.066*** (6.41) 0.060*** (5.79) 
Sex -0.021 (-0.34) -0.037 (-0.59) 
Age -0.01*** (-4.85) -0.008*** (-3.86) 
Growth 0.01 (0.28) 0.037 (1.00) 
Inflation 0.127** (2.65) 0.113* (2.43) 
Jewish Identity: Jew -0.193 (-0.63) -0.015 (-0.11) 
Jewish Identity: Social group (Ashkenazi/Mizrahi) 1.208 (1.87) 0.769* (2.58) 
Jewish Identity: Religious (Haredi/secular) -0.579 (-0.91) 0.479** (2.79) 
Political Identity  0.220*** (6.54) 
Conflict outcome: Victory -0.572 (-1.61)  
Victory X Jew 0.662 (1.69)  
Victory X Ethnic-group (Ashkenazi/Mizrahi) -0.583 (-0.77)  
Victory X religious Jewish (Haredi/secular) 1.483* (2.05)  
Moderate right (political identity) 0.197 (0.61)  
Center (political identity) -0.410 (-1.27)  
Moderate left (political identity) 0.485 (1.48)  
Left (Political identity) 0.723 (1.37)  
Victory X Moderate Right (Political identity) 0.269 (0.66)  
Victory X Center (Political identity) 0.926* (2.40)  
Victory X Moderate Left (Political identity) 0.624 (1.53)  
Victory X Left (Political identity) 0.303 (0.50)  
Jew X Moderate Right (Political identity) -0.056 (-0.14)  
Jew X Center (Political identity) 0.738 (1.73)  
Jew X Moderate Left (Political identity) 0.338 (0.70)  
Jew X Left (Political identity) -0.841 (-0.63)  




Social group (Ashkenazi/Mizrahi) X Moderate left 0.017 (0.02)  
Social group (Ashkenazi/Mizrahi) X Center 0.492 (0.55)  
Social group (Ashkenazi/Mizrahi) X Moderate left -16.92 (-0.02)  
Social group (Ashkenazi/Mizrahi) X Left -16.62 (-0.01)  
Religious (Haredi/secular) X Moderate right 0.766 (1.01)  
Religious (Haredi/secular) X Center 1.724* (2.30)  
Religious (Haredi/secular) X Moderate Left 2.103** (2.63)  
Religious (Haredi/secular) X Left -0.285 (-0.24)  
Victory X Jew X Moderate Right -0.169 (-0.33)  
Victory X Jew X Center -1.081* (-2.16)  
Victory X Jew X Moderate Left -1.289* (-2.09)  
Victory Jew X Left 0.231 (0.16)  
Victory X Social group (Ashkenazi/Mizrahi) X Moderate right -0.382 (-0.35)  
Victory X Social group (Ashkenazi/Mizrahi) X Center -0.699 (-0.69)  
Victory X Social group (Ashkenazi/Mizrahi) X Moderate left 15.19 (0.01)  
Victory X Social group (Ashkenazi/Mizrahi) X Left 18.72 (0.01)  
Victory X religious (Haredi/secular) X Moderate Right -0.562 (-0.65)  
Victory X religious (Haredi/secular) X Center -1.561 (-1.85)  
Victory X religious (Haredi/secular) X Moderate Left -2.399** (-2.58)  
Victory X religious (Haredi/secular) X Left 0.180 (0.13)  
cut1_cons 1.597** (2.97) 1.926*** (3.99) 
cut2_cons 3.157*** (5.84) 3.485*** (7.19) 
cut3_cons 4.699*** (8.61) 5.019*** (10.22) 
var(_cons[surveyyear])_cons 4.02e-34 5.45e-34 
N 4,271 4,270 
Note: Multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic regression, (STATA 14). The table reports coefficients whilst t 
statistics can be found in parentheses. Clustering according to survey year. 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
 
  




Table C-7: Political Violence Outcomes’ effect on National Pride in Israel, 
interaction models (secondary explanatory variables) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
National Pride    
Victory -0.367 (-1.61) 0.062 (0.65)  
Upper middle class -0.117 (-0.55)   
Middle class -0.137 (-0.70)   
Low class 0.361 (1.72)   
Victory X upper middle class 0.153 (0.57)   
Victory X middle class 0.581* (2.37)   
Victory X low class 0.767** (2.82)   
Origin 0.0515 (0.59) 0.200* (2.06) 0.306** (3.08) 
Social class  0.272*** (6.43) 0.251*** (5.97) 
Ethnic group 0.501*** (5.53) 0.761*** (7.45)  
Education years 0.06*** (6.16)   
Gender -0.076 (-1.34) -0.074 (-1.22) -0.061 (-1.00) 
Age -0.011*** (-5.96) -0.009*** (-4.63) -0.009*** (-4.23) 
Growth 0.038 (1.96) 0.0196 (1.00) 0.0215 (1.20) 
Inflation 0.159*** (5.75) 0.133*** (4.85) 0.103*** (4.07) 
Political identity 0.361*** (12.84) 0.333*** (11.05) 0.319*** (10.64) 
Degree  0.054 (0.48) -0.469 (-0.49) 
Victory X degree  0.160 (1.19)  
Jews   -3.514*** (-4.19) 
Immigrants    -2.428** (-2.86) 
Jews X degree   0.668 (0.70) 
Immigrants X degree   0.486 (0.51) 
cut1_cons 2.781*** (8.34) 3.044*** (9.60) -1.232 (-1.41) 
cut2_cons 4.250*** (12.62) 4.541*** (14.12) 0.288 (0.33) 
cut3_cons 5.657*** (16.52) 5.961*** (18.12) 1.755* (2.01) 
var(_cons[surveyyear])_cons 7.78e-34 (0.00) 4.19e-33 (0.00) 1.39e-33 (0.00) 
N 5,030 4,326 4,326 
Note: Multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic regression (STATA 14). The table reports coefficients 












Evaluative Assertion Analysis (EAA) involves four stages which can be done one after 
another by a single coder or serially by four different coders. The first stage of EEA requires 
the identification of attitude objects within the analysed text. Attitude objects are words or 
signs, whose evaluative meaning can greatly vary from person to person. For example, the 
underlying opinions that accompany such terms as “Obama” or “Iran” can vary greatly 
depending on the traits and experience of the individual reading them.  
 In the second stage of the analysis, the text is transcribed into a set of assertions which 
relate to the above identified attitude objects. This stage requires the identification of two 
more types of terms, common meaning terms and verb connectors. Common meaning terms 
are terms that have similar evaluative meaning across individuals. For example, the words 
“good” and “peace” are generally perceived positively by people. Verb connectors are verbs 
or verb phrases which link the attitude object to common meaning terms or other attitude 
objects. The attitude objects, verb connectors and common meaning terms are crystallized 
into simplified assertions.  
 The third stage of EAA involves the allocation of directions and intensities to the verb 
connectors and evaluators, which may be a common meaning term or an attitude object. This 
requires the coder to work through each verb connector and evaluator and assign a value, on a 
scale from -3 to +3, depending on the direction and strength of the word. Once the above 
described terms and values have been entered the assertion chart, a table used to summarize 
the data obtained in the earlier stages of the process, the coder takes the product of the verb 
connector and the evaluator for each assertion and averages it across the units of analysis. 
This produces a cumulative evaluative score which offers a measure of how positively or 
negatively the author views the attitude object. As the analysis is carried out using Israeli 
newspapers, the coding will be done in relation to the Israeli side (Israel, the IDF, etc.). 
 Following the above stages of evaluative assertion analysis and using Krippendorf 
(2004) and Schneider, Hadar and Bosler (2017), the following coding scheme was developed:  
 
 
CODING SCHEME  
PLEASE READ AND FOLLOW THESE INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY 
 
Aim and background 
The aim of this procedure is to identify and classify paragraphs extracted from the following 
Israeli newspapers (in Hebrew): Ha’aretz, Ma’ariv and Yediot Ahronot. 
The articles of interest are those that refer to the 10 Military operations under examination in 
this study. These military operations occurred between 2004 and 2014, concerning Israel and a 
second party. Military operations customarily end with a mutual or unilateral ceasefire (when 
both parties to the conflict make declarations to cease hostilities), a withdrawal of forces by 
one or both belligerents (often by the belligerent who initiated the operation after it concludes 
that the goals of the operation were achieved), or the surrender of one of the combatants.  
 




In the offset of such violent hostilities, one of the most imperative questions that arise is: who 
won? Although objective measures exist (though rarely agreed upon), which enable us to 
evaluate the objective triumphant combatant, the aim of the coding is to extract media 
commentaries that explicitly or implicitly answer this question. Since the theory put into test 
in this paper relates to the social effects of different military operations’ outcomes on the 
Israeli public, it is vital to find the subjective perceptions of how successful (or unsuccessful) 




Keeping the above aim and background in mind, please evaluate the Ha’aretz, Ma’ariv and 
Yediot Ahronot articles by carefully following the coding procedure set out below and 
recording your work in the assertion chart provided. Each worksheet in the Excel file 
represents a different military operation. 
The coding procedure outlined below comprises 8 steps, which should be completed 
sequentially. As relevant data originated in the abovementioned newspapers is only 
physically available in libraries and archives in Israel, step 1 was already done by the co-
author in Israel. 
 
These instructions have been designed so that you may complete the coding process 
autonomously; however, should you have any further questions; please feel free to contact 




STEP 1 – Preparing documents 
 
For Ha’aretz, Ma’ariv and Yediot Ahronot, retrieve articles between the day of and day after the 
announced termination of the military operation. If the termination day was Saturday, look for relevant 
articles on the Sunday and Monday following the termination announcement. 
Record the articles (as JPG files), download them and sort them into 10 folders according to the numbering 
of the operations in appendix B.  




STEP 2 – Entering basic information in Excel 
(1)       CREATE A NEW SHEET TABLE, using Excel, for operation, date and newspaper  
a.   Operation: the operation identification number 
b.  Date: the date on which the article was published 
c.   Newspaper: what newspaper the article appeared in. 
(2)       PROCEED to STEP 3 
 
 
STEP 3 – Extracting paragraphs 
OPEN articles produced by Ha’aretz for operation id=1 
LOCATE all paragraphs including the terms: 
a.   operation / military operation 
b.  war 




c.   termination  
d.  halt 
e.   truce, or 
f.   withdraw 
 
(3)       HIGHLIGHT all paragraphs and save in Folder  
             Haaretz_operation_id. 
(4)       REPEAT numbers 2 and 3 for all ceasefires. 
(5)       PROCEED to STEP 4 
 
 
STEP 4 – Reading and deciding relevancy 
 
(1)     READ through the paragraph carefully and completely. 
(2)     DECIDE whether the paragraph makes reference to the operation at hand,  
           the answer is YES if: 
a.  It is clear that the paragraph refers to a current event, e.g. YES: …the  
announced yesterday… NO: …the ceasefire following the Yom Kippur War… 
b.  The paragraph refers to an actual operation and not a different occurrence, e.g. YES: …Israel and 
the PLO have agreed to halt fighting… NO: …Israel has halted exports to England… 
c.  The paragraph refers to a ceasefire that has already been announced and is not conjectured, e.g. 
YES: …the truce ordered today… NO: The PLO has demanded a truce… 
(3) If YES: PROCEED to STEP 5. 
(4) If NO: PROCEED to STEP 4 for next paragraph. 
 
 
STEP 5 – Identifying the attitude object 
 
(1)      CREATE an Assertion Chart in excel for this ceasefire and newspaper. Columns are  
           labelled AO, VC, VC*, CMT, CMT* and Product. 
(2)       IDENTIFY the ATTITUDE OBJECT (AO). This is either the military operation or the  
            way it was terminated (ceasefire, truce, etc.)  
(3)       ENTER AO into initial column in excel sheet.  
(4)       PROCEED to STEP 6 
 
 
STEP 6 – transformation into assertion form 
 
(1)       IDENTIFY the COMMON MEANING TERM (CMT), this could be an   
            adjective or a noun with a clear positive or negative implication, e.g.    
            defeat, successful, unsuccessful, victorious, etc. 
(2)       ENTER CMT into fourth column in excel sheet. 
(3)       IDENTIFY the VERB CONNECTOR (VC), this is generally the verb in  
the sentence; however may also be, if the CMT is an adjective, simply “is”.  
(4)       ENTER VC into second column of excel sheet. E.g.: Operation “Case led” ended     
            yesterday as Israel rose victorious:  
           -    Operation “Cast Led” (AO) ended (VC) Israel rose victorious (CMT). 
(5)       REPEAT STEP 5 for next paragraph. 
(6)       PROCEED to STEP 7 
 
 




STEP 7 – Assigning directions and intensities to connectors (VC) and evaluators (CMT) 
 
 (1)      ALLOCATE values for CMT, depending on the direction and intensity of the   
            term from the perspective of Israel or the IDF. For example: 
a.   -3: defeated, unsuccessful, failure, etc. 
b.  -1.5: disappointed, a sense of missed opportunity, etc. 
c.   +1.5: sense of improvement, stronger, etc. 
d.   +3: successful, wining, achieved goals, etc. 
 
(2)       ENTER these values in the CMT* column of the assertion chart.  
(3)       PROCEED to STEP 8. 
 
 
STEP 8 – Collecting and averaging the assertions to calculate the cumulative evaluative scores. 
 
(1)       CALCULATE the average CMT scores for each assertion. 
  




Table C-8: Summary Statistics 
VARIABLES Explanation and source N mean sd min max 
Id Subjects’ ID number 6,829 3,415 1,972 1 6,829 
Conflict_outcome 
The outcome of the political 
violence/military operation (0=defeat, 1= 
victory). Source: self-performed content 
analysis. 
6,829 0.677 0.468 0 1 
Natonal_pride 
“How proud are you to be Israeli?” 
(1=very proud, 2=somewhat proud, 3=not 
so proud, 4= not at all proud).  Source: 
Israeli democracy index. 
6,735 1.752 0.952 1 4 
Isr_situation 
“What’s Israel’s general situation?” 
(1=very good, 2=good, 3=so so, 4=not 
good, 5=bad). Source: Israeli democracy 
index. 
6,765 3.293 1.122 1 5 
Important_prob 
(dummy) 
“What are the most important problems to 
deal with in Israel” (0=non-social, 
1=social). Source: Israeli democracy index 
4,828 0.203 0.402 0 1 
Jewish_identity 
“How would you define yourself?” (Jews) 
1=Israeli, 2= Jew, 3=Ethnic group 
(Ashkenazi/Mizrahi), 4= Religious 
(Haredi/secular).  Source: Israeli 
democracy index. 
4,886 1.779 .908 1 4 
Arab_identity 
“How would you define yourself?” 
(Arabs) 1= Israeli, 2= Palestinian, 3=Arab, 
4=Religious (Muslim, Christian, Druze).  
Source: Israeli democracy index.   
2,850 2.513 1.189 1 4 
Jewish_religion 
“How would you define yourself?”  
1=secular, 2=traditional, 3=religious, 
4=ultra-religious).  Source: Israeli 
democracy index. 
5,735 1.725 .942 1 4 
Arab_religion 
“Would you characterize yourself as?” 
(Only asked Arabs) 1= Muslim, 
2=Christian, 3=Druze.  Source: Israeli 
democracy index. 
1,035 1.372 0.633 1 3 
Age 
Respondent’s age. Source: Israeli 
democracy index. 
6,624 43.49 17.57 18 96 
Tradition 
“To what degree do you observe religious 
traditions?” 1=don’t observe at all, 
2=slightly observe, 3=observe to a large 
extent, 4=observe meticulously. Source: 
Israeli democracy index. 
5,721 2.266 0.922 1 4 
Origin (dummy) 
“Where were you born?” 1=Israel, 0= not 
in Israel. Source: Israeli democracy index. 
5,917 0.603 0.489 0 1 
Place of residence 
(‘Mahoz’) 
Place of residence (Israel is divided to 7 
parts: 1=South, 2=Haifa, 3=Judea and 
Samaria, 4=Jerusalem, 5=Center, 6=North, 
7=Tel Aviv. Source: Israeli democracy 
index. 
6,503 3.744 1.572 1 7 
Ethnic group 
(‘Migzar’) 
Ethnic Group (0=Arabs, 1=Jews, 
2=Immigrants). Source: Israeli democracy 
index. 
6,828 1.055 0.587 0 2 
Social Class “To which socio-economic status do you 6,436 2.793 .789 1 4 









belong?” (1=High/upper, 2=Upper middle 
3=middle, 4=lower). Source: Israeli 
democracy index. 
Sex 
Subject’s gender (1=man, 2=woman). 
Source: Israeli democracy index. 
6,829 1.519 0.500 1 2 
Degree (dummy) 
Does the subject hold a degree? (0=no, 
1=yes). Source: Israeli democracy index. 
5,698 0.432 0.495 0 1 
Political Identity 
“Where would you locate yourself on a 1-5 
right left continuum?” 1=right,2=moderate 
right, 3=centre, 4=moderate left, 5=left). 
Source: Israeli democracy index. 
6,253 2.761 1.161 1 5 
Education 
“How many years did you spend in school 
and university?” Source: calculated by 
author based on data originated in the 
Israeli democracy index. 
6,657 13.54 3.145 0 46 
Survey_year 
The Survey year from which the data was 
taken. Source: Israeli democracy index. 
6,829 2,008 2.678 2,005 2,013 
Eco_development 
GDP per capita per survey year. Source: 
OECD statistical profile of Israel. 
6,829 266.6 30.20 241 333 
Economic_growth 
Israel’s real GDP growth per survey year. 
Source: OECD statistical profile of Israel. 
6,829 4.393 1.964 1.200 6.900 
Inflation 
Israel’s inflation rate in the year of the 
survey. Source: Israel’s Central Bureau of 
Statistics and www.inflation.eu. 
6,829 2.367 1.336 -.1 3.92 







   
Table C-9 Fieldwork Information 
Survey year Dates of survey Polling firm Sample size Maximum 
Sampling Error 
2005 February March  Mihshuv 
Institute  
1,203 +–2.8, at confidence 
levels of 95%  
2006 February Mihshuv 
Institute  
1,204 +–2.8, at confidence 
levels of 95% 
2007 February Mihshuv 
Institute  
1,203 +–2.8, at confidence 
levels of 95% 
2009 March Mahshov 
Institute 
1,191  +–2.8, at confidence 
levels of 95% 
2013 April- May Dialog Institute 1,000 +–3.2, at confidence 
levels of 95% 




Table C-10: Israel’s Most Important Problem 2003-2005, 2008 (Percentages) 
Problem 2003 2004 2005 2008 
Security (General) 34.8 25.9 12.7 27.6 
The Palestinian problem, the future of the occupied territories, the 
settlements 
5 2.9 5.8 1.5 
Terrorism, terrorist attacks, intifada 3.4 4.1 2.3 0.4 
The separation fence  - 1.7 - - 
The prisoners of war - - - 3 
The Kassams in Sdrot - - - 5.7 
The disengagement plan - - 17.3 0.2 
The Iranian threat - - - 0.7 
Total Security Problems 43.2 34.6 38.1 39 
Foreign policy, the peace process (general) 6.8 6.2 3.9 3.6 
Reaching a final agreement with the Palestinian Authority - 1.2 1.1 0.5 
Total Political Problems 6.8 7.4 7.4 4.1 
Total Political and Security Problems 50 41 45.5 43.1 
Economy (general) 34.1 25.1 13 11.6 
Reducing unemployment, ensure employment 4 6.0 5.6 1.5 
Economic stability, growth, raising living standards 0.3 0.9 0.7 0.2 
Total Economic Problems 38.4 32 19.3 13.3 
Interior, social (general) 5.4 7.6 7 7.7 
Education, youth 1.5 4.6 6.9 11.1 
Narrowing gaps, helping the weak, poverty, welfare 0.8 5.4 6.1 3.1 
Violence in society - 0.9 4.1 1.3 
Individual rights, governance regime, government functioning 1.2 2.9 3.1 1.9 
Fighting corruption, strengthening the rule of law 1.2 0.6 2.5 1.9 
The unity of the people 0.6 0.3 1.5 0.2 
Road accidents  0.1 0.3 1.5 0.5 
Absorbing immigrants and taking care of them 0.1 0.2 0.9  
Health, pensions 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.2 
Religion and state 0.3 1.1 0.6 0.5 
Ecology 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Total Interior and Social Problems 11.5 24.4 35.1 28.5 
Others 0.1 1.8 0.1 15.1 
N 1,227 1,177 988 1,201 




Appendix D: Supplementary Materials and Robustness Checks,  
    Chapter Seven 
 
 
D-1: Fieldwork Information, The Israeli Democracy Indices Used in the Research, 2003-2015 
Survey year Dates of survey Polling firm Sample size Maximum Sampling 
Error (total sample) 
2003 April Mihshuv Institute 1,208 +–3.1, at confidence 
levels of 95% 
2005 February March  Mihshuv Institute  1,203 +–2.8, at confidence 
levels of 95%  
2006 February Mihshuv Institute  1,204 +–2.8, at confidence 
levels of 95% 
2007 February Mihshuv Institute  1,203 +–2.8, at confidence 
levels of 95% 
2009 March Mahshov Institute 1,191  +–2.8, at confidence 
levels of 95% 
2013 April- May Dialogue  Research 
Institute   
1,000 +–3.2, at confidence 
levels of 95% 
2015 February- March Dialogue and Taldor 
Research Institutes 
1,019 +–3.2, at confidence 
levels of 95% 
  




D-2: MILITARY OPERATIONS 2002-2015 




Adversaries Military outcome Outcomes 
according to the 
Israeli media  
1 Operation Defensive Shield  Part of the second Intifada and the largest 
operation in the West bank since the 1967 
war. Came to be following a suicide bombing 
that took place on 27.03 during Passover 
Seder. The operation included IDF’s 
incursion into most of the largest cities in the 
West bank (not Gaza). 









In May 2002, Israeli troops 
pulled out of the Palestinian 
cities, but maintained cordons of 
troops around West Bank towns 
and villages. A significant 
decrease in suicide bombings and 
terror attacks’ occurrence was 
registered following the 
completion of the operation.  
Success 
Israeli democracy index used: 2003. 
2 Operation Rainbow Operation Rainbow, an IDF military 
operation in the Gaza strip was prompted by 
several attacks on Israeli armoured vehicles 
that killed 11 soldiers. 
Israel's declared aims of the Operation were 
finding and destroying smuggling tunnels, 
targeting terrorists and securing the 
Philadelphi Route (along the border) by 
expanding the buffer zone. 
18.05.2004 25.05.2004 IDF, Hamas, 
Islamic Jihad 
No Israeli casualties, extensive 
destruction in Gaza. 
Undetermined (too 
close to a more 
significant operation  
and due to 
insufficient media 
representation) 
Israeli democracy index used: 2005. 
3 Days of Penitence/Repentance Following the death of two Israeli children 
from a Qassam rocket launched by terrorist 
militants in the Gaza strip, Israel launched a 
major military invasion of the northern part of 
the strip. The stated goal of the firing of 
rockets and mortar shells into Israeli 
settlements in the Gaza strip and the town of 
Sderot in Israel. Largest IDF incursion into 
Gaza since the start of the Al-Aqsa intifada in 
September 2000. 






Victory claimed by both sides. Success 
  Israeli democracy index used: 2005. 




4 First Rain Israeli Air Force weeklong offensive against 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad targets in the Gaza. 
The operation was launched following 
extensive firing of rockets at Israeli 
communities in the western Negev and the 
city of Sderot. 
23.09.2005 01.10.2005 Israel, Hamas 
& Islamic 
Jihad 
The IDF terminate the operation, 
claiming that it’s goals were 
achieved (following the stopping 
of missiles firing into Israel) 
Success 
Israeli democracy index used: 2006. 
5 Summer Rains + Autumn Clouds A series of large scale conventional warfare 
between Palestinian militants and the IDF in 
the Gaya strip, during the summer of 2006. 
The battles were prompted by Hamas 
operations which resulted in the capture of 
the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Israel's stated 
goals in the Operation were to suppress the 
firing of Qassam rockets from Gaza into the 
western Negev, and to secure the release of 
Corporal Shalit. Operation “Summer Rains" 
was completed by Operation "Autumn 
Clouds". 
28.06.2006 26.11.2006 IDF, Fatah, 
Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad 
The IDF terminate the operation 
and withdrew from north Gaza. 
No deal to release the captive 
Israeli soldier, one of the main 
goals of the operation 
Undetermined (too 
close to a highly 
significant operation 
and due to 
insufficient media 
representation) 
  Israeli democracy index used: 2007. 
6 Second Lebanon War The Israeli combined airstrike and ground 
invasion of southern Lebanon was 
precipitated by the firing of rockets, from 
Lebanon, at Israeli border towns, the killing 
of three IDF soldiers by Hezbolla militants at 
the Israeli side of its’ Lebanon border and the 
abduction of two IDF soldiers by Hezbollah. 
12.07.2006 14.08.2006 Israel & 
Hezbollah 
Ceasefire through UNSC 
Resolution 1701, with the 
deployment of UN forces and the 
Lebanese army in South 
Lebanon. Victory claimed by 
both sides. 
Unsuccessful 
Israeli democracy index used: 2007. 
7 Hot/Warm winter The operation was lunched following the 
smuggling of a large numbers of longer-range 
missiles by Palestinian militant groups from 
Egypt into the strip. Those missiles were 
capable of reaching, and later were fired at, 
Ashkelon, a coastal city in the Southern 
District of Israel with a population of more 
than 100k, 50k south of Tel Aviv. 
28.02.2008 03.03.2008 IDF and 
Hamas 
The IDF withdrew its troops from 
Gaza, terminating the operation, 
claiming that its’ goals were 
achieved 
(Successful disrupting of 
terrorist’s infrastructure in the 
Gaza Strip and suppression of the 
missile fire from the Strip). 
Undetermined (too 
close to a highly 
significant operation 
and due to 
insufficient media 
representation) 
Israeli democracy index used: 2009. 




8 Cast Lead/Gaza War A three-week armed conflict, which included 
an unprecedented and extensive collaboration 
of Israeli air, naval, artillery and ground 
forces in the Gaza Strip. It was the largest 
Israeli military campaign since the Second 
Intifada and resulted in high rates of 
casualties and injuries.  
Israel's defines goals for the operations were:  
create a long term period of calm; prevent 
Hamas from rearming itself (thus ensuring a 
situation in which arms smuggling from 
Egypt into Gaza is a phenomenon of the 
past). 















Israel declared unilateral 
ceasefire, 12 hours later Hamas 
announced a one-week ceasefire.  
Tactical victory of Israel: 
*hundreds of Hamas militants 
affiliated killed 
*several senior Hamas military 
commanders and politburo 
members killed 
*destruction of Hamas’ weaponry 
and equipment hoards 
*reduction of rockets fired by 
Hamas at Israel’s Gaza periphery 
towns (3,300 in preceding year 
the to less than 300 rockets in the 
following year) 
*Agreement with Egypt 
regarding closer supervision 
regarding weapon smuggling.   
Success 
Israeli democracy index used: 2009. 
9 Returning Echo (March 2012 
Gaza–Israel clashes) 
Worst outbreak of violence in the region 
since the Gaza War/Operation Cast Lead. 
Triggered by Israel’s targeted airstrike killing 
the secretary general of the Popular 
Resistance Committees (PRC), a terror 
organisation, who was preparing the final 
stages of a mega-attack in Israel. Palestinian 
militant groups retaliated by launching 
massive rocket attacks on Israeli territory 
striking major urban centres (Ashdod, 
Ashkelon and Beersheba). 




Ceasefire brokered by Egypt 
brokered a ceasefire between 
Israel and Palestinian militant 
groups.  
Undetermined (too 
close to a highly 
significant operation 
and due to 
insufficient media 
representation) 
Israeli democracy index used: 2013. 




10 Pillar of Defence  An eight-day IDF operation in the Hamas-
governed Gaza Strip, which began with the 
killing of Ahmed Jabari, chief of the Gaza 
military wing of Hamas and a number of 
mutual Israeli–Palestinian responsive attacks. 
The operation was also commenced in response 
to the launch of over 100 rockets at Israel 
during a 24-hour period and an attack by Gaza 
militants on an Israeli military patrol jeep 
within Israeli borders. The Israeli government 
stated that the aims of the operation were to halt 
rocket attacks against civilian targets 
originating from the Gaza Strip and to disrupt 
the capabilities of militant organizations. The 
Palestinians blamed the Israeli government for 
the upsurge in violence, accusing the IDF of 
attacks on Gazan civilians in the days leading 
up to the operation. The blockade of the Gaza 
Strip and the occupation of the West Bank and 
East Jerusalem were cited as reasons for the 
rocket attacks against Israel. 








Ceasefire, both sides claim 
victory 
Israel argued that the operation 
severely impaired Hamas's 
launching capabilities. According 
to Hamas, their rocket strikes led 
to the ceasefire deal.  
* Cessation of rocket fire from 




Israeli democracy index used: 2013.  
11 Operation Protective Edge (aka 
the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict) 
A 7 weeks military operation launched by Israel 
in the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip. Following the 
kidnapping and murder of three Israeli 
teenagers by Hamas members and an increase 
in rocket fire from Gaza into Israel.  In response 
to the IDF’s “Brother's Keeper” operation 
aimed at arresting militant leaders, Hamas fired 
rockets into Israel and operation Protective 
Edge started. The operation was expanded to an 
Israeli ground invasion of Gaza with the stated 
aim of destroying Gaza's tunnel system. Israeli 
ground forces withdrew on 5 August. 














An open-ended ceasefire. 
Both sides claimed to be 
victorious. According to Israel 
and Palestinian president Abbas 
Hamas was severely weakened 
and achieved none of its demands 
(to bring international pressure to 
bear to lift Israel’s blockade of 
the Gaza Strip, end Israel's 
offensive, obtain a third party to 
monitor and guarantee 
compliance with a ceasefire, 
release Palestinian prisoners and 
overcome its political isolation). 
According to Hamas, Israel was 
repelled from Gaza 
Success 
Israeli democracy index used: 2015. 





D-3: Summary Statistics 
VARIABLES Explanation and source N Mean SD Min Max 
Id Subjects’ ID number 9,055 4,528 2614.01 1 9,055 
Outcome The outcome of the political violence/military 
operation (0=unsuccessful, 1= successful). Source: 
self-performed content analysis. 
9,055 0.76 0.43 0 1 
Arab_jew_t Level of tension between Israeli Jews and Arabs, 
aka Intercommunal tension. “In your opinion, are 
relationships between Israeli-Arabs and Jews good 
or not good?” (1=not good at all, 2= not so good, 
3= good, 4=very good). Source: the Israeli 
democracy index. 
5,525 1.53 .7 1 4 
ask_sef_t Level of tension between (Sephardim) and 
Ashkenazim, aka Jewish intercommunal tension. 
“In your opinion, are relationships between 
Ashkenazim and Mizrahim good or not good? [Not 
asked of Arabs]” (1=not good at all, 2= not so 
good, 3= good, 4=very good). Source: the Israeli 
democracy index. 
4,936 2.244 .8 1 4 
rel_sec_t Level of tension between religious and secular 
Jews, aka religious tension. “In your opinion, are 
relationships between religious and not religious 
good or not good? [Not asked of Arabs]” (1=not 
good at all, 2= not so good, 3= good, 4=very 
good). Source: the Israeli democracy index. 
5,019 1.890 .77 1 4 
rich_poo_t Level of tension between rich and poor, aka 
socioeconomic tension. “In your opinion, are 
relationships between rich and poor good or not 
good? [Not asked of Arabs]” (1=not good at all, 2= 
not so good, 3= good, 4=very good). Source: the 
Israeli democracy index. 
5,432 1.782 .81 1 4 
olim_vat_t Level of tension between immigrants and old-
timers, aka nativist tension. “In your opinion, are 
relationships between new immigrant and old 
timers good or not good? [Not asked of Arabs]” 
(1=not good at all, 2= not so good, 3= good, 
4=very good). Source: the Israeli democracy index. 
5,452 2.643 1.01 1 4 
pol_trust Level of tension between right and left (on 
political/security issues), aka ideological tension. 
“In your opinion, are relationships between new 
right and left wing supporters good or not good? 
[Not asked of Arabs]” (1=not good at all, 2= not so 
good, 3= good, 4=very good). Source: the Israeli 
democracy index. 
1,911 1.542 .72 1 4 
soc_trust In general, do you think you can trust people, or do 
you have to be very careful in relationships with 
people? (1=you can always trust people, 2=in 
general, you can trust people, 3= in general you 
have to be very careful, 4= you always have to be 
very careful)*. Source: the Israeli democracy 
index. 
6,826 2.9 .82 1 4 
J_identity “How would you define yourself?”  1=secular, 
2=traditional, 3=religious, 4=ultra-religious).  
Source: the Israeli democracy index. 
7,670 1.737 .94 1 4 
A_identity “Would you characterize yourself as?” (Only 
asked Arabs) 1= Muslim, 2=Christian, 3=Druze.  
1,309 1.35 .63 1 3 




Source: the Israeli democracy index. 
Age Respondent’s age. Source: the Israeli democracy 
index. 
8,791 43.5 17.46 18 90 
obs_tra  To what degree do you observe religious 
traditions?” (1=don’t observe at all, 2=slightly 
observe, 3=observe to a large extent, 4=observing 
meticulously. Source: the Israeli democracy index 
6,896 2.25 .93 1 4 
Migzar Ethnic Group (1=Jews, 2=Arabs, 3=Russians). 
Source: the Israeli democracy index. 
9,055 1.508 .78 1 3 
Soc_class “To which socio-economic status do you belong?” 
(1=High/upper, 2=Upper middle 3=middle, 
4=lower). Source: the Israeli democracy index. 
8,429 2.796 .78 1 4 
Gender Subject’s gender (1=man, 2=woman). Source: the 
Israeli democracy index. 
9,055 1.52 .5 1 2 
Degree (dummy) Does the subject hold a degree? (0=no, 1=yes). 
Source: the Israeli Democracy Index. 
7,728 .49 .5 0 1 
Aliya_year (If respondent is an immigrant) when did you 
immigrate to Israel? (Open-year of immigration). 
Source: the Israeli democracy index. 
2,353 1979.
48 
18.21 1920 2008 
Aliya_cat (If respondent is an immigrant) when did you 
immigrate to Israel? (1= until 1989, 2=after 1990). 
Source: the Israeli democracy index. 
2,979 1.49 .5 1 2 
Politics “Where would you locate yourself on a 1-5 right 
left continuum?” 1=right,2=moderate right, 
3=centre, 4=moderate left, 5=left). Source: the 
Israeli democracy index. 
8,344 3.6 1.82 1 7 
Survey_year The Survey year from which the data was taken. 
Source: the Israeli democracy index. 
9,055 2007.
76 
3.79 2003 2015 










growth Israel’s real GDP growth per survey year. Source: 
World Bank at:  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKT
P.KD.ZG?end=2015&locations=IL&start=2003 
9,055 3.69 1.85 1.2 6.1 





9,055 1.410 1.04 -1 3.32 
 
* Data for this variable was obtained using coding of similar questions when the mentioned question 









When regressing the dependent variable, successful termination of Israeli military 
operation, on the various social tensions in Israel (without controlling for covariates) a 
mild significant effect is found with regard to the nativist tension (0.889, p<0.05) and 
a strong significant effect if revealed concerning the ideological tension (-0.418, 
p<0.001). Whereas the former tension decreases with a successful termination of 
political violence, the latter increases.  
 
 
Table D-4: The Effect of Successful Termination54 of Israeli Military Operations on 






















0.08 0.162 0.195 0.305 0.889* -
0.418*** 
-0.089 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.52) (0.78) (2.18) (-152.98) (-0.76) 
cut1_cons 0.385 -0.559 -1.341*** -0.081 -
4.089*** 
0.114*** -3.242*** 
 (1.21) (-0.82) (-3.65) (-0.23) (-3.98) (16.21) (-27.52) 
cut2_cons 2.281*** 1.396* 0.563 1.643*** -
1.126*** 
1.942*** -0.870*** 
 (6.37) (2.12) (1.80) (5.09) (-5.15) (77.20) (-29.60) 
cut3_cons 4.391*** 4.200*** 3.252*** 3.883*** 0.464*** 3.948*** 1.002*** 
 (17.19) (8.09) (11.83) (11.18) (9.40) (31.74) (32.36) 
cut4_cons     1.917***   
     (3.75)   
N 5,525 5,019 4,936 5,432 5,452 1,911 6,826 
Notes: The estimations are the result of ordinal logit regression (in STATA 14). The table reports 
coefficients whilst t statistics can be found in parentheses. Clustering according to survey year. * 
p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
                                                 
54 As “warfare outcome” is a binary variable (successful/unsuccessful), the analysis essentially points 
to the effect of successful termination/Israeli victories (unsuccessful termination being the reference 
group). In the following analysis I use the terms “successful termination” and “Israeli victory” 
interchanging as the perceived outcome is viewed through an Israeli eye. 



















Individual level variables  












Social Class -0.026 0.023  -0.025 -0.069 0.04 0.898 











































Gender -0.018 -0.173*** -0.147* 0.015 -0.145 -0.486*** 0.05 
 (-0.19) (-6.63) (-1.97) (0.36) (-1.52) (-3.60) (1.02) 
Age 0.005 -0.0008 -0.006** -0.009** -0.004 0.01 0.003 
 (1.63) (-0.61) (-2.85) (-2.58) (-1.66) (1.51) (1.04) 















County level variables 














Inflation Rate -0.088*** -0.184*** 0.052** -0.046*** 0.365***  0.026 
 (-16.38) (-177.97) (3.28) (-3.66) (4.67)  (0.87) 
cut1_cons 0.249 -1.044*** -2.456*** -1.488*** -6.644*** 1.423*** -0.658 
 (1.19) (-30.82) (-8.40) (-4.63) (-5.74) (23.19) (-0.41) 
cut2_cons 2.356*** 1.252*** -0.322 0.391 -2.397*** 3.307*** 1.892 
 (16.92) (13.01) (-1.01) (1.25) (-13.14) (49.73) (1.05) 
cut3_cons 4.717*** 4.545*** 2.518*** 3.023*** -0.430* 5.835*** 3.983* 
 (29.39) (33.44) (9.55) (6.99) (-2.43) (7.56) (1.97) 
cut4_cons     2.134***   
     (4.81)   
N 2,832 2,505 2,558 2,777 3,189 1,387 4,286 
Notes: The estimations are the result of ordinal logit regressions (in STATA 14). The table reports coefficients whilst t statistics can be found in parentheses. Clustering 
according to survey year. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.  




















Inter-communal Tension  
Conflict Outcome: Success -0.312 -0.081 0.292 -0.052 -0.026 -0.547* -0.157 
 (-1.72) (-0.77) (0.97) (-0.36) (-0.20) (-2.21) (-1.28) 
Political Identity: Right 0.055       
 (0.24)       
Political Identity: Moderate Right 0.005       
 (0.02)       
Political Identity: Center 0.347       
 (1.87)       
Political Identity: Moderate Left 0.678**       
 (2.86)       
Political Identity: Left 0.156       
 (0.47)       
Political Identity: Far Left 0.848**       
 (2.94)       
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political 
Identity: Right 
0.034       
 (0.12)       
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political 
Identity: Moderate Right 
0.654*       
 (2.47)       
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political 
Identity: Center 
0.327       
 (1.43)       
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political 
Identity: Moderate Left 
-0.210       
 (-0.72)       
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political 
Identity: Left 
0.333       
 (0.86)       
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political 
Identity: Far Left 
0.036       
 (0.10)       
Political Identity    0.129**
* 
   
    (6.12)    
Observing Tradition -0.012 -
0.130** 
-0.046 -0.009 -0.054 0.017 -0.049 
 (-0.27) (-3.13) (-1.23) (-0.22) (-0.82) (0.15) (-0.75) 
Social Class -0.013 -0.024   -0.089 0.137 -0.084 
 (-0.25) (-0.49)   (-1.66) (1.17) (-1.58) 
Academic Degree  0.101 -0.0008   0.045 -0.163 0.043 
 (1.26) (-0.01)   (0.55) (-0.71) (0.52) 
Gender -0.072 -0.022 -0.077 -0.059 -0.035 -0.016 -0.033 
 (-0.98) (-0.31) (-1.15) (-0.81) (-0.46) (-0.08) (-0.44) 
Age -0.001 0.005* -0.001 -0.001 0.004 -0.007 0.004 
 (-0.65) (2.31) (-0.78) (-0.59) (1.52) (-0.74) (1.63) 
Economic Growth 0.002 -0.01 0.01 -0.0009   -0.048* 
 (0.12) (-0.52) (0.53) (-0.05)   (-2.37) 
Ethnic Group: Arabs  1.549**
* 
     
  (8.36)      
Ethnic Group: Russians  -0.235      
  (-1.12)      
Conflict Outcome: Success # Ethnic 
Group: Arabs 
 -0.160      
  (-0.71)      
Conflict Outcome: Success # Ethnic 
Group: Russians 
 0.134      
  (0.56)      
Upper Middle Class   0.209     




   (0.83)     
Middle Class   0.241     
   (1.03)     
Lower Class   0.111     
   (0.38)     
Conflict Outcome: Success # Upper 
Middle Class 
  -0.387     
   (-1.17)     
Conflict Outcome: Success # Middle 
Class 
  -0.317     
   (-1.03)     
Conflict Outcome: Success # Lower 
Class 
  -0.362     
   (-0.99)     
Academic Degree     0.163    
    (1.15)    
Conflict Outcome: Success # Academic 
Degree  
   -0.097    
    (-0.59)    
Jewish Identity: Traditional     -0.201  -0.203 
     (-1.22)  (-1.24) 
Jewish Identity: Religious     -0.176  -0.180 
     (-0.70)  (-0.72) 
Jewish Identity: Ultra Religious     -0.583  -0.589 
     (-1.63)  (-1.65) 
Conflict Outcome: Success # Jewish 
Identity: Traditional 
    0.157  0.154 
     (0.82)  (0.80) 
Conflict Outcome: Success # Jewish 
Identity: Religious 
    0.095  0.091 
     (0.35)  (0.33) 
Conflict Outcome: Success # Jewish 
Identity: Ultra-Religious 
    0.237  0.236 
     (0.63)  (0.63) 
Arab Identity: Christian      -1.110*  
      (-2.53)  
Arab Identity: Druze      -1.208*  
      (-2.06)  
Conflict Outcome: Success # Arab 
Identity: Christian 
     1.397**  
       (2.62)  
Conflict Outcome: Success # Arab 
Identity: Druze 
     1.142  
      (1.61)  
cut1_cons 0.116 -0.015 0.021 0.410 -0.119 -1.198* -0.380 









































 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.57) (0.00) (0.00) 
N 2,832 2,981 3,329 2,908 2,692 367 2,692 
Note: The estimations are the result of Multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic regression (STATA 14). The table 
reports coefficients whilst t statistics can be found in parentheses. Clustering according to survey year. * p<0.05 ** 
p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
 
  

















Jewish Inter-communal Tension        
Conflict Outcome: Success -0.045 0.154 0.779* -0.069 0.029 -0.016 
 (-0.25) (1.49) (2.20) (-0.48) (0.23) (-0.05) 
Political Identity: Right -0.114      
 (-0.51)      
Political Identity: Moderate Right 0.08      
 (0.37)      
Political Identity: Center 0.206      
 (1.10)      
Political Identity: Moderate Left 0.816**      
 (3.26)      
Political Identity: Left 0.503      
 (1.43)      
Political Identity: Far Left -0.09      
 (-0.19)      
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political 
Identity: Right 
0.546*      
 (1.99)      
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political 
Identity: Moderate Right 
0.183      
 (0.70)      
Conflict Outcome: Victor # Political Identity: 
Center 
0.226      
 (0.99)      
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political 
Identity: Moderate Left 
-0.193      
 (-0.64)      
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political 
Identity: Left 
0.078      
 (0.19)      
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political 
Identity: Far Left 
0.377      
 (0.74)      
Political Identity    0.104**
* 
  
    (4.32)   
Observing Tradition 0.115* 0.003 0.056 0.104* 0.051  
 (2.54) (0.08) (1.42) (2.36) (0.82)  
Social Class -0.131* -0.096   -
0.157** 
-0.212 
 (-2.42) (-1.78)   (-3.16) (-1.40) 
Degree (yes) -0.063 -0.159*     
 (-0.78) (-1.97)     
Gender -0.154* -0.117 -0.127 -0.155* -0.120 -0.175 













 (-3.95) (-2.33) (-3.37) (-4.71) (-3.16) (0.57) 
Economic Growth 0.055** 0.05* 0.055** 0.053**   
 (2.73) (2.54) (2.82) (2.68)   
Ethnic Group: Russians  -0.499*     
  (-2.46)     
Conflict Outcome: Success # Ethnic Group: 
Russians 
 -0.278     
  (-1.21)     
Upper Middle Class   0.311    
   (1.06)    
Middle Class   0.401    
   (1.46)    
Lower Class   -0.028    




   (-0.08)    
Conflict Outcome: Success # Upper Middle 
Class 
  -0.456    
   (-1.19)    
Conflict Outcome: Success # Middle Class   -0.708*    
   (-1.96)    
Conflict Outcome: Success # Lower Class   -0.653    
   (-1.59)    
Academic Degree     -0.239   
    (-1.66)   
Conflict Outcome: Success # Academic 
Degree  
   0.208   
    (1.23)   
Jewish Identity: Traditional     -0.012  
     (-0.08)  
Jewish Identity: Religious     0.394  
     (1.71)  
Jewish Identity: Ultra-Religious     -0.109  
     (-0.35)  
Conflict Outcome: Success # Jewish Identity: 
Traditional 
    0.048  
     (0.27)  
Conflict Outcome: Success # Jewish Identity: 
Religious 
    -0.220  
     (-0.87)  
Conflict Outcome: Success # Jewish Identity: 
Ultra-Religious 
    -0.110  
     (-0.34)  
Arab Identity: Christian      -1.172* 
      (-2.13) 
Arab Identity: Druze      -0.676 
      (-0.79) 
Conflict Outcome: Success # Arab 
Identity: Christian 
     1.812* 
      (2.48) 
Conflict Outcome: Success # Arab Identity: 
Druze 
     0.545 

















 (-7.63) (-9.63) (-4.97) (-7.38) (-10.88) (-2.24) 
cut2_cons -0.124 -0.351 0.476 0.174 -0.563* 0.961 













 (9.14) (9.46) (9.98) (11.04) (9.13) (3.84) 
var(_cons[survey_year])cons 2.79e-19 5.48e-21 2.18e-20 2.02e-18 0.004 4.76e-
34 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.65) (0.00) 
N 2,487 2,588 2,834 2,558 2,819 217 
Note: The estimations are the result of Multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic regression (STATA 14). The table 
reports coefficients whilst t statistics can be found in parentheses. Clustering according to survey year. * p<0.05 ** 
p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
 
  




D-8: The Effects Of Victories on Ideological Tension Among Israelis 
Ideological Tension Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     Conflict Outcome: Success -0.225 -0.452*** -0.867** -0.246 
 (-1.08) (-3.97) (-2.78) (-1.89) 
Political Identity: Moderate Right 0.561**    
 (2.66)    
Political Identity: Center 0.856***    
 (4.45)    
Political Identity: Moderate Left 0.665**    
 (2.68)    
Political Identity: Far Left 0.521    
 (1.88)    
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political Identity: Mod. Right -0.0277    
 (-0.09)    
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political Identity: Center -0.341    
 (-1.21)    
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political Identity: Mod. Left -0.565    
 (-1.64)    
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political Identity: Far Left -0.389    
 (-1.02)    
Political Identity    0.068* 
    (2.47) 
Ethnic Group 0.042    
 (0.56)    
Academic Degree  -0.0002 0.03   
 (-0.00) (0.30)   
Gender -0.479*** -0.471*** -0.493*** -0.499*** 
 (-4.72) (-4.89) (-4.77) (-4.95) 
Age 0.009** 0.014*** 0.01** 0.011*** 
 (3.15) (4.87) (3.16) (3.57) 
Ethnic Group: Arabs  0.286   
  (1.33)   
Ethnic Group: Russians  -0.098   
  (-0.53)   
Conflict Outcome: Success # Ethnic Group: Arabs  0.131   
  (0.47)   
Conflict Outcome: Success # Ethnic Group: Russians  -0.001   
  (-0.00)   
Upper Middle Class   0.05  
   (0.19)  
Middle Class   -0.026  
   (-0.11)  
Lower Class   -0.221  
   (-0.89)  
Conflict Outcome: Success # Upper Middle Class   0.172  
   (0.43)  
Conflict Outcome: Success # Middle Class   0.510  
   (1.48)  
Conflict Outcome: Success # Lower Class   0.761*  
   (2.00)  
Academic Degree     0.307* 
    (2.09) 
Conflict Outcome: Success # Academic Degree     -0.578** 
    (-2.81) 
cut1_cons 0.461 0.122 -0.219 0.244 
 (1.77) (0.58) (-0.75) (1.07) 
cut2_cons 2.372*** 1.993*** 1.603*** 2.140*** 
 (8.83) (9.09) (5.42) (8.99) 
cut3_cons 4.815*** 4.326*** 3.757*** 4.581*** 
 (13.24) (14.06) (10.48) (13.42) 
var(_cons[survey_year])_cons 1.25e-34 2.81e-34 5.01e-34 9.88e-35 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
N 1,625 1,758 1,516 1,625 
Note: The estimations are the result of Multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic regression (STATA 14). The table 
reports coefficients whilst t statistics can be found in parentheses. Clustering according to survey year. * p<0.05 ** 
p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
 




D-9: The Effects Of Victories On Nativist Tension Among Israelis 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Nativist Tension      
Conflict Outcome: Success 1.536 0.571 -0.849*** 1.806 1.275 
 (0.74) (1.08) (-7.51) (0.85) (0.67) 
Political Identity: Right -0.370     
 (-1.84)     
Political Identity: Moderate Right -0.297     
 (-1.51)     
Political Identity: Center -0.232     
 (-1.36)     
Political Identity: Moderate Left -0.022     
 (-0.10)     
Political Identity: Left -0.072     
 (-0.22)     
Political Identity: Far Left -0.317     
 (-0.85)     
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political Identity: Right 0.676** 
(2.90) 
    




    




    




    
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political Identity: Left 0.360 
(0.98) 
    
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political Identity: Far Left -0.290 
(-0.72) 
    
Political Identity    -0.022 0.018 
    (-1.18) (0.59) 
Observing Tradition  0.012 0.071   
  (0.35) (1.93)   
Social Class -0.03 -0.052   -0.072 
 (-0.74) (-1.23)   (-1.08) 
Gender -0.086 -0.095 -0.128* -0.116 -0.052 
 (-1.51) (-1.64) (-2.01) (-1.91) (-0.57) 
Age -0.00008 -0.003 -0.004* -0.002 -0.008** 
 (-0.05) (-1.53) (-2.06) (-1.20) (-2.67) 
Academic Degree    -0.124   
   (-1.79)   
Growth -0.160  -0.232*** -0.200 -0.277 
 (-0.43)  (-12.62) (-0.53) (-0.82) 
Inflation -0.821  0.495*** -0.721 -0.462 
 (-1.57)  (11.99) (-1.35) (-0.97) 
Ethnic Group: Arabs  -2.669*** -3.294***   
  (-14.84) (-10.45)   
Ethnic Group: Russians  0.148 0.011   
  (0.83) (0.06)   





Academic Degree     -0.033  
    (-0.24)  
Conflict Outcome: Success # Academic Degree     -0.094 
(-0.62) 
 
Immigration After 1990     0.400 
     (1.79) 
Conflict Outcome: Success # Immigration After 1990     -0.500* 
(-1.98) 
cut1_ cons -6.571* -4.768*** -7.026*** -7.530** -7.897** 
 (-2.49) (-9.27) (-18.79) (-2.77) (-3.20) 
cut2_cons -3.083 -1.763*** -2.897*** -3.249 -3.777 
 (-1.17) (-3.60) (-14.25) (-1.20) (-1.56) 
cut3_cons -1.310 0.152 -0.960*** -1.492 -1.943 
 (-0.50) (0.31) (-4.84) (-0.55) (-0.80) 




cut4_cons 0.896 2.593*** 1.637*** 0.767 0.208 
 (0.34) (5.28) (8.14) (0.28) (0.09) 
var(_cons[survey_year])_cons 1.869 0.207 1.69e-17 1.961 1.550 
 (1.57) (1.38) (0.00) (1.57) (1.56) 
N 4,613 4,157 3,482 4,169 1,727 
Note: The estimations are the result of Multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic regression (STATA 14). The table reports 
coefficients whilst t statistics can be found in parentheses. Clustering according to survey year. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** 
p<0.001 















Social Trust  
Conflict Outcome: Success 0.041 -0.365 -0.218 -0.714* 0.215 
 (0.14) (-1.79) (-1.58) (-2.41) (1.06) 
Ethnic Group: Arabs   0.544*
* 
  
   (3.24)   
Ethnic Group: Russians   -0.169   
   (-0.89)   
Conflict Outcome: Success # Ethnic Group: Arabs   0.396* 
(2.10) 
  
Conflict Outcome: Success # Ethnic Group: 
Russians 
  0.477* 
(2.39) 
  
Academic Degree  0.199*
** 
    
 (3.74)     
Gender 0.058 0.035 0.081 0.079 0.079 





0.002 -0.0005 0.006*** 
 (2.96) (0.06) (1.04) (-0.35) (3.34) 





  (4.24)  (4.77) (0.69) 
Political Identity: Right -0.154 -0.192    
 (-0.71) (-0.90)    
Political Identity: Moderate Right -0.293 -0.311    
 (-1.43) (-1.56)    
Political Identity: Center 0.031 -0.02    
 (0.17) (-0.12)    






   
 (-3.40) (-3.44)    
Political Identity: Left 0.120 0.133    
 (0.38) (0.42)    
Political Identity: Far Left 0.306 0.338    
 (1.11) (1.29)    




   






   




   






   





   






   
Political Identity     -0.047** 
     (-2.83) 
Observing Tradition   0.108*
** 
 0.086** 
   (3.75)  (2.64) 
Social Class  0.747* 0.840*   










Growth  -0.02  -0.036 0.012 
  (-0.68)  (-1.13) (0.41) 
Upper Middle Class    0.008  
    (0.03)  
Middle Class    0.428  
    (1.85)  
Lower Class    0.730*  
    (2.53)  
Conflict Outcome: Success # Upper Middle Class    -0.292 
(-1.04) 
 
Conflict Outcome: Success # Middle Class    0.152  
    (0.59)  
Conflict Outcome: Success # Lower Class    1.397**
* 
 
    (4.42)  
Academic Degree      0.497*** 
     (3.64) 
Conflict Outcome: Success # Degree     -0.321* 






































var(_cons[survey_year])_cons 0.045 0.01 0.011 0.013 0.097 
 (1.60) (1.25) (1.16) (1.34) (1.10) 
N 5,262 5,918 5,505 6,356 4,356 
Note: The estimations are the result of Multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic regression. We report 








Table D-11: The Effects of Victories on Socio-economic Tension Among Israelis 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Socio-economic Tension  
Conflict Outcome: Success -0.237 -0.036 -0.153 0.455 
 (-1.48) (-0.38) (-0.52) (1.10) 
Ethnic Group: Arabs  0.479**   
  (2.92)   
Ethnic Group: Russians  0.280   
  (1.37)   
Conflict Outcome: Success # Ethnic Group: Arabs  -0.034   
  (-0.17)   
Conflict Outcome: Success # Ethnic Group: Russians  -0.349   
  (-1.49)   
Observing Tradition 0.071 0.055 0.071  
 (1.80) (1.47) (1.94)  
Degree (yes)     
     
Gender 0.014 0.04 0.021 -0.072 







 (-4.71) (-4.19) (-4.97) (-3.65) 
Political Identity    -0.036* 








 (-3.80) (-4.28) (-3.71) (0.50) 
Political Identity: Right -0.110    
 (-0.52)    
Political Identity: Moderate Right -0.156    
 (-0.78)    
Political Identity: Center -0.004    
 (-0.02)    
Political Identity: Moderate Left -0.193    
 (-0.90)    
Political Identity: Left -0.372    
 (-1.20)    
Political Identity: Far Left -0.249    
 (-0.94)    
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political Identity: Right 0.327    
 (1.26)    
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political Identity: 
Moderate Right 
0.396    
 (1.62)    
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political Identity: Center 0.143    
 (0.69)    
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political Identity: 
Moderate Left 
0.305    
 (1.15)    
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political Identity: Left 0.340    
 (0.96)    
Conflict Outcome: Success # Political Identity: Far 
Left 
0.133    
 (0.43)    
Social Class -0.022 -0.041   
 (-0.48) (-0.90)   
Inflation    -0.096 
    (-0.38) 
Upper Middle Class   0.015  
   (0.06)  




Middle Class   -0.049  
   (-0.22)  
Lower Class   -0.248  
   (-0.85)  
Conflict Outcome: Success # Upper Middle Class   0.006  
   (0.02)  
Conflict Outcome: Success # Middle Class   0.122  
   (0.41)  
Conflict Outcome: Success # Lower Class   0.228  
   (0.63)  
Academic Degree     -0.02 
    (-0.20) 
Conflict Outcome: Success # Academic Degree     0.033 








 (-5.20) (-5.29) (-4.18) (-0.46) 
cut2_cons 0.590* 0.718*** 0.689* 1.518* 
 (2.43) (3.37) (2.51) (2.46) 
cut3_cons 3.204*** 3.331*** 3.293*** 3.862*** 
 (11.86) (13.77) (11.08) (6.19) 
var(_cons[survey_year])_cons 4.70e-20 4.83e-19 1.16e-17 0.129 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (1.53) 
N 3,088 3,261 3,261 4,517 
Note: The estimations are the result of Multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic regression (STATA 14). 
The table reports coefficients whilst t statistics can be found in parentheses. Clustering according to 
survey year. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
 
